State of Tennessee v. Martarious Hoskins
The defendant, Martarious Hoskins, appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gdongalay P. Berry v. State of Tennessee
The Davidson County Criminal Court denied the petitioner, Gdongalay P. Berry, post-conviction relief from his Davidson County Criminal Court convictions of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping but granted relief from his sentence of death in the form of a new capital sentencing hearing. The petitioner appeals the partial denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the State violated the tenets of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); that neither the State nor the trial court honored his constitutional right to a speedy trial; that the State’s pursuit of inconsistent theories violated his constitutional right to due process; that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel; and that the cumulative effect of the constitutional deprivations rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The State appeals the post-conviction court’s grant of a new sentencing hearing, asserting that the error attending the petitioner’s original sentencing hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Wesley Wright
The Defendant, John Wesley Wright, was convicted by a Dickson County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued at ten thousand dollars or more but less than sixty thousand dollars, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II,multiple offender to seven years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (3) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shanta Jones
The Defendant, Shanta Jones, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of facilitation of aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; facilitation of aggravated burglary, a Class D felony; facilitation of aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-11-403 (2010), 39-13-402 (2010), 39-14-403 (2010), 39-13-102 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010), 39-16-510 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to six years for facilitation of aggravated robbery, to four years each for the burglary and assault convictions, and to two years for retaliation for past action, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marlon McKay
The defendant, Marlon McKay, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery and was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of life plus six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and contends that the trial court committed plain error by granting the State’s request to omit a portion of the pattern jury instruction on criminal responsibility. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ron Littlefield v. Hamilton County Election Commission, et al .
Chattanooga’s mayor, the subject of a recall petition, filed suit against the county election commission, seeking a declaratory judgment that the petition process was flawed and to enjoin the election commission from placing the recall issue on the November 2010 election ballot. The trial court found the election commission could not lawfully certify the recall petition due to noncompliance with applicable statutory provisions and enjoined the placement of the recall issue on the ballot. The leader of the recall effort appeals. We find that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in entering an injunction against the election commission. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and the complaint dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Breanna A.L.
The Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”), upon a petition by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and following a trial, terminated the parental rights of Troy L. (“Father”) to the minor child Breanna A. L. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) (2010). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 13 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence existed such that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert White
The defendant, Robert White, appeals his conviction of second offense driving under the influence, see T.C.A. § 55-10-401(a)(1); -403(a)(1)(A)(iv), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction in light of his acquittal on an alternative count also charging driving under the influence, see id. § 55-10-401(a)(2). Because the seemingly inconsistent verdicts in this case do not render the evidence of the defendant’s intoxication infirm or insufficient, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Edward Coffey
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Mark Edward Coffey, pled guilty to facilitation of second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to eight years, suspended and placed on probation. Defendant was charged with a violation of probation, and after a hearing, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Braun v. Nita Lynn Braun
In this divorce case involving a minor child of the parties and the appellant Charles Braun’s stepson, the record before us does not contain a permanent parenting plan certified by the trial court clerk as being entered by that court. Furthermore, the record affirmatively shows that the trial court has not yet made a final decision as to an amount of child support to be paid by Charles Braun. Therefore, we are persuaded that there is no final judgment in this case. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Rhea Helton v. Gregory Herbert Helton
This is a divorce case. Gregory Herbert Helton appeals from the “final” judgment of divorce entered April 29, 2011. That judgment is not a final judgment. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Gloria G. Neuenschwander v. Roy P. Neuenschwander
This appeal is being pursued from the trial court’s order of August 9, 2011. That order is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant Gloria G. Neuenschwander’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Matter of the Conservatorship of Mittie T. Alexander v. JB Partners, A Tennessee General Partnership
Plaintiff Conservator filed an action seeking rescission of a warranty deed executed by her Ward prior to the establishment of the conservatorship. The deed conveyed real property in Nashville to Defendant without consideration, but retained a life-estate. Plaintiff alleged incapacity to contract as grounds for recision. Prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s action, Defendant and Appellee Intervener executed a contractfor sale of the property, subject to the life-estate. The trial court determined that the Intervener held superior title to the real property under the doctrine of equitable conversion. The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Intervener pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Randstad North America, L.P. v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development
This appeal involves the constitutionality of a statute on temporary disability benefits,T.C.A. § 50-6-238. The plaintiff employment agency refused to pay temporary disability benefits to an employee who claimed that she was disabled from an on-the-job injury. The employee filed a request for assistance with the defendant Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development pursuant to T.C.A.§ 50-6-238. A workers’compensation specialist entered an order requiring the employer to pay temporary disability benefits to the employee. The employer filed an unsuccessful administrative appeal. The employer then filed the instant petition for common law writ of certiorari alleging, inter alia, that the procedures in T.C.A. § 50-6-238 violate the employer’s right to procedural due process. The trial court agreed and held the statute to be unconstitutional on its face. The State appeals. In light of this Court’s recent decision in Tyson Foods v. TDOL, No. M2010-0227-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4790980 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2011), we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy J. Turner
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Timothy J. Turner, was convicted of four counts of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of eighteen months for each count of sexual battery and four years for each count of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court ordered two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure to run consecutively to each other and the remaining counts to run concurrently for an effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction as a Range I offender. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) that the original judge failed to perform his role as thirteenth juror; (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to hear his motion for new trial; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Defendant’s dual convictions for sexual battery and sexual battery by an authority figure in counts five, six, and seven of the indictment violate double jeopardy principles. We accordingly merge his convictions for sexual battery into his convictions for sexual battery by an authority figure in counts five, six, and seven and remand to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial courts, including the effective sentence of eight years imposed by the trial court |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Whetstone
The Defendant, Paul Whetstone, was convicted of direct criminal contempt by the Jefferson County General Sessions Court, Judge Alfred Benjamin Strand, Jr., presiding. The Defendant then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and supersedeas in the Jefferson County Circuit Court, which was granted. Following its review, the Jefferson County Circuit Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
ICG Link, Inc. v. Philip Steen, et al. v. TN Sports, LLC v. ICG Link, Inc.
This is a dispute concerning payment for website development services. The plaintiff, a website development company, filed suit against the defendants, an LLC and its managing member in his individual capacity, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court found there was no express contract between the parties due to a lack of mutual assent. The court found there was a quasi-contract and that plaintiff was entitled to the reasonable value of its services, minus the costs incurred by defendants in attempting to repair the defects in the website. Last, the court held the individual defendant personally liable for the judgment. We affirm the finding of a quasi-contract and the personal liability of the individual defendant; however, we modify the trial court’s monetary award, finding the plaintiff is entitled to recover a judgment of $13,952.88. The court’s holding is affirmed in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mamakeh Mamadi Jawara v. Latoya Michelle Jawara
This is an appeal from a divorce decree entered on August 5, 2008. Because the appellant voluntarily dismissed her first appeal from the same divorce decree in 2008, and did not file her current notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert R. Smith, As Conservator for the Estate of H. Boyd Israel, Ward v. Mark Israel
Petitioner sought to domesticate four orders entered by a probate court in Georgia for the payment of money pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §26-6-101, et seq. The trial court granted the petitioner the relief he sought, and the debtor appealed, arguing Tennessee public policy should prevent the orders from being enforced based on the unusual circumstances surrounding the issuance of the orders and his attorney’s misconduct in the Georgia proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because the Georgia court had jurisdiction to enter the orders and Tennessee courts are not in a position to review the facts leading to a foreign court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Town of Smyrna, Tennessee v. Perry Bell
The Town of Smyrna annexed land in 1991 that included a retail furniture store. The owner of that business kept a number of tractor-trailers parked on his property to store some of his inventory. Several years after the annexation, the town cited the owner in an attempt to enforce a municipal ordinance regulating the parking of tractor-trailers on commercially zoned property. The municipal court ruled against the owner. He appealed to the Circuit Court,which held that the ordinance in question was a zoning regulation and that the owner’s use of the tractor- trailers was protected bythe grandfathering provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b)(1). The town contends on appeal to this court that the ordinance is a property maintenance regulation rather than a zoning regulation and that the owner’s use of the tractor-trailers is therefore not entitled to the protection of the grandfather clause. We agree, and we reverse the Circuit Court because the proof does not indicate that compliance with the ordinance would substantially interfere with the store owner’s use of the property as a retail furniture business. Thus, it cannot be considered a zoning ordinance as applied to him under the standard established by our Supreme Court in Cherokee Country Club v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.2d 466 (Tenn. 2004). |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Casterlow v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Timothy Casterlow, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. In this appeal, he contends that principles of due process require the tolling of the statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeff Dayton, et al. v. James Ackerman d/b/a Home Design, Inc., et al.
Sellers of a house provided the purchasers with a Limited Warranty in which different aspects of the house were warranted to be without defects for a term not to exceed one year. The purchasers testified theycomplained two months following the closing that the windows did not operate properly, and the sellers testified the purchasers did not complain about the windows until after more than two years. The trial court found the purchasers’ testimony more credible, and based on the purchasers’ expert and other evidence, concluded the installation of the windows was defective. The court awarded the purchasers damages, consisting of the replacement cost for all the windows, even though not all the windows were defective. The sellers alleged the trial court erred by excluding its expert from testifying, by determining the window installation was defective, and in the way it calculated the purchasers’ damages. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified to correct a computational error in the calculation of damages. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Aubrey E. Givens, et al. v. Vanderbilt University, et al.
The question in this case is whether the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs’ medical malpractice action. Because the lawsuit before this court was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Roy L. Hamilton v. Elizabeth K. Hamilton
The trial court denied Father’s petition to modify custody, restore telephone privileges, and re-evaluate income assignment. It found Father to be in contempt, and denied Mother’s request for attorney’s fees under Rule 11. The trial court awarded Mother a portion of her attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Junkans v. Alamo Rentals, Inc. v. Pamela Junkans
Plaintiff and third-partydefendant appeal the circuitcourt’s denial of third-partydefendant’s motion to dismiss, grant of defendant/third-party plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against third-party defendant, and dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. Finding that defendant/thirdparty plaintiff’s complaint makes out a claim for relief as a matter of law, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss. Finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the grant of the motion for sanctions. Finding that defendant negated an element of plaintiff’s claim, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s case against the defendant. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |