State of Tennessee v. Steve William Pollock
The Defendant-Appellant, Steve William Pollock, appeals his two convictions for vehicular assault in the Obion County Circuit Court. On appeal, Pollock argues: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the State’s expert to rely on a study, a copy of which he was not provided, in forming her opinion regarding the likelihood of his intoxication at the time of the collision and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s proof and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cole Woodard
The Defendant-Appellant, Cole Woodard, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, Class C felonies, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three concurrent sentences of ten years. On appeal, Woodard argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) his convictions violate principles of double jeopardy. Upon review, we affirm the convictions, but we vacate the judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments reflecting merger of the jury verdicts into a single conviction for sale of cocaine. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Doris Sharphine Halliburton
The Defendant-Appellant, Doris Sharphine Halliburton, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a term of three years, with Halliburton to serve one year in the Dyer County Jail before serving the remaining two years of her sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, Halliburton argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and (2) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emmett Hartnest, Jr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Emmett Hartnest, Jr., was convicted by a Hardin County jury of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with Hartnest to serve ten days in the Hardin County Jail before serving the balance of his sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, Hartnest argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Mark Watkins, Surviving Spouse of Amy Rose Watkins v. Affiliated Internists, P.C., et al.
Husband of a decedent filed a wrongful death medical malpractice action against the |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of John Daniel Tate
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of a motion for |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Alfonso B. Patton
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Alfonso B. Patton
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Allen Pollard
Defendant, James Allen Pollard, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court merged Defendants’ murder convictions and sentenced him to life in prison for first degree murder and to 18 years to be served at 100 percent for his especially aggravated robbery conviction, which was ordered to be served consecutively to his life sentence. Defendant appeals his convictions and asserts the following: 1) that the State violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), when it failed to disclose evidence regarding State’s witness Anthony Bowers; 2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant Defendant a continuance to investigate Anthony Bowers; 3) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police; 4) the trial court erred by allowing Detective Windsor to testify regarding his opinion about whether Defendant acted in self-defense; 5) the trial court committed plain error by allowing an officer to testify regarding blood spatter; 6) the alleged errors constitute cumulative error requiring a reversal of Defendants’ convictions; and 7) the trial court erred by ordering Defendant’s sentences to run consecutively. After a careful review of the entire record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and the lengths of his individual sentences; however, we reverse the trial court’s order of consecutive sentencing and remand for a new sentencing hearing in order for the trial court to state on the record the facts which support consecutive sentencing. See State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995). |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In The Matter Of Abigail F.K.
This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The subject child is the eighth born to the appellant mother. The appellant mother failed a prenatal drug screen prior to the birth of the child at issue, so the appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services took the child into protective custody three days after birth. A permanency plan was adopted and the mother made efforts to comply with her permanency plan responsibilities. The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights as to this child. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights based on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. The mother now appeals only as to the grounds for termination. We reverse as to the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan but affirm as to the ground of persistent conditions. On that basis, we affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ameale Hudson
A Madison County Circuit Court Jury found the appellant, Ameale Hudson, guilty of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a change of venue; (2) denying his motion to bar the State from referring to him by his nickname,“Pistol”; and (3) denying his motion to prohibit the admission of postmortem photographs of the victim. The appellant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Alexander Jones
A Gibson County grand jury indicted appellant, Christopher Alexander Jones, for first degree murder. The jury found appellant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Specifically, he contends that the evidence did not show sufficient proof of premeditation and that his intoxication negated the required culpable mental state for this offense. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Cameron S.H.
In this parental termination case, the father was appointed counsel at the time the Court held a dependency hearing in the Juvenile Court and the Order appointing counsel in that proceeding also appointed the attorney for the subsequent termination of parental rights trial. When the Petition to terminate the father's parental rights trial was held, neither the father nor counsel appeared at trial and a Judgment was entered terminating the father's parental rights. On appeal, appellant argues that the statue and rule governing this proceeding required notification to the father's attorney. We vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court on the grounds that both the Court and the Department of Children's Services were charged with the knowledge that the appellee was appointed counsel and that the termination Petition's Judgment was prejudicial to the judicial process when the father's lawyer was not notified of the Petition or trial. We vacate and remand for a new trial. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. Jason Morris, et al.
A Memphis police officer was terminated after he was involved in a physical altercation with his girlfriend during which she sustained facial injuries. The Civil Service Commission upheld the termination, and the chancery court affirmed. In the initial appeal to this Court, we remanded for the Commission to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commission issued an amended decision with additional findings. Upon reviewing the amended decision, the chancery court reversed the termination and reinstated the officer. The City appeals, arguing that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence. The officer presents numerous arguments in support of his assertion that reversal of the Commission was proper. We affirm the order of the chancery court in part, but we vacate the reinstatement of the officer and reinstate the Commission’s decision to uphold termination. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Milledgeville United Methodist Church, et al. v. Jimmy G. Melton, et al.
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of real property. Appellee church purchased the disputed property from the seller bank in 1974, but failed to record its deed. Through a clerical error, the seller bank sold the disputed property to Appellant real estate investor in 2008. Appellant promptly recorded his deed. After the investor demolished a portion of a wall constructed by the church on the disputed property, the church sued to quiet title and for damages. The trial court ruled that the deed to the investor was void as champertous because the church’s possession of the property was open and obvious at the time of conveyance. Thus the trial court ruled that the church was the true owner of the property. Although we affirm the decision of the trial court, we rely on grounds other than those found by the trial court. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Traci Jones v. Bernice Jones et al.
This matter arose from a car accident between Traci Jones and Bernice Jones. At trial, the |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffery Allen v. State of Tennessee
Jeffery D. Allen (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, challenging his convictions for first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, facilitation of attempted first degree murder, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. As his bases for relief, he alleged several grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel (1) failed to call two witnesses to testify at trial, (2) failed to adequately cross-examine a witness, and (3) failed to move to sever the Petitioner’s offenses prior to trial. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew T. McGee
The Defendant, Matthew T. McGee, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2008). He was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with forty-five days’ confinement and the remainder on probation. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved two certified questions of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rocky Top Realty, Inc., v. Debra Young, et al
This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal we held that the parties did not have a contract for the sale of the property, and we remanded it back to the Trial Court to determine a reasonable fee in quantum meruit for the plaintiff as the facilitator of the sale. Upon remand, the Trial Court heard proof and held that plaintiff was entitled to a 6% commission on the sale price. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment as modified. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Leah Austin v. A-1 Used Restaurant Equipment, Inc.
Plaintiff purchased a vent hood from defendant. The hood was paid for at the time of purchase and delivered, but was returned to defendant as being unworkable. Plaintiff brought this action for reimbursement of payment for the hood in Sessions Court. Sessions Court entered a Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Judge entered Judgment for the plaintiff for $3,500 for the amount paid for the hood to defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Cass Rye & Associates, Inc. v. Edward Coleman, et al.
Plaintiff in suit seeking to have court declare boundaries of fifteen acre tract of land appeals |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Lee Scales Jr. v. Dwight Barbee, Warden
Petitioner, Bobby Lee Scales, Jr., filed a pro se etition for habeas corpus relief attacking two convictions of theft in Davidson County and one conviction of theft in Williamson County. The habeas corpus trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and Petitioner appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roger Brent Banks v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Roger Brent Banks, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for six counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor. Petitioner pled guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual battery. The remaining counts were dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, Petitioner received an effective sentence of sixteen years at 100%, and was ordered to lifetime supervision after the service of the sentence. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis that his sentences were void and illegal. The petition was dismissed as untimely. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that the petition was properly dismissed as untimely as Petitioner failed to show any reason that the statute of limitations should be tolled. As a result, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Helton
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Appellant, Andrew Helton, has appealed the Davidson County Criminal Court order dismissing his motion for new trial in which Appellant alleged that: (1) the trial court erred by denying Appellant the right to be present at his trial; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on all lesser included offenses; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to allow the jury to examine evidence during deliberation. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the motion for new trial as duplicitous and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fletcher Gordon v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Fletcher Gordon, pled guilty to second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and it awarded him no jail credit. The Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court failed to award him pretrial jail credit. He asserted that he was incarcerated pending arraignment and trial from December 20, 2004, to August 24, 2006. The State filed a motion to dismiss the Petitioner’s motion based upon the Petitioner’s failure to provide documentation supporting his claim. The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court improperly dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals |