State of Tennessee v. Calvin Cole
The Defendant, Calvin Cole, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily denying the petition. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jonquarius Cunningham v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jonquarius Cunningham, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2015, Petitioner was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of reckless endangerment, two counts of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. This court affirmed the judgments of conviction on direct appeal. State v. Jonquarius Cunningham, No. W2016-00065-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3616667, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 23, 2017), no perm. app. filed. Thereafter, Petitioner instituted a collateral proceeding seeking post-conviction relief. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to introduce at trial the deposition transcript of one of the victims. He further contends that his judgment of conviction in count five is void based on inconsistent verdicts. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Egan v. Rachael Marie Bailey Egan
In this appeal from a final decree of divorce, the husband contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding spousal support. He challenges the type, amount, and duration of the alimony awarded. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia E. Yebuah et al. v. Center for Urological Treatment, PLC
Following surgery to remove a cancerous kidney, part of a gelport device was left inside the patient. The patient and her husband brought this health care liability action against multiple defendants, including the surgeon who removed the kidney and the radiologist who initially failed to detect the foreign object. The defendants admitted fault, so the trial focused solely on causation and damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded $4 million in noneconomic damages to the patient for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life and $500,000 in noneconomic damages to her husband for loss of consortium. The trial court initially applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages to the total damages award and entered a judgment of $750,000 in favor of both plaintiffs. In response to the plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend, the trial court issued a revised judgment of $750,000 in favor of the patient and $500,000 in favor of the husband. But the court refused to address the plaintiffs’ arguments premised on the constitutionality of the statutory cap, ruling that the issue had been waived. The court also denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial or for a remittitur. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the plaintiffs’ constitutional issue. But because we also conclude that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages is constitutional and was applied properly and that the defendant is not entitled to a new trial or a remittitur, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Todd Ghormley v. State of Tennessee
In 2009, a Blount County jury convicted the Petitioner, Anthony Todd Ghormley, of two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of especially aggravated burglary, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of 105 years. See State v. Anthony Todd Ghormley, No. E2010-00634-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 171940, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 20, 2012), no perm. app. filed. On March 13, 2019, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his indictment was void because it failed to include the requisite level of mens rea for the charged offenses and that the affidavit of complaint had been improperly amended. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains his claims and argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his petition. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Javier Carrasco v. North Surgery Center, LP, et al.
This is a healthcare liability action resulting from injuries sustained by a guidewire left in the plaintiff’s neck following a procedure. The defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with notice requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice, and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Woodruff
We granted this interlocutory appeal to review the trial court’s suppression of an incriminating statement the Defendant, Joseph Woodruff, made to police. The Defendant was arrested in May 2015 related to an aggravated robbery and an attorney was appointed to represent him. The Defendant later asked to speak with police and, following a waiver of his Miranda rights and without his attorney present, confessed to the robbery. Following his indictment, the Defendant sought to suppress his statement to police and, after a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress. The State filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal challenging the suppression of the statement, which the trial court granted, and this court granted the State’s application for a Rule 9 appeal. After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Luis Jorge Diaz v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Luis Jorge Diaz, was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery and subsequently sentenced to twenty years in confinement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective because of his failure to communicate multiple plea offers from the State to the Petitioner. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner filed a timely appeal. Following our review, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Williamson
The Defendant, Carlos Williamson, pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and evading arrest and agreed to allow the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. The trial court subsequently ordered the Defendant to serve concurrent twelve-year, three-year, and four-year sentences, respectively, in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it applied two enhancement factors to his sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Beth Anne Manis
The Defendant, Beth Anne Manis, was convicted by a jury of one count of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C Felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211(a). Thereafter, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and ordered the Defendant to serve five years, six months in confinement as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to negate her claim of self-defense; (2) the trial court erred by declining to give a special jury instruction on self-defense; (3) the Defendant’s constitutional rights were violated by the absence of a jury verdict form regarding self-defense; and (4) the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. Upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Martha Gilmore, Executrix of the Estate of Nannie Susan Carpenter v. NOL, LLC a/k/a Premier Radiology
A physical therapy patient standing just outside a building was struck by the building’s automatic door, causing her to fall and suffer broken bones. The patient sued the owner of the building, asserting negligence and premises liability. The owner asserted the affirmative defense of comparative fault. The jury returned verdicts finding both parties negligent and assigned more fault to the patient than to the building owner, thus barring the patient from any recovery. The patient moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict finding her to be at fault was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied her motion, and the patient appealed. We conclude that the trial judge did not err in its role as the thirteenth juror, but we vacate the court’s judgment finding the patient comparatively at fault because no material evidence was introduced at trial to support this aspect of the jury’s verdict.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
KELLY LOVE MCGUFFEY v. BELMONT WEEKDAY SCHOOL ET AL.
A preschool teacher terminated from her employment at a church preschool brought multiple claims against the church, the school, the director of the school, and a church committee. After the teacher presented her evidence to a jury, the court granted motions for a directed verdict as to all defendants except the church and on all claims except common law retaliatory discharge and promissory estoppel. The teacher claimed that the director terminated her employment in retaliation for her complaints about safety issues at the school and that she relied on a promise by the chair of a church committee that a probation report would be removed from her personnel file. The jury found in favor of the church on both counts, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the church. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Cunningham, Executor Of The Estate Of Iva Zan Thrall v. Eastman Credit Union, Et Al.
In this probate action, Iva Zan Thrall (“Decedent”) had named the original respondent, Marion Dodd, as a payable-on-death (“POD”) beneficiary on several of Decedent’s bank accounts.1 The petitioner, Jerry Cunningham, acting as executor of Decedent’s estate (“Executor”), initiated the instant action by filing a petition to enforce Decedent’s last will and testament in the Sullivan County Chancery Court (“trial court”). Executor named as respondents Ms. Dodd and the two financial institutions where Decedent’s accounts were maintained. Upon notice of Ms. Dodd’s death, her estate (“the Dodd Estate”) was subsequently substituted as a respondent. The two financial institutions were eventually dismissed from this action and are not participating in this appeal. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the Dodd Estate must provide to Executor all account funds that Ms. Dodd had received as a POD beneficiary. Following a review of Decedent’s testamentary documents, including a codicil to her last will and testament, the trial court concluded by clear and convincing evidence that Decedent intended for Ms. Dodd, who had originally been named as executrix in the last will and testament, to act in a representative capacity with regard to the account funds. The trial court held that a constructive trust be imposed regarding the funds to give effect to Decedent’s intent, which the court found to be the creation of “a resulting trust and/or implied trust” concerning the account funds. The effect of the constructive trust was that it dispossessed the account funds from the Dodd Estate and transferred those funds to Decedent’s estate via Executor. The trial court further determined that the Dodd Estate would be unjustly enriched if the trial court did not impose equitable principles. The Dodd Estate has appealed. Because we are unable to ascertain whether the trial court’s final order represents the independent judgment of the court, we vacate the order and remand for sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law that reflect the trial court’s independent analysis and judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Benke Bottorff v. Christian Todd Bottorff
In this post-divorce custody modification action, the Davidson County Circuit Court (“trial court”) entered a protective order requiring the return and permanent destruction of documents, including copies, that were allegedly central to the mother’s separate professional malpractice action against the father’s testifying expert. The trial court subsequently denied the mother’s motion for relief from the protective order, wherein she sought access to the documents for her use in the professional malpractice action. Although the mother filed a motion seeking to alter or amend the trial court’s order, the trial court also denied that motion. The mother has appealed. Following our thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we vacate the trial court’s order denying the mother’s motion to alter or amend as it pertains to the documents produced during discovery. We remand this issue to the trial court for further hearing, as necessary, and determination of the issue based upon the appropriate factors. We reverse the trial court’s order denying the mother’s motion to alter or amend as it pertains to the trial transcript and exhibits. We deny the father’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Robert Black, Jr.
Defendant, James Robert Black, Jr., was charged in a seven-count indictment returned by the Lawrence County Grand Jury with DUI second offense, DUI per se second offense, reckless driving, violation of the open container law, violation of the child restraint law, driving his vehicle left of the center of the road, and violation of the implied consent law. All the charges were the result of one traffic stop of Defendant by a trooper of the Tennessee Highway Patrol. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized on the basis that the trooper made an unconstitutional stop of Defendant’s vehicle without probable cause or reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts that a crime had been, or was about to be, committed. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion. As a result, the charges were dismissed upon motion of the State and the State filed an appeal as of right. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Legacy Five Leasing, LLC, et al. v. Busforsale.com, LLC.
A bus and a trailer sustained water damage when the lot where they were stored flooded following a rainstorm. The owner of the bus and trailer sued the operator of the lot, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and breach of contract. Before filing the complaint, the owner disposed of the bus and trailer. The trial court granted the lot operator’s motion to dismiss the negligence and breach of contract causes of action. The trial court then dismissed the owner’s claim for gross negligence due to spoliation of evidence. The owner appealed the dismissal of its gross negligence claim, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Hamblin Proctor v. Michael Owen Proctor
More than ten years after the final decree was entered in this divorce action, Wife filed a contempt action to enforce a provision in the marital dissolution agreement, which had been incorporated into the final decree. Husband filed a separate breach of contract action to recover amounts that he had paid on Wife’s behalf when the parties resumed living together for a five year period following the entry of the divorce decree; the matters were consolidated for the court to rule on whether the controversy should proceed as a contempt action or as a contract action. The court ruled that the action would continue as an action for contempt and, following a hearing, entered an order granting Wife judgment for the $50,000 Husband had been ordered to pay her in the final decree, subject to set-offs for the cost of an automobile, furniture, and medical and dental expenses Husband provided to Wife or paid on her behalf. Husband appeals. We hold that because Wife’s action was filed more than ten years after entry of the judgment, it is barred by the statute of limitations at Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-110(a)(2); accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael P. Abraham v. Carolynn Abraham
This is an appeal of the post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. Father ceased making regular contributions into an account for the children’s education that was established in the original parenting plan agreed upon in 2004, but was not included in a modified plan adopted by agreement seven years later. Mother sought to recover the contributions that were not made by Father after 2011 in addition to the amount Father withdrew from the college fund account without her consent. Mother also sought reimbursement for the cost of a vehicle she purchased for one of the children and for an upward adjustment to Father’s child support obligation to pay for extracurricular expenses. The court held that Father was not obligated to contribute to the college fund after 2011, but ordered Father to reimburse the fund for the amount he withdrew; the court denied Mother’s request for reimbursement of the cost of the vehicle and for an upward adjustment of child support, and granted Mother a money judgment for expenses incurred when the children moved out of Father’s home to reside with her. Mother appeals. Upon a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
MITCHELL WHITSON ET AL. v. CITY OF LAVERGNE BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS
Property owners applied to the City of La Vergne for a building permit to install new doors on their car wash. Their purpose was to convert the car wash to a car lot. The city issued a building permit to the property owners, who proceeded to perform the work necessary to convert the property to a car lot. Months later, the city informed the property owners that they had to obtain planning commission approval of a site plan before they could operate a car lot on the property. The property owners appealed to the board of zoning appeals, which upheld the city’s decision. The plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court, and the court upheld the decision of the board of zoning appeals. We affirm the chancery court’s decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Adam Paul Jasinskis et al. v. Don R. Cameron, III, et al.
Homeowners sued their builder, asserting claims for violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (“TCPA”), among others. The builder counterclaimed for attorney’s fees, contending that the TCPA claims were frivolous, without legal or factual merit, or brought for the purpose of harassment. The trial court denied the builder’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the builder moved to amend its counterclaim to add a claim for attorney’s fees based on the parties’ purchase and sale agreement. The homeowners nonsuited their claims against the builder before the trial court heard oral argument on the motion to amend, and the trial court subsequently denied the builder’s motion to amend. The homeowners then moved to dismiss the builder’s counterclaim, and the trial court granted the motion. The builder appeals the trial court’s denial of its motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, the denial of its motion to alter or amend, and the dismissal of its counterclaim. We dismiss the appeal of the denial of the builder’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of the builder’s motion to amend and its dismissal of the builder’s counterclaim for attorney’s fees. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Buddy Wayne Mooney
The Defendant, Buddy Wayne Mooney, was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of possession with intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; possession with intent to deliver 0.5 gram or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a) (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession of methamphetamine), 39-17-1324 (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession of a firearm), 39-17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia). The trial court merged the two possession of methamphetamine convictions and imposed a ten-year probationary sentence, and it imposed sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction and three years in the Department of Correction for the weapon possession conviction. The court ordered the sentence for possession of methamphetamine to be served consecutively to the sentence for possession of drug paraphernalia. The court imposed the sentence for firearm possession consecutively to the sentence for methamphetamine possession but concurrently to the sentence for possession of drug paraphernalia. The effective sentence was thirteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his felony convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that the gun found inside the Defendant’s car had been stolen. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
JACOB DALTON DICUS ET AL. v. LISA GAYE SMITH
This is a partition suit. The residential property at issue was purchased approximately three months before Plaintiff’s father died from a terminal condition. The deed to the property listed the owners as Plaintiff’s father and his former girlfriend, and the two of them resided together at the property for the last three months of his life. After Plaintiff’s father died, Plaintiff, his sole heir, brought this partition suit individually and as executor of his father’s estate. Plaintiff asserted that his father’s former girlfriend should not receive any of the proceeds from the sale of the home because she did not financially contribute to its purchase. The former girlfriend took the position that Plaintiff’s father gifted her a one-half interest in the home because she agreed to act as his live-in caregiver in the last three months of his life. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to establish the elements of a gift and split the proceeds of the sale of the home equally, after accounting for some expenses paid by Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the proof did not establish a gift. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Mitzi Bayne Ruth, Et Al. v. Home Health Care of Middle Tennessee, LLC., Et Al.
This is a breach of contract action in which Plaintiffs sought to recover the balance of a promissory note executed to secure payment for of a deceased owner’s interest in the defendant company and to recover on a guaranty to secure the note. Defendants conceded that they did not pay the note according to its terms and counterclaimed, asserting that Plaintiffs breached a separate agreement which required the deceased owner’s estate to file amended tax returns and tender payment to the Internal Revenue Service for taxes which had been paid on behalf of the deceased owner by the company. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment; the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion, denied Defendants’ motion, and dismissed Defendants’ counterclaim. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher S. Mayberry v. State of Tennessee
Following a bench trial, the trial court found the Petitioner, Christopher S. Mayberry, guilty of two counts of the sale of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to concurrent sentences of ten years for each count, to run consecutively to a prior sentence. The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his attorney was ineffective and also asserts that the post-conviction court erred by “delaying the [post-conviction] hearing.” After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gardenia Parker, et al. v. Epstein Enterprises, LLC, et al.
This is an appeal from a jury trial. The defendants own and manage an apartment complex in Memphis, Tennessee. In 2010, two pit bull dogs left one of the apartments and attacked two individuals in a neighboring lot. One of the individuals died on the scene. The jury found the defendants were at fault and awarded a total jury verdict of $2.5 million. The trial judge granted the defendants’ motion for remittitur of the jury verdict and suggested remittitur of the award to $1.3 million. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest. The defendants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by denying their motion to amend their answers to assert comparative fault; denying their motion for a continuance; denying their motion for directed verdict; denying their motion for a mistrial due to comments made by plaintiff’s counsel during closing arguments; and denying their motion for new trial due to juror misconduct. In her posture as appellee, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in suggesting remittitur of the jury verdict. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |