Araceli Cordova et al. v. Robert J. Martin
M2021-01412-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge David D. Wolfe,

This is an action for malicious prosecution of an attorney’s fee claim. The plaintiffs contend
that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the defendant under the one-year
statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(1). The court held
that the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued when the allegedly-malicious prosecution
terminated, and it held that the prosecution terminated when the first court denied the
defendant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 59.04. The plaintiffs contend that this is wrong because the defendant was a
party to and participated in the appeal of those proceedings. They assert that the defendant’s
action did not terminate until he exhausted his appellate remedies. We agree and hold that
the defendant’s cause of action did not terminate until his time for filing an appellate brief
expired. Thus, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand with instructions to
reinstate the complaint and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately to highlight the flawed and impractical analysis in the concurring in judgment opinion, authored by Justice Campbell and joined by Justice Kirby.

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

I agree with the Court’s decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. But my agreement with the majority ends there. I would not adopt a new evidentiary privilege for expert witnesses because that privilege is not grounded in the Constitution, Tennessee’s statutes, the common law, or this Court’s Rules—the only permissible sources of a privilege under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 501. Although the trial court erred by excluding the expert opinions at issue in this case, that error was harmless and did not warrant reversal of the judgment below or a new trial. For that reason, I join in the Court’s judgment.

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al. - Concurring
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

I am pleased to concur in Justice Campbell’s separate concurring opinion, concurring in the result of the majority opinion but not the reasoning. I write separately on particular problems with the majority’s reasoning, as well as far-reaching unintended consequences of this ill-defined new common-law privilege.

Joseph Lester Haven, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
W2022-00813-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jeff Parham

The Appellee, Joseph Lester Haven, Jr., was originally convicted of rape of a child and two
counts of aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against his stepchildren, for
which he received an effective forty-year sentence. After his convictions were affirmed,
State v. Joseph Lester Haven, No. W2018-01204-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 3410242, at *1-
2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020), the Appellee filed a petition seeking post-conviction
relief based on trial counsel’s failure to challenge the State’s compliance with the
Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123, the statute which authorizes a video
recording of a child to a forensic interviewer to be introduced as evidence at trial, but only
when certain requirements are met. The Obion County post-conviction court granted relief,
and the State now appeals. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the postconviction
court, reinstate the Appellee’s convictions, and remand for execution of
judgments consistent with this opinion.

Brittany Borngne Ex Rel. Miyona Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority Et Al.
E2020-00158-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge J.B. Bennett

This appeal primarily concerns the compulsion of a physician’s deposition testimony in a health care liability action. In 2014, a child was born via cesarean section and suffered permanent brain damage and severely debilitating injuries. By and through her next friend and mother Brittany Borngne (“Plaintiff”), the child sued the doctor who delivered her and the certified nurse midwife who was initially in charge of the birthing process, among other defendants. The trial court dismissed all claims of direct negligence against the defendant physician but allowed the plaintiff to proceed against the physician on a vicarious liability theory as the midwife’s supervising physician. However, during his deposition prior to trial, the physician refused to opine on the midwife’s performance outside of his presence. The trial court declined to require the physician to do so, and after a trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, partially reversed the judgment. The intermediate court concluded, among other things, that the trial court committed reversible error in declining to order the physician to answer the questions at issue in his deposition and remanded for a new trial. After review, we hold that a defendant healthcare provider cannot be compelled to provide expert opinion testimony about another defendant provider’s standard of care or deviation from that standard. We therefore conclude that the trial court here properly declined to compel the defendant physician’s testimony. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In Re Markus E.
M2019-01079-SC-R11-PT
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Philip E. Smith

In this appeal, we address the standards for severe child abuse as a ground for termination of parental rights. The statute defining severe child abuse includes “knowing” failure to protect a child from abuse or neglect likely to cause serious injury or death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(22)(A)(i) (Supp. 2016). The statutes do not define “knowing.” We hold that, for severe child abuse, a person’s conduct is considered “knowing,” and a person is deemed to “knowingly” act or fail to act, when he actually knows of relevant facts, circumstances or information, or when he is either in deliberate ignorance of or in reckless disregard of such facts, circumstances, or information presented to him. Under this standard, the relevant facts, circumstances, or information would alert a reasonable parent to take affirmative action to protect the child. For deliberate ignorance, a parent can be found to have acted knowingly when he has specific reason to know the relevant facts, circumstances, or information but deliberately ignores them. For reckless disregard, if the parent has been presented with the relevant facts, circumstances, or information and recklessly disregards them, the parent’s failure to protect can be considered knowing. Here, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents of an infant who suffered over twenty rib fractures, in part for knowing failure to protect the child. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse, holding under the particular circumstances of this case that the proof in the record does not clearly and convincingly show that the parents’ failure to protect the child was “knowing.”

Christopher L. Wiesmueller v. Corrine Oliver Et Al.
M2023-00651-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to § 2.02 of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

State of Tennessee v. Stacy Matthews
M2021-01342-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella Hargrove

A Maury County jury convicted Stacy Matthews, Defendant, of two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school zone and one count of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the trial court struck the school zone sentencing aggravator for two of the convictions and entered judgments on three counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. The trial court imposed three concurrent sentences of twelve years, as a Range I, standard offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: he was prejudiced by the language of Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment; that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In Re Markus E. - Concurring
M2019-01079-SC-R11-PT
Authoring Judge: Justice Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Philip E. Smith

I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the termination of parental rights as to both Mother and Father, and I join nearly all of Justice Kirby’s opinion for the majority. In particular, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that this case presents circumstances that call strongly for application of the prior-construction canon. I would hesitate to apply the canon if only one or two intermediate appellate courts had interpreted the language at issue. Here, however, the Court of Appeals had issued at least eight opinions interpreting “knowing” in a uniform manner before the General Assembly’s reenactment of that language. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (finding “the uniformity of . . . judicial precedent construing the [statutory] definition significant”); Kentucky v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 554 (6th Cir. 2023) (noting that the force of the prior-construction canon is “stronger when the lower courts uniformly adopt a particular interpretation of an oft-invoked statute”); cf. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (declining to apply canon where “widespread disagreement exist[ed] among the lower courts”).

In Re Estate of Robert McKeel Bone
M2022-00771-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Haylee Bradley-Maples

At issue is the validity of an amendment to a revocable trust. The specific issue is whether the Settlor’s attorney-in-fact was authorized to execute an amendment to the Robert McKeel Bone Living Trust. The trial court held that the amendment was valid. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Gregory Hickman
W2022-00671-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee. V. Coffee

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Gregory Hickman, of rape of a child, and
the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to forty years in prison. On
appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction
and that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to submit a rebuttal closing argument.
After our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Frances P. Owens v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center
M2021-01273-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

A patient brought a health care liability action against a hospital after she developed a pressure wound during her hospital stay. The hospital moved for summary judgment on the ground that the patient’s standard of care expert was not competent to testify under the Health Care Liability Act. Alternatively, it sought to narrow the remaining claims through a partial summary judgment. The trial court disqualified the expert witness and granted the hospital summary judgment on all claims. The court’s decision was based, in part, on grounds not raised in the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that the expert was competent to testify and the trial court erred in ruling on additional grounds not raised by the movant, we vacate the judgment in part.

State of Tennessee v. Charles Randolph Johnson
E2021-01106-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor M. Nichole Cantrell

Defendant, Charles Randolph Johnson, was convicted by an Anderson County Jury of one
count of possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin within 1,000 feet of a drug free
school zone; possession of more than 14.175 grams of marijuana with intent to sell or
deliver; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective thirtyyear
sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant appears to argue that (1)
the length of time between his trial and the hearing on his motion for new trial violated his
right to due process; (2) the search warrant was invalid; (3) the untimely “constructive
amendment” of the indictment rendered it invalid; (4) the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Wheelhouse Partners, LLC v. Wilson & Associates, PLLC Et Al.
M2022-00369-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

This case stems from an unpaid promissory note secured by real property that was sold in foreclosure. Wheelhouse Partners, LLC (“Wheelhouse”), the beneficiary under a second deed of trust on the subject property, sued Wilson & Associates, PLLC (“Wilson”), the substitute trustee under the first deed of trust on the subject property, and James G. Akers and Deborah L. Akers (the “property owners” or, together with Wilson, “Defendants”). Wheelhouse alleged that the foreclosure sale produced excess funds sufficient to satisfy its second deed of trust and promissory note after satisfying the first deed of trust, but that Defendants refused to deliver such funds to Wheelhouse. Wheelhouse also alleged breach of contract against the property owners. Wilson interpleaded the surplus funds into the court and, following a successful motion for summary judgment, Wheelhouse was awarded the balance of its promissory note as well as its attorney’s fees. Mr. Akers appeals. Because his appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, his issues are waived and the lower court’s judgment is affirmed. Because Wheelhouse’s deed of trust clearly provides for an award of attorney’s fees and Wheelhouse properly requested its appellate attorney’s fees, we award Wheelhouse said fees.

Raymon Muhammad v. State of Tennessee
W2022-00027-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Robert Carter, Jr.

The Petitioner, Raymon Muhammad, filed a post-conviction petition in the Shelby County
Criminal Court, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and
resulting life sentence. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner
appeals. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

George Gary Ingram v. Dr. Michael Gallagher Et Al.
E2020-01222-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ward Jeffrey Hollingsworth

The issue before us is whether the voluntary dismissal of a defendant in a multi-defendant case that is governed by the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) may be set aside and the claim against the dismissed defendant reinstated on the motion of a plaintiff pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The plaintiff in this case initiated a healthcare liability action against a physician, a hospital, and two other defendants. Before any responsive pleading was filed by any defendant, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, naming only the physician as a defendant. The plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal that dismissed all of the defendants except the physician, and the trial court entered an order of voluntary dismissal the following day. In his answer to the amended complaint, the physician argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed under the GTLA because the hospital, which was his employer and a governmental entity, was not a defendant. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend in which he sought to set aside the trial court’s order voluntarily dismissing the hospital from the action. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The trial court later dismissed the hospital from the action with prejudice and granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the physician. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the order of voluntary dismissal. Upon our review of this case, we do not reach the question of whether the voluntary dismissal order could be altered or amended pursuant to Rule 54.02. Because the plaintiff removed the hospital from the lawsuit when he filed his amended complaint, the plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal and the trial court’s order of voluntary dismissal were of no legal effect. Accordingly, there was no valid order of voluntary dismissal to alter or amend. As a result, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues it deemed pretermitted as moot.

State of Tennessee v. Timothy Travis Jenkins
M2022-01093-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

The Defendant, Timothy Travis Jenkins, appeals the trial court’s order imposing confinement after finding that the Defendant violated his probation. The Defendant’s probation began in 2019, when he was convicted of sale of methamphetamine and given a six-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. In 2022, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant, the Defendant’s third, which alleged multiple violations. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and when it ordered him to confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In Re Abraham S.
M2022-00690-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sheila Calloway

Keith S. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his son, Abraham S. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“the juvenile court”) terminated Father’s parental rights based on several statutory grounds: abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support; abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability to assume legal and physical custody. The juvenile court concluded that one alleged ground for termination, substantial noncompliance with permanency plan, was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s ruling as to all but one ground for termination. Because the record contains scant evidence of help offered to Father regarding housing, we conclude that abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the juvenile court’s ruling as to the other statutory grounds, and we affirm the ruling that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interests.

Cory Lamont Batey v. State of Tennessee
M2022-00407-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte Watkins

Petitioner, Cory Lamont Batey, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely because he was actively misled by his appellate counsel. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Annie J. Jones, by and through her conservatorship, Joyce Sons a/k/a Calisa Joyce Sons v. Life Care Centers of America d/b/a Life Care Center of Tullahoma
M2022-00471-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge William A. Lockhart

This appeal arises from an incident in which the nude body of a resident at an assisted living facility was exposed on a video call via telephone when an employee of the healthcare facility engaged in a personal call while assisting the resident in the shower. The resident, by and through her conservator/daughter (“Plaintiff”), sued the owner and operator of the healthcare facility, Life Care Centers of America d/b/a Life Care Center of Tullahoma (“Defendant”), asserting a claim of “Negligence Pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act” and a generalized claim for invasion of privacy with allegations of “Gross Negligence, Willful, Wanton, Reckless, Malicious and/or Intentional Misconduct.” Relying on the undisputed fact that the resident was unaware and never informed that the incident occurred, Defendant moved for summary judgment due to the lack of a cognizable injury or recoverable damages. Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that actual damages were not an essential element of her claims and, in the alternative, moved to amend the complaint to specifically assert a claim for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon the resident’s seclusion and a claim for negligent supervision. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint on the ground “that damages for invasion of privacy . . . cannot be proven as it would be impossible to suffer from personal humiliation, mental anguish or similar damages since [the resident] is unaware that the incident happened” and denied the motion to amend the complaint on the basis of futility. Plaintiff appealed. We have determined that the gravamen of the complaint states a claim for invasion of privacy based upon the distinct tort of intrusion upon seclusion. We have also determined that actual damages are not an essential element of a claim for invasion of privacy based on the distinct tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Thus, Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment. Moreover, granting leave to amend the complaint would not have been futile. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision to summarily dismiss the complaint, reverse the decision to deny the motion to amend the complaint, and remand with instruction to reinstate the complaint, grant the motion to amend the complaint, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Clifton W. Wright, Jr. v. Joseph K. Reid, II Et Al.
E2021-01258-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John C. Rambo

This case arises from the demise of a short-lived business venture. For three years, two of
the parties owned and operated a wellness center from the same location as an existing
medical clinic. When disputes arose, the plaintiff (co-owner of the wellness center) sued
the defendants, asserting twelve counts in his complaint and seeking judicial dissolution of
the company. The plaintiff died during the course of the proceeding, and the executor of
his estate was substituted as the plaintiff. A special master held a three-day hearing
regarding fifteen issues, and the trial court adopted the majority of his findings. The trial
court then held a seven-day bench trial. Ultimately, the trial court ruled in favor of the
defendants on all counts and judicially dissolved the company upon agreement of the
parties. The plaintiff appeals, raising very limited issues regarding his claims for unjust
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and judicial dissolution. We affirm and remand for
further proceedings.

In Re Riley B. Et Al.
E2022-00684-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jeffrey D. Rader

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on the
grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) persistence of conditions; and (3)
failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial
responsibility of the child. She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the
children. We reverse the trial court’s finding of abandonment by failure to provide a
suitable home, but we affirm the trial court in all other respects.

Angela Buchanan v. State of Tennessee
M2022-00190-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge James A. Turner

The Petitioner, Angela Buchanan, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, wherein she challenged her convictions for criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child neglect. On appeal, the Petitioner argues: (1) she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) her convictions were based on inadmissible Rule 404(b) evidence; (3) she received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (4) the trial court, in violation of Tennessee law and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, failed to inform her that she could make a statement of allocution at sentencing. 1 We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lyons, James Michael Usinger, Lee Harold Cromwell, Austin Gary Cooper, and Christopher Alan Hauser
M2019-01946-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The Uniform Commercial Code provides a mechanism for secured creditors to give notice to the world of their security interest in debtors’ property as collateral for debt by filling out a form for a financing statement and posting it on the website for Tennessee’s Secretary of State. In this case, that system was weaponized. Collectively, the defendants filed over a hundred bogus financing statements on the Secretary of State’s website regarding over forty Tennessee residents, including judges, mayors, public officials, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and ex-spouses. The online financing statements falsely claimed liens for the defendants’ alleged security interest in the victims’ property as collateral for millions of dollars in fictitious debt. All were done for the apparent purpose of vexing and harassing the victims. All of the defendants were convicted of multiple counts of filing a lien without a reasonable basis, a Class E felony, and forgery of at least $250,000, a Class A felony. We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the forgery convictions. We hold that the defendants’ conduct fits within the statutory definition of forgery. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the apparent value associated with the fraudulent financing statements was over $250,000. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.