State of Tennessee v. Aaron Dewayne Troutt
The Defendant, Aaron Dewayne Troutt, appeals as of right from the trial court’s dismissal of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct a clerical error. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by concluding it was without jurisdiction to modify a final judgment to award behavioral and pretrial jail credit. After review, we affirm the trial court’s decision in part, reverse in part, and remand for findings on whether a clerical error exists regarding the Defendant’s pretrial jail credit. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandon Nathaniel Merritt v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Brandon Nathaniel Merritt, pled guilty to attempted rape and sexual battery and agreed to an effective sentence of six years. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine how the sentence would be served. After the trial court imposed a sentence of full confinement, the Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his guilty pleas and at his sentencing hearing. He also asserted that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sarah Boren v. David Wade, Jr.
This case involves a post-divorce modification of the parties’ parenting plan for their minor child. The trial court suspended Appellant/Father’s visitation. Because the trial court failed to make any findings concerning the child’s best interest, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-404(b), 36-6-106(a), we vacate the trial court’s order. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Balmoral Shopping Center, LLC v. City of Memphis ET AL.
This is an appeal of a trial judge’s denial of a Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B motion for the recusal of the trial judge from the case. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the recusal motion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Trust of Katherine D. Graham
Decedent created a trust and named one of the beneficiaries and Appellee, a third-party bank, as co-trustees. The trust beneficiaries petitioned for Appellee’s removal and for the substitution of another beneficiary as co-trustee. The petitioners also sought an order directing Appellee to reimburse the trust for fees paid to Appellee as co-trustee. The trial court held that Appellee administered the trust diligently and without any malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-feasance. As such, the trial court implicitly found that Appellee was entitled to its fees. The trial court further found that it would violate a material purpose of the trust to appoint, as co-trustee, another related beneficiary. Ultimately, the trial court declined to remove Appellee and to substitute another beneficiary as co-trustee. Appellant is the only petitioner/beneficiary to appeal. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in its material purpose finding, for reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s decision not to remove Appellee as co-trustee. Further, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petitioners’ request that Appellee reimburse the trust for its fees. Appellee’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees is denied.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Vanessa Colley v. John S. Colley, III
Appellant/Husband voluntarily nonsuited his post-divorce lawsuit involving issues of alimony and the parties’ alleged settlement of an IRS debt. Appellee/Wife moved for an award of her attorney’s fees on alternative grounds, i.e., the abusive lawsuit statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-106; the parties’ MDA; and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5- 103(c). The trial court granted Wife’s motion and entered judgment for her attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court specifically held that Husband’s lawsuit was not abusive, and Wife does not raise this as an issue on appeal. As such, we conclude that she is not entitled to her attorney’s fees under the abusive lawsuit statute. As to her claim for attorney’s fees and costs under the MDA and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c), both grounds require that Wife be a “prevailing party” in the underlying lawsuit. Because Husband took a voluntary nonsuit, neither party prevailed in the action, and Wife is not entitled to her attorney’s fees and costs. Reversed and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Gaby v. Tony Gaby
This is the second appeal of this action concerning the father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan for his two children. In the first appeal, we remanded the case back to the trial court for submission of additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. The father now appeals the decision on remand. We vacate the order of the trial court and remand for entry of a new permanent parenting plan for the remaining minor child. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Farm Credit Leasing Services Corp. v. Jeffrey Daniels
Lessee disputes the trial court’s denial of his emergency motion to continue leasing company’s summary judgment hearing. Lessee also appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for leasing company, despite not responding to discovery requests or submitting evidence in opposition to summary judgment. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marlon J. Johnson, Jr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Marlon J. Johnson, Jr., appeals the revocation of his six-year probationary sentence for two counts of aggravated burglary, domestic assault, misdemeanor assault, misdemeanor theft, and misdemeanor false imprisonment. The Defendant conceded the probation violation before the trial court and on appeal. Accordingly, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lori S. Fernandez v. Tennessee Department of Revenue
Lori S. Fernandez (“Appellant”) was employed by the Tennessee Department of Revenue from 2014 until March 6, 2020, when she resigned. Following her resignation, Appellant sued the Department and several of its employees (the “Appellees”) for various causes of action including, inter alia, racial and disability discrimination. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court granted. Thereafter, Appellant filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or amend the trial court’s order, as well as an amended complaint. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend and declined to address the outstanding amended complaint. Appellant timely appealed to this court. We conclude that the order appealed from is non-final. Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin J. McNeill v. Blount Memorial Hospital Incorporated, Et Al.
The pro se plaintiff appeals the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of his action against the defendant hospital and its Chief Executive Officer. The trial court also granted the hospital CEO’s motion for a reasonable award of attorney fees and costs in defending against the lawsuit in his personal capacity pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29- 20-113. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
First Bank F/D/B/A Northwest Georgia Bank v. Mountain Apartments, LLC Et Al.
The plaintiff bank appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of its breach of contract action against the defendants pursuant to the law in Georgia. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Adam Blackwell
Thomas Adam Blackwell, Defendant, claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation, denying an alternative sentence, and ordering his three-year sentence for fourth offense driving under the influence (“DUI”) to be served consecutively to the seven-year sentence that he was serving on community corrections when he was arrested for the DUI. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.
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Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donta Lamar Weir v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Donta Lamar Weir, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his 2021 guilty-pleaded convictions of delivery of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, delivery of cocaine, and delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance. He argues that the post-conviction court erred by concluding that he failed to state a colorable claim for relief. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Lynn Thornton
The Defendant, Jeremy Lynn Thornton, was convicted in the Benton County Circuit Court of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of heroin with intent to sell or deliver, simple possession of alprazolam, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and simple possession of diazepam and received an effective ten-year sentence to be served as one year in confinement followed by nine years on community corrections. The State appealed the Defendant’s community corrections sentence, and this court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. On remand, the trial court again imposed an effective ten-year sentence to be served as one year in confinement followed by community corrections. The State appeals, claiming that the Defendant is not eligible for community corrections due to his past pattern of behavior indicating violence and pattern of committing violent offenses. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Hampton and Margaret Hampton
Stephen Paul Hampton and Margaret Mary Hampton were charged in the Madison County Circuit Court with drug and weapon offenses, but the charges were dismissed after the trial court granted their motions to suppress statements made to a police officer and evidence found in their vehicle. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the motions to suppress because the statements were not made during a custodial interrogation and because the police officer had probable cause to search the vehicle. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the trial court’s orders granting the motions to suppress, vacate the order dismissing the indictment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demarcus Wooten
A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Demarcus Wooten, guilty of the offenses of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-nine years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his murder and attempted murder convictions, arguing principally that the proof did not establish the elements of intent and premeditation. We respectfully disagree, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Brown v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Christopher Brown, was convicted of one count of first degree murder and three counts of aggravated assault by a Shelby County jury. The Petitioner later filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to disclose discovery materials and failed to call particular witnesses. The post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Davis
The Defendant, Marcus Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of twenty-one years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to show premeditation and that the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on self-defense. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John E. Sullivan, Jr. GST Exempt Trust, et al. v. Frank G. Sullivan, et al.
This case concerns the administration of a generation-skipping exempt trust. On review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s order is not a final judgment, so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court. Specifically, the trial court did not adjudicate: (1) the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees; (2) Appellees’ prayer to remove David M. Sullivan as trustee; (3) Appellees’ motion to disqualify David M. Sullivan from acting as legal counsel for the Trust; or (4) Trustee’s motion for sanctions against Appellees and Appellees’ legal counsel. Appeal dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Elijah F.
In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the Davidson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) determined that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence established that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Having determined that three of the statutory grounds were not supported by sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support, abandonment by exhibiting wanton disregard for the child’s welfare prior to incarceration, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the child. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Joseph D.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination existed as to the mother: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (3) persistent conditions; (4) severe child abuse; (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility; and (6) mental incompetence. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Jacob Tate v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jacob Tate, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2018 guilty-pleaded convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and rape, arguing that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Toni Barrios et al. v. Charlie Simpkins et al.
In this boundary line dispute in which the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment concerning the boundary between the parties’ adjoining parcels of real property, the trial court, following a bench trial, entered declaratory judgment adopting the boundary line of a survey presented by the plaintiffs over other competing surveys. The court, however, did not adopt a boundary line alternatively propounded by the plaintiffs claiming adverse possession of a disputed portion of land. The court dismissed all other claims with prejudice, including, inter alia, competing trespass claims and the plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault. The plaintiffs have appealed, raising issues regarding the trial court’s denial of their adverse possession and trespass claims and requests for damages and injunctive relief. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ adverse possession claim and the court’s declaration of the parties’ boundary line. However, determining that the trial court erred in applying an intent to trespass as a necessary element of civil trespass, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ trespass claim. We remand for the trial court to (1) apply the proper intent standard for trespass to determine, with the boundary line as declared by the trial court, whether the defendants trespassed on the plaintiffs’ property; (2) if trespass occurred, determine the type(s) of damages to be awarded; and (3) if trespass occurred, set the amount of damages to be awarded with discretionary costs as appropriate. Discerning that the trial court made no findings regarding the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, we also remand for consideration of that request based on relevant factors and entry of an order granting or denying injunctive relief with appropriate findings of fact. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. We deem the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ respective requests for attorney’s fees on appeal to be waived. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kelyahna T.
The trial court clerk notified this Court that a final judgment has not been entered. This Court ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed. Appellant failed to respond to our show cause order. As no final judgment has been entered, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals |