Henry Darnell Talley v. State of Tennessee
In 2016, the Petitioner, Henry Darnell Talley, pleaded guilty to attempted first degree murder, reckless aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, being a convicted felon in possession of a weapon, employing a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony, and violation of a protective order. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-three years. The Petitioner appealed his sentence as excessive, and this court affirmed. State v. Henry Darnell Talley, No. M2016-01632-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1830100, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 5, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017). In 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Dorothy L. Nelson, et al.
This case involves a forcible entry and detainer action regarding a parcel of real property that was purchased at a foreclosure sale. The purchaser at foreclosure brought this detainer action against the previous owners of the property. The General Sessions Court ruled in favor of the purchaser, as did the Circuit Court pursuant to a de novo appeal. Although the prior owners now appeal to this Court to raise certain grievances, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Edward Arnold, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, William Edward Arnold, Jr., appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction and error coram nobis relief from his convictions for one count of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. After a careful and laborious review of the entire record, we are compelled to reverse the denial of post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences are reversed and vacated, and this case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial and for any necessary pre-trial motions. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William K. Lawrence, Jr.
Defendant, William K. Lawrence, Jr., was convicted of first-degree murder during the attempt to perpetrate a robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends: 1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; 2) that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Timothy Harlan; and 3) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on all lesser-included offenses. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward Spencer III
The defendant, Edward Spencer III, was indicted for one count of aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of both offenses as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender and imposed an eight-year split confinement sentence, with the defendant to serve one year in jail followed by seven years of community corrections. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also contends the sentence of eight years was excessive. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bank of New York Mellon v. Helen E. Chamberlain
Appellant homeowner appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the purchaser bank in an unlawful detainer action. Because the homeowner presented specific evidence to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to the whether certain mandatory provisions of the deed of trust were complied with prior to foreclosure, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Whitney S. Phillips
In 2018, the Defendant-Appellant, Whitney S. Phillips, entered a guilty plea to several drug related offenses and received an effective sentence of ten years under the supervision of the Community Corrections Program, after service of eleven months and twenty-nine days imprisonment. In 2019, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence and imposed the original ten-year term of confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion. Upon review, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Tommy Lynn Rutherford
The Defendant, Tommy Lynn Rutherford, appeals his convictions for second degree murder and tampering with evidence, for which he received an effective thirty-seven-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder and that he is entitled to a new trial due to the short amount of time during which the jury deliberated before returning the guilty verdicts. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elijah Paul Williams v. Carroll County Sheriff
The Petitioner’s father, Paul Williams, appeals on behalf of the Petitioner, Elijah Paul Williams, from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donriel A. Borne v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc.
The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this matter to the trial court for a more definite statement as to the grounds for remittitur. The Court specifically noted that “the trial court’s failure to indicate the reasons for its suggested remittitur leaves us unable to determine whether the evidence preponderates against the remittitur and, consequently, unable to conduct a proper appellate review of the trial court’s remittitur decision.” The trial court responded, inter alia, that the plaintiff had improved his ability to lift and engage in repetitive activities, and that this proof, along with the plaintiff’s success at rehabilitation, strong work ethic, and desire to support his family, led the court to find that the plaintiff “will have some future income over the next 38 years which is the basis for reducing the loss of earning capacity from $1,455,000 to $1,100,000.” We find that a preponderance of the evidence does not support the decision of the trial court to remit the judgment to $1,100,000, and we, therefore reverse the judgment. We further find that based on the proof in the record that the judgment for loss of earning capacity damages should be remitted to $1,334,647. We, therefore, remit the jury’s verdict for loss of earning capacity damages to $1,334,647. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richard J. Hartigan et al. v. Arnold Brush
This is an action to recover damages for a purported buyer’s breach of a contract to purchase improved residential real property. The trial court awarded Sellers damages calculated as the difference between the contract price and the amount for which the home sold one year after the breach. It also awarded Sellers and both realty companies prejudgment interest. On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in its determination of damages. He contends that, under the circumstances, an appraisal of the property performed at the time of breach demonstrates a substantially greater real market value than the sales price. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s calculation of the amount of prejudgment interest awarded to Sellers and the realty companies. Because the trial court made no findings of fact with respect to the fair market value of the property at the time of breach, we remand this matter for further findings and, if necessary, recalculation of the damages and prejudgment interest awarded to Sellers. We also remand this matter to the trial court to recalculate the amount of prejudgment interest to be awarded to the realty companies. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
The Electric Employees' Civil Service and Pension Board of Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Brian Mansell
This appeal arises from the decision of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Electric Power Board to terminate a Nashville Electric Service (“NES”) cable splicer/working foreman. The foreman allegedly approved fraudulent timesheets for a Metropolitan Nashville Police Department officer, who performed traffic control at NES jobsites for a private contractor. After NES preferred charges against the foreman and suspended him without pay, the board referred the matter to an administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) for adjudication. Following a two-day administrative hearing, the ALJ made numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law in a 55-page report. The ALJ found that the foreman’s job description did not include verifying the accuracy of the timesheets, NES had not trained the foreman on how to verify the accuracy of the timesheets, and a majority of the inaccurate timesheets could be explained by NES’s common practice of rounding up hours at the end of an officer’s shift. Although there was evidence that the officer overstated his hours, the ALJ found the evidence was insufficient to establish the foreman knowingly approved any false timesheets. Accordingly, the ALJ recommended that the charges of termination be denied and that the foreman be reinstated without back pay. After reviewing the ALJ’s report, the board rejected his recommendation and approved NES’s termination of the foreman. However, the board did not make its own findings of fact or express disagreement with the ALJ’s findings. After the foreman filed his petition for judicial review, the trial court reviewed the administrative record and heard arguments of counsel. In its final order, the trial court concluded that “NES’s lack of proof and the apparent acceptance of time-approval practices combine here to demonstrate a lack of substantial and material evidence to uphold the Board’s decision to terminate.” Thus, the trial court reversed the board’s decision, adopted the ALJ’s Report in toto, and directed that the foreman “be reinstated, without backpay.” On appeal, the board contends the trial court applied incorrect principles of law and reweighed the evidence. We disagree. The Charter of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County requires the Electric Power Board to reduce its findings to writing when taking disciplinary action against an employee. In this case, the board rejected the recommendation of the ALJ without making alternative findings of fact to support or explain its reasoning. Thus, the only findings of fact, credibility determinations, and conclusions of law in the administrative record are those of the ALJ. Because the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial and material evidence, we conclude that NES failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the foreman knowingly approved false timesheets for the police officer. We also conclude that a reasoning mind could not have reached the same conclusion as the board under a proper application of the controlling legal principles. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Benjamin P. et al.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her two minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory ground of the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Aaron White v. State of Tennessee
A Montgomery County Grand jury indicted the Petitioner, Robert Aaron White, for multiple offenses including first-degree, premeditated murder. A petit jury convicted the Petitioner of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, and he received a sentence of twenty-three years imprisonment. State v. Robert Aaron White, No. M2011-01985-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 2432372, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 4, 2013). Following denial of his appeal, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective based on the following grounds: (1) failure to investigate the victim’s criminal history and to introduce at trial evidence of the victim’s prior bad acts, (2) failure to investigate and introduce evidence of the prior bad acts of one of the State’s witnesses, and (3) failure to properly move the trial court for an order allowing the Petitioner to cover his tattoos at trial. The post-conviction court denied relief by written order, and the Petitioner appealed. Following our review, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derrick Jerome Miller
The defendant, Derrick Jerome Miller, appeals his Putnam County Criminal Court jury conviction of reckless endangerment, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a certain document, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the trial court erred by denying him probation. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Peterson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Johnny Peterson, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Taboris Ramon Jones v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Taboris Ramon Jones, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury conviction for possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, that his sentence is unconstitutional, and that he was deprived of a fair trial on the basis of cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommy Lee Houser v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tommy Lee Houser, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ziberia Carero
A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Ziberia Carero, of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana with intent to sell, and possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana with intent to deliver. The trial court merged the possession of cocaine convictions and merged the possession of marijuana convictions and sentenced the Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of twelve years and two years, respectively. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found during his traffic stop, and that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting rebuttal evidence of his subsequent drug-selling activities. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case to the trial court for correction of the judgments of conviction. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Ivy v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Division
Employee fell onto his buttocks during the course and scope of his employment with Employer and experienced left hip and shoulder pain that later radiated to his right leg. After a course of treatment, the selected treating physician and a second-opinion physician opined Employee’s pain was attributable to a degenerative condition rather than to his work injury and assigned no impairment. Because the pain persisted, Employee’s personal physician referred him to an orthopedic surgeon who opined Employee’s fall ruptured a synovial cyst which aggravated his pre-existing spine condition. The orthopedic surgeon performed surgery and later assigned a twelve percent (12%) impairment rating. A physician who conducted an independent medical records review at Employer’s request sided with the selected physician as to causation and impairment; however, a physician who performed an independent medical examination at Employee’s request agreed with the orthopedic surgeon. Following a trial, the court awarded benefits having determined that Employee met his burden of establishing causation and overcame the statutory presumption afforded the selected physician’s causation opinion. Employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Susan Scott Davis v. Bobby Tex Henry
This appeal arose from the trial court’s final order denying the father’s motion to set aside a prior agreed parentage order and agreed permanent parenting plan order (“PPP”) entered into by the father and the mother. The trial court determined that under relevant case law, it had “no duty to conduct any further hearing” regarding the parentage order and PPP because the court had on previous occasions conducted multiple hearings. The father subsequently appealed the trial court’s final order, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact regarding the best interest of the minor child. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Serenity S. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Serenity S., Hezeki S., Azaiah W., and Lyriq S., the minor children (“the Children”) of Angela W. (“Mother”) and William S. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on March 30, 2017, upon investigation into allegations of environmental and educational neglect. The Anderson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) subsequently adjudicated the Children dependent and neglected as to both parents on May 23, 2017. On July 11, 2018, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father to the Children. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to both parents in an order entered on January 18, 2019.1 As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children by failing to visit them, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans, (3) the conditions leading to the Children’s removal from Mother’s home persisted, and (4) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Children. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jonah Paul Anders v. Mayla Anders
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Petitioner contends the trial judge should have recused herself but fails to state any grounds or facts to support his contention. Moreover, Petitioner failed to comply with Rule 10B by, inter alia, not attaching an affidavit that verified the specific factual grounds supporting disqualification of the trial judge. Due to Petitioner’s failure to comply with Rule 10B, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Pryor v. City of Memphis
This appeal involves Appellant City of Memphis’ (“the City”) decision to deny Appellee Pamela Pryor’s application for On-the-Job-Injury (“OJI”) benefits arising from the death of her husband while he was employed as a firefighter. On appeal, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upheld the City’s denial of the OJI claim citing the absence of an autopsy report as required by the City’s OJI policy. On review, the trial court reversed the ALJ’s decision on its finding that the City’s OJI Policy PM 74-02(3), which required claimant to procure an autopsy, conflicted with the statutory presumption given firefighters in Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-51-201, and remanded the case to the ALJ to conduct a new hearing on the merits. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quinton Wilkins
The Defendant, Quinton Wilkins, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-17-1324 (2014) (subsequently amended) (firearms possession), 39-13-102 (2018) (aggravated assault), 39-13-103 (2018) (reckless endangerment). After the appropriate merger, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to fifteen years for attempted second degree murder, seven years for the firearm conviction, and seven years for aggravated assault. The court ordered consecutive service, for an effective twenty-nine-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a State’s witness, and (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the Defendant’s demeanor. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |