In Re Paisley J.
W2022-01059-COA-R3- PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William C. Cole

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his children, the trial
court found by clear and convincing evidence three statutory grounds for termination of
the father’s parental rights to all three of his children, and the court found by clear and
convincing evidence additional putative father grounds for termination of his parental
rights to his youngest child only. The trial court further determined that clear and
convincing evidence established that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. The father has appealed. Having determined that the trial court
found two statutory grounds, abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure
to support, that were not included in the petitioners’ original or amended petitions, we
reverse the court’s findings on these two grounds. We must also reverse the four statutory
grounds applicable to a putative father inasmuch as the petitioners did not present evidence
to establish that the father qualified as a putative father. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment in all other respects, including termination of the father’s parental rights based
upon the remaining ground and best interest analysis.

State of Tennessee v. Marquez Billingsley
E2022-01419-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

The Defendant, Marquez Travell Billingsley, pleaded guilty to conspiracy with intent to
sell over fifteen grams of heroin in a drug-free zone, a park. In exchange, the State
dismissed other charges pending against him. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial
court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years, to be served at 100%. Several years later,
the Defendant filed a motion to be resentenced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39-17-432(h). After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. On appeal, we conclude
that an appeal as of right does not lie from a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for
discretionary resentencing pursuant to the Drug-Free School Zone Act. Accordingly, the
Defendant’s appeal is dismissed.

In Re Zayda C.
E2022-01483-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kenlyn Foster

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his child. Following a
bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the
following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by wanton disregard; (2)
incarceration for a period of ten or more years; and (3) the persistence of conditions which
led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child.
We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision.

Ricky Campbell, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
E2022-01526-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Alex E. Pearson

The Petitioner, Ricky Campbell, Jr., pleaded guilty to theft of more than $10,000.
Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after
a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Travis G. Bumbalough v. Rachel M. Hall
M2022-01003-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven D. Qualls

This appeal arises from a petition to establish parentage and a parenting plan pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36–2–311 for a child born out of wedlock. In finding that the statutory best interest factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) favored the father, the trial court designated the father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and ruled that the child would live with the father in Tennessee during the school year and spend the majority of the summers and holidays with Mother in Texas. The mother appeals. We affirm.

Martrice Thomas v. State of Tennessee
W2022-00887-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Martrice Thomas, of first degree premeditated murder.  The Petitioner appealed her conviction, and this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  State v. Martrice Thomas, No. W2017-02489-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 6266277, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nov. 29, 2018), perm.  app. denied (Tenn. March 28, 2019).  On April 6, 2020, more than a year after the expiration of the statute of limitations, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective.  After a hearing, the trial court denied relief, finding that the Petitioner had received the effective assistance of counsel.  The Petitioner appeals, maintaining that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome at trial.  Because the post-conviction court treated the petition as timely from the outset of the hearing, thereby preempting any proof the Petitioner may have presented to show that due process considerations required tolling of the statute of limitations, we remand the case for a hearing on the sole issue of the statute of limitations.  

State of Tennessee v. Paula Christine Hutcherson
W2022-01046-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Brent Bradberry

Paula Christine Hutcherson, Defendant, appeals after a jury found her guilty of eight counts of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B).  The trial court subsequently sentenced her to ten years for each conviction, to be served concurrently, and ordered the sentences suspended to supervised probation.  On appeal, Defendant argues that her prior convictions for obtaining drugs by fraud are not “felony crimes of violence” or “felony drug offenses” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307(b)(1) and that her convictions must be reversed.  Because we determine that Defendant’s prior convictions for obtaining drugs by fraud are felony drug offenses for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B), we affirm Defendant’s convictions.  However, during our review of the record, we identified possible clerical errors on the judgment forms concerning the arrest date and pretrial jail credit dates.  On remand, the trial court should enter corrected judgment forms if necessary.   

John Mark Bowers v. Carlton J. Ditto, Et Al.
E2022-01307-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey M. Atherton

In this quiet title action, the pro se defendant appeals the trial court’s decision to permit
constructive service by publication in lieu of personal service, pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 21-1-203(a)(2). Because Plaintiff met the statutory requirements of
service by publication and because constructive service by publication was effective to
establish the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendant, we affirm.

Jessie Dotson v. State of Tennessee
W2019-01059-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

This appeal involves a capital post-conviction petitioner’s expert funding requests under
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13. A jury convicted the Petitioner, Jessie Dotson, of six
counts of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. This Court
affirmed the jury’s verdict. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging several
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. He requested funds under Tennessee Supreme
Court Rule 13 to hire expert witnesses to assist in establishing his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court authorized the funds, but the Director of
the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) and the Chief Justice denied approval for
some of the Petitioner’s requested experts. After an evidentiary hearing, the
post-conviction court denied relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the ruling
without deciding the Petitioner’s Rule 13 constitutional challenges. We granted review to
consider the Petitioner’s constitutional issues regarding Rule 13. We hold the provisions
of Rule 13 are constitutional as applied; the Petitioner was not unconstitutionally denied
appellate review of the denial of his request for expert funds; and the Petitioner was not
deprived of a full and fair post-conviction hearing due to the denial of expert funds.

Kimberly Ann King v. Jackie Lee King, Jr.
E2023-00504-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sharp

This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 6, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was
not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until April 6, 2023, more than thirty days from the
date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the Notice
of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

State of Tennessee v. James Pitts
E2022-01375-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge G. Scott Green

The defendant, James Pitts, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault in exchange for
a sentence of six years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court.
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant’s six-year sentence
be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in
imposing a sentence of incarceration rather than an alternative sentence. After reviewing
the record, the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, and the applicable law, we conclude the
trial court failed to acknowledge most of the relevant statutory considerations or articulate
the reasons for the sentence of confinement in accordance with the purposes and principles
of sentencing. Therefore, we remand the case for the limited purpose of having the trial
court make the appropriate findings on whether the defendant should receive an alternative
sentence or a sentence of incarceration, noting that the trial court shall fully articulate its
reasoning in accordance with the applicable statutes and case law. Accordingly, the
judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court.

Joshua Allen Felts v. State of Tennessee
M2022-01736-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte Watkins

Petitioner, Joshua Allen Felts, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 convictions for theft of property valued at less than $500 (Counts One and Four), attempted theft of property valued at less than $500 (Counts Two and Three), and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 (Count Five). Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to: (1) file a motion to withdraw as requested by Petitioner; (2) object to a witness’s hearsay testimony regarding the ownership of the stolen items in Counts One through Four; (3) challenge the value of the stolen laptop in Count Five; (4) adequately prepare for trial; and (5) adequately communicate with Petitioner. Petitioner further contends that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors entitles him to relief. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction’s court denial of relief as to Petitioner’s conviction in Count Five; however, we reverse the denial of post-conviction relief as to Counts One through Four. We vacate the judgments of conviction in Counts One through Four and remand for a new trial on those counts.

State of Tennessee v. Myles Wiseman
W2022-00680-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee V. Coffee

The Defendant, Myles Wiseman, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape, a Class B felony; two counts of incest, a Class C felony; and two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, a Class C felony.  He was sentenced by the trial court to thirty years at 100% as a Range IV, career offender for the Class B felony rape conviction and fifteen years at 45% as a Range III, persistent offender for each of the Class C felony incest and statutory rape convictions.  The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of ninety years in the Department of Correction.  The Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce the Defendant’s recorded phone calls from the jail; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence.  Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.   

Hayes Family Partnership ET AL. v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
W2022-01209-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

This is an insurance policy coverage dispute between Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance
Company (“Tennessee Farmers”) and its insured, Hayes Family Partnership (“Hayes”). At
issue is property damage to a commercial building owned by Hayes and insured by
Tennessee Farmers. The damage, which was in excess of two hundred thousand dollars,
was caused by a third-party tortfeasor, George Hardey, who drove his vehicle into the
insured building. Shortly after the accident and without the knowledge or consent of
Tennessee Farmers, Hayes executed a release of all claims against Hardey and his insurer,
Allstate Property & Casualty Company (“Allstate”), in consideration for the $25,000 policy
limits paid by Allstate. After Hayes submitted its claim to Tennessee Farmers for benefits
under its policy, Tennessee Farmers denied Hayes’ claim based on Hayes’ violations of
material provisions in the insurance policy, including the provision that required Hayes to
“do everything necessary to secure [Tennessee Farmers’] rights” and “do nothing after loss
to impair them.” The trial court denied Tennessee Farmers’ Motion for Summary Judgment
based, in part, on the “made whole” doctrine, and it ruled that “the release executed by
Hayes in favor of the third-party tortfeasor George Hardey does not foreclose Hayes’ right
to pursue recovery from Tennessee Farmers.” The trial court also reasoned that Tennessee
Farmers may not avoid coverage “on the basis of breach of the insurance policy condition
that its insured must do everything necessary to secure its rights and nothing to impair those
rights, and Hayes[’] release of Hardey.” The trial court then granted Tennessee Farmers’
motion for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, which we also granted. The
dispositive issue on appeal is whether Hayes forfeited its right to coverage under the
Tennessee Farmers’ policy by, inter alia, releasing all of Hayes’ claims against the thirdparty
tortfeasor and his insurance company without the knowledge or consent of Tennessee
Farmers. We have determined that Hayes materially breached the insurance policy by
releasing the third-party tortfeasor and his insurer from liability without the consent of Tennessee Farmers; therefore, Tennessee Farmers was entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand with
instructions to summarily dismiss the complaint.

State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter v. LLPS, Inc., Et Al.
M2022-00214-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissal entered in favor of all defendants in a civil enforcement action involving violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and the Government Imposters and Deceptive Advertising Act. We vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Adam T. Huffstutter v. Metropolitan Historical Zoning Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
M2022-00850-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russel T. Perkins

The appellant is a property owner who sought review of a decision by the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the Historic Zoning Commission. The appellant property owner appeals. We affirm.

David L. Richman, Et Al. v. Joshua Debity, Et Al.
E2022-00908-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Lowell Headrick

This case began with the filing of a “Civil Warrant Restraining Order” in general sessions
court. The defendants then filed a petition to dismiss pursuant to the Tennessee Public
Participation Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-101, et seq. The plaintiffs filed a response,
asking the court to deny the TPPA petition to dismiss. After an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court entered an order denying the defendants’ TPPA petition for reasons set forth in
an attached transcript. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the trial court to
enter an order setting forth the reason for the trial court’s decision.

In Re: James Ralph Hickman, Jr., BPR #020125
M2022-00755-SC-BAR-BP
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Board of Professional Responsibility Hearing Panel

In this case, we consider the appropriate discipline for Tennessee attorney James Ralph Hickman, Jr. The Board of Professional Responsibility filed a petition for discipline against Hickman alleging that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct while representing an estate in probate proceedings. A hearing panel of the Board adjudicated the petition and recommended a one-year suspension, with “at least” ninety days served as an active suspension and the rest on probation. Any violation of the conditions of probation would result in “reversion to active suspension.” The hearing panel also directed Hickman to obtain a practice monitor during the probationary period, complete fifteen additional hours of estate-management continuing legal education (“CLE”) and three additional hours of ethics CLE, and pay the costs of the matter. Neither Hickman nor the Board appealed. The Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the hearing panel’s judgment. Exercising our authority under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 15.4, we determined that the punishment imposed by the hearing panel appeared too lenient and proposed to increase it. After carefully considering the entire record, “with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case,” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b), we affirm the hearing panel’s one-year suspension but modify the judgment to impose six months of active suspension followed by six months on probation. We also clarify that the period of probation imposed should be fixed rather than indefinite and that violation of a condition of probation does not automatically result in reversion of the probationary period to active suspension. We affirm the decision of the hearing panel in all other respects.

Eric Emory Edwards v. Dallis Leeann Edwards
M2022-00614-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Mark Rogers

In this post-divorce action, the trial court modified the permanent parenting plan to provide the father with equal co-parenting time after the father and the mother had, by oral agreement, lived by an alternate plan for approximately sixteen months during the COVID19 pandemic in an effort to adapt to their child’s virtual education from home. The mother has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding a material change in circumstance affecting the child’s best interest and by determining that modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. Both parties have requested attorney’s fees on appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We decline to award attorney’s fees to either party.

In Re A.H. Et Al.
M2022-01066-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Wayne Collins

This is a dependency and neglect case predicated on an allegation of severe abuse. The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and found that one of the children had been subject to severe child abuse at the hands of the children’s father. The father appealed to circuit court. After a de novo hearing, the circuit court found the allegations of severe abuse were not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence and declined to find the children dependent and neglected. The Department of Children’s Services, the children’s guardian ad litem, and the children’s mother appeal, arguing that the circuit court erred in concluding that the evidence of severe abuse was not clear and convincing. Based on our review of the entire record, we find there was not clear and convincing evidence to support a finding of severe abuse. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.

In Re Kenneth D.
M2022-01466-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Larry B. Stanley, Jr.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his child upon a petition filed by the child’s mother and stepfather, the trial court determined that five statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Following the father’s initial appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for entry of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k). On remand, the trial court entered a judgment confirming its prior determinations with added specific findings and conclusions. The father has again appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Ernest Falls et al. v. Mark Goins et al.
M2020-01510-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

In this appeal, we consider the interplay and applicability of two statutes that relate to suffrage rights of Tennessee residents previously convicted of infamous crimes in other states. Although the Tennessee Constitution recognizes the importance of the right of its residents to vote, the Constitution also allows the General Assembly to restrict the right of a person to vote “upon a conviction by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 5. Ernest Falls, a resident of Tennessee since 2018, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Virginia in 1986, an infamous crime under the laws of Tennessee. In 2020, Mr. Falls was granted clemency in Virginia by then-Governor Ralph Northam. The grant of clemency reinstated Mr. Falls’ rights of citizenship in Virginia, including his right to vote. Subsequently, Mr. Falls attempted to register to vote in Grainger County, Tennessee, in June of 2020. The Grainger County Election Commission denied his restoration of voting rights request and cited “Incomplete/Insufficient Document(s)” as the reasoning for the denial. Mr. Falls and a co-plaintiff, who was left off the voter rolls under similar circumstances, filed a lawsuit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19-143(3) requires the state to re-enfranchise persons convicted of out-of-state infamous crimes as soon as said persons are “pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the governor or other appropriate authority of such other state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) (2014). Respondents, three public employees sued in their official capacity, countered that Mr. Falls also is required to comply with requirements set forth in another statutory provision, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-202, which requires that persons convicted of infamous crimes pay outstanding court costs, restitution, and child support obligations before they can be re-enfranchised. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202 (2018). The Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of the three state officials, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment with Mr. Falls acting as the sole remaining plaintiff. Like the Court of Appeals, we affirm the grant of summary judgment and conclude that, in order to regain the right of suffrage in Tennessee, Mr. Falls and other similarly situated individuals must comply with both section 2-19-143(3) and the additional requirements set forth in section 40-29-202.

Ernest Falls et al. v. Mark Goins et al. (Dissent)
M2020-01510-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Ernest Falls’ right to vote is guaranteed under the Tennessee Constitution. Tenn.
Const. art. I, § 5.1 In 1986, almost forty years ago, Mr. Falls was convicted of an infamous
crime in Virginia. He completed his sentence in 1987. In 2018, Mr. Falls moved to
Tennessee. In February 2020, the Governor of Virginia gave him an individualized grant
of clemency, fully restoring his rights to vote, hold public office, serve on a jury, and be a
notary public. With his voting rights fully restored, Mr. Falls tried to register to vote in
Tennessee; he disclosed his previous conviction and verified the restoration of his right to
vote. His application was denied because he provided no evidence that he did not owe
restitution or court costs in Virginia from his 1986 conviction and that he was current on
any child support obligations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202(b)–(c) (2018). Yet, under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19-143(3), Mr. Falls was not prohibited from voting
because his right to vote had been restored by the grant of clemency. The requirement
regarding restitution, court costs, and child support under section 40-29-202 does not apply
to Mr. Falls because he had no need to have his voting rights restored.

State of Tennessee v. Bruce Antione Cole
W2022-00656-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

For the second time, the Defendant, Bruce Antione Cole, appeals the trial court’s order of
restitution in the amount of $25,474.16 associated with his convictions for aggravated
assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Specifically, the Defendant argues
that the trial court abused its discretion by reinstating a restitution amount that was not
substantiated by evidence in the record and by failing to consider the Defendant’s financial
resources and future ability to pay. After review, we reverse the restitution order of the
trial court and remand for a new restitution hearing.

Shatyra Johnson v. Romello Love
W2022-00293-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jerry Stokes

The Appellant challenges the circuit court’s grant of an order of protection, asserting that
the evidence preponderates against the finding that the Appellant stalked the Appellee.
Because the order of protection has expired by its own terms, we dismiss the appeal as
moot.