James L. Davidson et al v. Jeremy Howard Johnson et al.
M2024-00412-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bonita Jo Atwood

Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and breach of contract to enforce a purchase and sale agreement, which was allegedly entered by and between Appellants and Appellees. In their answer, Appellees asserted, as an affirmative defense, that Appellants had no standing to enforce the contract because they were not parties to it. On Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Appellants were not parties to the contract and had no standing to bring an action to enforce it. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

In Re Nicholai L. Et Al.
M2023-01796-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sheila Calloway

A putative father appeals the termination of his parental rights to a child. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of several statutory grounds for termination. It also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. Following thorough review, we conclude that not all grounds for termination were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Still, we affirm the termination of parental rights.

Davidson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Forrest Ray Hester
M2023-01312-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Forest A. Durard, Jr.

A Bedford County jury convicted the Defendant, Forrest Ray Hester, of delivery of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine based upon a theory of criminal responsibility, possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell, and possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the possession convictions and imposed an effective sentence of sixteen years to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his co-defendant’s guilty plea to sale/delivery of methamphetamine based on a theory of criminal responsibility precludes the Defendant’s conviction for the same offense based on a theory of criminal responsibility. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Bedford Court of Criminal Appeals

Robert Elmore v. Travis Mills Et Al.
E2023-01044-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex Henry Ogle

Lonnie Elmore (“Decedent”) died on July 5, 2020, a few weeks after being treated by Travis Mills, CRNA, (“Mills”) an employee of Lakeway Regional Anesthesia Services, PLLC (“Lakeway”) (collectively “Defendants”) and Angelo J. Sorce, M.D., (“Sorce”), an employee of Tennessee Valley Orthopaedics, LLC (“TVO”).1 On July 2, 2021, Robert Elmore, as Executor of the Estate of Lonnie Elmore, (“Plaintiff”) sent pre-suit notice to Defendants. Relying on the 120-day extension provided for by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-121(c), Plaintiff filed his complaint alleging wrongful death on November 1, 2021, in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), claiming that the accrual of Plaintiff’s cause of action arose no later than June 21, 2020, and Plaintiff, accordingly, provided pre-suit notice past the one-year statute of limitations, rendering his complaint untimely. The Trial Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss. This interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, followed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. 

Jefferson Court of Appeals

Abraham Anderson v. Alice Musick Et Al.
E2024-00249-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Telford E. Forgety, Jr.

The Plaintiff sought specific performance related to a real estate transaction. The trial court denied relief, concluding that the series of papers introduced by the Plaintiff as a purported real estate contract between the parties did not constitute a valid contract. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that specific performance was inappropriate because the court could not discern the terms of the purported contract. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Sevier Court of Appeals

Mary Rachel Cayson v. Patrick Cayson
W2023-00943-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kasey Culbreath

In this divorce, the husband claims the trial court erred in its classification of certain separate property and valuation of certain marital property. The trial court found that the equity held in the marital home attributable to the sale of property owned by the wife prior to the marriage had been transmuted into marital property, but then treated that property as separate despite its initial finding due to what it believed the wife’s intent would have been under an alternative set of circumstances. The husband argues this was improper. The trial court also valued certain marital property, including the home and Wife’s 401(k) retirement account, as of several years prior to the divorce proceedings. The trial court reasoned that the divorce proceedings had been delayed by the husband’s criminal proceedings and subsequent incarceration arising from his theft of funds from the wife during the marriage. Husband filed this appeal. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Tipton Court of Appeals

Lakeway Real Estate2, LLC v. ERA Franchise Systems, LLC
E2023-00764-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James H. Ripley

This appeal arises out of a contract dispute between Lakeway Real Estate2, LLC f/k/a Lakeway Real Estate, LLC (“Lakeway”), and ERA Franchise Systems, LLC f/k/a ERA Franchise Systems, Inc. (“ERA”). Lakeway filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Jefferson County (the “trial court”) seeking declaratory relief and a ruling that a noncompete provision within a Franchise Agreement (the “Agreement”) is unenforceable as a matter of law. ERA moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the Venue and Jurisdiction clause (the “Clause”) of the Agreement makes the trial court an improper venue. The trial court granted ERA’s motion to dismiss. Because the Clause, when read in context with no disproportionate emphasis on one portion, provides permissive, but not mandatory, jurisdiction and venue in New Jersey, we reverse.

Jefferson Court of Appeals

Robert Dickerson v. United Medical Transportation, LLC, et al.
W2023-01084-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary L. Wagner

After suffering an injury, patient alleged that in-patient facility was negligent in failing to inform medical transportation company of his physical limitations prior to his discharge from the facility. In response to the facility’s summary judgment motion, patient relied on the testimony of an “expert in passenger ground transportation.” The trial court found that issues of fact remained as to patient’s ambulation needs, but granted summary judgment as to standard of care and breach because patient’s expert was not competent to testify under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act, and the common knowledge exception did not apply. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Michael Gersper v. Jonathan Turner
M2022-01136-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kelvin D. Jones

This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-101 to -110, challenging the denial of the petition to dismiss all three claims asserted by the plaintiff. After the defendant filed his TPPA petition, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed two of his three claims, leaving only his claim for malicious prosecution. While the TPPA petitioner sought to adjudicate all three claims under the TPPA, the trial court ruled that the only remaining issue was whether the plaintiff “has properly plead a claim for malicious prosecution and whether this action should be dismissed pursuant to TPPA.” Following a hearing limited to the malicious prosecution claim, the trial court denied the petition to dismiss without setting forth the reasons for its decision. On appeal, the TPPA petitioner contends he was wrongfully deprived of a decision on his petition concerning the two claims the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed. He also contends the trial court erred in denying his TPPA petition to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim. Relying on the Supreme Court’s most recent ruling in Flade v. City of Shelbyville, ––– S.W.3d ––––, No. M2022-00553-SC-R11-CV, 2024 WL 4448736, at *5 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2024), we affirm the trial court’s determination that the TPPA petitioner was not entitled to a decision on the two voluntarily dismissed claims. As for the trial court’s denial of the petition to dismiss the remaining claim, malicious prosecution, we have determined that the TPPA petitioner established that the TPPA applies to the claim presented, which shifted to the plaintiff the burden to establish “a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in the legal action.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-105. We have also determined that the plaintiff failed to establish an essential element of his malicious prosecution claim, that the proceeding brought against him by the defendant “terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” See Mynatt v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, Chapter 39, 669 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2023). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to not adjudicate the first two claims after they were voluntarily dismissed but reverse the trial court’s decision denying the TPPA petition to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim and remand with instructions to dismiss that claim. Further, the TPPA states that, “[i]f the court dismisses a legal action pursuant to a petition filed under this chapter, the court shall award to the petitioning party . . . [c]ourt costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, discretionary costs, and other expenses incurred in filing and prevailing upon the petition.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-107(a), (a)(1). Accordingly, we remand with instructions for the trial court to make the appropriate award as it pertains to the costs and fees incurred in the trial court and on appeal that pertain to the TPPA petitioner’s efforts to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Queshan Brooks v. State of Tennessee
M2024-00198-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

The Petitioner, Queshan Brooks, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Thomas Dequan Solomon
E2024-00457-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge G. Scott Green

The Defendant, Thomas Dequan Solomon, appeals from the judgment of the trial court
revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in
confinement. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by basing its
decision merely on proof of alleged criminal conduct prior to the filing of formal charges
and without considering his history of supervision while on probation. After review, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Nathaniel Scott Robinson
E2024-00176-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

The Defendant, Nathaniel Scott Robinson, pled guilty to the offense of statutory rape, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of six years. The court suspended the sentence and placed the Defendant on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine for resale. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the suspended sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve the six-year sentence in custody. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court should have considered alternatives to fully revoking his suspended sentence. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

Howard Jefferson Atkins v. Brian Eller, Warden
E2024-00665-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lisa N. Rice

Tipton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Howard Jefferson Atkins, of first degree premeditated murder in 2000, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. The Petitioner later applied for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case because the juvenile court did not make the necessary statutory findings to transfer his case to the circuit court. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the application, finding that the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for relief. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Johnson Court of Criminal Appeals

Roxana Bianca Jordan v. Thomas Kerry Jordan
E2024-01571-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Pemberton

A pro se litigant sought to appeal the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion. She did not follow the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2.03. Therefore, we dismiss the case.

Roane Court of Appeals

Foothills Land Conservancy v. Creekside Estates Partnership Et Al.
E2023-01647-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John F. Weaver

This case involves dueling declaratory judgment actions arising out of a deed of conservation easement dated December 31, 2007, encumbering property located within the Town of Farragut in Knox County. The trial court found in favor of Foothills Land Conservancy and awarded the nonprofit its damages, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. Upon review, we affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

Lorenzo C. White, et al. v. Carolyn Fields Hayes, et al.
W2021-01345-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William C. Cole

This appeal concerns the estate of Dr. Hillery W. Key (“Dr. Key”), who died testate in 1912. These proceedings began in 1998 in the Chancery Court for Tipton County (“the Trial Court”). The parties are descendants of Dr. Key. Odessa Rose and Marilyn Locke (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) advocate a per capita distribution of Dr. Key’s estate. Carolyn Fields Hayes and Frederick Fields (“Hayes Defendants,” collectively) and Larry Murrell, Jr., Joyce A. Carter, Dorethea McIntyre, and Lynnie Higgs (“Murrell Defendants,” collectively) (“Defendants,” all defendants together) assert that this Court, in a 2005 opinion, already decided upon a per stirpes distribution. The parties reached an agreement on the record in open court ostensibly ending this long-running matter, but Plaintiffs have appealed anyway. Defendants filed motions to dismiss. We hold, inter alia, that Plaintiffs are bound by the agreement announced in court whereby the parties waived their right to appeal. We hold further that the law of the case doctrine prevents Plaintiffs from relitigating the distribution of Dr. Key’s estate. We affirm. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied as moot. We find this appeal frivolous, and remand for the Trial Court to award Defendants reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122, to be paid by Plaintiffs rather than from the common fund in this case.

Tipton Court of Appeals

In Re Mitchell C.
E2023-01803-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert D. Philyaw

The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to a minor child based on severe abuse. The trial court also concluded that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Aaron Malone v. State of Tennessee
W2023-017301-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jennifer Johnson Mitchell

Aaron Malone, Petitioner, was convicted of first degree felony murder for his role in a murder that took place during an attempted robbery and sentenced to life in prison. State v. Malone, No. W2009-02047-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1005487, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 13, 2011). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. Malone v. State, No. W2016-00666-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 1404374, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2017). Petitioner then filed a “Petition to Reopen for Requesting DNA Post-conviction.” The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, and Petitioner timely appealed, arguing that: (1) the postconviction court erred by failing to address and make findings of fact regarding all four requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-304 in its order denying the petition; (2) the post-conviction court erred in finding the evidence was previously subjected to DNA analysis; (3) the post-conviction court erred in finding there was not a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results were obtained from DNA analysis; (4) the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without a hearing; and (5) the post-conviction court erred by failing to appoint new counsel after counsel informed the court he was leaving the jurisdiction. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Joshua James Smith
E2023-01416-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge John F. Dugger, Jr.

A Hamblen County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua James Smith, of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges his conviction and sentence, but the State argues that this appeal should be dismissed because his notice of appeal was untimely. Upon our review, we agree that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely and that the “interest of justice” does not require us to waive the timely filing requirement. We respectfully dismiss the appeal.

Hamblen Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Joshua James Smith
E2023-01416-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge John F. Dugger, Jr.

I ultimately concur in the majority’s judgment dismissing this appeal. I write
separately simply to address the majority’s Part B consideration of why waiver of the
timeliness requirement is not in the interest of justice. Candidly, Defendant did not ask for
such consideration, let alone attempt to bear the burden of demonstrating that the interest
of justice merits waiving the timely filing requirement.

Hamblen Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Andrew Martin Robbs
E2023-01187-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge G. Scott Green

The Defendant, Andrew Martin Robbs, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence per
se, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2020). The trial
court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to
probation after 120 days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified
question of law challenging the sufficiency of the affidavit of complaint in support of the
arrest warrant. Because the certified question fails to identify the scope and limits of the
legal issue reserved, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Christopher L. Dowlen
M2024-00534-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Bateman

The Defendant, Christopher L. Dowlen, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve his original four-year sentence for his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender in confinement. The Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement (1) by finding sufficient evidence that the Defendant possessed a firearm in violation of his probation, and (2) by failing to consider whether full revocation of his sentence would serve the “ends of justice” and “best interest” of the Defendant. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Robertson Court of Criminal Appeals

Mamadou Dian Diallo v. Aminata Cherif Diallo
W2023-01513-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Valerie L. Smith

This is an appeal of a final divorce decree brought by a husband acting pro se. Because the husband’s brief is deficient, we determine that he has waived consideration of any issues. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

Shelby Court of Appeals

In Re Conservatorship of Charles C. Rowe
E2023-01236-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda Magan Worley

The Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) granted the petition of Janice Peters-Rowe (“Petitioner”) for a conservatorship over her husband, Charles Rowe (“Respondent”). Respondent’s daughter from a previous marriage, Dawn Rowe (“Daughter”), filed an intervening petition. Daughter claimed that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction, arguing that Respondent had lived his entire life in New York until recently and that Respondent had not established residency in Tennessee. The Trial Court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter; that the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent was valid, giving Petitioner priority for appointment as conservator; and that it was in Respondent’s best interest that Petitioner be appointed as his conservator. Daughter appealed. Given that Respondent did not have the mental capacity to change his domicile at the time of his arrival in Tennessee, we conclude that the Trial Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and accordingly vacate the Trial Court’s judgment.

Cumberland Court of Appeals

Wells Fargo Bank National Association v. Mark A. Searcy
E2024-00238-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James H. Ripley

A bank obtained a money judgment in South Carolina in 2010. The judgment debtor moved to North Carolina, and the bank domesticated the South Carolina judgment in North Carolina, a state that treats enrolled judgments as new North Carolina judgments. The judgment debtor moved to Tennessee, and in 2023, the bank filed a petition to enroll the North Carolina judgment in Tennessee. The judgment debtor objected, arguing that the original South Carolina judgment had expired. The bank responded that it was not seeking to enroll the South Carolina judgment, but instead the North Carolina judgment. The trial court enrolled the North Carolina judgment. The judgment debtor appeals. We affirm.

Sevier Court of Appeals