Roger Joiner v. United Parcel Services, Inc., Et Al.
Roger Joiner (“Employee”) sustained an injury to his neck while lifting a mailbag in the course of his employment with United Parcel Service, Inc. (“Employer”) on February 26, 2016. Employer provided medical benefits, but subsequently limited those benefits to treatment of the injury at the C6-7 level of Employee’s cervical spine. Employer refused to authorize treatment and denied benefits for injury at the C5-6 level of Employee’s cervical spine based on the opinion of his treating physician. After a compensation hearing, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (the “trial court”) concluded that the causation opinion of Employee’s medical evaluator overcame the statutory presumption afforded the causation opinion of his treating physician. The trial court determined that Employee was entitled to medical benefits for treatment of his injures at the C5-6 and C6-7 levels and to permanent partial disability benefits based on medical impairment attributable to both levels. Employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, which reversed the trial court’s decision, with one judge concurring in part and dissenting in part. Employee has appealed that ruling. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Blake Hart
A Henderson County jury convicted the Defendant, Jonathan Blake Hart, of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to fifty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it: (1) barred his father from testifying; (2) denied his motion to exclude the medical expert’s conclusion that child sexual abuse had occurred; (3) admitted drawings from the forensic interview; and (4) limited his cross-examination of an investigator. The Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his motion for new trial should have been granted on these same grounds. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommy Leroy Bryant v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Tommy Leroy Bryant, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his three rape of a child convictions, for which he is serving a twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kayla Danielle Skillern
The Defendant, Kayla Danielle Skillern, was convicted by a Wayne County Circuit Court jury of the sale of 0.5 gram or more of methamphetamine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-434 (2018). She received a sentence of ten and one-half years’ confinement. On appeal, she contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying her motions for a judgment of acquittal, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting video evidence depicting the Defendant arguing with her codefendant in front of a child. We affirm the Defendant’s conviction but remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a corrected judgment. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffery Todd Burke v. Sparta Newspapers, Inc.
This appeal requires us to determine whether the fair report privilege applies to a nonpublic, one-on-one conversation between a newspaper reporter and a detective of a county sheriff’s department, who also served as the public information officer for the sheriff’s department. The plaintiff sued the newspaper alleging that it had published defamatory statements the detective made about the plaintiff during the nonpublic, one-on-one conversation with the reporter. The newspaper moved for summary judgment based on the fair report privilege. The trial court granted the newspaper summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the fair report privilege applies only to public proceedings or official actions of government that have been made public and does not apply to the nonpublic, one-on-one conversation at issue here. On this basis alone we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court’s decision granting the defendant summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
White | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Adarion C. Morris
The defendant, Adarion C. Morris, appeals the 48-year sentence imposed following the revocation of his community corrections placement, arguing that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose the new sentence and that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the revocation of the defendant’s community corrections placement and the sentences imposed following the resentencing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joan Odell
The Defendant, Joan Odell, appeals from her felony conviction for failure to appear, which resulted in a sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction and challenges the jury instructions. She also contends that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination in striking a prospective juror in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that there was no reversible error in the instructions. However, the trial court failed to comply with the procedure set forth in Batson by denying the Defendant’s Batson claim based upon the Defendant’s race, and we remand for a hearing on the issue. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Angela Dotson v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting a health care liability claim against the state and attached a certificate of good faith. The Tennessee Claims Commission found that the certificate of good faith failed to satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26- 122 because it was not specific as to the state health care provider. Despite this finding, the court concluded that the statute was satisfied because the complaint contained the certificate of good faith language and identified the state health care provider. The state then filed this interlocutory appeal. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bryson B. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving four minor children. In October 2017, temporary custody of the children was granted to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), and the children were placed in foster care. The McMinn County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) subsequently adjudicated the children dependent and neglected in December 2017. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother and father on December 7, 2018, alleging, as statutory grounds for termination, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment by failure to support, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of the conditions leading to the children’s removal from the parents’ home, and failure to assume custody or financial responsibility for the children.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to the mother upon finding that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence the grounds of (1) persistence of the conditions leading to removal, (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and (3) failure to assume custody or financial responsibility for the children.2 The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Danny Santarone v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Danny Santarone, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues (1) that he was wrongfully convicted based on the fruits of an unconstitutional search and (2) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Petr Pompa v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Petr Pompa, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: 1) raise in the motion for new trial the admissibility of opinion testimony from a school resource officer; 2) raise in the motion for new trial the admissibility of character testimony provided by a school counselor; and 3) object to the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument. Following a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nathaniel P. Carson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Nathaniel P. Carson, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 2010 convictions of two counts of first degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ashley N. Menke
This appeal concerns Section 5 of the Public Safety Act of 2016, which took effect on January 1, 2017, and amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-105, the statute providing for grading of theft offenses. In 2016, before the amended statute took effect, Ashley N. Menke, the defendant, entered a guilty plea without a recommended sentence for, among other things, theft of property in the amount of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony at the time of the offense. In sentencing the defendant after the amendment’s effective date, the trial court applied the amended version of the statute, which graded theft in the amount of $1,000 or less as a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced the defendant accordingly for her theft of exactly $1,000. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing within the applicable range for a Class D felony and consecutive alignment with the sentences for some of the defendant’s other charges. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal in this case with direction to the parties to particularly address the following issues: (1) whether the State was entitled to pursue an appeal as of right from the trial court’s decision, and (2) whether the Criminal Savings Statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112, should apply to the amendments of the theft grading statute. We conclude that the State had a statutory right to appeal the sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-402(b)(1). We further conclude, unlike the Court of Criminal Appeals, that the Criminal Savings Statute applies to the amendments to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-105. Thus, the amended theft grading statute was appropriately applied by the trial court even though the offense occurred before the amendment’s effective date. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Keese
This is the second in a succession of three cases concerning Section 5 of the Public Safety Act of 2016, which took effect on January 1, 2017, and amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-105, the statute providing for grading of theft offenses. In 2016, before the amended version of the statute took effect, Charles Keese, the defendant, was convicted of theft of property in the amount of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony at the time of the offense. In sentencing the defendant before the amendment’s effective date, the trial court applied the amended version of the statute, which graded theft of more than $1,000 but less than $2,500 as a Class E felony, and sentenced the defendant accordingly. Both the State and the defendant filed notices of appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals, after determining that appellate jurisdiction over the sentencing issue raised by the State was proper, vacated the sentence and remanded for entry of a sentence reflecting a conviction of a Class D felony. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal in this case in order to consider (1) whether the State had the right to appeal the trial court’s sentencing decision, and (2) whether the Criminal Savings Statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112, should apply to the amendments of the theft grading statute where, as here, the offense occurred and the defendant was sentenced before the statute’s effective date. We conclude that the State had a statutory right to appeal the sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-402(b)(1). In addition, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that the Criminal Savings Statute applies to the amendments to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-105. We also agree with its ultimate conclusion that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant under the amended version of the statute prior to its effective date. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for the entry of a modified judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Dana Ray Davison
A McNairy County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Dana Ray Davison, of attempted voluntary manslaughter; employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony; employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; felony reckless endangerment; possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense; criminal trespass of a habitation; and the intentional killing of an animal. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two convictions of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony and ordered that the Appellant serve a total effective twenty-year sentence for all of the convictions. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(h)(2), the twenty-year sentence included a mandatory ten-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent for employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the sentencing provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324 violate the principles of due process because they lack definiteness and specificity. The State contends that the trial court erred by not sentencing the Appellant for both convictions of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony before merging the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Holmes v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Holmes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to adequately prepare for Petitioner’s trial and because there was a breakdown in communication between Petitioner and his attorneys. Following a review of the briefs and record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
ELIZABETH JANE KNIZLEY v. ANDREW CARLTON KNIZLEY
Finding agreement in the midst of a divorce can be difficult, but leading up to and during the trial in their divorce, husband and wife entered into certain stipulations. Among those, according to wife, was a stipulation that she would receive alimony in futuro of some amount. Following the trial, the trial court awarded wife transitional alimony. On appeal, wife argues that the court improperly created a dispute when none existed by ignoring the parties’ stipulation. For his part, husband argues that parties cannot stipulate to a type of alimony and, in any event, there was no such stipulation. After a review of the record, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Eugene Tolle
This is the third in a succession of three cases concerning Section 5 of the Public Safety Act of 2016, which took effect on January 1, 2017, and amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-105, the statute providing for grading of theft offenses. In 2012, before the amended version of the statute took effect, Michael Eugene Tolle, the defendant, pleaded guilty to theft of property in the amount of more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony at the time of the offense, and he was sentenced accordingly. In 2017, following the revocation of his probation, the trial court applied the amended version of the statute, which graded theft in the amount of $1,000 or less as a Class A misdemeanor, and imposed a Class A misdemeanor sentence. The State appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals, after determining that it had authority to consider the issue raised by the State, vacated the sentence and remanded for entry of a sentence reflecting his conviction for a Class E felony. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal in this case in order to consider (1) whether the State had the right to appeal the trial court’s revocation order, and (2) whether the defendant, who was originally sentenced under the prior version of the statute, may benefit from the lesser punishment under the amended version of the theft grading statute following the revocation of his probation. We conclude that, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, the intermediate appellate court acquired jurisdiction of the State’s claim when the defendant, in effect, filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. In addition, while we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that the Criminal Savings Statute applies to the amendments to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-105, we also agree with its ultimate conclusion that the trial court exceeded its authority in modifying the offense class and sentence pursuant to the amended version of the statute following the revocation of his probation. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for the entry of a modified judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Carl J. Wagner v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Carl J. Wagner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis and the dismissal of his Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to correct/relieve him of his judgments of conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Floyd Rodney Burns v. State of Tennessee
This appeal arose from a claim filed with the Tennessee Claims Commission (“the Commission”) against the State of Tennessee (“the State”), seeking an award of damages for defamation allegedly committed by a district attorney general through statements made to the media concerning the claimant. The State filed, inter alia, a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the claimant filed, inter alia, a response objecting to the motion. Following a hearing, the Commission denied the State’s motion to dismiss upon finding, in pertinent part, that the Commission did not have the authority to extend absolute immunity to district attorneys general. Upon the State’s application, the Commission and this Court each granted permission for interlocutory review. Having considered the certified question of whether the absolute privilege afforded to state officials for statements made in the course of their official duties, as recognized in Jones v. State, 426 S.W.3d 50 (Tenn. 2013), extends to district attorneys general, we determine that the privilege does not apply and accordingly affirm the Commission’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cheryle Luane Levoy v. Jason Hunter Levoy
In this post-divorce dispute, the mother filed a criminal contempt petition against her ex-husband, alleging multiple violations of a permanent parenting plan. The husband responded with a petition for temporary emergency custody. The trial court granted temporary custody to the father and scheduled a hearing on both petitions. After the hearing, the court found the father guilty of 12 counts of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced him to 120 days in jail. Finding no credible evidence to support the father’s custody petition, the court dissolved the temporary custody order. On appeal, the father argues that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of criminal contempt. Because the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of criminal contempt, we affirm. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio Richardson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Antonio Richardson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner also challenges the constitutionality of Rule 13 of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules, claiming the post-conviction court erred in its adherence to the same. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition and the post-conviction court’s application of Rule 13. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamal Bowens
The defendant, Jamal Bowens, appeals from the entry of an order denying his motion to suspend the remainder of his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-306(c). The defendant pleaded guilty to robbery and aggravated assault, both Class C felonies, for which he received a total effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court found the defendant was not a suitable candidate for probation. Following our review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barry Leon Ferguson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Barry Leon Ferguson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective the assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommie Taylor
The defendant, Tommie Taylor, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, arguing the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was the person who shot the victim. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |