Opinions
Matthew Long v. Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund
Matthew Long applied for disability pension benefits from the Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund. After a hearing by the Fund’s Board of Trustees, his application was denied. Mr. Long sought judicial review. The trial court reviewed the denial of benefits under Tennessee’s Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) and held that the Board’s interpretation of the Pension Benefits Policy was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by sufficient and material evidence. The trial court reversed the Board’s decision and awarded Mr. Long benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals found the Policy ambiguous and construed it liberally in favor of Mr. Long. On appeal to this Court, the Fund challenges the reversal of the Board’s decision. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in finding the Policy ambiguous and in construing it liberally. We hold that under a fair reading of the Policy, the Board’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by sufficient and material evidence, or otherwise reversible under the UAPA. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Ashley Denson ex rel. Bobbie J. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge et al.
This case clarifies who may be “the claimant authorizing the notice” under the health care liability pre-suit notice statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(B). Ashley Denson died after being admitted to the hospital. Her mother Bobbie Jo Denson took in Ashley’s two minor children and obtained legal custody of them. Bobbie Jo sent pre-suit notice to defendant health care providers identifying herself as the “claimant authorizing the notice” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(B). She subsequently filed suit on her own behalf and on behalf of the minor children, ultimately pursuing the claim solely on behalf of the minor children. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing Bobbie Jo did not comply with pre-suit notice requirements because she did not identify the children as the claimants. The trial court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss but granted their motion for interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Bobbie Jo did not comply with pre-suit notice requirements because the children were the claimants but not identified as such. We now reverse. Bobbie Jo Denson is “the claimant authorizing the notice” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 121(a)(2)(B), as minor children cannot authorize pre-suit notice and file suit on their own behalf. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court. |
Anderson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jacob Columbus Deal
In May 2023, the Greene County Grand Jury issued a presentment against Defendant, Jacob Columbus Deal, charging him with three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure and three counts of aggravated statutory rape. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated statutory rape to be sentenced out of range at ten years as a Range I offender at thirty percent with the trial court to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve his entire ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him alternative sentencing. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Warren Trotter
A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant, Phillip Warren Trotter, of statutory rape by an authority figure, incest, attempted statutory rape by an authority figure, and attempted incest. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. On August 8, 2025, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgments. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 seeking review of the trial court’s order denying bail pending appeal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144. The State has filed a response in opposition to the motion. Upon full consideration of the motion, the response, and the applicable legal authority, the Defendant’s motion is DENIED. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
Marilyn Butcher, et al. v. Shelby County Board of Education
Appellee was injured in an automobile accident where Appellant’s, a governmental entity, employee was 100% at-fault. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that Appellant’s governmental immunity had been removed; (2) admitting testimony from two of Appellee’s treating physicians; and (3) admitting certain medical billing records. Appellees ask this Court to award frivolous appeal damages. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court order and deny Appellees’ request for appellate attorney’s fees. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DANIEL JOSEPH WILLIAMS
The Defendant has filed an application for interlocutory appeal, see Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 9, seeking review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from a search of his vehicle. The Defendant argues that interlocutory review of the trial court’s order is required to prevent irreparable harm and to prevent needless and protracted litigation. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1) and (2). The State has filed an answer in opposition to the Defendant’s application. Following our review, the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal is DENIED. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Dakari M.
This is the second appeal by a mother and a father of the termination of their parental rights. We have concluded that the juvenile court correctly determined that a ground for termination existed as to the father. Regarding Mother, we find that the court erred in its analysis finding a ground for termination. We also conclude that the court failed to make sufficient findings regarding the ground for termination and vacate this portion of the order and remand for further proceedings. We also conclude that the juvenile court did not make sufficient findings of fact in its best interests analysis regarding Father. Therefore, we also vacate this part of the order and remand the matter for the juvenile court to enter an order that makes sufficient findings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re the Name Change of Alessandria A. et al.
Father appeals the trial court’s order changing his children’s surnames from his surname to another family name. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we do not address four of his stated issues. As to his final issue, because the appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we have no evidence to review. Accordingly, we must presume that the evidence presented at the final hearing supports the trial court’s conclusion that the name change was in the children’s best interests. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Conservatorship of Joan Perrett Gaskin
In this conservatorship action, the trial court’s appointment of the ward’s stepdaughter as conservator has been appealed by the ward’s nephew and ostensibly the ward herself. Because the record leaves us unable to discern the basis of the trial court’s decisions, we vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand for the entry of an appropriate order. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Demarcus Keyon Cole v. Julian Wiser, Sheriff
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DENIED. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ambreia Washington
Ambreia Washington (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of, among other offenses, unlawful possession of a firearm. Before trial, the Defendant moved to suppress the firearm a law enforcement officer seized from the vehicle the Defendant was driving. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments, including the trial court’s ruling on the suppression issue. We granted permission to appeal to determine the legality of the officer’s warrantless seizure of the firearm. We hold that the seizure was constitutionally permissible under the plain view doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ambreia Washington (Concurring)
I fully join the majority’s opinion upholding seizure of the handgun under the plain view doctrine. I write separately to further address the plain view doctrine’s “immediately apparent” requirement that has caused confusion and consternation among both federal and state courts. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
Thomas Cecil Cletus Virden v. Myven Magdy Virden
This is an appeal from an order suspending a mother’s parenting time until she completes a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 mental health evaluation. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney Miller v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rodney Miller, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated statutory rape, and aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, the Petitioner initially argues that the order of the post-conviction court is insufficient for appellate review. He further claims that each of his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to the State’s improper voir dire, in failing to effectively cross-examine the victim at trial, and in failing to adequately advise the Petitioner of his right to testify. Finally, the Petitioner asserts that the cumulative effect of trial counsels’ deficiencies deprived him of his right to a fair trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Laila Rumsey v. Regions Morgan Keegan Trust et al.
This case originates in a dispute over the administration of two trusts created for Joseph Peter Meersman, Jr. (“Meersman”). Meersman has filed multiple lawsuits against former trustees Michael Castellarin (“Castellarin”) and Regions Bank (“Regions”) (“Defendants,” collectively) alleging that they mismanaged the trusts. The trusts were terminated by court order in 2015. Laila Rumsey (“Rumsey”), Meersman’s partner, sued Defendants in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that she too was damaged by Defendants’ actions. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted based on the statute of limitations. Rumsey filed a motion to alter or amend within thirty days of entry of judgment but, contrary to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04, did not serve Defendants within thirty days. The Trial Court denied Rumsey’s motion as untimely. Rumsey appeals. Rule 59.04 requires such a motion be both “filed and served” within thirty days of entry of judgment. Rumsey failed to serve Defendants timely. Therefore, Rumsey’s motion to alter or amend was untimely and did not toll the time in which to file a notice of appeal. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rodger Broadway v. Tennessee Department of Correction et al.
This appeal concerns a disciplinary action taken against a prisoner. Rodger Broadway (“Petitioner”), an inmate at Turney Center Industrial Complex, was found guilty of Class B Defiance by the prison’s disciplinary board (“the Board”) for cursing at another inmate while in the gym. Petitioner, pro se, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County (“the Trial Court”) against the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and multiple officials (“Respondents,” collectively). The Trial Court upheld the Board’s decision. Petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend, which the Trial Court denied as untimely even though Petitioner delivered the motion to the appropriate individual at his correctional facility within the time fixed for filing. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for the Trial Court to consider Petitioner’s motion to alter or amend on its merits. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE ZARIAH H.1 ET AL.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to one minor child. Discerning no error, we affirm |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Constance Monieka Every
The Defendant was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of disrupting a lawful |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Gracie W., et al.
The appellant appeals the circuit court’s finding that her minor children are dependent and neglected. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zachary Thomas Hays
The Defendant has filed an application for interlocutory appeal, see Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 9, seeking review of the trial court’s February 14, 2025 order denying his motion to dismiss a presentment charging him with aggravated stalking. See |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas S. Collins
Defendant, Nicholas S. Collins, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of the following offenses: domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor (count 2); assault, a Class A misdemeanor (count 3); and aggravated domestic assault, a Class C felony (count 5). He received an effective sentence of seven and one-half years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Marvin M. Green
Before the court is the pro se Defendant’s “Application for Extraordinary Relief.” See Tenn. R. App. P. 10. The Defendant raises two issues for this court’s review: |
Unicoi | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Hunter W.
The appellant appeals the circuit court’s findings that her minor child is dependent and neglected and a victim of severe abuse. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Anthony Pearson
The Defendant, Marcus Anthony Pearson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court did not sufficiently set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to each argument raised in his Rule 36.1 motion. Additionally, the Defendant contends that his consecutive sentences are illegal because he was not resentenced in accordance with this court’s prior order, and as such, adequate Wilkerson findings were never made to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Lastly, he claims the amended judgment forms were not entered in a timely fashion. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jessie Rose Hodge
Defendant, Jessie Rose Hodge, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s decision to deny judicial diversion for her guilty-pleaded conviction of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-212. Following our review, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |