Melanie Lemon v. Williamson County Schools, Et Al.
The plaintiff, a former tenured schoolteacher, sued the Williamson County Board of Education and three administrators alleging that she was forced to resign after the defendants “bullied, stalked, intimidated, and defamed” her during the 2015–2016 school year. She asserted claims for wrongful termination, breach of contract, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court dismissed all of the claims asserted in the original complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted but permitted the plaintiff to file an amended complaint to revise and restate her claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following discovery, the court summarily dismissed the two remaining claims as asserted in the amended complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissal of her wrongful termination and negligence claims, and the summary dismissal of her claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm the trial court’s determination the plaintiff’s negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act and Teachers’ Tenure Act, respectively. We have also determined that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence of a compensable injury in her claim for breach of contract. As for the plaintiff’s claim of wrongful termination, we respectfully disagree with the trial court’s determination that the doctrine of constructive discharge is inapplicable to wrongful termination claims under the Teachers’ Tenure Act. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of the plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim and remand this claim for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Isaac Scott v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Isaac Scott, of first degree premeditated murder, for which the Petitioner received an automatic life sentence. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the conviction and sentence. See State v Isaac Scott, No. W2005-02902-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3837243 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 28, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 30, 2007). The Petitioner then filed a postconviction petition, claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and, following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. This court affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial. Isaac Scott v. State, No. W2009-01256-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 744764 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 2, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 16, 2011). In May 2018, the Petitioner filed a “Motion for Plain and Harmless Error Review.” The trial court, treating the motion as a post-conviction petition, summarily dismissed the motion because the issues had been previously determined and the petition was a second petition. The Petitioner appeals the denial, maintaining that he is entitled to plain error relief due to the jury instructions, the sentencing hearing, and the jury composition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Henry C. Ellis, III and In Re Conservatorship of Henry C. Ellis, III
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by Nancy Neely (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in these companion cases involving a conservatorship and an estate. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and the answer ordered by this Court, and finding no error in the orders of the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) denying recusal, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Missy Daniella Lane
A Cocke County Jury found Defendant, Missy Daniella Lane, guilty of reckless homicide. The trial court imposed a sentence of two years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction for reckless homicide; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for an extension of time to file an amended motion for new trial; (3) whether the Cocke County Grand Jury had jurisdiction to render a superseding presentment; (4) whether the trial court denied Defendant the right to peremptory challenges during voir dire; (5) whether Defendant was prejudiced by a violation of the rule of sequestration by the State’s witnesses; (6) whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by calling Derrick Raines as a witness; (7) whether the trial court violated Defendant’s right to a public trial; (8) whether the State’s expert witnesses testified improperly; (9) whether the trial court improperly denied Defendant’s request for jury instructions; (10) whether the jury was exposed to extraneous information; (11) whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; (12) whether the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing; and (13) cumulative error. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Michael Atha
The Defendant, Jonathan Michael Atha, was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated rape, four counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of fifty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victims’ in-court identifications of the Defendant; (2) that the trial court erred by declining to issue a limiting jury instruction regarding the State’s failure to preserve evidence; (3) that the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve consecutive sentences for aggravated rape; and (4) that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cheryl Lynn Williams v. SWS LLC d/b/a Securewatch
Cheryl Lynn Williams (“Employee”) alleged that she sustained a compensable injury and/or an occupational disease as a result of exposure to mold during the course and scope of her employment with SWS LLC d/b/a SecureWatch (“Employer”). Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the one-year statute of limitations barred Employee’s claim. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Having determined that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the commencement of the statute of limitations, we reverse the judgment and remand for proceedings on the merits. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Tevin Mantez Harris
A Robertson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Tevin Mantez Harris, of second degree murder and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twenty-two years to be served at one hundred percent and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing witnesses to testify about his being Muslim and his “viewpoint” toward Christianity and that his twenty-two-year sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jennifer Elizabeth Meehan v. Board of Professional Responsibility Of The Supreme Court of Tennessee
A Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel found that an attorney should be disbarred after she was convicted of bank fraud. On appeal, the circuit court held that the hearing panel’s decision was arbitrary and imposed a five-year suspension. We reverse. The hearing panel’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence and was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Don Gatlin, Et Al. v. Linda L. Scott
This appeal concerns the alleged formation of a contract for the sale of real property. The court ruled that text messages concerning the sale of the property did not constitute a present offer and acceptance sufficient to form a contract for the purchase of the property at issue. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Morgan, Et Al. v. Land Design Company, Inc., Et Al.
The plaintiffs have appealed from an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The trial court also directed the entry of a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Because the ruling is not appropriate for certification as a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy P. Duncan v. State of Tennessee
A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jeremy P. Duncan, of two counts of aggravated assault, one count of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, one count of possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun, and one count of tampering with the evidence. The trial court imposed an effective twenty-four-year sentence. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the convictions and sentence. See State v. Jeremy Peres Duncan, No. W2017-00529-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1182579 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 6, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 8, 2018). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals the denial, maintaining that his counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deangelo Norton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Deangelo Norton, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kendall Joy v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Kendall Joy, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Shelby County Criminal Court. The petitioner argues his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rachel Kay Bond v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rachel Kay Bond, appeals the Lawrence County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from her conviction of first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: 1) request a change of venue; 2) strike three potential jurors; 3) investigate the existence of text messages stored in the Petitioner’s cell phone; 4) adequately cross-examine a witness; and 5) challenge the Petitioner’s competency. The Petitioner also alleges that trial counsel was ineffective because he allowed her to testify. Following a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frazier Lee Savage
The Defendant, Frazier Lee Savage, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession with intent to sell less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class B felony; possession with intent to deliver less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class B felony; possession with intent to sell alprazolam within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class D felony; possession with intent to deliver alprazolam within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class D felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(2) (2018) (possession with intent to deliver), 39-17-417(a)(3) (possession with intent to sell), 39-17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia), 39- 17-432 (2018) (providing enhanced penalties for drug offenses committed in Drug-Free School Zones). After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two heroin counts and the two alprazolam counts and imposed an effective twelve-year sentence at 100% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a motel room. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wayford Demonbreun, Jr.
The Petitioner, Wayford Demonbreun, Jr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his convictions are illegal because the trial court failed to award pretrial jail credits, the date his sentences were imposed is in question, the trial judge’s name was not printed on the judgment forms, and the judgment forms were not stamped filed. We affirm the trial court’s denial of relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Caldwell
The Defendant, Christopher Caldwell, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for his convictions for burglary of a motor vehicle and felony theft and ordering him to serve the remainder of his effective twelve-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arnold Asbury
Arnold Asbury, Defendant, claims that the trial court erred by denying his “Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Prior to Sentencing” and, as a result, that he was denied a right to trial by jury. Although we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, we determine that the trial court committed reversible error at the subsequent sentencing hearing because it neither properly accepted Defendant’s Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(4) nor properly rejected the plea agreement pursuant Rule 11(c)(5). We reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a hearing in which the court may, in its discretion, either reject or accept the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. If the trial court rejects the plea agreement and Defendant opts to withdraw his guilty pleas, Defendant will have the right to a trial by jury. If the trial court accepts the agreement, it must sentence Defendant pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Moses, Et Al. v. Rebecca Elrod, Et Al.
The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s decision concerning the ownership of real property. We affirm. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Clarissa Bidwell, Deceased, By Next Friend and Husband, James Bidwell, Et Al v. Timothy A. Strait, M.D., Et Al
Plaintiff, James Bidwell, took his wife, Clarissa Bidwell, to Starr Regional Medical Center for treatment. She was transferred to Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority dba Erlanger Health System, a governmental hospital authority, where she was treated, but later died. Plaintiff provided statutorily compliant pre-suit notice of his intent to file a health care liability action against each health care provider that was named as a defendant in the complaint. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). Plaintiff did not provide pre-suit notice to Erlanger. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(5) requires a recipient of pre-suit notice to give written notice to a claimant of any other person, entity, or health care provider who may be properly named a defendant within thirty days of receiving pre-suit notice. However, Dr. Jeffery Colburn and Dr. Timothy A. Strait failed to identify Erlanger as their employer, i.e. a known and necessary party to the suit. Plaintiff timely filed his complaint within the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121. Defendants answered plaintiff’s complaint, each raising the affirmative defense of comparative fault. Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait then moved for summary judgment arguing that, pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, without Erlanger as a party defendant no judgment could be rendered against them. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b). In response, plaintiff filed two motions to amend his complaint to add Erlanger as a defendant, in reliance upon the extension to the statute of limitations provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119(a). After a hearing, the trial court held that plaintiff’s failure to provide pre-suit notice to Erlanger prevents him from adding them to his complaint. It granted Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait’s motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 2926-121(a)(5) required Dr. Colburn and Dr. Strait to identify Erlanger as a known and necessary party within thirty days after receiving pre-suit notice; they failed to comply with § 29-26-121(a)(5). We hold that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Douglas A. Messerli, E. AL. v. Vickie Sue Williams, Et Al.
This action was filed by two brothers, after the death of their father, contesting the validity of an amendment to their father’s trust agreement. The brothers alleged that their siblings coerced their infirmed father to amend his trust in such a manner that was favorable to the siblings’ pecuniary interests and that two sisters had a confidential relationship with their father. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm the decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Harold Francis Butler, III v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Harold Francis Butler, III, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree felony murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and resulting sentence of life plus thirty-one years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the State violated his constitutional rights by conducting an unduly suggestive identification procedure that rendered the identification unreliable and by eliciting false testimony from a key witness at trial. He also raises numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and contends that he is entitled to a new trial under the cumulative error doctrine. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David William Gary
A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, David William Gary, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, that the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding his expressed interest in a specific type of sexual activity, and that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to present evidence that a police investigator improperly influenced the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Polly Spann Kershaw v. Jeffrey L. Levy
We granted permission to appeal in this case to clarify application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The plaintiff filed this legal malpractice action against an attorney who represented her in her divorce. She asserts that the attorney’s actions so compromised her position in the divorce proceedings that she was forced to settle on unfavorable terms. After the attorney filed a motion for summary judgment, the trial court applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Citing the plaintiff’s sworn acknowledgment in her marital dissolution agreement that the divorce settlement was “fair and equitable,” the trial court held that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting in the legal malpractice action that the divorce settlement terms were unfavorable. On this basis, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant attorney. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the trial court should not have applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to the statements at issue because they are not directly contradictory statements of fact. The plaintiff’s sworn acknowledgment in her marital dissolution agreement is instead a context-related legal conclusion, and the plaintiff offers a reasonable explanation for any apparent discrepancy between her sworn acknowledgment in the divorce and her assertions in this legal malpractice action. As a result, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Rachel Maddox v. Olshan Foundation Repair And Waterproofing Co. Of Nashville, L.P., Et Al.
This appeal involves a homeowner’s fraud claim against a foundation repair company. The trial court rejected the foundation repair company’s argument that the fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the statute of repose. After a three-day bench trial, the trial court found that the foundation repair company had engaged in fraud. Specifically, the trial court found that the foundation repair company sold its systems to the homeowner representing that they would stabilize her house from further movement when in reality it did not have the knowledge or understanding to design an effective solution for the house and “simply did not really care” whether the systems would be effective in any way. The trial court further found that the company fraudulently misrepresented whether an engineer would be involved in the process and whether it would obtain a permit for the work. The home had been condemned by the time of trial, and the trial court awarded the homeowner $187,000 for the loss of the value of the structure. Based on the reckless and fraudulent conduct of the foundation repair company, the trial court also awarded $15,000 in punitive damages to the homeowner. The foundation repair company appeals. We affirm as modified. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |