Kellum Williams v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kellum Williams, appeals as of right from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated kidnapping and resulting sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to: (1) sufficiently emphasize at trial the theory that the victim died in Montgomery County rather than in Robertson County, as testified to by the State’s experts; (2) seek an independent expert “to test samples from the crime scene”; (3) raise as a defense that venue of the trial should have been in Robertson County instead of Montgomery County; and (4) more extensively question witnesses to demonstrate Petitioner’s “non-participation in the events leading to [the victim’s] death.” Petitioner further asserts that he is entitled to relief based upon cumulative error. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roger Fulmer et al. v. Sarco, GP d/b/a Sarco et al.
This is an action to recover amounts due under a promissory note. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, attorney’s fees of one-third of that amount, and prejudgment interest on both the compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that the individual defendants are individually liable on the obligation and that the ad damnum clause permitted the plaintiffs to recover $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, plus attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest. We vacate the attorney’s fees award and remand for a determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees. We reverse the award of prejudgment interest on the attorney’s fees award only. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Cole Bryan Howell, III v. United Rentals (North America), Inc., Et Al.
The plaintiff appeals from the grant of summary judgment to the defendants in this action. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Isaiah Harris
Defendant, Isaiah Harris, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary sentence |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Jayla S.
The parents of Jayla S. appeal the termination of their parental rights. Jayla was removed from her parents’ custody because Jayla tested positive for amphetamines at birth. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) subsequently filed a petition to terminate both parents’ parental rights. Following a two-day trial, the trial court found that multiple grounds for termination had been proven, including the ground of severe child abuse. Finding it also to be in the best interest of Jayla that her parents’ parental rights be terminated, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Alsco, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Revenue- Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. As the majority notes, an administrative judge determined that the taxpayer’s sanitizing operations in this case do not constitute “manufacturing” as they are not “processing” tangible personal property. The administrative judge reasoned that a taxpayer is required to show that its activity fundamentally changes or transforms the property from the state or form in which it originally existed. Applying that standard, the administrative judge found that the state or form of the linens has not been changed or altered by the cleaning, as they remain the same linens before and after. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Clint Earl Sims v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Clint Earl Sims, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, three counts of domestic assault, three counts of vandalism less than $1,000, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of violating an order of protection. Petitioner also argues counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude Petitioner’s appeal is untimely, the interest of justice does not favor waiver of the untimely notice, and therefore, this appeal is dismissed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alsco, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Revenue
A taxpayer who rented hygienically-clean textiles to its customers challenged the revocation of three industrial machinery tax exemption certificates that it had previously been issued. An administrative judge determined that the taxpayer was not entitled to the exemption because the taxpayer’s operations did not constitute “manufacturing” as they were not necessary for processing tangible personal property. The taxpayer appealed to the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The chancery court reversed after concluding that the administrative decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Patrece Edwards-Bradford v. Kellogg Company, et al.
Employee Patrece Edwards-Bradford filed a petition for benefit determination seeking permanent disability benefits for an alleged back injury. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims denied Employee's claim, finding that she had not rebutted the presumption of correctness afforded to the causation and impairment opinions of her authorized treating physicians, and was therefore not entitled to permanent disability benefits. Employee has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for consideration and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
State of Tennessee v. Riki Kale Moss
In 2020, the Defendant, Riki Kale Moss, was indicted for violation of the implied consent law, driving under the influence (“DUI”) by impairment, and DUI, per se. The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop of his vehicle. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, and the State filed a motion to reconsider on the grounds that law enforcement had probable cause to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. The trial court issued a revised order denying the motion to suppress, and a jury convicted the Defendant of DUI by impairment and DUI per se. The Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Monica A. Davalos (Dale) v. Douglas C. Dale
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher David Pace
Defendant, Christopher David Pace, entered a partially open plea in which the length of his |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chad Aaron Reagan v. Rachel Bogart Reagan
The March 9, 2023 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Jessie Lee Short
The Defendant, Jessie Lee Short, was convicted by a Hardin County Circuit Court jury of |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re James T.
A foster mother filed a petition to terminate parental rights and adopt a minor child. This appeal concerns the rights of a putative father who signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity asserting that he was the biological father of the minor child. We have determined that the foster mother had standing to challenge the VAP, and we affirm the trial court’s decision disestablishing the putative father’s status as legal father. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Susan M. Austin v. Tommy Joe Richmond
Mother appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her petition for civil contempt and |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Welch et al. v. Oaktree Health and Rehabilitation Center LLC d/b/a Christian Care Centers of Memphis et al.
Tennessee’s Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 34-6-201 to -218, includes a provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who rely in good faith on health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -208. Tennessee’s Health Care Decisions Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 68-11-1801 to -1815, includes a similar provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who comply in good faith with health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -1810. The health care decision in this case is the execution of an arbitration agreement with admission to a nursing home. The agreement was signed by an agent under a durable power of attorney for health care executed several years earlier. After the resident’s death, his estate filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the nursing home on negligence theories. On appeal from the trial court’s denial of the defendant nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration, we hold that the nursing home does not meet the requirements for limited statutory immunity from civil liability under either the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act or the Health Care Decisions Act. Consequently, the trial court did not err in considering evidence on whether the principal had the requisite mental capacity to execute the durable power of attorney for health care. We overrule the holding on the immunity provision in the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-6-208, in Owens v. National Health Corporation, 263 S.W.3d 876, 889 n.4 (Tenn. 2007), to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. We affirm the trial court, reverse the Court of Appeals, and remand to the Court of Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Paul Lebel v. CWS Marketing Group, Inc.
The plaintiff purchased a home at an auction. The home was sold “as is.” The plaintiff |
Court of Appeals | ||
John Stanley Jarnagin v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center Et Al.
The Plaintiff brought suit alleging the Defendants failed to obtain informed consent prior to conducting a medical procedure. The Defendants responded with a consent form signed by the Plaintiff detailing the potential side effects of the procedure of which the Plaintiff asserted he had not been informed, and they moved for summary judgment. The Plaintiff argued the consent form in the present case was inadequate to establish informed consent. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. The Plaintiff appealed, challenging the validity of the signed consent form based on an alleged misrepresentation and his inability to read because of an eye condition, and arguing, therefore, that there is a material question of fact as to whether informed consent was obtained. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Defari R.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The juvenile court |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Sarah N. Eakes
The Defendant, Sarah N. Eakes, pleaded guilty to one count of child neglect, and the trial court sentenced her to serve eighteen months in confinement and denied her request for both an alternative sentence and judicial diversion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her requests for an alternative sentence and judicial diversion, and she asks this court to enter an order granting both. The State concedes that the trial court failed to consider or weigh the relevant factors in its denial, but it asks this court to remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and grant judicial diversion. The matter is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of the conditions, and term of judicial diversion, with the term not to exceed eighteen months. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Waste Management, Inc. of Tennessee v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County By and Through Davidson County Solid Waste Region Board
This appeal involves judicial review of the denial of approval to expand a private |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jon Beck v. Dyer County Board of Education, et al.
A tenured teacher appealed his dismissal for insubordination, neglect of duty, and |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Hasty v. Greyhawk Development Corporation
A plaintiff obtained a default judgment against a corporation. Ten months later, the plaintiff moved to pierce the corporate veil and enforce the judgment against an alleged alter ego of the corporation. The trial court denied the motion. Because the judgment was final and the alleged alter ego was never made a party to the action, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Pervis Tyrone Payne
In this case of first impression, the State appeals the trial court’s sentencing hearing order |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |