Scott Ostendorf, Et Al. v. R. Stephen Fox, et al.
Scott Ostendorf, et al. (“Plaintiffs”) sued R. Stephen Fox, Mark S. 1 Dessauer (“Attorney Dessauer”), and Hunter, Smith & Davis, LLP (“the Firm”) with regard to a transaction involving the sale of substantially all of the assets of Mothwing Camo Technologies, Inc. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. After a hearing, the Chancery Court for Scott County (“the Trial Court”) granted the motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We find no error in the Trial Court’s finding and holding that Plaintiffs’ claims against Attorney Dessauer and the Firm are barred by the statute of limitations. We, however, find error in the sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Mr. Fox for improper venue. We affirm the dismissal of the claims against Attorney Dessauer and the Firm, vacate the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Mr. Fox, and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Edward Greene
Appellant, Mark Edward Greene, appeals the denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct a clerical error. He alleges that the trial court should have granted pretrial jail credits from the time that Williamson County lodged a detainer against him until the date he was sentenced. Following our review, we affirm the circuit court’s decision. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Lamont French
Appellant, Kevin Lamont French, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. He received life sentences for the murder convictions, and the trial court sentenced him to a concurrent sentence of twenty-one years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting prior bad act testimony; (3) the trial court erred by admitting a letter purportedly written by appellant; (4) the trial court erred by admitting testimony regarding weapons found in appellant’s home; (5) the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; and (6) the trial court erred by admitting certain autopsy photographs. Following our review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for the trial court to merge the two murder convictions. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Robert E. L. Hathaway, Ward
This is a conservatorship proceeding. The ward’s wife filed a petition to appoint a conservator in which she asked to be appointed as conservator for the ward. After a trial, the trial court held that the ward was disabled and in need of a conservator but appointed a public conservator instead of the wife. The trial court also set aside a transfer of real property, purportedly made by the ward prior to the filing of the conservatorship action. The wife now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in setting aside the transfer of real property and in rejecting her request to be appointed conservator. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy W. Hamilton v. Pemberton Truck Lines, Inc., et al.
The employee sustained a work-related injury to his cervical spine. The trial court found permanent and total disability as a result of the injury. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Adoption of Male Child A.F.C. By: C.M.C. and D.F.C., and J.L.B.
Parents of a child born of a surrogate mother with an anonymously donated egg and the father’s sperm and Tennessee Department of Health appeal order entered in consolidated parentage and adoption proceedings which required the live birth certificate issued for the child to list the mother as “unknown.” Having determined that the definition of “mother” for the purpose of completing the birth certificate is the same as that used in preparing the standard birth certificate promulgated bythe National Center for Health Statistics,we reverse the trial court’s decision and hold that the gestational carrier should be listed as the mother. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Michael O'Neil v. Clinically Home, LLC
The Chief Executive Officer of a Company and the Company executed an Employment Agreement that covered, among other issues, consequences of termination with or without cause, either by the Officer or by the Company. A year or so later, the Officer called a meeting and issued an ultimatum to the board of directors threatening to resign if certain changes were not made. The Company later wrote a letter to the Officer accepting his resignation without “Good Reason” as defined in the Employment Agreement. The Officer asserted the Company terminated him “without cause” and that he did not resign. The Company responded that it did not terminate the Officer,but simply accepted his resignation. The Officer filed a complaint seeking severance pay and other benefits he claimed he was entitled to pursuant to the Employment Agreement. The trial court agreed with the Officer and granted his motion for summary judgment. The Company appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Nashville Metro Government v. New Orleans Manor, Inc., et al.
Metropolitan Government filed suit for recovery of delinquent real property taxes on property leased by the Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority. Taxpayers filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding, asserting that its obligation to pay taxes arose from its lease obligation and was extinguished when the Airport Authority released taxpayers from all obligations under the lease. Metropolitan Government moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the taxpayers did not have standing to challenge the taxes because they had failed to pay the tax under protest as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1-901; the trial court granted the motion. We affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon Alexander Rankin v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Brandon Alexander Rankin, pled guilty to second degree murder and accessory after the fact or facilitation to commit first degree murder, to which he was sentenced to concurrent 40-year sentences at 100%. Petitioner subsequently filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on the same date. A hearing was conducted on the two motions. The trial court elected to classify petitioner’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea as a post-conviction petition. Trial counsel’s motion to withdraw was sustained. Petitioner’s “Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief combined with Rule 36 Motion to Correct Clerical Error in Order” was filed through newly appointed counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the amended petition as time barred. Petitioner timely appealed. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred in construing Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas as a petition for post-conviction relief. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for consideration of Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charlie Lovell Leavy III v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Charlie Lovell Leavy, III, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for aggravated burglary, burglary of a building, theft over $1,000, felony evading arrest, and simple assault. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Markeesha L. Rucker v. Frederick E. Harris
The trial court fashioned a parenting plan that designated the mother of five year old twins as their primary residential parent and gave the father 91 days of visitation each year. The father argues on appeal that the trial court should have divided parenting time equally between the parties, or, in the alternative, simply granted him additional parenting time. He relies on language in the child custody statute,Tenn.Code Ann.§ 36-6-106(a),which directs the court to “order a custody arrangement that permits both parents to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the life of the child . . .” For her part, the mother argues that the parenting plan adopted by the trial court is in the best interest of the children. We affirm, but we remand this case to the trial court for correction of a clerical error. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Blake Delaney Tallant v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Blake Delaney Tallant, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel due to counsel’s failure to properly educate him on the importance of testifying in his own defense, to press the issue of the bill of particulars in the trial court or to raise it as an issue on direct appeal, and to include the jury questionnaires in the record on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George A. Wylie v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, George A. Wylie, appeals the Criminal Court for Shelby County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary C. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves the manner in which a trial court granted motions for summary judgment in a proceeding involving the death of a patient whose treatment for viral encephalitis was delayed because he was also being assessed for involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital. The widow of the deceased patient filed suit against three health care providers in the Circuit Court for Shelby County. In her original complaint and four subsequent amended complaints, the widow asserted eight causes of action against one or more of the providers. The trial court eventually granted a series of summary judgments dismissing all the claims against one of the providers without explaining the grounds for its decisions and requested counsel for the provider to prepare appropriate orders “establish[ing] the rationale for the [c]ourt’s ruling in quite specific detail.” The provider’s counsel prepared detailed orders adopting all the arguments the provider had made in favor of its summary judgment motions, and the trial court signed these orders over the widow’s objections. The widow appealed, arguing that the trial court had failed to provide reasons for its decisions and that the orders did not accurately reflect what had occurred at the summary judgment hearings. The Court of Appeals vacated the disputed orders because the trial court had failed to state the legal grounds for its decisions as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 and remanded the case to the trial court. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., No. W2011-02405-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 210250, at *12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013). We granted the provider’s application for permission to appeal. We have determined that the record establishes that the contested orders were not the product of the trial court’s independent judgment, and therefore, we hold that the trial court failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwight James
After a jury trial, appellant, Dwight James, was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender. The trial court sentenced appellant to two years in confinement, suspended to probation after 150 days of incarceration. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate his prior guilty plea to two counts of sexual battery in 1989 and that the requirement that he register as a sex offender violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and his procedural due process rights. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company v. Judy Pauline Simmons, et al.
This case presents an issue regarding the proper interpretation of a policy of insurance. The insurance company filed a declaratory judgment action against the defendants, seeking a determination from the trial court regarding whether the insurance policy afforded coverage for an accident involving a four-wheeler vehicle owned by one of the defendants. The accident resulted in the death of a minor, Ryan Casey. The child’s father intervened in the declaratory judgment action. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that the policy did not provide coverage. The intervenor has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wendell Guinn
The Defendant, Wendell Guinn, was indicted for aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; rape, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-111, -13-304, -13-503, -14-403. The State ultimately dismissed the domestic assault charge, and, following a jury trial, the Defendant was acquitted of the aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary charges. The jury convicted the Defendant of rape as charged in the indictment. The trial court imposed a sentence of nine years, with two years to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; and (3) that the trial court erred in providing a supplemental instruction to the jury in response to a question from the jury during deliberations. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis W. Hammock
Appellant, Curtis W. Hammock was indicted for initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, being a felon in possession of a handgun, and child neglect. He pleaded guilty to the first two counts and received a sentence of ten years on the drug charge to be served in community corrections and a concurrent sentence of two years in community corrections for the handgun charge. The State dismissed the child neglect charge. As a condition of his guilty plea, appellant, with agreement from the State and the trial court, reserved a certified question of law for our consideration: “Whether the trial court correctly ruled[,] following a suppression hearing[,] that the Defendant did voluntarily consent to a search of his residence subsequent to the unlawful entry of law enforcement on June 12, 2012?” Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Everett Russ
The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. James Allen Pollard, — S.W.3d —, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013). See State v. Everett Russ, No. M2012-00461-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 9, 2013), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. May 15, 2014). Relevant to the current remand, this court concluded in the previous appeal that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences when only one of the statutory aggravating factors applied to the Defendant’s two offenses involving the sexual abuse of a minor. See T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(5) (2010). Upon further review, we conclude that the aggravating factors were sufficient to support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keith Collins
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Keith Collins, of conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than 300 grams of cocaine, a Class A felony, and attempt to possess more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to consecutive sentences of forty and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court should have given an accomplice instruction with regard to one of the State’s witnesses; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (3) the trial court improperly allowed a State witness to testify about a bad act pursuant to 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (4) he is entitled to a new trial based on a witness’s false testimony; and (5) consecutive sentencing was improper. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cory Meeks
Defendant, Cory Meeks, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and the imposition of a sentence of confinement. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Craig L. Beene v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Craig L. Beene, pleaded guilty to attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault. Craig Lamont Beene v. State, No. M2005-01322-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 680919, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2006). Pursuant to the plea agreement, petitioner was sentenced to seventeen years in confinement. Id. Subsequently, he filed the instant petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that affidavits and two pictures constitute newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christina Lee Jones Thomas
The Defendant, Christina Lee Jones Thomas, was convicted by a Washington County jury of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent terms of eighteen years at 100% for these convictions. On appeal, the Defendant claims that she had not abandoned her residence as the trial court determined and that, therefore, it was error to deny her motion to suppress the evidence found inside her home obtained without a search warrant. The Defendant also contends that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in enhancing the length of her sentences. After reviewing the record, we conclude that trial court did not err in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress because the Defendant had abandoned the property, that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the length of the Defendant’s sentences. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Joe Croom
A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Bobby Joe Croom, as charged of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See State v. Bobby Joe Croom, No. W2011-00461-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1656718, at *1 Tenn. Crim. App. May 10, 2012). In his first direct appeal, Croom argued that the trial court erred in failing to require the State to elect the particular instances of rape and sexual battery on which it was relying for each conviction and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Id. at *1. In counts 1 through 4, which charged Croom with rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery during the period of July 1-4, 2009, and with rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery during the period of July 5-11, 2009, this court reversed Croom’s convictions, dismissed his charges, and vacated his sentences after concluding that there was no proof presented at trial that the offenses occurred within the time periods charged. Id. at *8. The court also reversed Croom’s convictions in counts 5 and 6, which charged Croom with rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery during the period of July 12-18, 2009, and remanded the case for a new trial on those counts. Id. Following a retrial on counts 5 and 6, Croom was again convicted as charged, and the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of thirty-five years for the rape of a child conviction and fifteen years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction. In this direct appeal, Croom argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing a physician to testify about the statements made by the victim and the victim’s mother during a medical examination and erred in admitting the physician’s medical report containing those statements because the statements were not made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(4), and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Khaliq Ra-El-Concurring
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to respectfully depart from the majority’s undertaking an analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence of passion and provocation. In my view, the reference to passion and provocation in the voluntary manslaughter statue does not denote an essential element of the offense. It describes a dispensation to a defendant who, having intentionally or knowingly killed another, would otherwise be guilty of first degree or second degree murder respectively. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |