Billy Carl Tomlin, et al v. Betty Baxter, et al
This appeal arises from a judgment for a post-foreclosure deficiency owing on a promissory note. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Defendants’ motion for relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 from the final judgment. After Defendants filed an answer to the complaint, they subsequently failed to comply with orders of the court, and, upon motion of Plaintiffs, a default judgment on liability was entered in 2012. The hearing on damages, which was set to be heard four weeks later, was continued by agreement more than a dozen times over two years while the parties attempted to reach a settlement. No settlement was reached, and the hearing on damages was held in May 2014, during which Plaintiffs introduced evidence to establish their damages; however, neither Defendants nor their counsel appeared. Following the evidentiary hearing on damages, the court awarded Plaintiffs damages of $153,328.26, and a final judgment was entered. Three months later, Defendants filed a “Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment” under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, seeking to set aside the May 2014 order on the grounds of excusable neglect. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, Defendants contend the court erred in denying their motion because their failure to attend the damages hearing can be justified by confusion and lack of notice. They also contend the court erred in awarding default judgment because they filed a joint answer to the complaint. We conclude that the damages judgment Defendants sought to have set aside was not a default judgment, but was a final judgment following an evidentiary hearing. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 60 relief from the damages judgment because Defendants failed to establish excusable neglect for not attending the 2014 hearing. We also hold that, although Defendants filed an answer to the complaint, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering a default judgment as to liability because Defendants failed to defend the claim in the time frame as ordered by the court. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven J. Ballou
The defendant, Steven J. Ballou, pled guilty to one count of evading arrest, a Class D felony, and received a sentence of five years to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. As part of his guilty plea, the defendant reserved two certified questions of law. In the first question, he argues that an eighteen-month pre-indictment delay caused substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and was an intentional delay by the State to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant. In the second, he contends that the loss of police cruiser dashboard camera videos that contained potentially exculpatory evidence violated his right to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the first certified question of law and conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the second certified question. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teresa Patterson v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP
This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant-property owner in a premises liability suit. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Theodore Franklin Davis v. Knox County, Tennessee
We granted this interlocutory appeal in order to consider whether Knox County can rely upon the defense of quasi-judicial immunity with respect to the allegations against it in the complaint filed by the plaintiff Theodore Franklin Davis. At an earlier time, Davis entered into a plea agreement in criminal court. In the agreement, he consented to comply with all of the requirements of the Knox County Pretrial Services Office during his six-month probation. One of the requirements was that he would wear a Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitoring unit (the SCRAM) to track his alcohol consumption. Pretrial Services – a department of the Knox County Sheriff's Office and an agent of Knox County – installed and monitored the device. Davis alleges that the agents of Pretrial Services were negligent in the installation of, and their refusal to adjust, the SCRAM. He alleges that the SCRAM exacerbated his diabetic condition. Knox County raised the defense of quasi-judicial immunity and later moved to dismiss. The trial court denied Knox County's motion, holding that it was not entitled to raise the defense of quasi-judicial immunity. We hold that Knox County is entitled to assert the defense of quasi-judicial immunity under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-206 (2012). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Parks et al v. Sun Belt Management Company et al.
The plaintiffs voluntarily non-suited an action against the defendants. Later, this suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action was filed. The plaintiffs in their second suit failed to have process issued and served on the defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss based upon this failure. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit. They appeal. We affirm. |
Washington | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In re C.J.A.H.
T.L. (Father) appeals the trial court's judgment terminating his parental rights with respect to his daughter C.J.A.H. (the Child). The court terminated Father's rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support. It did so after an ex parte hearing at which neither Father nor his attorney was present because neither had received notice of the hearing. After subsequent hearings, where Father was present with counsel and introduced evidence, the trial court entered a second order “reaffirming” its earlier termination decision, relying on proof from both the ex parte hearing and later hearings. We hold that the trial court erred in relying on evidence presented at the ex parte hearing. We further hold that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that Father's failure to pay child support was willful. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the petition for termination with prejudice. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tracey Melinda Cook v. Tracy Dean Iverson
Father and Mother divorced in February 2012. Later that same year, Father’s employer notified him that his high-paying sales job would be eliminated. Due to his unemployment, Father filed a petition to modify his alimony and child support obligations. The trial court concluded there was a material change in circumstances and reduced Father’s monthly alimony and child support obligations. Father argues on appeal that the trial court erred by applying an incorrect legal standard; not reducing his alimony and child support obligations further; and declining to reduce his alimony in futuro obligation retroactive to the date of his petition. As an additional issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred in measuring any change in circumstances from the final decree of divorce rather than an agreed order addressing payments to Mother entered after Father learned that he was losing his job. Both Father and Mother seek an award of their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court correctly found a material change in circumstances but erred in imputing income to Father. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Callins v. NSK Steering Systems America, Inc.
Employee aggravated a pre-existing asymptomatic condition in her shoulder while working for Employer and failed to make a meaningful return to work. The trial court found employee to be 100 percent disabled and awarded permanent total disability benefits. Employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that employee sustained a compensable injury in the absence of anatomical change and in awarding employee permanent total disability benefits. After our review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Robert Morrow v. MBI and/or Mr. Bult's Inc.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, it is undisputed that Employee sustained an injury arising out of and in the scope of his employment; the issue on appeal, however, is whether Employee carried his burden of proving that his work-related injury caused a permanent disability. The trial court found that Employee failed to carry his burden of proving any permanent disability resulting from the injury. Based on our review of the evidence, we agree with the trial court’s finding, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Benton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas Zweig
Petitioner, Douglas Zweig, was convicted in 1981 of attempt to commit a felony: to wit, third degree burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-603 (1975). He was sentenced to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days in the Shelby County Correctional Center, but the trial court suspended his sentence to two years of probation after service of thirty days in confinement. In 2014, he filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, requesting that the trial court correct the judgment to reflect that he was convicted of a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The trial court denied his petition. Upon review, we conclude that petitioner’s conviction was a felony and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mario D. Thomas v. State of Tennessee
In this appeal, pro se Petitioner Mario D. Thomas challenges the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cassidy Lynne Aragon v. Reynaldo Manuel Aragon - Dissent
Because I find the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Father lacked a reasonable purpose for relocating, I respectfully dissent. As noted by the majority, we have defined “reasonable purpose” to mean “a significant purpose, substantial when weighed against the gravity of the loss of the non-custodial parent’s ability to participate fully in their children’s lives in a more meaningful way.” Redmon v. Redmon, No. W2013-01017-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1694708, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2014). In my view, such precedent represents a departure from the natural and ordinary meaning of the words found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108, otherwise known as the Parental Relocation Statute. Giving the words “reasonable purpose” their natural and ordinary meaning, from this record, I find that Mother failed to show Father lacked a reasonable purpose for relocating with their child. As such and because no other Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108(d)(1) ground was present that would prevent relocation, I would reverse the trial court and remand with instructions to approve the relocation. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In re Telisha B., et al.
Three children were removed from their home as a result of a petition filed by the Department of Children’s Services, alleging that the stepfather was guilty of sexual abuse of the oldest child. After the children were removed from the home, it was found that the Mother knew of but had failed to report previous abuse. The children were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected; the Department later filed a petition for termination of the Mother’s parental rights. Her parental rights were terminated as to all three children on the grounds of severe child abuse and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals the court’s holding that termination of her parental rights was in her children’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Richard G. Davis v. Tennessee Rural Health Improvement Association
Plaintiff policy holder filed suit against defendant insurance company after the insurance company denied his claim for benefits. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to utilize the appeals procedure outlined in the contract for insurance before filing a lawsuit. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Emilio Cisneros v. Lindsey Dianna Cisneros
This is a consolidated appeal from two separate actions arising from numerous competing petitions filed by the parents of two minor children. Due to the fact that the parents represented themselves during much of the trial court proceedings and at all times on appeal, the procedural history is muddled, the record is incomplete, and the briefs are of little assistance. The salient facts and procedural history are that a petition for divorce was filed in 2011 at which time both parties were represented by counsel. In December 2012, the trial court entered a final judgment whereby it declared the parties divorced, awarded Mother custody, and set child support. Father appealed, but soon thereafter he filed several petitions to modify custody and support. Mother answered and filed a petition for civil contempt against Father. The trial court found Father in civil contempt for failing to pay child support; he was incarcerated but released when the arrearage was paid. The court also entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Father from having contact with Mother. Father appealed several decisions in the second case. Based on post-judgment facts we agreed to consider, we are advised that Father filed an emergency petition in May 2015 to be granted custody due to Mother’s drug problems. After a hearing, the trial court awarded Father temporary custody, and the children remain in Father’s exclusive custody. Because Father has custody of the children, we are unable to provide Father meaningful relief with respect to this issue. The issues that are currently justiciable include: (1) whether the trial court is biased against Father; (2) the initial award of child support; (3) finding Father in civil contempt; (4) the injunction against Father; and (5) attorney’s fees awarded Mother. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Kuhn, et al v. Pam Panter dba Valley Mini Storage
This is negligence case. Appellees rented a storage unit from Appellant. The storage unit flooded, and the flooding destroyed Appellees’ personal property. Appellees filed suit against Appellant in general sessions court, claiming negligence and gross negligence. Appellees prevailed in general sessions court, and Appellant appealed the case to the trial court. After a bench trial, the trial court found the exculpatory clause in the parties’ rental agreement was void. The trial court also found that the Appellant’s rental of the unit to the Appellees, despite its knowledge of the obvious condition of flooding and advertising its units as dry, constituted gross negligence. We affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Blake Edward Childress
Defendant, Blake Edward Childress, was convicted by a Hamblen County Jury of incest. He was sentenced to six years in incarceration. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court improperly denied a motion to suppress; (2) the trial court improperly allowed introduction of evidence of prior bad acts; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. After a review, we determine Defendant properly invoked his right to counsel and, thereafter, was improperly subjected to continued discussion by a detective that produced an incriminating response. Consequently, the subsequent confession by Defendant was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. We determine the subsequent introduction of the confession at trial was not harmless error, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for new trial. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Michael Rigsby v. Marcy Leanne Rigsby
In this divorce case, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce based upon the sole statutory ground of irreconcilable differences, adopting and approving the parties‟ signed and notarized marital dissolution agreement and signed temporary parenting plan. The trial court subsequently entered two different parenting plans, designating the second plan as the permanent parenting plan. The mother has appealed the entry of the subsequent parenting plans. Determining that the trial court lacked authority to enter a temporary parenting plan concomitant with a final decree of divorce, we vacate the later plans and reinstate the original temporary parenting plan, designating it to be the controlling permanent parenting plan in this action. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Memphis Bonding Company, Inc. v. Criminal Court of Tennessee 30th District, et al.
This appeal involves a challenge to a local rule of the criminal court in Shelby County. The lawsuit was filed in the chancery court. After a hearing, the chancery court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and entered a temporary injunction prohibiting the criminal court and its ten judges from enforcing a section of the local rule. We granted an application for an extraordinary appeal filed by the criminal court and its judges. We reverse the chancery court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, vacate the temporary injunction and remand for dismissal of the complaint. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy Bode v. The Hartford Insurance Company
The employee successfully pursued a Request for Assistance (“RFA”) through the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“DOL”) for treatment of deep vein thrombosis resulting from a fall at work in February 2006. In January 2013, she filed a second RFA alleging that she required knee replacement surgery as a result of the same incident. DOL denied her request, and she filed this action in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County. The trial court dismissed her claim based on the expiration of the statute of limitations, laches, waiver, and estoppel. She has appealed that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon review, we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s granting of the motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations and reverse the judgment on that issue. Additionally, there are genuine issues of fact as to the equitable defenses. Therefore, we remand the case for further consideration consistent with this ruling. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Carolyn Primm v. Tennessee Board of Appeals, et al
The plaintiff has appealed from a final order entered on September 25, 2015, dismissing her Petition for Judicial Review. Because the plaintiff did not file her notice of appeal within the thirty day time period required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Raven P.
This is an appeal from a juvenile court order assessing a portion of the mother’s attorney’s fees against the father’s counsel. Because the father’s counsel did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre De'Lane Ross
The Appellant, Andre De'Lane Ross, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion for correction of a clerical error on the face of his possession of cocaine judgment. In this appeal, the Appellant submits that the trial court erred in denying his motion because, at the guilty plea hearing, the court found that his plea to this charge lacked a sufficient factual basis but a guilty judgment was, thereafter, erroneously entered. Based on our review, we dismiss the appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Mitchell
The Defendant-Appellant, Thomas Mitchell, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of burglary of a building, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(1). As a Range III, persistent offender, he was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in applying certain enhancement factors. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Denver Case
A Dickson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, James Denver Case, of first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and the trial court immediately sentenced him to life in prison for the murder conviction. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eight years for aggravated robbery and three years for aggravated burglary with all of the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by instructing the grand jury in the presence of the jury venire, and that the trial court erred by allowing the deliberating jury to view a video in the courtroom without the appellant’s being present. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals |