Robert Johnson v. Memphis Guitar Spa, LLC
After losing in general sessions court, Plaintiff attempted to appeal the judgment to the circuit court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a counterclaim in the circuit court. Plaintiff’s appeal was thereafter dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not perfected in a timely manner. The circuit court then entered a default judgment against the Plaintiff based upon Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the counterclaim. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the circuit court lost subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim upon the dismissal of the appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stacy Renee Carter v. Antonio Elmore Carter
This is an appeal from a final order in the parties’ divorce proceeding entered on April 18, 2017. The Notice of Appeal, filed with the Appellate Court Clerk on April 16, 2019, was accompanied by a motion seeking leave to file it late, presumably pursuant to certain provisions in Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, and because there is no authority in Rule 4(a) for a waiver of the timely filing of a Notice of Appeal in a civil case, we do not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Rocky McElhaney Et Al. v. Hughes & Coleman PLLC Et Al.
The defendants have appealed from the trial court’s rulings granting the plaintiffs a partial summary judgment and directing the entry of a final judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Because the order appealed was not properly entered under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and because the order is not appropriate for certification as final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lennon R.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order that: (1) designated Father/Appellee as primary residential parent; (2) awarded him sole decision-making authority; and (3) set visitation. Mother/Appellant appeals: (1) the designation of Father as primary residential parent; (2) the award of sole decision-making authority to Father; and (3) her number of parenting days with the child. Because the trial court failed to make any findings regarding decision-making authority, we vacate the trial court’s award of sole decision-making authority to Father and remand for findings of facts and conclusions of law related to same. We also conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to maximize Mother’s parenting time with the child. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s visitation award and remand for a more equal award of parenting time. Finally, we reverse the trial court’s order concerning child support and remand for a recalculation of support consistent with the new parenting schedule entered on remand. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cameron Neil Brown
The petitioner, Cameron Neil Brown, appeals the denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Karen Nisenbaum v. Michael Nisenbaum
In this divorce action, the trial court awarded Wife transitional alimony of $2,000 per month for 24 months and $1,000 per month for the next 24 months; the court denied her requests for alimony in futuro and for alimony in solido to cover the cost of future dental care. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Christian Padgett
Defendant, Christopher Christian Padgett, was convicted for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life in prison. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce indirect hearsay evidence regarding an eyewitness’s description of the suspect’s shoes in violation of the rules of evidence and the Confrontation Clause. Additionally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce a recording of Defendant’s conversation with his mother taken at the police service center because the statements were taken in violation of Defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Tennessee and United States Constitutions. After a review, we hold that the trial court committed harmless error by admitting the indirect hearsay description of the suspect and that Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief on the other issues raised. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but we remand this case for entry of judgment documents in Counts Two and Four. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jack R. Owen Revocable Trust v. City of Germantown Tennessee, et al.
Appellee Germantown Planning Commission voted to change the zoning designation of property held by Appellant trust. In response, Appellant filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking review of the Planning Commission’s decision. Appellees moved for dismissal of Appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1). Following a hearing on Appellant’s request for temporary injunction to halt Appellee City of Germantown from taking any action on the Planning Commission’s recommendation for rezoning, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Planning Commission’s recommendation did not constitute a final judgment for purposes of review under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-9-101. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court’s adjudication of the motion to dismiss was premature because Appellant had no opportunity to respond to the motion. Appellant also contends that the grant of the motion to dismiss was error because, under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 13-7-203(b) and 13-7-204, the Planning Commission’s decision was a final approval of the rezoning as opposed to a mere recommendation. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lucas D. Bottorff, Et Al. v. Anne A. Sears, Et Al.
After the administrator of an estate obtained a judgment vesting title to real property in the estate, the administrator filed a detainer summons against the decedent’s daughter in general sessions court seeking possession of the property. The general sessions court determined that the estate was entitled to possession of the property, and the decedent’s daughter appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court granted possession of the property to the estate and ordered the decedent’s daughter to vacate the premises within thirty days. The decedent’s daughter appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Thomas Welch, Jr.
The State appeals the Monroe County Criminal Court’s dismissal of the charge of vehicular assault by intoxication against the defendant, Paul Thomas Welch, Jr. Because the trial court erred by dismissing the charge, we vacate the trial court’s order, reinstate the indictment charging the defendant with vehicular assault by intoxication, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Garrett
In 2007, a Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Jeremy Garrett, guilty of aggravated robbery, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. In 2018, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, seeking to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily denied Rule 36.1 relief. On review, having determined that the Defendant has failed to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth M. Wright v. National Strategic Protective Services, LLC et al.
Kenneth M. Wright was employed by National Strategic Protective Services, LLC, as a security officer at the Department of Energy, Oak Ridge facility. While participating in a training exercise, he injured his neck, which required surgery. The trial court found Mr. Wright was entitled to increased permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(B) and then awarded extraordinary benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(a)(2). The employer has appealed the award of extraordinary benefits. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Patrick Masserano v. Alyse Masserano
Husband and Wife both appeal the trial court’s ruling with regard to alimony. Based on Husband’s failure to adequately support his arguments with legal authority, his issues are waived. We affirm the trial court’s decision to exclude Wife’s affidavit of income and expenses. We vacate the trial court’s alimony award and remand for the entry of an order that contains specific findings of fact as to Wife’s need and Husband’s ability to pay. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Jerome Miller
We granted permission to appeal in this case in order to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1007, which provides that “[n]o process, except as otherwise provided, shall be issued for the violation of [the statutes proscribing the offenses of sexual exploitation of a minor] unless it is issued upon the application of the district attorney general of the district,” applies to search warrants sought and obtained prior to the commencement of a prosecution for sexual exploitation of a minor. In this case, a police officer applied for and obtained the search warrant by which pornographic images of minors were recovered from the Defendant’s computer. The Defendant sought to suppress the evidence on the basis that the search warrant was not applied for by the district attorney general. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and the Defendant subsequently pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, reserving as a certified question the efficacy of the search warrant. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling and the Defendant’s conviction. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1007 does not require search warrants to be applied for by the office of the district attorney general. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below. |
Greene | Supreme Court | |
Michael White v. Russell Washburn, Warden
The petitioner, Michael White, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 2005 Marshall County Circuit Court jury convictions of rape. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jasmine Desiree Wightman v. Joshua Charles Wightman
In this appeal, the father challenges the trial court’s determination of the residential parenting schedule as it relates to visitation during the school term. Upon our review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Marie Paterson (Potter) v. Scott Paterson
This appeal involves a request for, inter alia, the modification of child support. Because the trial court failed to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we are unable to effectively review the issues raised on appeal. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Cooper
The Defendant, Jonathan Cooper, was indicted for two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; five counts of incest, a Class C felony; and five counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-504, -13-522, -15-302. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, three counts of incest, and three counts of rape of a child. The Defendant was acquitted of the remaining charges. The trial court later imposed a total effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify that he observed the victim crying during a forensic interview. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ashley M. Cook v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ashley M. Cook, appeals the summary dismissal of her petition for writ of error coram nobis, which petition challenged her 2008 convictions of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Walls
The Petitioner, Ronnie Walls, appeals from the Moore County Circuit Court’s denial of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence. In March 2013, the Petitioner entered guilty pleas to conspiracy to introduce contraband into a penal institution and attempt to introduce contraband into a penal institution and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of six years, with the balance to be served on community corrections after four months imprisonment. This sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to all unexpired sentences. In August 2014, a warrant was issued alleging the Petitioner violated his community corrections sentence. He later agreed that he had failed to comply with the terms of his community corrections sentence based upon a new arrest and other violations. On October 31, 2014, he entered a guilty plea to the community corrections violation and agreed to a two-year increase in his sentence. Nearly three years later, the Petitioner filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure because the trial court that accepted his guilty plea for his community corrections violation failed to advise him during the plea colloquy that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. The trial court denied relief, finding that the Petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Moore | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Adrian Wilkerson v. Michael A. Parris, Warden et al.
The Appellant, Adrian D. Wilkerson, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s judgment summarily denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal due to an untimely notice of appeal or, alternatively, affirm by memorandum opinion the judgment of the habeas corpus court. Following our review, we conclude that the interest of justice requires a waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal and, therefore, deny the State’s motion to dismiss. We further conclude, however, that an opinion in this case would have no precedential value and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
April R. Burchfield v. D. Ryan Burchfield
Mother filed a petition for modification of the residential parenting schedule in a permanent parenting plan. Father filed a |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Earl Gene Davis v. Civil Service Commission Of The Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, Et Al.
This appeal arises from the Metropolitan Government of Nashville Civil Service Commission’s decision to suspend and demote Appellant, a police officer with Metropolitan Nashville Police Department. The department’s decision to suspend Appellant was affirmed by the administrative law judge, but the administrative law judge reversed the demotion. The Commission then reviewed the administrative law judge’s order and upheld the suspension but reinstated the demotion. On appeal to the Davidson County Chancery Court, the Commission’s decision was affirmed. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Chancery Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Earl Gene Davis v. Civil Service Commission Of The Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, Et Al. - Concurring In Part
The majority opinion concludes that the Commission’s finding that Officer Davis violated both MNPD Policy § 4.20.040(B) and MNPD Policy § 4.20.040(K) was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial and material evidence. In reaching its decision concerning MNPD Policy § 4.20.040(B), the majority essentially concludes that consideration of the public authority defense is irrelevant because the only question involved is whether Officer Davis committed the acts that constitute the offense outlined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-301(a), not whether Officer Davis would be able to assert any defense to criminal prosecution of that crime. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Wallace v. City Of Lewisburg, Tennessee
Former employee of the City of Lewisburg brought an action pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act challenging his termination. The trial court held a bench trial and, a year and a half later, entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order, finding in favor of defendant and dismissing the action. The judge who tried the case retired shortly thereafter. Five months later, the employee filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, seeking to have the order dismissing the complaint set aside on the grounds that his counsel did not receive the order dismissing the case and that, because the order did not comply with Rule 58, it was not a final order. The motion was heard by a new judge, who ruled that the order substantially complied with Rule 58 and was therefore an effective, final order. The employee appeals. Upon our review, we determine that the order dismissing the case did not comply with Rule 58 and was not a final order. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for entry of a final order that complies with Rule 58. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals |