Norman Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis
This appeal involves a dispute regarding the civil liability of the Catholic Diocese of Memphis for acts of child sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by one of its priests in the 1970s. A victim of this alleged abuse filed suit against the Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Memphis in the Circuit Court for Shelby County seeking monetary damages. The Diocese moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived state courts of subject matter jurisdiction and that the victim’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the Diocese’s motion. The Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations had run on the victim’s claims and that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred state courts from considering the victim’s negligent hiring and retention claims but not the negligent supervision claims. Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, No. W2009-00986-COA-R10-CV, 2010 WL 2106222 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2010). We granted the victim’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the victim’s claims and that the victim’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Edith Wenczl Simpkins v. Otto Kent Simpkins
Husband appeals his conviction of fourteen counts of criminal contempt for violations of the Marital Dissolution Agreement and the imposition of fourteen consecutive ten-day sentences for a total of 140 days in jail. Husband also appeals an award of attorney’s fees to Wife. We affirm the award of attorney’s fees to Wife and the finding that Husband was guilty of fourteen separate counts of criminal contempt; however, we find the imposition of the maximum sentence was excessive and employ our authority under Thigpen v. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) to modify the sentence. Applying contempt sentencing principles found in In re Sneed, 302 S.W.3d 825 (Tenn. 2010) and sentencing considerations under Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-103 and 115(b), the sentences for twelve of the counts are reduced to four (4) days each, which will run consecutive to each other, the sentences for the two remaining counts are reduced to one (1) day each, which will run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the other twelve counts for an effective sentence of forty-nine (49) days. We also award Wife her reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to the enforcement provision contained in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick Edward Reeder v. Jo Beth (Curtis) Reeder
In this post-divorce action, a father seeks to have his child support obligation reduced following the emancipation of the parties’ older child.Mother opposes a reduction due to the expense of the younger child’s extracurricular activities and Father’s failure to exercise visitation with the younger child. Mother also seeks payment for unpaid child support from 2002. The trial court held Father was entitled to a reduction in his child support obligation, and that the circumstances justified the creation of a new parenting plan with less visitation time for Father, and an upward deviation from the Child Support Guidelines for Father’s child support obligation for the younger child. Further, the court held Father in “willful civil contempt” for the unpaid support from 2002, and ordered Father to pay the arrearage and a portion of Mother’s attorney fees. We affirm the trial court in all but two respects. We reverse the decision holding Father in contempt for failing to satisfy his support obligation in 2002, because it was not willful. Father was out of work due to an injury. We also reverse the decision denying prejudgment interest on the child support arrearage from 2002, finding that Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(f)(1) mandates that interest on unpaid child support shall accrue from the date the ordered support was due, at a rate of 12% per year. We also find Mother is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal and remand for determination of the amount. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Mario Thomas v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Mario Thomas, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Rebekah R. W.
Perley W. Jr., (“Father”) appeals the termination of his rights to his minor daughter, Rebekah R.W. (DOB: Oct. 7, 2005) (“the Child”). The petition to terminate was filed by Arlin H. and Emma H. (collectively “the Grandparents”), the Child’s maternal grandparents, who were the Child’s temporary custodians. At the time of the bench trial, Father was serving an effective 40-year prison sentence pursuant to two convictions for attempted murder and a conviction for attempted aggravated arson. The court terminated Father’s rights based upon the ground that Father was incarcerated under a sentence of ten or more years while the Child was under eight years of age, and its finding that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals the trial court’s best interest determination. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Christa Goddard v. Thomas E. Goddard
This is a post-divorce case. Thomas E. Goddard (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order granting Christa Goddard (“Mother”) permission to move to Florida with the parties’ minor child, Emma Elizabeth (DOB: July 1, 2004)(“the Child”). Based upon finding that Mother was spending the greater amount of time with the Child, the court applied Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d)(1)(2010). The court found that the proposed relocation (1) had a reasonable purpose, (2) posed no threat of specific and serious harm to the Child, and (3) was not motivated by a vindictive effort to defeat Father’s parenting rights. Father appeals. We affirm . |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Chris Allen Dykes v. David Sexton, Warden
The Petitioner, Chris Allen Dykes, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that the habeas corpus court erred by dismissing his petition on procedural grounds and (2) that the judgments against him are void because they reflect a conviction of criminal responsibility for first degree murder when he was indicted for criminal responsibility for attempted first degree murder. Following our review, we conclude that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing the petition on the grounds stated in its order. However, we affirm the summary dismissal based upon other grounds stated in this opinion. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Ford v. State of Tennessee
A Madison County Jury convicted Petitioner of three counts of aggravated assault and one count of reckless endangerment resulting from an altercation Petitioner had with his live-in girlfriend and her three daughters. State v. Kenneth Ford, No. W2007-02149-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1034522, at *1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 17, 2009). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-two years. Id. at *3. Petitioner was unsuccessful in his direct appeal of his sentence to this Court. Id. at *1. Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court held a hearing and denied the petition. Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings. In addition, several issues raised by Petitioner were not raised in front of the post-conviction court. In addition they were not raised during direct appeal but could have been and are now waived; or were addressed on direct appeal. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. U.S. Golf & Tennis Centers, Inc., et al
Wilson Sporting Goods Company brought suit in the Cumberland County General Sessions Court on an open account against U.S. Golf & Tennis Centers, Inc. (“the Company”) and its owners, Arthur H. Bell and Louise Bell (collectively “the Guarantors”). The account resulted from a large shipment of golf balls. After delivery, the Company questioned the price charged and refused and failed to make any payments. In response to Wilson’s suit, the defendants filed a counterclaim in which they denied owing the amount sought and moved the court to modify or rescind the contract with Wilson. Following a bench trial, the general sessions court entered judgment in favor of Wilson. On appeal to the trial court, both sides sought summary judgment; both motions were denied. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of Wilson for $33,099.28. The defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Gray Mills, Jr. et al. v. Fulmarque, Inc.
We accepted this appeal to determine whether the phrase “a defendant named . . . within the applicable statute of limitations” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(a) (2009) refers only to a defendant sued within the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s claim or also refers to defendants not sued within the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s claim, but added to the lawsuit during the ninety-day period provided by section 20-1-119(a). Whether section 20-1-119(a) affords successive ninety-day windows during which a plaintiff may amend a complaint to add a new nonparty defendant as a comparative tortfeasor is an issue of first impression. Because we answer that question in the negative, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court granting Fulmarque’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing this action. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Calvin Gray Mills, Jr. et al. v. Fulmarque, Inc. - Dissent
Because I would have affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I do not interpret Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 as precluding successive ninety-day windows for the purpose of adding additional parties identified as comparative tortfeasors by defendants already in the lawsuit. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyeshia Stewart
The defendant was convicted in a jury trial of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, for killing her boyfriend following an altercation. She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years, split one year in jail with the balance to be served on probation. The defendant now appeals her conviction and sentence, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that the trial court erred by failing to sentence her to the minimum sentence. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Davis Jeremy Uselton v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Shawn Harris v. Tennessee Department of Correction et al.
This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing an inmate’s petition for writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v, Tyrone Ralph Wright
A Coffee County jury convicted the Defendant, Tyrone Ralph Wright, of one count of theft of property under $500 and one count of forgery over $1000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to an effective sentence of twelve years. The Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of a vehicle in which the Defendant was a passenger; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of an uncharged forgery; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to charge the jury on a lesser included offense; (4) the identification of the Defendant submitted at trial violated the “physical facts rule;” (5) the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (6) he was denied his right to allocution at the sentencing hearing; and (7) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that there is no error in the judgments of the trial court, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen Bernard Wlodarz v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, charged with first degree premeditated murder and other crimes, entered best interest guilty pleas and received an effective sentence of life without parole. After an unsuccessful petition for post-conviction relief challenging the effectiveness of his trial counsel, he filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging newly discovered, exculpatory ballistic evidence. The trial court denied the petition, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Wlodarz v. State, No. E2008-02179-CCA-R3-CO, 2010 WL 1998766 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 19, 2010). We granted the application for permission to appeal to consider whether a petitioner who has entered guilty pleas may challenge his convictions by writ of error coram nobis pursuant to the terms of our statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26105(b) (2006). While we have determined that the petitioner did not forfeit the procedural remedy of writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence by entering the guiltypleas,the evidence in this instance does notqualifyas newlydiscovered. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Hawkins | Supreme Court | |
Julie Leamon Tomlin v. Nathan Leamon
This case arises from a dispute over which parent should be the primary residential parent of two minor children, Julian and Tristen (“the Children,” collectively). Julie Leamon Tomlin (“Mother”) and Nathan Leamon (“Father”) are the parents of the Children. Mother and Father divorced several years ago and both have since remarried. Some time after the divorce, Mother, with whom the Children spent the majority of their time, filed a petition for correct child support and to modify the existing permanent parenting plan in the Circuit Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”). Father filed an answer and counterclaim, requesting that he be made the primary residential parent, or, in the alternative, that he have equal parenting time with the Children. Following trial, the Trial Court found that a material change of circumstances had occurred and that it was in the Children’s best interests that Father be made primary residential parent of the Children. Mother appeals, arguing, in part, that no material change of circumstances had occurred that could support making Father the primary residential parent. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Homer P. Norton
This lawsuit was filed by the decedent’s nephew and the nephew’s wife alleging that the caretakers of the decedent improperly influenced him to change his will. The proponents of the decedent’s will filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that no confidential relationship existed between the decedent and the caretakers in regard to the will. The trial court granted the proponents’ motion, finding that proof of a confidential relationship was necessary to pursue a will contest on the ground of undue influence, and that no such confidential relationship existed between decedent and the caretakers. The contestants appeal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Angela T., Ekene T., and Ember T.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights that was filed in 2005. At the hearing, the Father consented to the termination of his parental rights, so the trial court entered an order terminating his parental rights without making findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding grounds for termination and the children’s best interest. Father subsequently challenged the trial court’s order on appeal, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to hold a new hearing and prepare an order with the requisite findings. On remand, the trial court found that Father had not abandoned the children by willfully failing to visit them or by willfully failing to support them, and therefore it declined to terminate his parental rights. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Angela T., Ekene T., and Ember T. - Concurring in Part and Partial Dissent
I concur fully in the majority’s finding that Father abandoned his children by willful failure to visit them. I must reluctantly dissent from the majority’s finding that Father’s child support payments during the pivotal four-month period amounted to abandonment by willful failure to support. The trial court viewed Father’s testimony and considered his payment history during the four-month period, and found no willful intent to abandon. While Father clearly had the means to pay his full child support obligation, in view of the trial court’s finding and the evidence on his payments, I must respectfully disagree that the record shows by clear and convincing evidence abandonment by failure to support. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Bernard Wlodarz v. State of Tennessee - Concur
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Wlodarz has not presented newly discovered evidence to support his effort to use a writ of error coram nobis to set aside his guilty plea. I write separately, however, because I cannot concur with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Wlodarz is entitled to challenge his guilty plea using a writ of error coram nobis. |
Hawkins | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher M. Foster
The appellant, Christopher M. Foster, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to robbery and received a five-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting him another alternative sentence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Khalfani S. Marion v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Khalfani Marion, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing to consider whether due process tolled the statute of limitations in his case. The State concedes that an evidentiary hearing should have been held to determine whether the statute of limitations should be tolled due to the petitioner’s trial counsel’s having failed to timely inform him of our supreme court’s denial of his application for permission to appeal. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the summary dismissal of the petition and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the circumstances require that the statute of limitations be tolled in this case. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gerald Lee Powers v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Gerald Lee Powers, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1998, he was convicted of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. His convictions and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 387 (Tenn. 2003), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1038, 123 S. Ct. 2083 (2003). On appeal, the petitioner presents a number of issues: trial counsel were ineffective in selection of jurors; the trial court erred in not allowing individual voir dire and limiting counsel’s voir dire questioning; trial counsel were ineffective because they had excessive caseloads and did not object to long trial days; trial counsel failed to investigate certain evidence; trial counsel were ineffective as to expert witnesses; trial counsel were ineffective in presentation of other suspects to the homicide; trial counsel were ineffective in their witness interviews and failed to locate certain relevant witnesses; the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to reasonable doubt; the State failed to produce exculpatory evidence and to preserve certain evidence; the trial court should have disqualified itself; trial counsel failed to object to the applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c); and imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional. We have carefully reviewed each of these claims and conclude, as did the post-conviction court, that they are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the order of that court denying the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carol Crisel v. Thomas Crisel
This appeal involves the “spousal impoverishment” provision of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (“MCCA”). Thomas Crisel (“Husband”) was placed in a nursing home for health-related problems. Subsequently, Carol Crisel (“Wife”) filed a complaint against Husband in which she sought spousal support in the form of a transfer of the family residence and all of his income. The trial court granted Wife’s request and filed an order reflecting its decision. Upon receiving notice of the order, the Tennessee Department of Human Services (“TDHS”) filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the order pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motion. TDHS appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instruction to the trial court to reconsider Wife’s complaint for spousal support with TDHS participating as an intervening party. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals |