State of Tennessee v. Jonathan T. Stewart
M2010-00355-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The Defendant, Jonathan T. Stewart, entered a plea of guilty to driving under the influence, first offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be suspended to probation after the service of forty-eight hours of confinement. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his traffic stop.  Because the Defendant has failed to properly certify his issue for review, the appeal is dismissed.

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

Sandra Kay Hembree v. State of Tennessee
E2010-00156-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

The Petitioner, Sandra Kay Hembree, pleaded guilty to second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. She received two twenty-year sentences, those sentences to be served concurrently at 100%. She now appeals from the Cocke County Circuit Court’s order denying post-conviction relief, contending that this denial was error because she received the ineffective  assistance of counsel and, consequently, entered her pleas involuntarily and unknowingly. Specifically, she contends that trial counsel failed to interview the State’s witnesses, failed to provide her with discovery materials, and failed to meet with her often enough to adequately prepare for trial. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Cocke Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re: Navaeh L.
E2009-01119-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson, II

This is a termination of parental rights case concerning a minor child Navaeh L. (“the Child”), who is the daughter of Elizabeth L. (“Mother”) and William T.(“Father”). Separate petitions to terminate the parents’ rights were filed by Nicole Q., the Child’s maternal aunt, and her husband, Bryan (collectively, “Aunt and Uncle”), after the Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected, pursuant to Mother’s stipulation. Following this finding, the Child was placed in the custody of Aunt and Uncle. Father’s paternity of the Child was not established until after the adjudicatory hearing, but before the petition to terminate was filed. Mother and Father, represented by separate counsel, each opposed the termination of their rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted both petitions upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that each of the alleged grounds was established and that termination was in the best interest of the Child. As to Father, the trial court relied upon the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit and the persistence of unremedied conditions. Father appeals. 1 We affirm.

Hamblen Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Melvin L. Finley
M2010-00569-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dee David Gay

The Defendant, Melvin L. Finley, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402(b). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to nine years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) did not sentence him to the Community Corrections Program; and (2) did not consider his drug addiction as a mitigating factor. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Montgomery Court of Criminal Appeals

George Shelton Rucker v. State of Tennessee
M2010-01344-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl Blackburn

The Petitioner, Gene Shelton Rucker, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for criminally negligent homicide and aggravated arson. In his petition, he asserts that his sentence is illegal because it was improperly enhanced in violation of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that principles of res judicata dictate that this issue not be relitigated. The order of dismissal is affirmed.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Roger Dale Raper v. Johanna Raper
E2009-02345-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri S. Bryant

In this divorce case, the trial court granted Roger Dale Raper (“Husband”) and Johanna Raper (“Wife”) an absolute divorce, thereby ending their 26-year union. A bench trial was held to resolve the remaining issues of property division and alimony. The court divided the marital property and awarded Wife alimony in solido and alimony in futuro. Husband appeals and challenges each of these determinations. We affirm.

Monroe Court of Appeals

Celso Vilorio Melendez,a/k/a Edwin Canales v. State of Tennessee
M2009-01489-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte Watkins

The Petitioner, Celso Vilorio Melendez, aka Edwin Canales, appeals as of right the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner alleges that his guilty pleas to two counts of facilitation to deliver over 300 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, was not voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly made due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel did not advise him of the eligibility requirements for participation in the Department of Correction’s (DOC) Boot Camp Program, and that, had he been properly advised, he would not have pleaded guilty. After the appointment of counsel and a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence and denied the petition. Following our review, we conclude that trial counsel rendered deficient representation when he incorrectly advised the Petitioner that he was eligible for the boot camp program. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a determination regarding whether that deficiency was prejudicial to the Petitioner.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Tammy V. Galloway v. Brian K. Vaughn, et al.
M2010-00890-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda McClendon

Plaintiff, a guest passenger in a vehicle involved in an accident, filed this action to recover uninsured motorist benefits. The vehicle in which Plaintiff was riding was owned and operated by an insured of Shelter Insurance Company. The accident was the fault of the driver of another vehicle who was not insured; therefore, Plaintiff seeks to recover uninsured motorist coverage benefits from Shelter. Insisting that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the driver’s policy because Plaintiff did not meet the definition of an “insured” in the policy, Shelter moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that Plaintiff was an “insured” under the terms of the Shelter policy and denied the motion. This interlocutory appeal followed. We have determined that Plaintiff is not an “insured” pursuant to the terms of the Shelter policy and that Shelter is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant Shelter’s motion for summary judgment.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Christopher Kyle v. State of Tennessee
W2009-00260-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee V. Coffee

Following his convictions for second degree murder and theft, the Petitioner, Christopher Kyle, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, specifically in failing to challenge the accuracy of the autopsy report and the sentencing procedure employed by the trial court. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Calvin Owens v. State of Tennessee
W2009-02298-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Otis Higgs, Jr.

The Petitioner, Calvin Owens, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to communicate with him, in failing to properly investigate his case, in withdrawing the suppression motion regarding the photo spread identification, in questioning the victim regarding the bad dreams he had while recovering from his injuries in the hospital, and in failing to advise him about the advantages and disadvantages of testifying at trial. In addition, the Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal a hearsay issue that was included in the motion for new trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Keith L. Jackson v. State of Tennessee
M2010-00446-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth Norman

A Davidson County jury convicted Petitioner, Keith L. Jackson, of one count of possession with the intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of a substance containing cocaine in a drugfree school zone and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to employ it in the commission of or escape from an offense. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty-six years. Following an appeal to this Court, his conviction for possession of a firearm was reversed. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was unsuccessful. His subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus was also unsuccessful. Petitioner has filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus which was summarily dismissed by the habeas corpus court. Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition in this appeal. He argues that his sentence requiring a 100% release eligibility is unconstitutional and is contrary to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition because these issues were determined by this Court in Petitioner’s prior appeal from the dismissal of his earlier petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Brian Mark Driggers
M2009-02124-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Crigler

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, Brian Mark Driggers, of forgery and misdemeanor theft, and the trial court sentenced him to one year and three months to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that the State failed to prove venue, and that the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Marshall Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Charles Phillip Maxwell
M2009-02323-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte Watkins

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Charles Phillip Maxwell, was convicted of driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s license for a year and sentenced the Defendant to 30 days in the county jail, suspended to probation following the service of 24 hours in the county jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Marriott Applewhite v. James Blanchard, Jr.
W2010-00343-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen R. Williams

The trial court awarded a directed verdict to the Defendant in this tort action arising out of an automobile accident. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Shelby Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Alan Dale Bobyarchick
E2010-00351-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don. W. Poole

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Alan Dale Bobyarchick, was convicted of violating an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-113(g). In this direct appeal, he contends that, in the Order of Protection, the circuit court did not make any specific findings of fact that he committed domestic abuse, sexual assault, or stalking, and, therefore, he could not be convicted of violating the Order of Protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-113(f)(3). After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Hamilton Court of Criminal Appeals

Willie Dockins v. State of Tennessee
W2008-02809-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge John T. Fowlkes, Jr.

A jury convicted the petitioner, Willie Dockins, of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On direct appeal, this court upheld the conviction and sentence. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and two amended petitions for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner now appeals. Following a review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

James E. Lofton v. State of Tennessee
W2010-01122-CA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The petitioner, James E. Lofton, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Lauderdale Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Billy D. Sizemore
M2009-01827-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robbie Beal

The Perry County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Billy D. Sizemore, for one count of theft over $1,000 in connection with the theft of rolls of wire fencing from Eugene Grinder. A jury convicted Appellant as charged, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to twelve yearsas a career offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because there was insufficient corroboration of his co-defendant’s testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was sufficient corroborating evidence and, therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Perry Court of Criminal Appeals

Mariam Fada Dirie v. State of Tennessee
M2009-02287-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte Watkins

The petitioner, Mariam Fada Dirie, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated child abuse by neglect, a Class A felony, and received concurrent sentences of 17 years’ incarceration. A timely filed petition for post-conviction relief followed wherein the petitioner alleged that her guilty pleas were involuntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the appointment of counsel, amendment of the petition, and an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Wendland
M2009-01150-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge David Bragg

The defendant, Kenneth Wendland, entered a plea of guilty to aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony, and criminal simulation, a Class E felony, but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37. He received sentences of eight years for the Class B felony and one year for the Class E felony. The question reserved for review is whether the searches of the defendant’s home and computers were illegal under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions. After careful consideration, we conclude that the searches at issue were legal. Police were properly admitted into Mr. Wendland’s house with the consent of his roommate. While properly in the home, the officers legally seized evidence of counterfeiting, pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Specifically, the officers had legal authority to seize certain computers, computer equipment, and other items as evidence because they had probable cause to believe that these items were involved in the production of counterfeit money. After these items were lawfully seized, the computers were properly searched pursuant to valid search warrants. Consequently, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Rutherford Court of Criminal Appeals

In the Matter of: Lillian M, DOB 08/08/06, a minor child under the age of Eighteen (18) years old, State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. TM and CM
E2010-00749-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Taylor

In this action, the Trial Court ordered the Department of Children's Services which had custody of the minor child, to furnish the parents with medical information, including video tapes. A written response was not made by the Department and the video tapes were not obtained and furnished to the parents. The Trial Court held the Department in willful contempt of the Court and entered sanctions as punishment. The Department has appealed.  We hold that the record does not establish a basis to hold the Department in willful contempt of Court and we reverse the Trial Court's contempt judgment.

Hawkins Court of Appeals

Kay Sauer v. Donald D. Launius dba Alpha Log Cabins
E2010-00477-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

Kay Sauer (“the Plaintiff”) sued Donald D. Launius (“the Defendant”) on a civil warrant in general sessions court alleging, among other things, that the Defendant did business as Alpha Log Cabins. The Defendant appealed an adverse judgment in general sessions to the trial court. In the trial court, the Defendant, by counsel, filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the Plaintiff had sued the wrong party as the contract upon which she had sued was with Alpha Log Cabin Sales and Rentals, Inc. (“the Agent”). The case was set for hearing on April 13, 2009. In the meantime,  between the filing of the motion to dismiss and the hearing date, the Defendant’s attorney  withdrew. The Defendant failed to appear on the hearing date, and the court entered judgment in the Plaintiff’s favor. The Defendant filed a motion to set aside pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 supported by his affidavit in which he stated that he did not receive notice of the hearing date. The trial court denied the motion to set aside. The Defendant appeals. We remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order vacating the court’s judgment.

Sevier Court of Appeals

Robert E. Davis et al. v. Crawford L. Wiliams et al.
E2010-01139-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frank V. Williams, III

Robert E. Davis and wife, Angela K. Davis (“the Buyers”), filed this action against Crawford L. Williams and wife, Betty Jo Williams (“the Sellers”), to enjoin them from taking possession of real property that the Sellers had sold the Buyers and re-acquired through foreclosure. The Buyers also sought to set aside the foreclosure sale. The Sellers moved to dismiss and then for  summary judgment on the ground that a final judgment against the Buyers in an unlawful detainer action in general sessions court barred the present action under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Sellers. The Buyers appeal. We affirm.

Loudon Court of Appeals

Tina J. Parks v. Mid-Atlantic Finance Company, Inc.
E2009-02593-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

Tina J. Parks (“the Buyer”) purchased an automobile on an installment payment plan and signed a “Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement” (“the Installment Contract”) pledging the vehicle as collateral to the seller-lender, Chris Yousif dba Quality Motors (“the Seller”). Mid-Atlantic Finance Company, Inc. purchased the Seller’s rights in the Installment Contract. Mid-Atlantic later informed the Seller when the Buyer fell behind on her payments. The Seller repossessed the vehicle. Mid-Atlantic sold its rights under the Installment Contract to the Seller. The Buyer then filed this action against the Seller and Mid-Atlantic on various theories. The trial court granted Mid-Atlantic summary judgment and dismissed the Buyer’s claim against the company, finding that, as the purchaser of the Installment Contract, it had no duty to the Buyer. The Buyer appeals. We affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

David L. Morrow and Judy M. Wright v. Suntrust Bank, et al.
W2010-01547-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold Goldin

Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to be named the sole heirs to trust residue. However, the Attorney General moved for summary judgment, claiming that a later trust document provided for a full disposition of the trust assets, and therefore, that no assets remained to which Appellants could be entitled. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the intent to leave no residue stated in the later document superseded the prior edition. On appeal, Appellants argue that intent is irrelevant without a determination of the legal efficacy of the  trust documents, and that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion. We find that the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction in adjudicating the declaratory judgment. Additionally, we affirm the trial court’s denial of attorney fees and costs to SunTrust incurred at trial, and we decline to award SunTrust its attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.

Shelby Court of Appeals