Jon Vazeen v. Martin Sir
M2022-00273-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

Former client sued his former attorney for legal malpractice and fraud. The trial court initially dismissed all claims, but was reversed on appeal as to the fraud claims. The trial court then held a bench trial and found in favor of the defendant attorney. In a second appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of all fraud claims except a fraud claim related to the hourly rate charged under the parties’ written contract. That claim was remanded to the trial court for purposes of consideration of the factors outlined in in Alexander v. Inman, 974 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. 1998). On remand, the trial judge denied the plaintiff’s efforts to disqualify him from the case and to enlarge the scope of the trial. A bench trial was eventually held, despite the plaintiff’s multiple efforts to postpone. After a late motion to continue was denied, the plaintiff did not attend trial. Following the bench trial, the trial court once again ruled in favor of the defendant attorney, resulting in the dismissal of all claims against him. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Benjamin McCurry v. Agness McCurry
E2023-00995-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas J. Wright

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final
appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Raghu Singh
W2022-01560-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Mr. Raghu Singh, guilty of two counts of
driving under the influence and one count of reckless driving. The trial court sentenced
the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, after service of
ten days in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally
insufficient to sustain his convictions for driving under the influence. He also asserts that
the trial court erred (1) in finding that the State had established a proper chain of custody
for his blood sample; and (2) by denying a motion to suppress statements he made at the
scene. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee, ex rel., Nene Gloria Ananaba v. Okebugwu Sunju Ananaba
W2022-00443-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Magistrate Nancy Percer Kessler

Mother filed a petition alleging civil and criminal contempt against the father of her child
due to unpaid child support. After several continuances, including based on Mother’s
request for an in-person hearing, the juvenile court heard the matter remotely via ZOOM.
At the start of the hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s request for a continuance for an
in-person hearing. The trial court also ruled that it had the authority to choose whether
Mother would prosecute her action as civil contempt or criminal contempt. The trial court
ruled that Mother’s petition would be treated solely as a civil contempt matter, but then
refused to punish Father for his past willful failure to pay child support because he had
made a purge payment. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further
proceedings.

Mark T. Stinson, Sr. v. Mr. Cooper
W2023-00161-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins

Appellant, Mark T. Stinson, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court
that was entered on January 27, 2023. We determine that the January 27, 2023 order does
not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

State of Tennessee v. Amanda Jean Phillips
E2022-01699-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Zachary R. Walden

The Defendant, Amanda Jean Phillips, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to “Set
Aside, Amend and/or Correct Improper and Unlawful Judgments.” The Defendant argues
(1) that her judgments are void due to noncompliance with the statutes and rules governing
the entry of judgment forms and (2) that she is entitled to relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule
of Criminal Procedure 36. Following our review, we have determined that we lack
jurisdiction to hear the Defendant’s voidness arguments and that the Defendant has waived
review of her Rule 36 claim. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

William Patrick Roberson A/K/A William Patrick Robinson v. State of Tennessee
W2022-01408-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bruce Irwin Griffey

The petitioner, William Patrick Robinson, appeals pro se from the Circuit Court of
Carroll County’s dismissal of his third request for post-conviction relief. Following
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Jason White v. State of Tennessee
W2022-01437-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Robert Carter, Jr.

Petitioner, Jason White, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues: (1) the post-conviction court abused its discretion by failing to recuse itself; (2) the post-conviction court abused its discretion by denying Petitioner a full and fair post-conviction procedure; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in numerous areas; and (4) he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court, but remand the case to the post-conviction court for the entry of amended judgments that properly reflect the offenses for which Petitioner was indicted and convicted.

State of Tennessee v. Eleanor Grace Hoffman
M2022-00357-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry B. Stanley, Jr.

The Appellant, Eleanor Grace Hoffman, filed a motion to suppress challenging the search of her purse during a traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant was convicted as charged by a Warren County jury of simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Appellant’s application for judicial diversion was granted, and she was sentenced to two concurrent terms of eleven months and twentynine days suspended to supervised probation after service of ten days’ imprisonment. A probation violation order was entered, and the Appellant conceded to violating the terms of probation before the trial court. The trial court revoked her probationary judicial diversion sentence, entered judgments of conviction for simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, and ordered the Appellant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment, with the possibility of furlough to an inpatient drug treatment facility after service of ninety days’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Alternatively, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred in revoking her diversionary probation and ordering service of her original sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and revocation of the Appellant’s probation but remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the consequence imposed for the revocation.

In Re Amayzha L.
M2023-00044-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sheila Calloway

This is an appeal of the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“Juvenile Court”) seeking the termination of the parental rights of Horace L. (“Father”) to his minor daughter Amayzha L. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court found that DCS had established by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) persistence of conditions, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. Determining that DCS presented insufficient evidence to establish that the Child was removed from Father’s home or physical or legal custody, we reverse the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights.

State of Tennessee v. Jason Lee Schutt
M2022-00905-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Forest A. Durard, Jr.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Appellant, Jason Lee Schutt, of alternative counts of possession of hydrocodone with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-408(b)(1)(F), -417(a), -417(c)(2)(A). The trial court properly merged the above counts, and following a sentencing hearing, the Appellant was ordered to serve nine years and six months in confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the alleged controlled substance was not verified by chemical analysis as hydrocodone, and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Joseph Marquis Jeffries v. State Of Tennessee
M2022-00865-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge James G. Martin, III

The Petitioner, Joseph Marquis Jeffries, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts each of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment, and one count each of domestic assault, interference with emergency communications, trafficking for a commercial sex act, promotion of prostitution, and evading arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately explore racial bias during voir dire and (2) failing to seek additional time for the Petitioner to consider the State’s plea agreement. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Kentrell Dickerson
W2022-00431-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

The Appellant, Nicholas Kentrell Dickerson, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s
orders revoking his probation and imposing his original sentences for various drug
convictions and a felony evading arrest. The Appellant contends the trial court abused its
discretion in revoking his probation because (1) the alleged violations were based on new
charges that were subsequently dismissed, and (2) the remaining violations were technical
in nature and not a valid basis for full revocation under Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-311(e)(1)(A) (2022). Upon our review, we affirm.

In Re Tinsley L.
E2022-00965-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Michael Sharp

In this appeal from the termination of parental rights, the mother does not challenge the
grounds for terminating her rights. Rather she argues that the evidence was less than clear
and convincing that termination was in the child’s best interest. After a review of both the
statutory grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Stacy M. Miller
E2022-01040-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jeffrey Wicks

The Defendant, Stacy M. Miller, was convicted by a Meigs County Criminal Court jury of
three counts of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, especially
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft of property valued at less than $1000.
See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony
murder), 39-13-212 (2018) (criminally negligent homicide), 39-13-305 (2018) (especially
aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft).
The trial court merged the three first degree felony murder convictions and imposed an
effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is
insufficient to support her first degree felony murder convictions and (2) the trial court
erred in failing to merge the criminally negligent homicide conviction with the first degree
felony murder conviction and to merge the theft conviction with the aggravated robbery
conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected
judgments reflecting the requested mergers of convictions and for correction of the
judgment form in Count 6 to reflect the correct conviction offense, aggravated robbery.

State of Tennessee v. Dan E. Durell
E2022-01800-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

The pro se petitioner, Dan E. Durrell, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

CIC Services, LLC v. Suresh Prabhu, et al.
W2022-01431-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gina C. Higgins

This case involves a dispute arising from services provided by the appellee, CIC Services, LLC (“CIC”), a creator and manager of “captive” insurance companies, to the appellant corporation, SRM Group, Inc. (“SRM”).  SRM hired CIC to form and manage two captive insurance companies to serve SRM in risk management, and the parties memorialized their relationship in two management agreements, one for each of the newly formed captive insurance companies.  When CIC subsequently ended its contractual relationship with SRM for cause, SRM demanded arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses contained in the agreements.  The arbitrator dismissed all of SRM’s claims.  CIC then demanded a second arbitration, seeking attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration and stating claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement against SRM.  The second arbitrator ultimately awarded to CIC $261,487.04 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration proceeding, pursuant to the indemnity clauses in the parties’ management agreements, and $137,337.50 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs because CIC was the substantially prevailing party in the second arbitration.  When SRM did not respond to CIC’s demand for payment of this award, CIC moved for confirmation of the award in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”).   SRM responded by filing a motion with the trial court to modify or vacate the award.  After the parties fully briefed the issues, the trial court confirmed the award in full and concomitantly denied SRM’s motion to modify or vacate.  SRM timely appealed.  Upon review, we  affirm the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration award, determining that because appellant Suresh Prabhu voluntarily participated in both arbitrations without raising objection to the potential attachment of liability against him as an individual, Mr. Prabhu and SRM have waived objection to the attachment of individual liability to Mr. Prabhu.  We further determine that the trial court properly denied SRM’s motion to vacate the award because the second arbitrator acted within her discretion to direct the arbitration procedure and SRM has failed to show any of the criteria necessary to meet the high standard for vacatur pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act or the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.

In Re Conservatorship of Gregory Blake Arvin
M2022-01808-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. B. Cox

This appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding. The issues on appeal concern the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem in the amount of $1,060. The trial court assessed the fees against the petitioners and the respondent, jointly and severally. The petitioners appeal, contending that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-125, the court had no discretion but to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent. The petitioners and the estate of the respondent also challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent on other grounds. We have determined that the trial court was statutorily required to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent and that it lacked the discretion to assess the fees against the petitioners. We have also determined that the petitioners have no standing to challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent and that the issues raised by the estate of the respondent lack merit. Thus, we reverse the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem against the petitioners but affirm the assessment of the fees against the respondent.

State of Tennessee v. Raymond D. Arwood
E2022-01292-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Alex E. Pearson

A Hamblen County jury convicted Defendant, Raymond D. Arwood, of one count of sexual
exploitation of a minor involving more than fifty images. The trial court imposed a
sentence of ten years as a Range II, multiple offender to be served in confinement. On
appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
suppress certain photographs and that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction. After reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Wayne Seidel
M2022-01169-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda Jane McClendon

Defendant, Jeffrey Wayne Seidel, challenges the denial of his pre-sentencing motion to
withdraw his guilty plea to second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”). Defendant
contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the factors set out by our
supreme court in State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 447 (Tenn. 2010), and that he established
a “fair and just reason” to permit the withdrawal of his guilty plea. After a thorough review
of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Douglas R. Roach
M2022-00871-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

The Defendant, Douglas R. Roach, was convicted of ten counts of especially aggravated
kidnapping and received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed especially
aggravated kidnapping because the evidence did not show that he accomplished the
kidnappings through use or display of a deadly weapon or that he used the victims as
hostages or human shields. The State responds that the evidence was sufficient to support
his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Archie Meeks
W2022-01327-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Archie Lee Meeks, of aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon, assault by offensive touching, and aggravated criminal trespass, and
the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we
affirm the trial court’s judgments.

State of Tennessee v. Tyler Hemmingway
W2022-01248-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jennifer Johnson Mitchell

The Defendant, Tyler Hemmingway, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court
jury of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard
offender to eight years at 100 percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On
appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce a photograph of the
Defendant’s bedroom that showed a pornographic poster on the wall. Based on our review,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. David Eugene Dunlap
E2022-00593-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

The defendant, David Eugene Dunlap, Alias, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury
convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, possession of a firearm after having been convicted
of a crime of violence, possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the
commission of a dangerous felony, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence,
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession with intent to
sell or deliver, and that the trial court erred by declining to sentence him under the amended
Drug-Free Zone statute. Discerning no error, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Charles Jonathan Murphy
W2022-01682-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kyle C. Atkins

The Defendant, Charles Jonathan Murphy, was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of rape, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to ten years for each conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years at 100 % in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing him by misapplying an enhancement factor and ordering consecutive sentences. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.