Brooke Lee Whitaker v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Brooke Lee Whitaker, pleaded guilty to rape and received a twelve-year sentence. In her petition for post-conviction relief she alleges that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that trial counsel had a conflict of interest as the former sheriff of Bedford County that prejudiced his representation of the petitioner. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fletcher Whaley Long v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
A Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that an attorney had violated multiple disciplinary rules and imposed a public censure. The attorney appealed, and the trial court affirmed the Hearing Panel’s decision. On appeal to this Court, the attorney raises a number of issues, including a facial constitutional challenge to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9. After reviewing the evidence and the applicable law, we reject the attorney’s constitutional challenge to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, and we conclude that his other issues are without merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. John Bradford Robinson
The Defendant, John Bradford Robinson, pled guilty to manufacturing marijuana, sale of marijuana, theft of property valued between $1000 and $10,000, initiation of process to manufacture methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. For these convictions, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective eight-year sentence on probation. After multiple arrests in 2012, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a revocation of his probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cedric Wayne Watkins
Appellant, Cedric Wayne Watkins, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by limiting the testimony of a defense witness. Following our review, we affirm appellant’s judgment but remand to the trial court to consider whether the judgment requires correction of a clerical error.
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Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chester L. Wallace v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Chester L. Wallace, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He alleges that his sentence had expired before an outstanding probation violation warrant was executed and served upon him. Therefore, he claims that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke his probation and impose the sentence. Petitioner also argues that the trial court erroneously failed to award him thirty months of pretrial jail credit from his arrest in 2006 to his guilty plea in 2008. He further asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint “new counsel” to represent him at the probation revocation hearing and that the trial court should have appointed counsel for Petitioner’s habeas corpus proceedings. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in the habeas corpus proceedings.
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Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Pamela Jamison
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Pamela Jamison, of theft of property valued more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and identity theft, Class D felonies, and she received an effective four-year sentence to be served as six months in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, the case is remanded to the trial court for the correction of a clerical error on the judgment for identity theft. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Maurice M. Acree, Jr.
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding attorneys’ fees and affirming the final accounting of a trust in this conservatorship action. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Betty D. Gentry Meek
The surviving husband who was excluded from his wife’s will filed a petition for elective-share, year’s support, exempt property, and homestead. The executors of her estate opposed the petition claiming the marriage was void ab initio because it was procured by fraud and misrepresentations, specifically alleging that he lied on the marriage license about his age and number of prior marriages. Alternatively, if he is the surviving spouse, they contend he is equitably estopped to assert such claims for the same underlying reasons. The trial court summarilydismissed the petition finding “(1) the marriage between [Plaintiff] and the Decedent was void ab initio due to the fraud perpetrated by [Plaintiff] in connection with false information supplied by him on the application for the parties’ marriage license; and (2) equitably estopped as a matter of law.” Based on these findings the trial court dismissed all claims. We have determined the marriage was not void ab initio; whether the marriage was voidable is now moot for any right to avoid the marriage abated upon the wife’s death. As for equitable estoppel, we have determined that summary judgment was inappropriate because essential facts are either disputed or not in the record, including whether the decedent relied on the misrepresentations to marry him. Accordingly, we reverse the award of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Domonic Lacy v. State of Tennessee
On November 5, 2010, Petitioner, Domonic Lacy, pleaded guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to three counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary. The offenses occurred when Petitioner was a juvenile and he had been transferred from juvenile court to criminal court. He received an agreed total effective sentence of twelve (12) years. No appeal was made from the judgments and they became final thirty days after they were entered on November 5, 2010. More than a year after the judgments became final, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on March 26, 2013. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed within the one-year statute of limitations, and Petitioner has appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Hearing v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, David Hearing, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief from his two convictions of felony murder and the accompanying life sentences. The coram nobis court denied relief, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Coy McKaughan
In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting the video-recorded forensic interview of the child-victim at trial. Specifically, he contends that the admission of the interview was improper for the following reason: Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123, the statute under which the video interview was admitted, is unconstitutional because it is in conflict with the existing rules of evidence and established case law and violates the separation of powers clause of the Tennessee Constitution. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kristopher Blake Kincer
The Defendant, Kristopher Blake Kincer, pleaded guilty as a Range I offender to theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-103 (Supp. 2013) (theft of property); 39-14-105(a)(3) (2010) (amended 2012) (grading of theft). The plea agreement called for a two-year sentence, and the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for the trial court to consider whether the Defendant should be placed on community corrections. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Adinolfi
The Defendant, Anthony Adinolfi, entered an Alford “best-interest” plea to two counts of solicitation to commit statutory rape, for which he received an effective sentence of 11 months and 29 days to serve at 75%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his application for judicial diversion and alternative sentencing. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephan Lajuan Beasley, Sr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Stephan Lajuan Beasley, Sr., was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. On May 24, 2007, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis arguing that new evidence exists. Following a hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition, and the Petitioner timely appealed. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Algie Lavell McClure v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Algie Lavell McClure, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his jury convictions for first degree murder, reckless endangerment, and aggravated burglary. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the following ways: (1) by counsel’s “opening the door” during his cross-examination of Kenya Houston to prejudicial testimony of the Petitioner’s violent nature; (2) by counsel’s failing to obtain Latasha Hinton’s medical records showing her intoxication at the time of the shooting to impeach her identification of the Petitioner as the shooter; (3) by counsel’s failing to present all law enforcement officers and accompanying reports as evidence that Ms. Hinton initially identified two, unknown black males as the perpetrators; (4) by counsel’s failing to call an expert witness to challenge Ms. Hinton’s identification of the Petitioner and to discredit the jailhouse informants; (5) by counsel’s failing to adequately impeach several witnesses with the specifics of their prior criminal records; (6) by counsel’s failing to review the jail records to verify the location of the jailhouse informant, Kordell Butler, at the time the Petitioner allegedly confessed to him; (7) by counsel’s failing to interview the State’s witnesses; (8) by counsel’s failing to object to the State’s improper closing argument; and (9) “in the manner that was presented” at the post-conviction hearings as testified to by the various witnesses. Following our review, we affirm the 1 denial of relief. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Zoey F.
The Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Johonauan J. R. (“Father”) to the minor child Zoey F. (“the Child”) on the grounds of willful failure to visit, wanton disregard for the welfare of the child, and substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in the permanency plan. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. As there is uncertainty regarding the time frame relied upon by the Juvenile Court for the ground of willful failure to visit, we modify the Juvenile Court’s judgment to exclude the ground of willful failure to visit. Otherwise, we find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights and that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Graham aka Charles Stevenson v. Michael Donahue, Warden
The Petitioner, Charles Graham, aka Charles Stevenson, appeals as of right from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, the Petitioner argued that his judgment of conviction for tampering with evidence was void because (1) the indictment was defective for failing to include the essential elements of the offense and (2) the facts alleged in the indictment demonstrate that he “mere[ly] abandon[ed]” the marijuana not that he tampered with the evidence. On appeal, he contends that there was a material variance between the indictment on the tampering with evidence count and the proof offered at trial. Following our review, we affirm the order of the habeas corpus court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dericko Jackson v. Michael Donahue
Petitioner, Dericko Jackson, appeals as of right from the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief filed by Petitioner. Petitioner attacks his 1998 convictions in Shelby County for felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The convictions were the result of guilty pleas apparently negotiated with the State as to the conviction offenses, and length and manner of service of the sentences. The sentences of life imprisonment for felony murder and fifteen years for especially aggravated robbery were ordered to be served consecutively. The three-year sentence for aggravated assault was ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence for felony murder. Each of three judgments provides that Petitioner is allowed 480 days of pre-trial jail credit against the sentence imposed in each judgment for the time period of May 9, 1997 to August 31, 1998. Petitioner asserts that all the convictions are void because the provisions for any pre-trial jail credit in the sentence for especially aggravated robbery results in an illegal sentence. Petitioner argues that as a result he is entitled to habeas corpus relief for all three convictions. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall Cunningham
In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying all forms of alternative sentencing because he admitted his guilt, and, despite being young, had a good employment history. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing was not in error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rickey Alvis Bell Jr.
A Lauderdale County jury convicted the defendant, Rickey Alvis Bell, Jr., of felony murder in the perpetration of a kidnapping, felony murder in the perpetration of a rape, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated sexual battery. Following the penalty phase, the jury sentenced the defendant to death on the two counts of felony murder. The trial court merged the two felony murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to twenty years each for the aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual battery convictions. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve the two twenty-year sentences concurrent to each other but consecutive to the death sentence, for an effective sentence of death plus twenty years. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the State’s notice of its intent to seek the death penalty because he is intellectually disabled; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (3) the trial court erred in denying his two motions for a mistrial; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to question the victim’s husband regarding an extramarital affair; (5) the aggravating circumstance codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(7) is unconstitutional; (6) the absence of an intent to kill renders the death penalty disproportionate; (7) proportionality review should be modified and the pool of cases considered in proportionality review should be broadened; and (8) the sentence of death is arbitrary and disproportionate. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rickey Bradford
The Defendant, Rickey Bradford, was convicted by a Lincoln County Circuit Court jury of two counts of making a false report, Class C felonies, and extortion, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-502, 39-14-112 (2010). The trial court merged the false report convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of eight years for making a false report and five years for extortion. The court ordered that the effective eight-year sentence be served consecutively to any unexpired sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding Navigator Telecommunications records, (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on lost or destroyed evidence, (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs taken from a lost or destroyed video recording, (4) the trial court erred by admitting bank records without requiring the State to comply with the Financial Records Privacy Act, (5) the trial court erred by permitting the State to impeach him with his previous conviction, and (6) that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors requires a new trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Linus Thornton v. James A. Massey
This is the second appeal in this breach of contract case. The defendant property owner leased his recreational farm on a yearly basis to the plaintiff lessee. Their agreement included a provision that, when the farm sold, the plaintiff would received a percentage of the proceeds of the sale. The defendant eventually divided the farm into several parcels and sold the parcels at auction to different purchasers. The plaintiff asserted his right to a percentage of the proceeds. Thereafter, for reasons that are disputed, none of the sales of the various parcels of the farm closed. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant owner, asserting that he was entitled to a percentage of the total sale price that would have been realized had all of the sales closed. After a trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. In the first appeal, the appellate court affirmed in part but vacated the judgment and remanded for the trial court to make a factual finding as to whether the sales failed to close because of the purposeful actions of the defendant. On remand, the trial court found that the closings on the sales failed to take place because of the defendant owner’s purposeful actions. The trial court found that the defendant prevented the sales from closing in order to avoid paying the plaintiff the percentage owed him under the parties’ lease agreement. The trial court reinstated the damage award in favor of the plaintiff and awarded prejudgment and post-judgment interest. The defendant now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of Marissa O. R.
This is a petition for termination of parental rights and adoption. The parents of the child at issue divorced in 2007. The father moved to Colorado, and the mother was designated the child’s primary residential parent. The father was given parenting time in Colorado during the child’s spring, winter, and summer vacations, as well as parenting time in Tennessee at any time, with reasonable notice. The father exercised his parenting time only for a single 30-day period each summer in 2008, 2009, and 2010. After the child’s summer 2010 visit, the father scheduled no parenting time. In July 2011, the mother and her husband filed the instant petition to terminate the father’s parental rights and for the mother’s husband to adopt the daughter. The petition alleged abandonment by willful failure to visit during the four-month period preceding the filing of the petition. After a trial, the trial court denied the petition. It held that the petitioners did not establish grounds for termination and that the child’s best interest would not be served by terminating the father’s parental rights. The petitioners now appeal. After careful review of the record, we hold that clear and convincing evidence supports the termination of the father’s parental rights, and so reverse the trial court’s denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donald J. Roberts IRA, et al. v. Phillip H. McNeill, Sr., et al.
This is the second interlocutory appeal from a class certification. In Roberts v. McNeill, No. W2010-01000-COA-R9-CV, 2011 WL 662648 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2011) (“Roberts I”), we vacated the trial court’s class certification and remanded for reconsideration. Plaintiffs/Appellees are former owners of preferred stock in Equity Inns, Inc., who filed suit against Defendants/Appellants, the board of directors, for breaches of the fiduciary duties allegedly owed to the preferred shareholders during the negotiation and approval of a merger. Upon remand from this Court, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification with respect to “the proposed preferred class stockholders.” Having previously enumerated three preferred classes of stockholders, the purported certification creates an ambiguity as to the global class. The trial court’s certification of three subclasses does not cure the ambiguity in the global class, and we cannot proceed to review under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in the absence of a clearly defined class. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further consideration. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mitchell S. Pozezinski
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Mitchell S. Pozezinski, for one count of violating the terms of his community supervision for life, and the trial court sentenced him to ten days in jail plus six months of state probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented is insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly violated the terms of his community supervision for life. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals |