State of Tennessee v. Mario Thomas
The defendant, Mario Thomas, appeals the sentences imposed for his guilty pleas to the offenses of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, and possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of violence. The defendant's sole allegation of error is that the trial court should not have ordered his convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery to run consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andra Taylor v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Andra Taylor, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2012 convictions for aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon, for which he is serving an effective fourteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief due to the ineffective assistance of counsel in the conviction proceedings. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dwayne Williams v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Dwayne Williams, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to eight years in confinement. Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, and following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to file a motion to suppress and failed to investigate a potential plea offer; and (3) he was denied a full and fair hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims against his first counsel. After our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Janet Wynn Snyder v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A.
This case involves the trial court's award of litigation costs, inclusive of attorney's fees, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c) (Supp. 2015), upon granting the defendant's Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the defendant in the amount of $10,000, the statutory maximum, against the plaintiff and her surety. The plaintiff appeals the portion of the ruling holding the surety liable for the $10,000 judgment of litigation costs in the event the principal fails to satisfy the judgment. Having determined that the surety's cost bond explicitly referred to “costs” as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-120 (2009), rather than as defined in subsection -119(c), we reverse the trial court's judgment as to the surety. We affirm the trial court's judgment against the principal and remand for enforcement of that judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Danny Blankenship Bonding Company v. State of Tennessee
Appellant, Danny Blankenship Bonding Company, appeals the judgment of the Henderson County Circuit Court forfeiting a $3,000 bail bond in the case of criminal defendant Edward Hunt. On appeal, appellant argues that he was entitled to relief pursuant to Tennessee Code sections 40-11-139(c) and 40-11-203(a). Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Louis Orlando Harmon
Appellant, Louis Orlando Harmon, stands convicted of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; possession of tools used to interfere with anti-theft security devices; and driving while his license was suspended. He was sentenced to six years for the theft of property offense, to a consecutive term of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of tools offense, and to a concurrent term of six months for the driving offense. On appeal, he argues that the trial court committed plain error by allowing an Academy Sports and Outdoors loss prevention officer to testify about the identification of appellant and his vehicle by other employees of the store. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brett Patterson v. State of Tennessee
The State of Tennessee (“the State”) appeals the decision of the Tennessee Claims Commission (“the Claims Commission”) awarding Brett Patterson (“Patterson”) $439.10 for arts-and-crafts supplies that Patterson was required either to mail out of the prison or donate pursuant to a policy of the Turney Center Industrial Complex (“Turney Center”) where Patterson is an inmate. We find and hold that the Claims Commission does not have jurisdiction over intentional torts, and as no negligence was alleged or shown, the Claims Commission lacked jurisdiction over this case. We, therefore, vacate the decision of the Claims Commission and dismiss this case. |
Court of Appeals | ||
City of Jackson v. Barry Walker
This appeal involves an allegedly unsafe building in the City of Jackson. After a hearing, the City of Jackson’s environmental court ordered the property owner to demolish the building. The property owner appealed to circuit court. After another hearing, the circuit court declared the property a public nuisance and also ordered it demolished. The property owner appeals. He argues that the City of Jackson failed to follow the correct procedures under the city code, and therefore, he should not be required to demolish the structure. Discerning no merit in this assertion, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Katarina R. Long
The appellant, Katarina R. Long, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and was granted judicial diversion with the requirement that she complete three years of probation and pay $20,000 restitution. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the amount of restitution when it was clear that she did not have the ability to pay it. Because we lack jurisdiction to consider her appeal, we must dismiss it. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin Lee Carnett v. PNC Bank, NA
Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant-bank to halt foreclosure proceedings. When the bank did not answer the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court denied the motion for default judgment and, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint. We affirm the denial of plaintiff‟s motion for default judgment but vacate the dismissal of his complaint. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Eric Tidwell v. Alicia Ann Tidwell
This appeal results from a divorce proceeding between Christopher Eric Tidwell (“Father”) and Alicia Ann Tidwell (“Mother”). On appeal, Father challenges the trial court’s determination of Mother’s income for child support purposes, the trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony to Mother, and the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us, we affirm the trial court’s determination of Mother’s income, vacate a portion of the awarded rehabilitative alimony, and modify the award of attorney’s fees. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Cecilia Thompson v. Kroger Limited Partnership I
An employee sustained a compensable injury to her shoulder. She was able to return to work in a transitional modified job and settled her claim within the one and one-half times impairment cap. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). Her employer offered her a permanent job with accommodations for her medical restrictions. The employee did not accept the position and was terminated. She sought reconsideration of her settlement. The trial court found that the employer had acted reasonably and that the employee had a meaningful return to work. The trial court, therefore, declined to award additional benefits. The employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Hardin | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Kyle Kernan v. Beverly J. Kernan Nabors et al.
Post-divorce, a guardian was appointed for two minor children while their mother received treatment for substance abuse. The guardian, the half-brother of the minors, sought child support from both parents. The guardian alleges, inter alia, the trial court abused its discretion by adjusting for tax deductions before calculating the mother's gross income for child support due and by allowing her credit for support in kind and purchases of necessities. We affirm the trial court's findings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stacey Green
The Defendant, Stacey Green, appeals from his convictions for aggravated robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and three counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence relating to a victim’s pretrial identification of the Defendant in a photographic lineup and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randy L. Fielder v. Southern Health Partners et al.
The plaintiff filed the instant action regarding injuries he allegedly received while in the custody of the Robertson County Detention Center. The trial court dismissed the action sua sponte based on multiple grounds, including untimeliness pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed a motion seeking alteration of the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the request by a handwritten notation supplied on the face of the motion. The plaintiff appealed. Having determined that there is no valid, final order in this matter, we conclude that the appeal must be dismissed due to this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
W & H LLC, et al v. Community Bank N.A. v. Willie Nelson
The trial court entered a final judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of the appellee. Appellants appealed. Due to deficiencies in the appellants' brief to this Court, we conclude that they have waived their issues on appeal. The appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Carrington H. et al.
We granted review in this case to decide (1) whether an indigent parent’s right to appointed counsel in a parental termination proceeding includes the right to challenge an order terminating parental rights based on ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals must review any ground the trial court relied on to terminate parental rights when a parent fails to raise all grounds for termination on appeal. We hold that parents are constitutionally entitled to fundamentally fair procedures in parental termination proceedings. Nevertheless, this constitutional mandate does not require us to adopt a procedure by which parents may collaterally attack orders terminating parental rights based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, we hold that appellate courts must review a trial court’s findings regarding all grounds for termination and whether termination is in a child’s best interests, even if a parent fails to challenge these findings on appeal. Having reviewed the record on appeal in accordance with these holdings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
In re Carrington H. et al - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
The Court has decided that an indigent parent has the right to assistance of counsel—but not the right to effective assistance of counsel—in a parental termination proceeding. I believe that the vast majority of lawyers provide competent representation as required by our Rules of Professional Conduct. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPCs 1.1 & 1.3. But in those rare situations where a lawyer makes a mistake or fails to do his or her duty to such an extent that the termination proceeding is not fundamentally fair, I favor providing the parent with an opportunity to seek relief. In my view, providing counsel for an indigent parent but not requiring counsel to render effective representation is an empty gesture. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Cornelius Banks
Defendant, Cornelius Banks, appeals his Shelby County convictions for one count of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one merged count of aggravated rape, one merged count of aggravated sexual battery, three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of 240 years. Defendant argues (1) that the indictment for one of the counts of aggravated rape was fatally defective and should be dismissed; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his kidnapping convictions violated double jeopardy; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could consider one of the witnesses as an accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated; and (4) that the trial court erred in ordering Defendant's sentences to be served consecutively. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frederick D. Deberry v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Frederick D. Deberry, appeals as of right from the Fayette County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the statute of limitations should be tolled (1) because he was in federal custody until 2014 and lacked access to Tennessee legal materials and (2) because his trial counsel and the trial court clerk failed to advise him about post-conviciton procedures after he inquired about such information. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Renee Pembroke (Cooley) v. Christopher Eugene Cooley
This appeal concerns a post-divorce modification of alimony. During the underlying divorce proceedings, the parties executed a marital dissolution agreement providing that the husband would make payments to the wife of $8,000 per month in transitional alimony for a period of five years followed by payments of $7,500 per month in alimony in futuro for a period of five years. The agreement provided that the alimony in futuro payments could be modified by either party ―upon a showing of a material, unanticipated change in circumstances.‖ The agreement was incorporated into the trial court‘s final decree of divorce entered in January 2005. In April 2014, the wife filed a petition seeking to increase and extend the husband‘s alimony in futuro obligation. After a trial, the Shelby County Circuit Court found a change in circumstances warranting a modification of alimony and ordered that the husband continue to pay alimony in futuro of $6,200 per month beginning in January 2015 and continuing for a period of six years or until his retirement, whichever occurred later. The trial court also awarded the wife $30,000 as alimony in solido for attorney‘s fees. On appeal, we conclude that the record does not support the trial court‘s finding of a substantial and material change in circumstances. We therefore reverse the trial court‘s modification of the husband‘s alimony in futuro obligation. Additionally, we reverse the trial court‘s award of alimony in solido for attorney‘s fees. This matter is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Serpas
Appellant, Phillip Serpas, entered guilty pleas to two counts of unlawfully obtaining a prescription for controlled substances by fraud, Class D felonies, and one count of conspiracy to obtain or attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of two years each for the Class D felonies and one year for the Class E felony. The trial court held a hearing on the issue of alternative sentencing and ordered appellant to serve his effective two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Estate of Marie Anderson Young
The trial court denied a personal representative's fee request after concluding that the request did not comply with a local rule setting a personal representative's fee as a percentage of the value of the estate. We reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider Appellant's fee request “in light of all the relevant circumstances.” In re Estate of Schorn, No. E2013-02245-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1778292, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2015). |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John N. Moffitt
Defendant, John N. Moffitt, was convicted of reckless aggravated assault and sentenced to four years' incarceration to be served at 30 percent release eligibility. Defendant was also ordered to pay restitution and a $2,500 fine. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that his conduct must have caused serious bodily injury; that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's order of restitution; and that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence within the applicable range. Having carefully reviewed the record before us, we affirm Defendant's conviction and sentence. However, we reduce the amount of restitution and remand this case to the trial court to determine Defendant's ability to pay restitution. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re M.A.P. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children's Services (DCS) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of A.C.P. (Mother) with respect to her three minor children, ages twenty-two months to six years at the time of trial. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of grounds. The court found the same quantum of evidence supporting the conclusion that termination of Mother‟s rights is in the children's best interest. Mother appeals. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals |