State of Tennessee v. Cedric Johnson
This appeal involves the application of the mandatory joinder provisions in Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a)(1)(A). The defendant was charged with committing an aggravated robbery and was separately charged with initiating a false police report twelve hours later regarding his automobile that was somehow connected with the robbery. Approximately one month after he was indicted by a Shelby County grand jury for initiating a false police report, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempting to initiate a false police report. Thereafter, a Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant for aggravated robbery. The defendant filed a motion in the Criminal Court for Shelby County seeking to dismiss the aggravated robbery indictment in accordance with Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a)(2) because the State had already prosecuted him separately on the initiation of a false police report charge. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, and the State appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. A divided panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. State v. Johnson, No. W2008-01593-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 4263653 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2009). We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to address the application of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a)(1)(A) to offenses arising from the same criminal episode. We have determined that the two offenses involved in this case were not part of the same criminal episode and, therefore, that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by relying on Tenn. R. Crim P. 8(a)(2) to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Leonard Gamble v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
The trial court determined that the insuror of a bar was liable under its commercial general liability policy and liquor liability policy for injuries to a bar patron. We have concluded that this occurrence is excluded under the assault and battery exclusion of the commercial general liability policy but is covered by the liquor liability policy. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Crye-Leike, Inc. v. Sarah A. Carver - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion in this case, but write separately to emphasize that the Court’s interpretation of the term “shown” in the Agreement is limited to the facts and the proof in this case. Given the evolving importance in the real estate market of the realtor’s online presentation of property and the fact that properties are sometimes purchased by buyers who never view the property in person, with different proof, the term “shown” could be given a more expansive interpretation. However, with the proof submitted to the trial court and no contractual definition of the term “shown,” I agree with the majority’s result and reasoning. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Dunlap
The defendant entered pleas of guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to five counts of aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-14-403(a) (2006); two counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, see id. § 39-14-103, -105(3); three counts of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, see id. § 39-14-103, -105(2); one count of vandalism of property valued at more than $500 but less than $10,000, see id. § 39-14-408(a); one count of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, see id. § 39-14-408, -105(2); and tampering with evidence, see id. § 39-16-503(a)(1). The trial court imposed a total effective entence of 15 years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cauley McCliton Cross
The Defendant-Appellant, Cauley Cross, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and three counts of exhibition of obscene materials to a minor, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a child predator to concurrent terms of ten years for both aggravated sexual battery convictions. For the misdemeanor offenses, Cross was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, he claims: (1) his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) his sentences for aggravated sexual battery were excessive; and (3) his convictions for aggravated sexual battery should be merged. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Ernest Hayes v. American Zurich Insurance Company et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury. In addition, it found that the employee had a meaningful return to work, and his award of permanent partial disability (“PPD”) benefits was limited to one and one-half times his anatomical impairment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-241(d)(1). On appeal, the employee contends the trial court erred by finding that he had a meaningful return to work. The employer contends the trial court erred by admitting a discovery deposition of an expert into evidence over its objection based upon Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 32.01(3), and finding that the injury at issue was not concurrent with injuries which were the subject of a separate lawsuit. We affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Donna Clark v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
The trial court determined that the insuror of a bar was liable under its commercial general liability policy and liquor liability policy for the death of a bar patron. We have concluded that this occurrence is excluded under the assault and battery exclusion of the commercial general liability policy but is covered by the liquor liability policy. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Hendricks v. Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari alleging that the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole acted arbitrarily and illegally in denying him parole. After reviewing the record, the chancery court concluded that the Board acted lawfully, and it dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals, and we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emanuel Hamilton
The Defendant, Emanuel Hamilton, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for possession with the intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony, and ordering the remainder of his effective eleven-year sentence to be served in confinement. He contends that he should have been returned to probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Betty Saint Rogers v. Louisville Land Company, et al.
.Betty Saint Rogers (“Plaintiff”) sued Louisville Land Company and Joe V. Williams, III (“Defendants”) alleging claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the Tennessee statutes governing cemeteries, outrageous conduct, and breach of contract, among other things. After a non-jury trial, the Trial Court entered its final judgment awarding Plaintiff a judgment of $250.00 for breach of contract, $45,000.00 for intentional infliction of emotional distress, $250,000.00 in punitive damages, $37,306.25 in attorney’s fees, and $556.42 in discretionary costs. Defendants appeal to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiff did not prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, and we, therefore, reverse the judgments for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. We also find and hold that because Plaintiff abandoned her statutory claim, she was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the statute, and we reverse the award of attorney’s fees. We further find and hold that Plaintiff did prove breach of contract, and we affirm the award of damages for breach of contract, and the remainder of the Trial Court’s final judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Cory Tyler Meeks v. Kimberly Ann Meeks
This is an appeal from a divorce decree entered by the Circuit Court for Grundy County on March 14, 2011. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Anthony Jones
Appellant, Darrell Anthony Jones, was charged in two separate indictments by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, one count of criminal impersonation, and one count of driving on a suspended, revoked, or canceled driver’s license. Appellant pled guilty to one count of felony possession of cocaine and one count of felony possession of marijuana, for a total effective sentence of four years. The remaining counts were dismissed. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentences were suspended, and Appellant was placed on four years of supervised probation. A probation violation warrant was filed. After a hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had violated the terms of his probation and imposed a sentence of one year to serve, after which Appellant was to be reinstated to probation for three years. Appellant contends on appeal that the evidence did not support the finding that he violated the terms of his probation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly revoked Appellant’s probation. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Michael Holmes
The Defendant, Jeremy Michael Holmes, pled guilty as a career offender 1 to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, with an agreed sentence of 6 years at 60 percent, leaving the manner of service to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying all forms of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dalton Reb Hughes et al. v. the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee et al.
After being injured when he jumped out of the path of a front-end loader owned by a governmental entity and operated by its employee, the plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the employee either was negligent in his operation of the equipment or had acted intentionally and that the governmental entity was liable under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff against the governmental entity and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The governmental entity sought permission to appeal, arguing first that the employee had acted outside the scope of his employment and, secondly, that he had committed an assault against the plaintiff, either of which would preclude liability under the Act. Although we hold that the employee’s conduct fell within the scope of his employment, his operation of the equipment constituted the intentional tort of assault rather than negligence. The governmental entity cannot, therefore, be held liable under the Act absent proof of its negligent supervision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to the governmental entity, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment against the employee. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Shawn Rafael Bough v. Jim Morrow, Warden
The Petitioner, Shawn Rafael Bough, appeals from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State of Tennessee has moved to have this court summarily affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the motion and affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 20. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John E. Lane
A Grainger County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, John E. Lane, of the premeditated first degree murder of Joe Brooks and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the appellant’s conviction for first degree murder but reverse his conviction for conspiracy. |
Grainger | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Byron Avenue 3501, LLC v. Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, TN
The purchaser of historic property appeals the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission’s denial of a demolition permit based on economic hardship. The Commission’s denial was affirmed by the chancery court. We find that the Commission’s denial was not supported by material evidence and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to return the matter to the Commission for a new hearing. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Alton Walton
A jury convicted the defendant, James Alton Walton, of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas Wayne Young
The Defendant, Douglas Wayne Young, was convicted by a Sullivan County Circuit Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; four counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010), 39-13-502 (2010), 39-13-102 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010), 39-14-403 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years’ confinement for especially aggravated kidnapping, twenty-five years’ confinement for each aggravated rape conviction, six years’ confinement for aggravated assault, and six years’ confinement for aggravated burglary. The kidnapping conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts and by enhancing his sentence based upon enhancement factors not found by the jury or admitted by the Defendant. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jarvis Nichols
The defendant, Jarvis Nichols, appeals the judgment of the Blount County Circuit Court, revoking his probation and imposing service of the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering service of the balance of the sentence in confinement when less severe sanctions were available. Upon a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kathleen Anne Dilley v. James Kevin Dilley
In this divorce case the father appeals the trial court’s naming of the mother as the primary residential parent, the calculation of the mother’s income for purposes of child support, and the trial court’s valuation and division of marital assets. We find the record supports the trial court’s decision to name the mother the primary residential parent. We further find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s valuation and division of the parties’ marital assets. An equitable division of marital assets does not require an equal division between the parties, and the court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. The trial court did not err in calculating the parties’ incomes for child support purposes. We conclude the mother is entitled to an award of some of the attorney’s fees she incurred in this appeal. We affirm the trial court in all respects and remand the case for a determination of the amount of the mother’s attorney’s fees on appeal to be paid by the father. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth W. Taylor v. Lawrence County, Tennessee Election Commission et al.
Unsuccessful sheriff candidate sued to void the August 5, 2010 Lawrence County sheriff’s election based on the ineligibility of one of the five candidates. The trial court found the challenged candidate ineligible but declined to void the election. On appeal, we find the plaintiff guilty of gross laches in waiting to file suit to the prejudice of the defendants. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Ray Irick v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Billy Ray Irick, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which challenged his 1987 convictions of felony murder and aggravated rape and resulting death sentence. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the coram nobis court erred by ruling that due process considerations did not toll the oneyear statute of limitations applicable to coram nobis petitions, see T.C.A. § 27-7-103 (2000), and that the newly discovered evidence “would not have” resulted in a different verdict had it been presented to the convicting jury. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas L. Grimes, et al. v. Helen Cornell
This appeal involves a will contest in which the trial court found that a will executed in 2005 was the product of undue influence and, as a consequence, admitted a will executed by the testator in 2004 to probate. The proponent of the 2005 Will appeals the finding of undue influence as well as the dismissal of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiffs to be paid from the estate. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Timmy Reagan v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Timmy Reagan, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. See State v. Timmy Reagan, No. M2002-01472-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1114588 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Nashville, May 19, 2004). The post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. See Timmy Reagan v. State, No. M2007-01396-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 230355 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 2, 2009). On appeal, this Court questioned the timeliness of the petition for post-conviction relief and remanded the case to the post-conviction court “for a determination of whether the petition was filed within one year of this court’s opinion affirming the petitioner’s conviction or whether due process requires the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations in this case.” Id. at *1. On remand, the post-conviction court first determined that Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was untimely. Then, the post-conviction court held that trial counsel failed to withdraw pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court and that his failure to withdraw or pursue an appeal was a misrepresentation to Petitioner of his intent to seek permission to appeal. Id. Based on this finding, the post-conviction court determined that trial counsel’s actions denied Petitioner the opportunity to seek post-conviction relief in a timely manner. The post-conviction court held that the statute of limitations for filing Petitioner’s petition should have been tolled. Then the post-conviction court reviewed the post-conviction petition and the transcript from the previous post-conviction hearing as well as the trial record, and agreed with the prior determination of the post-conviction court that Petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction relief. On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, we determine: that the post-conviction court properly determined that Petitioner’s petition was untimely but improperly determined that due process required the tolling of the statute of limitations for Petitioner’s post-conviction petition. Therefore, the post-conviction court improperly addressed the merits of the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed. |
Overton | Court of Criminal Appeals |