Antonio Hampton v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Antonio Hampton, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James D. Holder and Barbara L. Holder v. S & S Family Entertainment, LLC
This dispute arose at the end of two long-term commercial leases and a contract for the sale of two businesses and their assets, which businesses operated at the leased premises. The issues pertain to what assets were purchased, whether the tenant properly maintained the premises during the lease term, and whether the tenant returned the premises to the landlord in the same condition as at the commencement of the leases. The trial court ruled that the tenant had not purchased the assets in dispute, which the tenant removed at the end of the lease; thus, the tenant was liable for removing the assets. The court also found that the tenant breached both leases by failing to maintain the premises and failing to return the premises in the same condition as at the commencement of the leases. The tenant insists the court erred in finding that the landlord owned the assets in dispute; it also insists it did not breach any duties arising under the leases. The tenant also contends it is not liable for any of the numerous categories of damages awarded because the landlord failed to prove its damages. We affirm the trial court’s rulings as to the ownership of the disputed assets and the findings that the tenant breached numerous provisions of the leases. As for the various awards of damages, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Baxter v. Heritage Bank & Trust, and Proctor Financial Insurance Corporation, Inc.
Homeowner sued Bank, alleging that it had settled her claim for damages to her house with Insurance Company without her consent. Bank served discovery on Homeowner, and when Homeowner did not comply with discovery requests to Bank’s satisfaction, Bank moved to dismiss Homeowner’s claims. Trial court granted Bank’s motion to dismiss, and Homeowner moved to set aside the dismissal pursuant to Rule 59. Trial court denied Homeowner’s motion to set aside, and Homeowner appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment denying Homeowner’s motion to set aside because (1) the scheduling order included a deadline for completing discovery that had not yet passed and (2) there was insufficient evidence of wrongdoing by Homeowner or her attorney. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Dickerson et al v. Regions Bank et al
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this action on February 17, 2009, to quiet title to property they own in Williamson County, Tennessee. At issue was a Deed of Trust that secured a 1997 promissory note, with an original maturity date in 1998, executed by a South Carolina limited liability company of which the plaintiff husband was a member. Plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that the statute of limitations for the 1997 note and deed of trust had lapsed; therefore, the deed of trust encumbering their property should be released. Defendant Beta, LLC, filed a counterclaim for judicial foreclosure asserting it was the assignee of an October 8, 1998 renewal note with a maturity date of October 1999, the maturity date of which was subsequently extended to October 2000 pursuant to a Change in Terms Agreement executed in October 1999. It is based on the Change in Terms Agreement that Beta insists the statute of limitations had not lapsed and it is entitled to enforce the deed of trust. Although Beta was unable to produce an original or photocopy of an October 1998 renewal promissory note or evidence that complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-8-101 to prove it was a lost negotiable instrument, the trial court held that a copy of the 1999 Change of Terms Agreement was sufficient to established the existence of the October 1998 renewal note and the extension of the maturity date to 2000; thus the statute of limitations had not run and Beta was vested with the right to enforce the deed of trust. Therefore, the court dismissed Plaintiffs complaint to quiet title and ruled in favor of Beta on the issue of foreclosure. On appeal Plaintiffs contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s rulings. Particularly, Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding that the Change in Terms Agreement dated October 8, 1999, was sufficient to establish Beta’s claims under an October 1998 promissory note of which there is no copy. We have determined the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy Beta’s burden of proof as the foreclosing party. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the specific relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip Pye v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Phillip Pye, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that due process concerns should toll the one-year statute of limitations to allow review of his underlying claims. Because the Petitioner has failed to prove any grounds upon which to toll the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Xen Maples
The defendant, Anthony Xen Maples, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the fine imposed by the trial court was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy Higdon
The Defendant, Tommy Higdon, was convicted by a Campbell County Criminal Court jury of three counts of reckless endangerment, Class A misdemeanors, assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-13-101, 39-13-103, 39-16-602 (2010). He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment and assault convictions and six months for the resisting arrest conviction, all to be served onprobation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because the indictment was improperly amended and a defect existed in the grand jury proceedings, (2) he was denied his right to confront witnesses against him, (3) his right to a speedy trial was violated, (4) his three reckless endangerment convictions violate principles of double jeopardy, and (5) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeff and Melissa Fitzpatrick v. State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services
The petitioners are foster parents who were indicated by the Department of Children’s Services as perpetrators of child neglect for “lack of supervision” and also for “environmental neglect.” The lack of supervision allegation arose out of an incident in which a foster child who was placed in the petitioners’ home was found fondling the private parts of a younger foster sibling on two occasions during the same evening. The environmental neglect allegation was due to the condition of the petitioners’ home when the DCS investigator arrived to look into the report of child-on-child sexual abuse. The petitioners requested an administrative hearing. After a four-day contested case hearing before an administrative law judge, the indication for environmental neglect was deemed unfounded, but the indication for lack of supervision was upheld. The petitioners filed a petition for judicial review in chancery court, and upon reviewing the record, the court upheld the indication for lack of supervision. The petitioners appeal to this Court, arguing that there is no substantial and material evidence to support their indication for lack of supervision, that they have been denied procedural and substantive due process,and that they are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred in defending against the allegation of environmental neglect that was deemed unfounded, as well as the allegation of lack of supervision. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the chancery court in part, and we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Blackburn, et al. v. Henry E. McGee
Plaintiff in wrongful death action filed motion to quash Notice of Hospital Lien which had been filed in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §29-22-101 et seq. on behalf of medical center which rendered care to the decedent. The trial court held that the medical center had not properly perfected its lien and granted the motion; medical center appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David DeGalliford v. United Cabinet Company, LLC et al.
In early 2012, an employee alleged that he suffered a gradual injury to his cervical spine due to strenuous repetitive tasks and heavy lifting required by his employment. He reported the injury to his employer, who denied the claim on the basis that the injury was not compensable under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12)(C)(ii) (Supp. 2011). This statute, which applies to injuries occurring after July 1, 2011, provides that “cumulative trauma conditions” do not include injuries resulting from repetitive work activities “unless such conditions arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.” The employee’s treating physician testified that the employee’s repetitive tasks at work were the primary cause of his injury. Another doctor, however, who examined the employee’s medical records on behalf of his employer, testified that the employee’s injury was caused by a degenerative disc disease common in the aging process. The trial court ruled for the employee, and the employer appealed. In accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it relied on the testimony of the employee’s treating physician, who testified that the employee’s work activities were the primary cause of the employee’s injuries. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
John Jay Hooker et al. v. Governor Bill Haslam et al.
We granted permission to appeal to determine whether certain provisions of the Tennessee Plan, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 17-4-101 through 17-4-109 (2009), which governs the way in which Tennessee appellate judges are initially selected and thereafter stand for reelection, violate the Tennessee Constitution. We hold that the issue of the constitutional validity of the Judicial Nominating Commission/gubernatorial appointment process under the Tennessee Plan is moot, and we decline to rule on this issue. We further hold that the retention election portion of the Tennessee Plan satisfies the constitutional requirement that the judges of the appellate courts be elected by the qualified voters of the State and does not violate the Tennessee Constitution. We likewise hold that the election of judges to the Tennessee Court of Appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee on a statewide basis does not violate the Tennessee Constitution. Accordingly, the portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the issue of the constitutional validity of the Judicial Nominating Commission/gubernatorial appointment process under the Tennessee Plan is vacated and that claim is dismissed. We affirm the portions of the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the constitutional validity of the retention election portion of the Tennessee Plan and the constitutional validity of the election of Tennessee intermediate appellate court judges on a statewide basis. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Lou Wadley v. Leonard Rowe
This action originated with the filing of a detainer warrant in General Sessions Court by the plaintiff, seeking possession of her home. The plaintiff obtained a judgment granting her possession of the home, and the defendant appealed that judgment to Circuit Court. Following a de novo trial, the Circuit Court likewise granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Randall Turner v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Randall Turner, filed a petition in the Hamilton County Criminal Court, seeking post-conviction relief. The trial court denied the petition because it was untimely. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Lemual Stepp
A Jefferson County Circuit Court Jury found the appellant, Glenn Lemual Stepp, guilty of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and in violation of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-five years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his attempted first degree murder conviction, contending that the State failed to prove premeditation. The appellant also complains about the twenty-five-year sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Nardone v. Louis A. Cartwright, Jr. , et al.
Charles Nardone (“Plaintiff”) sued Louis A. Cartwright, Jr. and Cartwright Communication Technology, Inc. (“CCT”) alleging, among other things, slander and libel. During trial, defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the Trial Court granted by order entered December 6, 2012. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claim for libel. We find and hold that Plaintiff failed to prove libel, and we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Nathaniel C.T., Jason J.T. and Emerald S.T.
This appeal concerns attorney’s fees. Two relatives (“Petitioners”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the parents (“Respondents”) to Respondents’ three minor children (“the Children”). The Chancery Court for Washington County (“1 the Trial Court”), pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13, appointed counsel to represent Respondents in the parental termination action. After a long, drawn out process, the parties resolved their legal dispute through a mediated agreement. The Children remained with Respondents. Respondents filed a motion for attorney’s fees, arguing that they should be awarded attorney’s fees under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). The Trial Court held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) was inapplicable under these circumstances and denied Respondents’ motion for attorney’s fees. Respondents appeal. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Estate of Earsie L. Kirkman
The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Nathaniel C.T., Jason J. T. and Emerald S.T. - Concurring
I concur completely in the majority opinion. I write separately to state that I do not believe the language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103 is broad enough to encompass a dispute between two biological parents on one side and two third persons with no custodial rights on the other. As I parse the wording of § 36-5-103, it only pertains to a dispute between spouses or a dispute between a “spouse” and an “other person to whom the custody of the child, or children, is awarded.” Since this case does not present either of these factual scenarios, I would hold, as an additional basis for the Court’s decision, that the language of § 36-5-103 is simply not applicable to these facts. See Brewster v. Galloway, E2011-01455-COA-R3- CV, 2012 WL 2849428 at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed July 11, 2012) (Susano, J., concurring). |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph P. Lubecke
The defendant, Joseph P. Lubecke, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Sullivan County Criminal Court convictions of aggravated assault and felony reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Brian Roberson
The Defendant, Brian Roberson, appeals from his jury conviction for facilitation of first-degree premeditated murder. Specifically, he contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing, over the objection of defense counsel, a witness’s preliminary hearing testimony to be admitted as substantive evidence at trial under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule; and (3) that consecutive sentencing was improperly imposed. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Akil Jahi a.k.a. Preston Carter v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Akil Jahi a.k.a. Preston Carter, appeals the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief regarding his convictions for two counts of felony murder and sentences of death. The Petitioner contends that (1) he is intellectually disabled and, ineligible for the death penalty; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at both his original trial and resentencing hearing; (3) the death penalty is unconstitutional; and (4) the cumulative effect of all errors warrants relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Johnson
The Defendant, Mario Johnson, was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of misdemeanor reckless endangerment. All verdicts were merged into a single conviction for aggravated assault, and the Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that an instruction on self-defense, which he requested, should have been included in the final charge to the jury. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Deon'dre Jones
Defendant, Christopher Deon’Dre Jones, was charged in a four-count indictment returned by the Madison County Grand Jury with aggravated burglary, assault, evading arrest, and vandalism. Following a trial, the jury acquitted Defendant of aggravated burglary and assault, but found him guilty as charged of misdemeanor evading arrest and misdemeanor vandalism. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 11 months and 29 days of incarceration in the county jail for each conviction. In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of the offense of evading arrest. Defendant assigns no error to his conviction of vandalism. After a thorough review of the briefs and the record we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Ann Pereira Brown v. Dwain Allen Brown
This appeal involves the grant of a Rule 60.02 motion to modify a default divorce decree entered nearly eight years prior. The husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion seeking relief from the parties’ divorce decree; he argued primarily that the provision pertaining to his retirement benefits was inequitable. The trial court initially denied the motion, and the husband filed a timely notice of appeal. Almost two years later, the husband voluntarily dismissed his appeal. The trial court then entered an order setting aside its prior denial of the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion, held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, and eventually entered an order granting the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion. The wife now appeals. We hold that the effect of the dismissal of the earlier appeal was to affirm the trial court’s denial of the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion, so the trial court was precluded under the law of the case doctrine from reconsidering its earlier denial of the Rule 60.02 motion. Consequently, we vacate the trial court’s order setting aside its prior denial of the husband’s Rule 60.02 motion, as well as the order granting the husband the relief requested. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Torrance Randle v. State of Tennessee
Civil Service Employee filed a grievance with the Civil Service Commission complaining he was not given supervisory responsibilities in accordance with the job description that was posted when he accepted the position. The administrative law judge dismissed Employee’s grievance because it was a “non-grievable matter” as that term is defined in the rules promulgated by the Department of Human Resources, leaving the Civil Service Commission without subject matter jurisdiction. Employee petitioned the Chancery Court for judicial review. The Chancery Court affirmed the administrative law judge’s dismissal of Employee’s grievance. Employee appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals, and we affirm the dismissal of Employee’s petition |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |