State of Tennessee v. Tenithia Malena
The Defendant-Appellant, Tenithia Malena, was convicted by a Hardeman County Circuit Court jury of one count of burglary, a Class D felony, and one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. The trial court approved the sentence recommendation by the State and sentenced Malena as a Range I, standard offender to three years of supervised probation for the burglary conviction. The court also ordered her to pay $20,000 in restitution by April 4, 2008 and ordered her to pay the restitution balance of $34,662.44 in monthly payments of $350.00 starting May 1, 2008. In addition, the trial court sentenced her, pursuant to the State's recommendation, as a Range I, standard offender to six years of supervised probation for the theft conviction, which was to be served consecutively to the burglary conviction, for an effective nine-year probationary sentence. In this appeal, Malena challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) the admission of her financial records as evidence related to the theft charge, and (3) the trial court's denial of her motion for new trial on the ground that extraneous prejudicial information was considered by the jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Hall v. Am Comp Assurance Corporation
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Michael Hall (“Employee”) alleged that he sustained compensable injuries as a result of repetitive use of his hands and arms in the course of his employment as a butcher for Latham’s Meat Company (“Employer”). Employer denied that he had sustained a compensable injury. In the alternative, it alleged that Employee’s injuries had been caused by his part-time work for a second employer. The trial court found that Employee had sustained compensable injuries to his arms and that Employer was liable for workers’ compensation benefits arising from those injuries. It awarded 22.5% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to both arms. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that a compensable injury occurred and by finding that Employee sustained permanent disability as a result. We affirm the judgment. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Lara L. Battleson vs. Dean L. Battleson
Approximately 29 months after the parties' divorce became final, Lara L. Battleson ("Wife") filed a motion in the trial court asking that Dean L. Battleson ("Husband") be held in contempt because of his failure to pay child support. Wife served a copy of the motion and notice of hearing on Douglas R. Beier ("Counsel"), the attorney who had represented Husband in the divorce action. Counsel filed a motion to dismiss supported by an affidavit stating that he no longer represented Husband and that his mail to Husband had been returned undeliverable. The trial court found that service on Counsel was sufficient. As a consequence of this ruling, the court denied Counsel's motion to dismiss; it also granted the motion for contempt. Husband appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment of contempt and remand for further proceedings. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tyler M.
At an earlier time, i.e., November 1, 2004, the trial court, inter alia, ordered Pamela M. ("Mother") to pay Gregory L. E. ("Father"), the then-custodian of their child, Tyler M. ("the Child"), a child support arrearage of $7,920 (through October 31, 2004) and prospective monthly child support of $165 plus $35 to be applied on the arrearage. Over the years that followed, several petitions were filed, the disposition of which are not germane to the issues on this appeal. On November 23, 2005, Mother filed a petition for modification based upon the fact that the Child was then in her custody under an order of the trial court. The trial court entered an order on February 15, 2006, providing that "current support is terminated because [Mother] now has custody of the [C]hild." The record contains a number of subsequent pleadings and orders that also are not relevant to this appeal. Finally, on January 16, 2009, Mother filed a petition for modification seeking "to terminate all arrearage and liquidate arrearage to [F]ather." The trial court entered an order on July 17, 2009, determining that "the arrearage balance was proper based on the fact that child support cannot be modified retroactively." The court did reduce Mother's monthly arrearage payment from $50 to $35. Mother appeals and both sides raise issues. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kay & Kay Contracting, LLC vs. Tennessee Department of Transportation
Kay and Kay Contracting, LLC ("Contractor") entered into a contract with the Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT") to build a bridge in Campbell County, Tennessee. Contractor subsequently entered into a subcontract with Whitley County Stone, LLC ("Subcontractor") to provide the excavation and grading work on the project. Subcontractor does not have a written contract with TDOT. Both Contractor and Subcontractor filed claims with the Claims Commission alleging they were owed money by TDOT. Subcontractor was dismissed as a party because it did not have a written contract with TDOT, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 9-8-307(a)(1)(L). The Commissioner, however, determined that Contractor was allowed to prosecute Subcontractor's claim as a "pass-through" claim. The sole issue on this interlocutory appeal is whether Tenn. Code Ann. _ 9-8-307(a)(1)(L) removes the State's sovereign immunity such that Contractor can assert a "pass-through" claim against TDOT on Subcontractor's behalf. We conclude that sovereign immunity from such a claim is not removed, and we reverse the judgment of the Claims Commission. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Regina D. Wiser vs Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr.
This appeal concerns post-divorce modification of alimony and child support. The parties had two children; during the marriage, the wife remained at home and cared for the parties' children. The husband was self-employed through his solely owned company. Ultimately, the parties divorced on stipulated grounds, and the husband was ordered to pay child support. The husband was awarded his business. The trial court awarded two commercial buildings to the wife and ordered the husband to pay the associated mortgage. The husband was ordered to pay alimony until the buildings were paid off, after which the wife's income was to be derived from the buildings. After the divorce, the income of the husband's company increased substantially and the husband refinanced the buildings. Two years after the divorce, the wife filed a petition for modification of alimony and child support. After a trial, the trial court declined to increase the alimony. It granted an increase in the husband's child support obligation to the maximum under the guidelines, but declined to award more than the guideline amount. The trial court also declined to award the wife attorney fees. The wife now appeals. We find that the increase in the income of the husband's company was a substantial and material change in circumstances, and that the decision not to increase alimony was an abuse of discretion, and therefore modify the alimony award. We affirm the trial court's refusal to grant an upward deviation from the guideline amount of child support. We reverse the trial court's denial of the wife's request for attorney fees with respect to child support and alimony, but affirm the denial of attorney fees for the refinancing of the two buildings awarded to the wife. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Glen Cruzen vs Ayman Awad
This case arises out of the alleged breach of a contractual agreement entered by and between Appellant and Appellee for the repair and renovation of a commercial building. Appellant filed suit, asserting that Appellee had failed to fully compensate Appellant for his work on the building. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant was an unlicensed contractor under Tenn. Code Ann. _62-6-102, and that his recovery was, therefore, limited to actual documented expenses under Tenn. Code Ann. _62- 6-103(b). Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Joseph Cordle
The defendant, Thomas Joseph Cordle, appeals from the revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his sentences in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shawn Howell, Individually and as Administrator for the Estate of Jesse Franklin Browning, Jr. vs Claiborne and Hughes Health Center
This is a medical malpractice action. Appellant originally filed a claim in 2007 in the name of an estate. The original claim was subsequently non-suited. Less than one year later, the claim was then re-filed, also in the name of an estate. With permission of the court, the Appellant later amended the complaint to name the administrator of the estate as the plaintiff. However, upon the Appellee's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint finding: (1) the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations as there were no allegations in the complaint which would invoke the savings statute; (2) the complaint failed to state with particularity the specific acts of negligence; and (3) that the Appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements for a medical malpractice action found in Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 29-26- 121. Finding that the trial court erred, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Karen Marable
The Defendant-Appellant, Karen Marable, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Shelby County of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. She was sentenced as a standard offender to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Marable claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court erred in responding to a jury question; and (3) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Estate of Joyce Bell et al. v. Shelby County Health Care Corporation d/b/a The Regional Medical Center
This appeal involves the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to an action for damages filed against a defendant that was not covered by the Act when the injuryproducing events occurred. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment in the Circuit Court for Shelby County seeking the benefit of the claims and defenses available to government entities under the Act. The plaintiffs responded by challenging the constitutionality of legislation extending the coverage of the Act to the defendant on the ground that the legislation had been enacted after the plaintiffs had sustained their injuries. The trial court held that the Act applied to the defendant but granted the plaintiffs permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We granted the plaintiffs' application for permission to appeal after the Court of Appeals declined to consider the case. We have determined that applying the substantive amendment to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act enacted after the injury-producing events occurred to the plaintiffs' damage claims violates the prohibition against retrospective laws in Article I, Section 20 of the Constitution of Tennessee. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ralphelle James
The defendant, a Range I offender, was found guilty of public intoxication, theft of property over $1,000, and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of thirty days for the misdemeanor and four years for the felony theft; because the six-year sentence for aggravated burglary is to be served consecutively, the effective sentence is ten years. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal to consider the propriety of instructions to the jury permitting inferences of both theft and burglary from the possession of recently stolen property. A second issue is whether the trial court erred by failing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of aggravated burglary for insufficient evidence. As his final issue, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to further examine a defense witness after jurors had submitted questions pursuant to rule. Because the instructions were proper, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict on the burglary charge, and the procedure utilized for juror questions was compliant with the rule, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Charles Parsley vs. Elmer Price
Charles Parsley ("the plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, sued Elmer Price ("the defendant") in the General Sessions Court for Hawkins County. In attempting to allege his cause of action, the plaintiff employed a civil warrant form with the pre-printed designation, "Detainer Summons." The general sessions court transferred the case to the trial court. The trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff's suit was not a detainer action but rather a suit "in the nature of either quiet title or of ejectment." Following a bench trial on September 22, 2009, the court incorporated its written memorandum opinion into an order and granted "judgment in favor of the defendant." Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Lynn Raney v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Terry Lynn Raney, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine, keeping or maintaining a dwelling place where controlled substances are used or sold, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana on grounds that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. Because there is a clerical error in the judgment form for the petitioner's conviction of possession of cocaine, the case is remanded to the Criminal Court for Sullivan County for the entry of a corrected judgment form. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Williams
The Defendant, Paul Williams, appeals from judgments entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of driving on a suspended license, violation of the passenger vehicle safety belt law, and violation of the motor vehicle registration law. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court was without jurisdiction to convict him, that his convictions violate his constitutional right to travel, and that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel C. Wicker, II, et al. vs. Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Revenue
Plaintiffs were assessed, and paid taxes under the Drug Tax, which was later declared unconstitutional. Plaintiffs sought refunds individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated. The trial court certified the class, and the Department filed this interlocutory appeal challenging certification. Because the Taxpayer Remedies Statute, which must be strictly construed as a derogation of sovereign immunity, does not contemplate the maintenance of a class action, we reverse the trial court's grant of class certification. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Davis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Davis, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his especially aggravated robbery conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Because we conclude that trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a jury instruction on facilitation as a lesser- included offense of especially aggravated robbery, and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the petitioner's trial would have been different had counsel done so, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for the granting of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dara Demetra Owens vs. Daniel Lee Owens
Husband seeks to set aside a divorce decree and permanent parenting plan entered by default on the ground that the provisions of such differed significantly from the relief sought in Wife's complaint for divorce and proposed parenting plan. We reverse the trial court's decision insofar as it failed to grant Husband the relief sought. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Dutton, et al. vs. Farmers Group, Inc., et al. - Concurring
I agree with the majority that, given the present state of the record in this case, summary judgment is not appropriate. As the record now stands, “[w]hether the plaintiff[s] exercised reasonable care and diligence in discovering the injury or wrong is . . . a fact question for the [trier of fact] to determine.” Wyatt v. A-Best Company, 910 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tenn. 1995). In other words, there is a genuine issue as to this material fact. At trial, the finder of fact must determine if the plaintiffs filed suit within one year of the point in time when they first knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 1 have known that an actionable injury had occurred. Id. at 856-57. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Dutton, et al. vs. Farmers Group, Inc., et al.
Plaintiffs' home flooded and incurred severe water and mold damage when the hot water tank burst. Plaintiffs began to experience varying illnesses after moving back into the home. Despite Defendants' assurances that the home was safe, three years after moving back into the home, Plaintiffs discovered that their home was contaminated with toxic mold. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants alleging various claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint asserting that the statute of limitations barred the claims. After a hearing, the trial court agreed and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment; the trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Garner Dwight Padgett v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Garner Dwight Padgett, appeals the Putnam County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder. The Petitioner contends (1) that the trial court violated the Petitioner's federal and state constitutional rights at the trial by asking members of the venire whether they could be fair to both sides, thus lowering the State's burden of proof, and (2) that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial for failing to object to the trial court's asking whether the members could be fair. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wesley Earl Brown v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Wesley Earl Brown, of two counts of rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twenty-five years for each rape conviction, to be served consecutively, and ten years for each sexual battery conviction, to be served concurrently but consecutively to the rape convictions, for a total effective sentence of sixty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and (3) the trial court's sentence violated the Petitioner's constitutional right to a jury. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeff D. Arp
Appellant Jeff D. Arp pled guilty to two counts of incest stemming from two separate incidents involving his mentally disabled teenage daughter. One incident took place before the effective date of the 2005 amendments to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, and one incident took place after the effective date. Appellant chose to be sentenced under the prior law for the first offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of five years for each conviction, to be served consecutively, and denied alternative sentencing. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in its application of the enhancement factors and in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Robert Thomas Reed
The Defendant, Robert Thomas Reed, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) (first offense), a Class A misdemeanor, and driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO), a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I offender to two years with service of six months in the county jail and the balance to be served on probation for the MVHO conviction and a concurrent sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to six months for the DUI conviction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that formed the basis of both convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alfred Turner - Dissenting
In large part, I agree with the majority in this case. However, I must respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ conclusion reversing the judgment of the trial court based on its failure to exclude Tate’s and Blades’ testimony regarding their acquittals. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |