Antonio Benson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Antonio Benson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claim alleging that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to meaningfully present the Petitioner’s self-defense claim. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Lynn Taylor
The Defendant, Anthony Lynn Taylor, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his effective four-year sentence in confinement. On appeal the Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that he absconded from probation and that the trial court failed to place sufficient findings on the record to justify placing his sentence into effect. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Neal Davis
The defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for access to the sealed Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) juvenile records relating to the victim’s mother’s records which were sealed to public inspection but provided to the parties prior to the defendant’s trial. Upon our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude the defendant does not have an appeal as of right from the denial of his motion. Additionally, the defendant has failed to establish review as a petition for writ of certiorari is appropriate. Therefore, the instant appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phennix Givens
A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Phennix Givens, of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of aggravated cruelty to animals. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective forty-six-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Whitby
Following a bench trial, the trial court found the Defendant, Timothy Whitby, guilty of: |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melissa Binns v. Trader Joe's East, Inc.
This interlocutory appeal involves an alleged slip and fall incident that occurred at the defendant’s grocery store. The plaintiff’s amended complaint included allegations of vicarious liability, premises liability, negligent training, and negligent supervision against the defendant. In an attempt to dismiss the plaintiff’s negligent training and supervision claims, the defendant filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and asserted two alternative arguments, both of which the trial court rejected. First, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that courts must dismiss “negligent activity” claims, such as claims for negligent training and supervision, when asserted concurrently with a premises liability theory of recovery. Second, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s direct negligence claims were no longer legally viable due to the defendant admitting it was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee, commonly referred to as the “preemption rule.” After denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application. The defendant then appealed to this Court, and we granted review. We hold that the preemption rule is incompatible with Tennessee’s system of comparative fault and decline to adopt it. In addition, we decline to adopt the rule proposed by the defendant pertaining to “negligent activity” claims asserted alongside premises liability claims. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Nedra R. Hastings v. Larry M. Hastings Jr.
This protracted and contentious child support action began on April 15, 2005, with the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lila F.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one of her children. On the day of trial, her appointed counsel orally moved for leave to withdraw. The court granted the motion, and the trial proceeded with the mother representing herself. Ultimately, the court found clear and convincing evidence of six grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in permitting her appointed counsel to withdraw. Because we agree, we vacate the judgment terminating her parental rights and remand for further proceedings. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Murali Ponnapula v. Immanuel Wright
Following a motor vehicle accident, Appellant/the insured brought a breach of contract |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Victor Daniel Medina-Tratel v. Christopher Holloway, Et Al.
The dispositive issue on appeal concerns a forum selection clause in the LLC Agreement of Catch22Nashville, LLC (“the LLC Agreement”). Catch22Nashville, LLC initially had four members who owned equal membership interests. The principal business of the LLC was a restaurant operating under the name Catch22 Gastropub. A dispute arose when one of the four members, Christopher Holloway (“Mr. Holloway”), purchased the membership interests of two other members, Richard Miley (“Mr. Miley”) and Justin Kamishlian (“Mr. Kamishlian”), resulting in Mr. Holloway owning three-fourths of the membership interests in the LLC. The fourth member, Victor Daniel Medina-Tratel (“Mr. Medina”), claims that Mr. Holloway promised to transfer the interest portion belonging to Mr. Kamishlian to Mr. Medina upon his payment of $40,000, so that Mr. Holloway and Mr. Medina would own Catch22Nashville, LLC in equal interests. Instead, Mr. Holloway transferred a one-fourth membership interest in the LLC to his wife Melanie Holloway (“Ms. Holloway”). Two years later, the landlord of Catch22 Gastropub terminated its lease and evicted the restaurant from the premises, forcing it to cease business. On the day of the eviction, Mr. Medina obtained a cashier’s check in the amount of $100,000 from the LLC’s bank account that was made payable to the Clerk and Master of Wilson County. Mr. Medina then filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Wilson County against Mr. Holloway and Ms. Holloway (hereinafter “the Holloways”) for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and conversion related to the transfer of Mr. Kamishlian’s membership interest in the LLC. Mr. Medina also filed a motion to interplead into court the $100,000 that he withdrew from the LLC’s corporate account. The LLC then motioned to intervene as a party with a vested interest in the interpleaded funds. The trial court granted both Mr. Medina’s motion for interpleader and the LLC’s motion to intervene. The LLC and the Holloways (hereinafter “Defendants”) then filed motions to dismiss based on the forum selection clause in the LLC Agreement. Section 1.09 of the LLC Agreement states “[v]enue for any dispute arising under this LLC Agreement or any disputes among any Members or the Company will be in the county of the Company’s Registered Office.” The trial court ruled that, under the forum selection clause in the LLC Agreement, exclusive venue for Mr. Medina’s claims was in Oconee County, Georgia, the county of the company’s registered office, and dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of proper venue. Mr. Medina filed a timely appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Albert Bohannon v. Grady Perry, Warden
The Petitioner, Albert Bohannon, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm the dismissal because the Petitioner is no longer imprisoned or restrained of his liberty and the petition fails to comply with the statutory requirements. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry J. Bradley v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Larry J. Bradley, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for evading arrest, attempted carjacking, aggravated burglary, and assault. Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) trial counsel argued that Petitioner was guilty of attempted carjacking without consulting with Petitioner and (2) trial counsel failed to properly determine the felony classification for Petitioner’s Indiana convictions for purposes of sentencing. He also argues the “Circuit Court erred in denying [Petitioner’s] petition to set aside the sentence on the attempted carjacking conviction due to the ineffective assistance of counsel.” After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry L. Gragg
The Appellant, Terry L. Gragg, appeals his conviction of aggravated assault for which he received a sentence of four years’ probation. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Augustina C. Durunna v. Nelson I. Durunna
This is a divorce case where the wife has raised several discrete issues on appeal. Although certain of her assertions are without merit, we agree with the wife that the trial court erred in failing to account for certain real property located in Nigeria. Thus, the marital estate division is vacated, and the matter is remanded so that the trial court can account for the Nigerian real property highlighted herein. As a result of our disposition on that issue, as well as other concerns, we also vacate the trial court’s award of alimony to the husband. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce Dorsett, II v. State of Tennessee
Bruce Dorsett, II, Petitioner, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief after the entry of a guilty plea to several offenses. Petitioner requested equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The post-conviction court determined Petitioner was entitled to neither statutory nor equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and, consequently, denied relief and dismissed the petition. Petitioner then filed an untimely notice of appeal. On appeal, Petitioner claims the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without allowing Petitioner to amend it. We waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal but affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Morgan Ashlee Hood v. State of Tennessee
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Court of Appeals | ||
Lavino Horne v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Lavino Horne, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court correctly determined that the statute of limitations should be tolled for his untimely petition because he diligently pursued his petition after being abandoned by trial counsel. He further contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The State responds that the post-conviction court erred by finding that extraordinary circumstances prevented Petitioner from timely filing his petition and denying the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. The State further argues that Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we conclude that Petitioner failed to show that the one-year statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds. Accordingly, Petitioner’s postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is barred by the statute of limitations and we reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Markee Mosley
An Obion County jury convicted the Appellant of second degree murder of Decora Alexander, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years’ confinement. At the time of the offense, the Appellant was serving a four-year probation sentence for an offense involving the same victim, which was subsequently violated and ordered to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-nine years’ confinement. The Appellant argues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in not charging the jury with self-defense; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the Appellant’s probation officer at trial; (5) the trial court erred in admitting photographs from the crime scene and a life-in-being photograph into evidence; (6) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence without consideration of the Appellant’s mitigation proof; and (7) the trial court’s cumulative errors necessitate a new trial. Upon our review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Janice N. Smith
This appeal concerns a partial summary judgment order certified as final pursuant to Rule |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Welch, et al. v. Oaktree Health and Rehabilitation Center, LLC d/b/a Christian Care Centers of Memphis, et al.
At issue in this appeal is whether an individual, now deceased, lacked the requisite mental capacity when he signed a durable power of attorney for health care. The trial court answered this question in the affirmative, specifically concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decedent was incompetent. As a result of this determination, the trial court further concluded that an arbitration agreement later signed by the decedent’s brother using the power of attorney was invalid, a conclusion which in turn prompted the trial court to deny the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the basis of that agreement. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua W. Gabehart
A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua W. Gabehart, of the unlawful sale of fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he knew he was selling fentanyl instead of heroin. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Alethea Skeen
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Anthony
The Defendant, Andre Anthony, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct a clerical mistake pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. The Defendant contends that his two consecutive sentences at issue were originally ordered to run in a specific order but that the challenged corrected judgment forms indicate that each sentence runs consecutively to the other, in no particular order, and should once again be corrected. The State responds that the trial court correctly denied the Rule 36 motion because the order of the consecutive sentences is immaterial and because the corrected judgments accurately reflect the Defendant’s sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Alethea Skeen
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection shouldtherefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Alethea Skeen, in the form of attorney’s fees. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Rowan Skeen
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals |