State of Tennessee v. Samuel Sherrill
The Defendant, Samuel Sherrill, was indicted for second degree murder, a Class A felony. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to admit testimony from two witnesses regarding the victim’s specific acts of prior violence in support of his assertion that the victim was the first aggressor. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Lynn Hunt Jr.
The appellant, Robert Lynn Hunt, Jr., pled nolo contendere in the Dyer County Circuit Court to abuse and neglect of a child under six years of age, a Class D felony, and received a fouryear sentence. At some point, the appellant was placed on probation. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwight A. Shankle
The defendant, Dwight A. Shankle, was convicted of facilitation of promotion of the manufacturing of methamphetamine, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the indictment was faulty. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Deon Mills and Kenneth Allen Spencer
A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellants, Michael Deon Mills and Kenneth Allen Spencer, of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellants to effective sentences of twenty-five years in confinement to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, Mills argues that the prosecutor committed plain error during closing arguments by referring to his failure to testify. Spencer contends that (1) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a document not provided to him during discovery; (2) the trial court erred by allowing evidence about weapons that were not used to commit the crimes; (3) an accomplice’s testimony did not provide sufficient corroboration to support the convictions; and (4) the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery violate due process. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, Mills’ convictions are affirmed. However, Spencer’s convictions are reversed and the charges are dismissed because there is insufficient corroboration to sustain the convictions. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Denzil Russ Partin v. Mary Ava Partin, et al.
This lawsuit arose out of two transfers of real property. Denzil Russ Partin (“Husband”) sued Mary Ava Partin (“Wife”) and Hazel Walden (“Mrs. Walden”), seeking declaratory relief that the two properties Wife transferred to Mrs. Walden, Wife’s mother, were held in trust for Husband, Wife, and their son, Courtney Partin. The Trial Court found that title to the real property at issue was vested in Mrs. Walden, that no resulting trust had been created, and, that, in any event, the statute of limitations had run on Husband’s action. Husband appeals. We hold that although the Trial Court erred in stating that the statute of limitations had run on Husband’s claim, the Trial Court did not err in declining to impose a resulting trust on the real property at issue. We affirm the judgment as modified. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David A. Hunter
The defendant, David A. Hunter, appeals his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree felony murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2006), and attempted especially aggravated robbery, see id. §§ 39-12-101(a)(3), -13-403, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. In addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress his statement and an eyewitness identification. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Judy Davis, as Next Friend of Eloise Gwinn, an Incapacitated Person v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., et al.
This is a nursing home abuse case. The trial court denied Appellant nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration based upon an alternative dispute resolution agreement that was executed by Appellee, the niece of the patient being admitted to Appellants’ nursing facility. The patient had executed a power of attorney in favor of her niece and her niece’s husband, but only the niece had signed the admission papers on behalf of the patient. The trial court determined that the power of attorney created a joint agency, whereby the signatures of both the niece and her husband were required in order to bind the patient, as principal, to arbitration. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Miguel Robles, etc. et al. v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, et al.
Defendants in medical malpractice action appeal the denial of their motion to set aside order entered on plaintiff’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01 notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Defendants contend that, because the certificate of good faith required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 was not filed with the complaint, dismissal should have been with prejudice. Finding that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 does not limit plaintiff’s right to voluntarily dismiss an action without prejudice under the circumstances presented, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Ernest Dwight King, Deceased
Following the death of her husband, a widow filed a petition in probate court and sought to aggregate the estate’s assets. The decedent had been in partnership with two brothers in a company that owned real estate and operated a nursery. The widow sought to partition the land and sell the partnership’s assets to obtain the estate’s one-third share of the partnership. The trial court ordered the land be sold at auction and the proceeds partitioned as the widow requested, and decreed certain expenses be paid from the sale before the proceeds were distributed to the estate and the two brothers. The brothers appealed the trial court’s decree affirming the payment of certain expenses before the proceeds were divided up among the partners, and claimed the estate should be liable for additional expenses the partnership incurred following the decedent’s death. However, the brothers failed to present evidence to the trial court in support of their arguments, with the result that we are unable to provide the brothers with any of the relief they seek. Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed in all respects. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph C. Barna v. W. Martin Seiler
An investor who lost money on stock transactions filed a claim against his stockbroker that was dismissed in arbitration. The investor then filed a complaint for legal malpractice against the attorney who had represented him in the arbitration proceeding. The attorney filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by his expert affidavit, declaring that in his representation of the investor he had complied with all applicable standards of legal professional practice. The investor did not respond with an expert testimony contradicting the defendant. Following a series of delays, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant attorney after declining to grant another continuance. The former client filed a motion for relief from judgment, and the trial court denied the motion. After the attorney voluntarily dismissed his counterclaim, the judgment became final, and the investor appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elmwood Apartments v. Jessica Woodson, et al.
This appeal arises out of a detainer action originally filed in general sessions court in which landlord of apartment was awarded possession of leased premises. Tenants filed a petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for de novo review to the circuit court, accompanied by an affidavit of indigency; the writs were issued. Landlord subsequently sought dismissal of both writs on several grounds. The court granted the motion, finding that the writ of supersedeas was improperly granted and, as a consequence, review by certiorari was not available as a substitute for appeal. Finding that the court erred in considering grounds for dismissal which were added by landlord within five days of the hearing on the motion, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph C. Barna v. W. Martin Seiler - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the movant, attorney Martin Seiler, shifted the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff Joseph Barna for purposes of summary judgment. Admittedly, Mr. Barna did not refute the affidavit of Mr. Seiler, but I submit he did not have to because Mr. Barna was not obliged to come forward with countervailing evidence to create a dispute of fact. This is due to the fact that Mr. Seiler failed to provide a sufficient affidavit or other proof. Specifically, Mr. Seiler’s affidavit, which is the only evidence to support his motion for summary judgment, is insufficient because he failed to provide any specific material fact for this court to consider that pertains to the legal services he actually rendered. Mr. Seiler only informed us of the fact that he has many years of experience as a lawyer in the field of security litigation, which is a relevant and material fact, but by itself is insufficient to refute the specific allegations in the complaint as to what Mr. Seiler failed to do in his representation of Mr. Barna. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald L. Seiber v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Donald L. Seiber, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the case should be remanded because the post-conviction court failed to make adequate factual findings and that the post-conviction court erred by denying post-conviction relief. Because the record supports the denial of post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bennie Joe Poteet, II, Individually and by and Through Evelyn Poteet, as Conservator of Bennie Joe Poteet, II v. National Healthcare of Cleveland, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves a claim of medical malpractice. Bennie Joe Poteet, II, individually and by and through his mother, Evelyn Poteet, as his conservator (collectively “the Plaintiffs”), sued Adam E. Fall, M.D. (“Dr. Fall”) and National Healthcare of Cleveland, formerly doing business as Cleveland Community Hospital (“the Hospital”) (collectively “the Defendants”) for medical malpractice after Mr. Poteet suffered a stroke while admitted at the Hospital which rendered him completely paralyzed from the nose down. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment on Mr. Poteet’s later added claim of negligence per se based on a bonus incentive plan allegedly maintained by the Hospital that indirectly set forth the reduction of MRIs ordered by Dr. Fall as a factor in his annual bonus determination. The trial court granted the Hospital’s dispositive motion on the issue, as well as the Hospital’s motion to dismiss on the bonus issue. Prior to trial, the court also granted the Defendants’ motions in limine to exclude any evidence of the bonus incentive plan offered to Dr. Fall, but denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude all testimony of one of the Plaintiffs’ neurology experts. At the close of the case, the trial court submitted a special verdict form to the jury which instructed that the question regarding the Hospital’s negligence based on insufficient neurology coverage was to be disregarded if neither Dr. Fall nor the treating nurses were found to be negligent. The jury subsequently returned a verdict favorable to the nurses and Dr. Fall, leaving the question on the adequacy of neurology coverage unaddressed. Judgment was entered on the jury’s findings. The Hospital thereafter filed a motion for directed verdict on the neurology coverage issue while the Plaintiffs moved for a new trial on multiple grounds. The trial court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial but granted the Hospital’s motion for directed verdict as well as the Defendants’ motions for discretionary costs. The Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Frank Peake, III v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Frank Peake, III, appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2004, the Petitioner was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and was, thereafter, sentenced to six years as a Range II, multiple offender. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. The Petitioner later filed a post-conviction petition and, following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure (1) to investigate and interview witnesses that would have corroborated his self-defense theory and (2) to request a limiting instruction as to the prior threat made by the Petitioner. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodney Buford v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Rodney Buford, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to obtain a medical expert to testify at trial and failed to file a motion to suppress his statement to police. He further argues that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal and that the trial court erred by not finding that he was illegally sentenced. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Neal Davis
Defendant, David Neal Davis, was originally indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury on four counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery. In a trial on these charges, Defendant moved for a mistrial, after the victim testified that she had been digitally penetrated by Defendant. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for a mistrial. In a superceding indictment, Defendant was indicted on two counts of rape of a child, eight counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of solicitation of a minor, and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial on these charges, Defendant was convicted of rape of a child, attempted rape of a child, seven counts of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of child abuse, and one count of attempted solicitation of a minor. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of twenty years confinement. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts the following errors by the trial court: 1) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment on the basis of double jeopardy, or alternatively, on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct; 2) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to introduce evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct by the victim; 3) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss Counts five and seven of the indictment, charging aggravated sexual battery, based on the State’s failure to prove venue in those counts; and 4) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss Count one of the indictment, charging rape of a child, based on the State’s failure to prove an element of the offense. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddie J. Baucom, III
The defendant, Eddie J. Baucom, III, was convicted by a Dickson County jury of one count of fourth offense of driving while under the influence and one count of resisting arrest. He was subsequently sentenced to two years probation for driving under the influence and thirty days incarceration in the Dickson County jail for resisting arrest. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for the driving under the influence. Based upon a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy Earl Jones
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Tommy Earl Jones, was convicted of rape, a Class B felony, theft of property over $1,000, a Class D felony, aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-304(b), -13-503(b), -14-103, -14-105(3), -14-404(c). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years for his rape conviction, three years for his theft conviction, ten years for his aggravated kidnapping conviction, and twelve years for his especially aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ordered that the Defendant’s sentences for rape and aggravated kidnapping be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of twenty years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) The trial court erred when it excluded the Defendant from jury selection, trial, and the return of the verdict in the absence of any waiver; (2) The State presented insufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of especially aggravated burglary; (3) The trial court erred when it allowed a forensic expert to testify about opinions based on possibilities; and (4) The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s fundamental right to be present during his trial was violated. As a result, we must reverse the Defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phyllis A. Polk
The Defendant, Phyllis A. Polk, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with credit for time served and the remainder in community corrections. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenny Lamont McGee
In January 2009, the Moore County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Kenny LaMont McGee for three counts of aggravated sexual battery. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to the plea agreement Appellant was ordered to serve an effective sentence of twelve years on community corrections. In January 2010, the Moore County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for violation of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act. In February 2010, Appellant’s community corrections officer filed an affidavit alleging that Appellant had violated the conditions of the community corrections sentence. Appellant pled guilty to the violation of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s community corrections sentence and ordered him to serve the twelve-year sentence in confinement. In addition, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two years and six months for his violation of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act and ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to the twelve-year sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the community corrections sentence. However, we vacate the consecutive sentence, order the new sentence to be served concurrently to the prior imposed sentence and remand for entry of a corrected judgment. |
Moore | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael W. Kemp
The defendant, Michael W. Kemp, was convicted by a Smith County Criminal Court jury of three counts of reckless vehicular homicide and three counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years for each vehicular homicide conviction and one year for each reckless endangerment conviction. The court merged the reckless endangerment convictions into the vehicular homicide convictions and ordered that the terms run consecutively with all but one year served on probation. The defendant appealed and, on direct appeal, this court remanded for reconsideration of the consecutive sentences because the trial court failed to make the proper findings. Upon remand, the trial court again imposed consecutive sentences, which the defendant now appeals. After review, we conclude that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing and order that the defendant’s sentences be served concurrently. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Deshawn Smith
The Defendant, Michael Deshawn Smith, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-three years’ confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose Hermes Gomez
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Jose Hermes Gomez, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-402(b), -14-403(b). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to ten years for each aggravated robbery conviction and five years for the aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ordered that his five-year sentence and two of his ten-year sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) The trial court erred when it denied two of the Defendant’s challenges for cause to potential jurors; (2) The State presented insufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of three counts of aggravated robbery; and (3) The trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand solely for the entry of corrected judgment forms for each of the Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darryl Suggs as Administrator of the Estate of Billy Ray Suggs v. Gallaway Health Care Center, et al.
This appeal arises out of a complaint filed against various healthcare providers. Before the trial court, Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate this case with an identical lawsuit he had filed against the same defendants in another county. The motion to consolidate was denied. The trial court later dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim against one of the defendant physicians for improper venue, and the other defendants were dismissed for various reasons not relevant to this appeal. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claim against the physician for improper venue, and he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to consolidate. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals |