In re Addison M.
This appeal arises out of juvenile delinquency proceedings in Knox County Juvenile Court. Due to numerous deficiencies in the proceedings below, we vacate the delinquency adjudication and remand for dismissal of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Battery Alliance, Inc. v. T & L Sales, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff brought suit after defendant-company defaulted on its obligation to pay for goods it received on credit. Plaintiff also brought a claim for breach of contract against defendant-president and defendant-employee of the defendant-company pursuant to an individual guaranty agreement signed by both. A default judgment was entered against the president of the company, but the employee disputes that he signed the individual guaranty in his individual capacity. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, concluding that the individual guaranty was unambiguous and the employee was thus liable in his individual capacity. We vacate the trial court‘s decision granting summary judgment because the individual guaranty is ambiguous and remand with instructions to consider parol evidence. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Hall
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Andrew Hall, was found guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUI). He had been charged in the same indictment with violation of the implied consent law, and the trial court found him guilty of that offense in a bench trial. Prior to the jury trial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges because no lawful prosecution was initiated within the applicable statute of limitations. After a hearing, the motion was denied. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Amy Diane Riggs v. Farmers Mutual Of Tennessee
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in an action on a homeowner’s insurance policy. The home of the insured party was damaged by a fire on May 29, 2011. The insured submitted proof of loss to the insurer pursuant to her homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer requested additional information from the insured to complete the proof of loss, which the insured provided. The insurer subsequently denied coverage. The insured party filed suit against insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the insured party’s claims were barred by the one-year contractual limitations period. We reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
John Ivory v. State of Tennessee
Following the apparent denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, the Petitioner, John Ivory, filed a pro se motion to reconsider the denial of relief, which the post-conviction court denied without a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider the denial of post-conviction relief. Because the Petitioner does not have an appeal as of right from the denial of such motion, we dismiss the appeal. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Niuklee, LLC v. Commissioner, TN Dept. of Revenue
The Commissioner of Revenue assessed a tax based on the taxpayer’s use of an aircraft purchased out of state. Taxpayer sought review from the Tennessee Department of Revenue but was denied relief following an informal hearing. Taxpayer paid the tax and filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a refund on the ground that it qualified for the sale for resale exemption in the Tennessee Retailers’ Sales Tax Act because it provided the seller with a certificate of resale and immediately leased the aircraft to third party users. The Department responded, arguing that the leases did not satisfy the exemption’s “bona fide sale” requirement. Following a non-jury trial, the Chancery Court reversed the Department’s assessment, concluding that the exemption applied because (1) the leases were legitimate and not illusory and were not chiefly motivated by tax avoidance, (2) the economic substance doctrine has not been adopted in Tennessee to analyze the “bona fide sale” requirement, and (3) the Department failed to present proof sufficient to pierce the corporate veil of the taxpayer. The Department appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott L. Bishop
The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Scott L. Bishop (“the Defendant”) with four counts of aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged, and the trial court ordered concurrent sentences for an effective sentence of eleven years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the trial court failed to act as a thirteenth juror; (3) the trial court should have granted the Defendant a new trial based on newly discovered alibi and impeachment evidence; (4) the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to ask leading questions during the direct examination of the nine-year-old victim; (6) a juror's sleeping during the jury instructions requires a new trial; (7) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive; and (8) cumulative error necessitates granting a new trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Brown
The defendant, Carl Brown, sought relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to vacate and correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence, the judgments in question not stating whether they were to be served concurrently or consecutively. The trial court concluded the motion was without merit, and, following our review, we affirm the court’s order denying the motion for relief, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Adrianne Kiser v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Adrianne Kiser, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, he asserts that: (1) the post-conviction court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating trial counsel's performance and the resulting prejudice, and (2) if the post-conviction court applied the correct standard, then the court's interpretation of that standard renders Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-106(e) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13 section 5(a)(2) unconstitutional as applied to him. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Seddrick Curry
The defendant, Seddrick Curry, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony; and one count of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to serve an effective sentence of thirty years at 60%. Subsequently, he filed a motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty, which was denied following a hearing. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the pleas. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
Owner of back-to-back billboards filed a petition for review challenging the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) to revoke his billboard permits on the ground that the billboards were not in compliance with the TDOT spacing requirements. We find substantial and material evidence to support the decision of the TDOT Commissioner and, therefore, affirm the chancellor’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby McEarl v. City of Brownsville
This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff alleges he slipped and fell in a leaf-filled gutter maintained by defendant. Plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant failed to properly maintain and warn pedestrians of a dangerous condition. Because the trial court granted defendant summary judgment without making findings of fact or stating the legal basis for its decision before instructing defendant to prepare an order, we vacate the trial court’s order of summary judgment and remand. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Haughton Webber
A jury convicted the defendant, Dennis Haughton Webber, of driving with a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor; disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor; failure to display his registration plates, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to carry a registration, a Class C misdemeanor. The defendant on appeal challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court. We interpret his other issues to be challenges to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to impose its judgments on the defendant. However, we reverse the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct because the evidence was not sufficient to support it as it was charged in the indictment. We affirm the remaining judgments of the trial court. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frederick L. Moore v. State of Tennessee
Frederick L. Moore (“the Petitioner”) filed his second petition for writ of error coram nobis, presenting “newly discovered evidence” in the form of expert testimony regarding cell phone towers accessed by the Petitioner's cell phone at the time of the offense. The coram nobis court denied relief without a hearing, finding that the Petitioner's claim was time-barred, that the evidence was not newly discovered, and that it was not the type of evidence which might have produced a different result at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffrey A. Miller v. State of Tennessee
A parking lot attendant injured his neck in the course of his employment with the University of Tennessee. He claimed that he was not able to return to his previous work and filed for total and permanent disability. The Claims Commission found that he was permanently and totally disabled. The University has appealed, contending that the Commission erroneously admitted certain testimony from the employee’s vocational evaluator. It further contends that the evidence preponderates against the finding of permanent total disability. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. After our review, we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Frederick Alexander Avery v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Frederick Alexander Avery, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jordan Thomas Peters - concurring
Given the clear and apparently controlling case law concerning convictions enhanced pursuant to the Drug Free School Zone Act (the Act), I must reluctantly concur. However, I write separately to set forth my ever increasing concern regarding enhancement of convictions under the Act. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy D. Seagraves
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Roy Seagraves, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant. He properly reserved a certified question of law for appeal. The question of law is dispositive of the case. Having reviewed the record in this case, we hold that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charges with prejudice. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, D/B/A Erlanger Health System
We granted permission to appeal to address whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in this lawsuit brought by a hospital against a TennCare managed care organization (MCO). The hospital alleged in its complaint that the MCO had not paid the hospital all of the monies due for emergency services provided to the MCO’s TennCare enrollees. In its answer, the MCO asserted that it had paid the hospital in accordance with TennCare regulations; the MCO also filed a counterclaim regarding overpayments made pursuant to the TennCare regulations. The MCO filed a motion for partial summary judgment. It argued that the hospital’s allegations implicitly challenged the applicability and/or validity of the TennCare regulations, so the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) required the hospital to exhaust its administrative remedies by bringing those issues to TennCare prior to filing suit. Absent exhaustion of administrative remedies, the MCO argued, the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The trial court agreed; it dismissed the hospital’s lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the MCO’s counterclaim as well. The Court of Appeals reversed; it concluded that the hospital’s lawsuit was simply a dispute regarding the interpretation of statutes and regulations, over which the trial court had jurisdiction. The MCO appeals. Looking at the substance of the parties’ dispute rather than simply the face of the hospital’s complaint, we hold that the UAPA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies in this matter to the extent that resolution of the parties’ claims would necessarily require the trial court to render a declaratory judgment concerning the validity or applicability of TennCare regulations. While the UAPA prohibits the trial court from rendering such declaratory relief absent exhaustion of administrative remedies, it does not address claims for damages. In this case, both parties have asserted damage claims that hinge on the issues to be addressed in the administrative proceedings. Under these circumstances, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint and the counterclaim and remand the case to the trial court with directions to hold the parties’ damage claims in abeyance pending resolution of administrative proceedings regarding the validity or applicability of the TennCare regulations at issue. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Shasta Jackson
Defendant, Shasta Jackson, appeals after being convicted by a Knox County jury of two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of second degree murder, one count of attempted second degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal, Defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court's refusal to allow an expert witness testify about eyewitness identification; (3) introduction of evidence relating to Defendant's membership in the “Westside 111 Neighborhood Crips”; (4) introduction of pictures from Defendant's Facebook page; (5) the decision by the trial court to strike the testimony of a defense witness after he refused to answer a question on cross-examination; and (6) the length of her sentence. After a review of the record, we determine that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shelby Lesean Harris
The Defendant, Shelby Lesean Harris, was indicted for one count of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and facilitation of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403. The trial court merged the Defendant’s conviction for facilitation of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine into his conviction for facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court then sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years and six months. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the in-court identification of the Defendant by two confidential informants; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ray Neil Thompson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ray Neil Thompson, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Davidson County. He was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery and later entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest. For these offenses, he received an effective sentence of fifty years at 100 percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edward Thomas Kendrick III v. State of Tennessee
This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Petitioner, Edward Thomas Kendrick III,1 was convicted by a jury of the first degree premeditated murder of his wife. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, raising, inter alia, numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. On appeal, a panel of this court granted the Petitioner post-conviction relief, concluding that he had established that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial due to (1) trial counsel‘s failure to offer expert proof about the trigger mechanism in the rifle, which was known to cause accidental shootings; and (2) trial counsel‘s failure to seek to admit, as excited utterances, out-of-court statements by a crime-scene investigator made to his fellow officers after he shot himself in the foot with the Petitioner‘s rifle. Our supreme court disagreed, reversing our conclusion that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel with regard to these two issues. The case has now been remanded to us for consideration of the issues that were pretermitted by this court after finding the two issues to be meritorious. Those pretermitted issues are as follows: (1) whether trial counsel erred by waiving the Petitioner‘s attorney-client privilege with his divorce attorney and, in so doing, allowed the State to insinuate adultery as a motive for the shooting; (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call the Petitioner‘s cousin, Randall Leftwich, to testify about the Petitioner‘s activities on the day of the shooting and about his discovery of cabbage simmering on the Petitioner‘s stove immediately following the shooting; (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective when he ―opened the door‖ on direct examination of the Petitioner for the State to inquire about additional misdemeanor convictions on cross-examination that had not been previously admissible; (4) whether trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately challenge Lennell Shepheard‘s testimony that the Petitioner stood over the victim‘s body and said "I told you so" six times; (5) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Officer William Lapoint to testify about the Petitioner‘s "very distraught" demeanor at the airport just after the shooting; (6) whether trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective when they did not object or raise on appeal the issue of Detective Mark Rawlston‘s volunteered testimony that the Petitioner never told him that the gun accidentally discharged when interviewed in the back of a patrol car at the airport; (7) whether trial counsel‘s failure to seek curative measures for a security officer‘s, Ms. Martha Maston, surprise testimony about the Petitioner‘s daughter‘s statement at the airport was ineffective; and (8) whether the cumulative impact of counsels‘ errors entitle him to relief. After consideration of these remaining issues, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jordan Thomas Peters
Defendant, Jordan Thomas Peters, was convicted of one count of delivery of psilocin, a Schedule I controlled substance, and one count of delivery of psilocin within 1000 feet of a school. Defendant received a total effective sentence of fifteen years to serve at 100%. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether a retrial for delivery of a controlled substance violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy after Defendant was originally acquitted of sale of a controlled substance; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel discovery of the case names and files of other cases in which the confidential informant had been involved; (3) whether the trial court erred by giving acquittal-first jury instructions, precluding the jury from considering the inference of casual exchange; (4) whether the trial court erred in not giving a specific instruction with regard to the defense of entrapment by luring into a school zone; (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (6) whether his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime committed and therefore unconstitutional. Upon our thorough review of the arguments, record, and authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charlotte D. Culpepper v. Brandon K. Culpepper
This appeal arises from an action for divorce wherein the trial court ordered the parties’ marital debt to be divided in a nearly equal fashion. The trial court awarded child support to the wife, who was designated primary residential parent and who received a greater share of co-parenting time with the children. The court also awarded child support retroactive to the date of the filing of the divorce complaint. In addition, the court allocated both federal tax exemptions for the children to the wife. The husband has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment with a slight modification in the amount of the child support arrearage award. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |