Davey Mann, and wife, Teresa Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, et al.
Plaintiffs sued Defendants in an amended complaint following the expiration of the statute of limitations. Defendants moved for summary judgment/judgment on the pleadings based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. Subsequently, co-defendants alleged Defendants’ comparative fault in an amended answer. Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and for judgment on the pleadings were granted, but were not made final. Based on co-defendants’ answer, Plaintiffs again amended their complaint to name Defendants pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119. However, Defendants claimed that section 20-1-119 could not be utilized as they were already parties to the lawsuit, and they moved for summary judgment and to dismiss. The trial court granted said motions, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamar Tyrone Harris
The Defendant, Lamar Tyrone Harris, was charged with tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. Following the denial of his motion to suppress his inculpatory statement following a traffic stop, the Defendant pled guilty as charged. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years, suspended to probation. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Defendant sought to reserve a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maurice Edward Carter
The defendant, Maurice Edward Carter, pled guilty in Smith County to one count of aggravated statutory rape and one count of criminal exposure to HIV for an effective sentence of twenty years. Additionally, he pled guilty in Rutherford County to four counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, two counts of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor, one count of statutory rape, and one count of criminal exposure to HIV for an effective sentence of twenty years, to be served concurrently with his Smith County sentences. As a condition of his guilty pleas, the defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the denial of his motions to suppress the stop and search of his automobile, and his subsequent statement to police and evidence obtained during the execution of search warrants. After review, we conclude that the record supports the findings of the trial courts that the motions to suppress were without merit and that the certified question is not dispositive of the charges against the defendant and, as a result, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden - Concurring
I can concur that the petitioner’s sentence is illegal and void because it directly contravenes the multiple rapist sentencing statute. By granting limited habeas corpus relief and remanding to the trial court for entry of a corrected sentence, the majority has essentially adopted the position of the State. While this result is proper under these specific circumstances, I would submit that the ruling today is inconsistent with the opinion in Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn. 2008), a case I continue to believe was wrongly decided. Moreover, in an apparent effort to conform its decision today with rulings in our previous habeas corpus cases, the majority has created new and heightened standards for relief which, in my assessment, will serve to further confuse this area of the law. Finally, I believe that this case offered an opportunity to overrule altogether our decision in Edwards and, by doing so, reconcile a series of our prior opinions on the subject of habeas corpus. |
Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
Louis Bonanno, Sr. v. Willa Faris
The plaintiff requested a transcript of a deposition from the defendant, a court reporter. When the defendant notified the plaintiff that the transcript was ready and told him her fee, he neither retrieved the transcript nor paid her. After the defendant made several telephone calls to the plaintiff in an attempt to obtain payment, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Jessee Brumit v. Stefanie Lynnne Brumit (Durham)
This wife, Stefanie Lynne Brumit (Durham) (“Wife”), and husband, Walter Jessee Brumit (“Husband”), were divorced in the early 1990s. The parties had one child, and Husband was ordered to pay $1500 per month in child support. From that amount, Wife was ordered to place $300 per month into an educational trust account for the child’s benefit. In 2008, Husband filed a motion for contempt, asserting that Wife was $6,600 behind in the payments to the trust account. Wife claimed that she had fallen behind in the payments because of financial difficulties and brought the trust account up to date prior to filing her response. In April 2009, the trial court, prior to hearing, dismissed the contempt motion and taxed the costs to Husband. Upon Husband’s appeal, we vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for a hearing on the merits before a new trial judge. On remand, the trial court found Wife in contempt of court. As Wife had brought the payments to the trust account up to date, the trial court ordered her to pay the interest income lost by the account due to her delinquent payments and half of Husband’s attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
David Cantrell v. Joe Easterling, Warden
We granted this appeal to determine if the defendant’s four sentences for aggravated rape are illegal because each of the four uniform judgment documents designates the defendant as a “Multiple 35% Range 2” offender and does not designate the defendant as a “Multiple Rapist.” Because the four uniform judgment documents indicate that the defendant is eligible for early release on parole, which is in direct contravention of a statutory provision, we hold that the four sentences are illegal and void. The defendant’s underlying convictions of aggravated rape, which arose from a jury verdict before a court of competent jurisdiction, remain intact. We remand this matter to the sentencing court for the entry of four amended judgment orders, each to set forth the legal sentence on each of the defendant’s four convictions of aggravated rape, including the designation that the defendant is a “Multiple Rapist.” |
Hardeman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Salwillel Thomas Fields
In February 2005, a 14-count indictment was returned against the Defendant, Salwillel Thomas Fields. In exchange for concurrent sentencing, the Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to sell over 300 grams of cocaine, a Class A felony; possession with intent to sell more than one half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony; possession of a machine gun, a Class E felony; and three counts of unlawful possession of a weapon, a Class E felony. The parties agreed to the Defendant’s sentencing range for each of the convictions but left the length of the sentences to the trial court’s discretion. The remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to 38 years for the Class A felony and as a Range III, persistent offender to 5-years for each of the Class E felonies. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting the length of his Class A felony sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ashraf M. Saweres v. Royal Net Auto Sale, Inc., et al.
This appeal arises out of an action in which the plaintiff asserted a claim that the agent of a used car business in which the plaintiff allegedly invested committed misrepresentation, fraud, and conversion, and violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act in failing to give him stock in the business or compensate him for work performed at the business. Plaintiff also asserted a claim based on defendants’ alleged failure to repair his vehicle. The trial court held that plaintiff had not established the necessary elements for any of his claims and dismissed the case; plaintiff appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy Miller v. Jessica Miller (Tolbe)
A Colorado court granted a divorce to married parents who were both active-duty members of the armed forces. The court named the mother as the primary residential parent of their two minor children, and a parenting plan with flexible provisions was fashioned in the event of overseas deployment by one or both parents. Both parties were deployed overseas at various times during the next five years. The children spent the majority of that time in the care of the father, or, during father’s deployments, in the care of his mother or his new wife. The father moved to Clarksville, Tennessee in April of 2007, and after living there with the children for eighteen consecutive months, he filed a petition in the Tennessee court for registration of the Colorado judgment and modification of the parenting plan. He asked the court to name him as the children’s primary residential parent. After a hearing, the trial court granted the father’s petition. The mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that there had been a material change of circumstances which was unanticipated at the time of the divorce, and she contends that the father had therefore failed to meet the statutory threshold before a change in a parenting plan may be ordered under Tennessee law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B). She also argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-113 limits the authority of the trial court to permanently modify the custody and visitation arrangements for the children of a mobilized parent. We affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jabari Issa Mandela a/k/a John H. Wooden v. Tennessee Department of Correction
This is a petition for declaratory judgment filed by an inmate seeking review of the calculation of his prison sentence. The petitioner inmate filed two administrative petitions for a declaratory order challenging the calculation of his sentence, and the respondent Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) denied both petitions. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the instant petition for declaratory judgment, arguing that his sentence was improperly calculated. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of TDOC. The petitioner now appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Paul W. Chambers v. First Volunteer Bank of Tennessee
This case arises from a dispute over the repayment of a loan. Penny Chambers obtained a loan through a bank in order to buy a house. Penny Chambers defaulted on the loan. Paul W. Chambers (“Chambers”), Penny Chambers’s husband, later assumed the mortgage. Chambers allegedly defaulted and First Volunteer Bank of Tennessee (“the Bank”) stated that it would foreclose if he did not cure the default. Chambers sued the Bank in the Chancery Court for Polk County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss. Chambers appeals. We find that the Trial Court did not err in granting the Bank’s motion to dismiss. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in denying Chambers’s motion to alter or amend and motion for default. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Millen v. Shelby County District Attorney Office, et al.
This is an appeal from the dismissal of a complaint for failure to conform to the minimal pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against numerous public officials. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. After review of the complaint, the trial court found that it was unintelligible and failed to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Freddie Davis v. Shelby County Government
This is a negligence action. Plaintiff/Appellant asserts that Defendant/Appellee is liable for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when he fell while walking down the steps at the Shelby County courthouse. Due to Appellant’s incarceration, the trial court granted three continuances; however, Appellant’s request for a fourth continuance was denied. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Appellant had failed to meet his burden to show negligence on the part of the Appellee, and further concluded that, if there was negligence in the case, Appellant was at least fifty percent at fault so as to bar recovery. Appellant appeals both the denial of his fourth motion for a continuance and the trial court’s ruling in favor of Appellee. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin R. Lewis
A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years. The Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Defendant argues on appeal that he is entitled to unspecified relief because the State displayed his booking photos to the jury during closing arguments. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Chance
The defendant, Steven Chance, pleaded guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, first offense. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of 11 months and 29 days suspended to probation after the service of 48 hours’ incarceration. The trial court also waived as a condition of probation the defendant’s payment of fines and completion of community service hours. A probation violation warrant issued alleging that the defendant failed to pay the court and probation costs. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and extended it for one year to allow the payment of the costs. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court lacked authority to extend his probationary term. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Garrison, et al. v. Andy E. Bickford, et al.
Plaintiffs brought this action for the wrongful death of their son, and also for their damages arising from "negligent infliction of emotional distress". State Farm Mutual Insurance Company filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the grounds that its policy afforded no coverage for a negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court overruled the Motion but proposed a Rule 9 appeal, which this Court granted. We reverse the Trial Court on this issue and grant the summary judgment motion. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Package Express Center, Inc. v. Doug Maund, et al.
In the initial suit between these parties, plaintiff sued and recovered damages for breach of contract and attorney's fees as provided in the contract between the parties. Subsequently, plaintiff brought this action for additional attorney's fees to recover the fees incurred in collecting the judgment against defendants. The Trial Court awarded attorney's fees and defendants appealed to this Court. We reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court and hold that the statute of limitations barred further recovery under the terms of the contract between the parties. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Osayamien Ogbeiwi
The defendant, Osayamien Ogbeiwi, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his request for a continuance so he could obtain a mental evaluation; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (3) the trial court erred in denying his objections concerning the admission of the store surveillance video; (4) the trial court erred in not requiring the State to develop legally sufficient corpus proof; (5) the trial court erred in overruling his objections to the State’s closing argument; (6) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (7) the trial court erred in charging the jury that it must first acquit the defendant before considering lesser offenses; and (8) the trial court erred in charging the jury with an inconsistent verdict form. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Travis Ward v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Travis Ward, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and entered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lashawn Bell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Lashawn Bell, pled guilty to one count of especially aggravated robbery, nine counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Beth L. Wineland v. City of Cleveland, Tennessee et al.
Beth L. Wineland, the sole plaintiff, sustained serious injuries when the front wheel of her bicycle fell into the open slots of a metal drainage grate (“the subject grate” or “the old style grate”) situated near a curb of State Highway 60. The slots on the subject grate run parallel with the direction of traffic. The subject grate is inside the municipal boundaries of the City of Cleveland. The plaintiff made a claim against the State of Tennessee in the Claims Commission and filed this action against the City of Cleveland in the trial court. The claim against the State was consolidated with this action for trial. The plaintiff alleges that the old style grate constitutes a dangerous condition on the highway and that both the City of Cleveland and the State were negligent in maintaining the highway. The trial court determined that neither defendant had a duty to change the grate and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals only as to the State. We reverse the judgment and remand for a determination of damages. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jerome Hertis Phillips v. State of Tennessee Department of Revenue
Jerome Hertis Phillips brought suit to contest a tax assessment made against him by the Department of Revenue (“the Department”). The Department filed a motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion based upon its finding that Phillips failed to file suit within the time provided by law. Phillips appeals. We affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Eddie Davis
A nine-year-old child, whose initials are C.M. (“the Child”), told her mother, whose initials are also C.M. (“Mother”), that Eddie Davis had touched her inappropriately. The disclosure was made shortly after the Child had reviewed a comic book that is designed to help children recognize and disclose child sexual abuse. Davis is the executive director of the Youth Emergency Shelter (“Y.E.S.”) in Hamblen County. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), a state agency, initiated an investigation and “indicated” Davis as a perpetrator of child sexual abuse. Davis requested an administrative hearing. The administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) found that the Child’s statements to Mother and later to a forensic interviewer were credible because they were “consistent” in that she told both a story of Davis putting his hand on her buttocks inside her panties. Davis appealed the ALJ’s finding to the trial court. The trial court sustained the findings of the ALJ. Davis appealed to this Court. Because there is no substantial and material evidence to support the findings of the ALJ, we reverse. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jim Frederick Hegel
A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Jim Frederick Hegel, of rape of a child and incest. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve consecutive sentences of nineteen and three years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the prosecutor made improper comments during voir dire about the victim’s testimony and credibility that may have biased the jury against the appellant, and (3) the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals |