State of Tennessee v. Patsy Lynn McCoy
The Defendant-Appellant, Patsy Lynn McCoy, appeals the DeKalb County Criminal Court’s revocation of her probation in two cases. She originally pled guilty to aggravated burglary, burglary, and theft under $500. She received an effective seven-year sentence, all of which was suspended to probation after sixty days’ incarceration. On appeal, McCoy argues that (1)Tennessee’s statutory scheme allowing incarceration after a revocation of probation based on judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence is unconstitutional, and (2) the trial court erred in revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the sentences in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chandra Pearson v. Victor Ross
This appeal involves a nuisance claim. The parties own adjoining homes in a neighborhood of zero-lot line homes. The defendant’s air conditioning condenser unit is outside his home, between the parties’ homes. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the noise of the defendant’s air conditioning unit constituted a nuisance, and seeking abatement of the nuisance, money damages, and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ryan Love
A Washington County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Ryan Love, of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. He received a suspended sentence of two years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the element of serious bodily injury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Grand Valley Lakes Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Dennis Burrow
Appellant, the owner of several lots in a subdivision managed and maintained by the Appellee home owners association, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee on the question of whether Appellant owed an increase in dues and fees on his lots, and the denial of his counter-claims for fraud, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, outrageous conduct, and invalidity of the restrictive covenants on grounds that these causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation or the doctrine of laches. We conclude that the Appellee followed the correct procedure in amending its restrictive covenants to increase the amount of dues. However, because the trial court did not make findings, as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, concerning the grounds for its application of laches, we cannot review the question of whether Appellant’s counter-claims were properly dismissed. Vacated and remanded. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cedric Lamar Moses
On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion to reinstate probation. Upon review, we conclude that the appellant does not have a Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, appeal as of right from the order. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Thomas Grady Chastain
We granted the application of June Chastain Patterson (“the Proponent”), which sought permission to appeal an order of the trial court holding, as a matter of law, that the “will” of Thomas Grady Chastain (“the Deceased”) was not executed in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104 (2007). The Deceased signed the affidavit of attesting witnesses on September 4, 2004, which affidavit was attached to the purported will of the same date; he also initialed the bottom of the first page of the “will,” but did not sign the second page of the two-page “will.” The Proponent appeals. We reverse. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Thomas Grady Chastain - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s Opinion. I believe that the answer to the issue of “Whether the Will was signed in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104” is a simple no. The majority, however, strives mightily to arrive at a conclusion that the Testator’s signature on a document other than the purported Will somehow satisfies the statutory requirement that the Testator signed the purported Will. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin D. Buford
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Kevin D. Buford, of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life for the felony murder conviction and ten years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Miguel Salinas
The defendant, Miguel Angel Salinas, entered a best-interest plea to one count of possession of marijuana, a Class D felony, and one count of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to sell over 300 grams, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the negotiated agreement, the defendant received an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. The only issue which remained undetermined by the agreement was whether the defendant’s ten-year sentence would be served concurrently with or consecutively to a twenty-five year Georgia sentence which he had received in 2004. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the separate sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant contends that this was error. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin Gibson
Defendant-Appellant, Justin Gibson, pled guilty to driving under the influence with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or more, a Class A misdemeanor. He agreed to a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, all of which was suspended after seven days’ incarceration. Gibson entered a conditional plea agreement and attempted to reserve a certified question of law under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. The certified question of law addressed whether the search of Gibson’s home violated his constitutional rights and whether evidence obtained as a result should be suppressed. On appeal, he argues that the warrantless search was not justified by either consent or exigent circumstances. We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the order stating the certified question was not filed until after Gibson filed his notice of appeal. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tish Walker, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Lisa Jo Abbott v. Dr. Shant Garabedian
This appeal concerns the application of the locality rule in a medical malpractice case. The trial court excluded the testimony of the plaintiff’s medical expert, based on the locality rule. On this basis, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant physician. The plaintiff appeals. We vacate the order excluding the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert and the grant of summary judgment, and remand for reconsideration in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s recent decision Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011). |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Michael Harden
The Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Michael Harden, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order granting the forfeiture of his automobile. The forfeiture proceedings were instituted pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-33-101 through -111 following his guilty pleas to aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. On appeal, Harden argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the forfeiture because the delay in the institution of forfeiture proceedings constituted a violation of his due process rights. Upon review, we determine that Harden does not have an appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
G. Kenneth Campbell, et al v. James E. Huddleston et al.
James E. Huddleston and his wife, Patricia M. Huddleston (“the Sellers”), sold their house to G. Kenneth Campbell and his wife, Teresa J. Campbell (“the Buyers’). The Buyers inquired of the Sellers as to whether there had been flooding in the house. The Sellers disclosed that there had been one flood in the basement to a depth of six inches. During the course of some later renovations, the Buyers became aware the Sellers had indicated, on a wall stud, that there had been a 1998 flood in the basement to a depth of 38 inches. They |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall Keith Smith and Nicholas Ryan Flood
Following the discovery by police of numerous materials commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine on property controlled by Defendant Randall Keith Smith, he was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction for manufacturing methamphetamine and to a concurrent eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant Nicholas Ryan Flood, who was in the company of Defendant Smith when the materials commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine were discovered on the property, was convicted of a single count of manufacturing methamphetamine. Defendant Flood was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Smith claims that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence seized from his property under the auspices of a search warrant. Defendant Flood claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. After carefully reviewing the record and the defendants’ arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Whited
A Wilson county jury convicted the Defendant, Anthony Whited, of second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to serve twenty years at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erroneously ruled that the State could cross-examine the Defendant about two prior misdemeanor convictions if the Defendant chose to testify; (3) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to give evidence in the form of an opinion when (a) the State did not tender the witness as an expert and (b) the testimony was outside any area of expertise possibly attributable to the witness; (4) the trial court erroneously overruled the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (5) the trial court’s jury instructions illegally shifted the burden of proof to the Defendant; and (6) the trial court erred by using the Defendant’s prior convictions to determine the length of the Defendant’s sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Steven Austin
The defendant, David Steven Austin, was convicted by a Fayette County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence, second offense, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation except for forty-five days. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Dortch
The Defendant, Alvin Dortch, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of making a false report, a Class D felony. See T.C.A.§ 39-16-502(a) (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years, with 120 days’ confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Lee Robinson and Jamie Nathaniel Grimes
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Bobby Lee Robinson, of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class A felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The jury convicted the Defendant, Jamie Nathaniel Grimes, of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class A felony; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Robinson to seventeen years as a standard offender for the cocaine offense, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor offense, with all of the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court sentenced Grimes to thirty years as a multiple offender for the cocaine offense and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor offense, ordering all of the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, Robinson argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce a redacted tape recording and transcript of statements he made during his arrest; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Grimes argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) improperly admitted evidence about the weight of the cocaine; (2) denied his motion for disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity; and (3) admitted a transcript of a recorded conversation between him and the confidential informant into evidence. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as to both Defendants. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Todd Joseph Sweet a/k/a Jamie Lee Turpin
A Monroe County jury convicted the Defendant, Todd Joseph Sweet, of theft greater than $10,000, and the trial court sentenced him to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a sentence he received in a separate case, case number 08-081. In this appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss for the State’s failure to comply with the Interstate Compact on Detainers; (2) the trial court improperly refused to remove for cause a juror who had previous knowledge of other crimes the Defendant allegedly committed; (3) the State failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 when it failed to provide the Defendant’s trial counsel with letters written by the Defendant and intercepted by the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department; (4) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence; (5) the trial court improperly admitted evidence that the Defendant had committed other crimes; (6) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial; (7) the trial court improperly instructed the jury; (8) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s Motion to Strike the State’s Notice of Impeachment; (9) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (10) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant to the maximum sentence within his range and improperly ordered that his sentence run consecutively to a sentence he had previously received in a separate case. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that there exists no error in the trial court’s judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment and sentence. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Shane Benson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Benson, proceeding pro se, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. On July 5, 2000, the petitioner pled guilty to one count of rape of a child in the Hamilton County. He now claims this conviction is void, and the State agrees, because the judgment of conviction does not contain the mandatory community supervision for life provision as required by law. The remedy he seeks is to require the State to honor its original plea agreement, which did not include the provision, even though it will result in an illegal sentence. After careful review, we conclude that the petitioner is correct and has a valid claim, but he has cited to no authority authorizing the relief he seeks. Therefore, we must deem that this issue is waived. Contrarily, the State requests that this court reverse the actions of the habeas corpus court in denying relief and that we remand with instructions to the court to summarily amend the judgment of conviction to provide for the mandatory community supervision for life provision. However, after review, we deem it proper to reverse and remand to follow the instructions contained herein. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Decker v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Daniel Decker, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of first-degree premeditated murder and is currently serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition because the proof presented established that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. More specifically, the petitioner alleges that the postconviction court erred in multiple aspects, specifically: (1) that the courtheld that an expert witness had the duty and burden to present her opinions more completely at trial; (2) that the court erred by admitting a letter written by the petitioner to trial counsel after the conviction; (3) that the court should haverecused itself in the matter; (4) denying relief because the petitioner met his burden of proof under the Strickland standard to establish ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) that the court erred by not reviewing trial counsel’s performance under the Cronic standard; and (6) that the court erred by failing to address all issues raised by the petitioner in its order denying relief. Following our review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
FILMtech, Inc. v. Charlie McAnally, d/b/a Grainger Paving
Plaintiff brought this action against this contractor alleging breach of contract to construct an asphalt parking lot for plaintiff. The Trial Court determined that defendant breached the contract and awarded damages. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Dobson and Milton Rance
Defendant-Appellants, Ronnie Dobson and Milton Rance, were convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor. Both Dobson and Rance were sentenced as Range I, standard offenders and received effective sentences of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions of attempted second degree murder and reckless aggravated assault. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald W. Owen and Jennifer Owen v. Long Tire, LLC; Leon Long; and Nancy Long v. Owen Alignment, Inc.
This is a breach of contract and conversion case. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint and conducted a bench trial on the defendants’ counterclaim for breach of contract and conversion. The trial court held in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs now appeal. We find the plaintiffs’ appellate brief to be in substantial violation of Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure; in light of this, we decline to address the merits of the case and dismiss the appeal. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John David Luther
A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury by failing to instruct the jury about voluntary intoxication and by misstating the definition of attempt; (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; (3) the assistant district attorney committed misconduct by repeatedly using a racial slur to inflame the jury; and (4) the trial court erred by admitting irrelevant testimony. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |