State of Tennessee v. Glover P. Smith
The defendant was indicted on two counts of fabricating evidence and on six counts of making a false report arising out of the disappearance of his wife. A jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the trial court imposed a sentence of one year in the county jail followed by six years on probation. After a hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial, the trial court affirmed the convictions for making a false report but dismissed the convictions for fabricating evidence after concluding that no investigation was “pending” when the defendant fabricated evidence. Both the State and the defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals reinstated the defendant’s convictions for fabricating evidence, dismissed as multiplicitous two convictions for making a false report, and affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. We granted the defendant permission to appeal. Although we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ reinstatement of the defendant’s convictions for fabricating evidence, we conclude that two of the defendant’s convictions for making a false report should be dismissed because the evidence is insufficient to support these convictions. We also conclude that three of the defendant’s convictions for making a false report are multiplicitous and therefore dismiss two of those convictions. We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals in all other respects. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Wilson R. Vasconez v. Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.
Appellant Shelby County appeals a portion of the trial court’s judgment in favor of Appellee, the purchaser of property formerly owned by Shelby County. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the Appellee property damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees based on its finding that Shelby County committed inverse condemnation of the Appellee’s property by failing to inform the Appellee of the condemnation proceedings commenced by the City of Memphis. Because the City of Memphis, and not Shelby County, was the condemnor of the property, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding damages against Shelby County on the theory of inverse condemnation, and further erred in awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to the inverse condemnation statute. Accordingly, we reverse the finding of inverse condemnation and the award of attorney’s fees against Shelby County. Shelby County does not appeal the trial court’s award of property damages or prejudgment interest. That award is, therefore, affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Practical Ventures, LLC d/b/a AAA Cash Fast v. James Neely, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, and Danyelle A. McCullough
This is an appeal from an administrative decision on unemployment benefits. The appellee Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development held that the claimant employee was “constructively discharged” and was therefore eligible for unemployment benefits. The appellant employer filed a petition for judicial review of the administrative decision. The chancery court affirmed, and the employer appeals. We hold that the doctrine of constructive discharge is inapplicable to proceedings under the unemployment compensation statutes. The facts as found by the administrative tribunal support a holding that the employee voluntarily terminated her employment. For this reason, we conclude that the administrative decision awarding benefits to the employee is not supported by substantial and material evidence and is arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Evans v. Nigel M. Reid
At an earlier time, Ashley Evans (“the petitioner”) filed a petition against Nigel M. Reid (“the respondent”) seeking an order of protection. The trial court dismissed the petition due to “[in]sufficient cause.” In the same order, however, the court found “proof of the need of a restraining order.” Accordingly, the court restrained the respondent from coming about, calling or harassing the petitioner or her family. Several years later, the respondent asked the court to void the restraining order, which, on its face, was still in effect. The court refused. The respondent appeals. We reverse the trial court and hold that (1) the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the restraining order and (2) the restraining order is, consequently, null and void. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Harris
The defendant, Brandon Harris, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; and three counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors. He was sentenced to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment and each of the three assault convictions. All of the sentences were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective term of twenty eight years, eleven months, and twenty-five days in the Tennessee department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing a voice recognition “expert” to testify; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction regarding mere presence; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing excessive and consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ryan Sosa
In this appeal, the Defendant, Ryan Sosa, contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering his original sentences for the sale of cocaine into execution because he showed a willingness to abide by the rules of probation and had not had any issues on probation prior to the violations currently at issue. Upon consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Lisa Gaston Luplow v. Martin Duane Luplow
This is an appeal in a divorce case, where Wife appeals the classification and division of marital property and debt, the calculation of the division of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, the dismissal of the contempt petition she filed against Husband, and the failure to award her attorney fees. Husband appeals the classification of certain real property and the division of marital debt; he also requests his fees on appeal. We modify the judgment allocating the marital debt and awarding $16,691 to Wife as alimony in solido; we affirm the judgment in all other respects |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brennen T.
This is a termination of parental rights case. After the Appellants filed a termination petition against Biological Parents, Mother filed a counter-claim for malicious use of process, kidnapping, and perjury. The trial court dismissed the termination petition, but failed to rule on Mother’s counter-claim. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Wade Myrick v. Gloria Denise Myrick
The issue presented in this case is whether alimony in futuro was properly terminated by the trial court. The parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement, which provided that Husband/Appellee would pay Wife/Appellant alimony in futuro until death, remarriage, or “until a third person not the Wife’s child, moves into the Wife’s residence.” The marital dissolution agreement was incorporated, by reference, into the final decree of divorce. Thereafter,Wife’s mother moved into Wife’s home,and Husband filed a motion to terminate his support obligation based upon the occurrence of the suspending condition. The trial court granted Husband’s petition, finding that the parties’ agreement for alimony in futuro was contractual in nature and that the unambiguous language mandated cessation of Husband’s support obligation when Wife’s mother moved into Wife’s home. Based upon the provision for attorney’s fees in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, the trial court also awarded Husband his attorney’s fees and costs. Wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RANDALL GRAINGER
Following a bench trial Defendant, Randall Grainger, was convicted of three counts of knowingly violating a condition of community supervision for life, with each condition violated not in itself constituting a criminal offense, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-526 (a),(b)(1). Each conviction is a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with each other. The trial court suspended all of the effective sentence of eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days except for ten (10) days’ incarceration, followed by eleven (11) months and nineteen (19) days of probation. In his appeal Defendant presents two issues for this Court’s review. First, Defendant asserts that the convictions should be reversed and the charges dismissed because Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524(d)(1) violates Article II, section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution. Second, Defendant argues that the conviction based upon his failure to successfully complete sex offender treatment violates his right to due process guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution. After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Barbee v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Timothy Barbee, pleaded guilty to possession of heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, with intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced petitioner to the agreed-upon term of eight years at thirty percent release eligibility. In his timely petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darren Eugene Fleshman, Alias
Darren Eugene Fleshman, alias (“the Defendant”), was convicted of theft 1 of property of at least $10,000 but less than $60,000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years, suspended to supervised probation, and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $42,815.93. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the following: the trial court’s interpretation of the definition of “owner” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(26) (2006); the sufficiency of the evidence at trial; and the amount of restitution imposed by the trial court. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction. We, however, vacate the trial court’s order of restitution and remand this matter for a new hearing as to the amount and manner of restitution. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clayton Arden, Surviving Spouse v. Kenya L. Kozawa, M. D.
The plaintiff, as surviving spouse, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his health care liability action against the defendant doctor who treated the plaintiff’s wife prior to her death and the hospital wherein the treatment occurred. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based upon the plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 (Supp. 2013). We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff had to strictly comply with the provisions of the notice requirement and conclude that the plaintiff substantially complied with said requirement. We affirm, however, the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff could not rely upon the statutory 120-day extension of the statute of limitations due to his failure to properly serve the notice. We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims as barred by the statute of limitations. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Orlando Fields v. Debra Johnson, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Charles Orlando Fields, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the sentence he received for his conviction for the sale of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school zone is illegal. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal on the grounds that the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Kason C. Et Al.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children. The juvenile court found the Department of Children’s Services established four grounds for termination of father’s parental rights: 1) parent sentenced to ten or more years for any criminal act and the children are under eight years of age pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6); 2) parent sentenced to more than two years for conduct against a child or sibling/half-sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5); |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Aaliyah R.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found four grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights: substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, failure to support financially, failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions; the court also determined that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals arguing the evidence is insufficient to establish any of the grounds and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supported two of the grounds, that of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. We have also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Creggar Snodgrass
Appellant, William Creggar Snodgrass, was convicted of attempted rape, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding flight; (2) the trial court erred in allowing testimony from an unsequestered witness; and (3) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Calhoun v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Charles Deon Calhoun, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery. He then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition for failing to state a colorable claim for relief. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the court erred in dismissing his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing and without appointing counsel to assist in presenting his claim. Upon review of the record, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tavares D. Braden v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial, petitioner, Tavares D. Braden, was convicted of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, promoting prostitution, possession of marijuana, and evading arrest, for which he received an effective eighteen-year sentence. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming two instances of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) failure to advise him of his potential sentence exposure and (2) failure to adequately prepare for trial and prepare a defense. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan T. Deal
Jonathan T. Deal (“the Defendant”) filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the Defendant set forth a colorable claim. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JACQUELINE M. HIYAMA
The appellant, Jacqueline M. Hiyama, was indicted on alternative counts of driving under the influence (DUI) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401(a)(1) and (a)(2). She filed a pretrial motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of her arrest, asserting that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle. The trial court denied the appellant’s motion. The appellant pled guilty to the indicted offense reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) concerning whether the stop of the appellant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful. After review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the appellant’s motion to suppress and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jay Wilfong v. CRK Real Estate , LLC, Et Al
This case arose out of a contract for the sale of real estate. The contract included a provision requiring the buyer to make “commercially reasonable efforts” to sell the property, and to split any profits with the seller if the property was resold within 36 months. The buyer did not sell the property, and the seller brought suit, raising numerous claims, including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, the Consumer Protection Act, RICO, wrongful foreclosure, promissory fraud, civil conspiracy, collusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, constructive trust, conversion and unjust enrichment. After a hearing, the trial court granted the buyer’s motion to dismiss thirteen of the seller’s claims, denied the motion to dismiss another six of his claims, and certified its order as final for the purposes of appeal under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Climer, Jr.
Appellant, Glenn Climer, Jr., was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury with attempted second degree murder, attempted aggravated child abuse, child abuse, assault, and resisting arrest. Appellant was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, attempted aggravated child abuse, child abuse, assault, and resisting arrest. As a result, he was sentenced to a total effective sentence of twenty-six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant sought this appeal. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter, attempted aggravated child abuse, and child abuse; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing counsel for the State to present an improper argument; (3) whether Appellant’s conviction for child abuse violates double jeopardy; and (4) whether the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the issues raised on appeal, this Court determines that the evidence was sufficient to support the offenses; Appellant waived any issue with regard to improper argument by failing to object at trial; Appellant’s convictions do not violate double jeopardy; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Frazier v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, David Frazier, appeals as of right from the Polk County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his motion without a hearing. The State concedes that the trial court erred. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a hearing on the Defendant’s motion. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tina Wilder v. Union County Board of Education
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a tenured teacher. The Union County Board of Education (“the Board”) dismissed Tina Wilder (“Wilder”) following an incident involving underage drinking at Wilder’s lake cabin. Wilder, contesting her dismissal, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Union County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court concluded that the evidence sustained Wilder’s dismissal. Wilder raises several issues on appeal. We hold, inter alia, that Wilder was afforded due process, that the Trial Court applied the correct standard of review, and that the evidence supported the Trial Court’s decision. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Union | Court of Appeals |