State of Tennessee v. Roderick Sammual Chadwick
A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Roderick Sammual Chadwick, guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed concurrent terms of twelve years and fifteen years, respectively, for these convictions. Under the same indictment, the Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years for this conviction, to be served consecutively to the effective fifteen-year sentence, for a total effective sentence of twentyone years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that consecutive sentencing was improper. Because the record on appeal does not include the necessary transcripts of what transpired in the trial court, we conclude that the Defendant has waived the issues argued on appeal. We must presume that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and that the sentencing ruling of the trial court was correct; therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demance Marshall Beasley
The Defendant, Demance Marshall Beasley, was charged with: one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, see Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39- 13-403(b), -12-107(a); one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, see Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-202(c), -12-107(a); and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102(e)(1). Following a jury trial, he was convicted as charged. In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; (2) the trial court erred by foreclosing crossexamination of the victims regarding their drug usage; and (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding identification of the Defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marquise Harris v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Marquise Harris, has appealed the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) was subject to an illegal search, seizure, and arrest; and (3) he received an unconstitutional enhancement of his sentences. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Trailer Source, et al.
A junior creditor sued the senior creditor claiming that the senior creditor's involvement in the sale of collateral, used trailers for tractor-trailer trucks, was commercially unreasonable. We agree with the trial court that the senior creditor, a bank, was subject to the commercially reasonable disposition of collateral rule. However, we hold that the bank's approval of the sale, arranged by the debtor, was not commercially unreasonable. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bernard Henry v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Bernard Henry, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lemar J. White v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner Lemar J. White was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. After this court affirmed his conviction, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging he received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Specifically, he claims both attorneys should have challenged the validity of his warrantless arrest because the State did not supply a sufficient basis for finding probable cause. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tracy Lynn Cope
The defendant, Tracy Lynn Cope, was convicted of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and one count of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to forty years for the Class A felony, twenty years for the Class B felony, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently for a total effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, he argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred in allowing the victim to testify that the defendant broke his hand by hitting her in the face; trial counsel was ineffective; and he was improperly sentenced. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Yolanda D. Barefield v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Yolanda D. Barefield, appeals the summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, she alleges that she entered an involuntary guilty plea due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we remand to the trial court for appointment of counsel and a hearing regarding the issue of whether the petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to her guilty plea to felony escape. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marilee Ann Petrey Jones v. John Timothy Jones
After the parties' divorce, Mother was named primary residential parent and Father was ordered to pay $3,250.00 per month child support. Father filed two petitions seeking a reduction of his support obligation, which were denied. The parties then agreed that Father would pay $2,500.00 per month support through March 1, 2014. Thereafter, Father filed a third petition to reduce support claiming decreased income and increased parenting time. Subsequently, the parties signed an agreement allowing substantially equal parenting time, which was filed with the trial court, but never signed by the trial judge. The trial court denied Father's third petition for modification, finding both that he had failed to prove a significant variance and that he was contractually bound to his $2,500.00 agreement. The trial court also awarded Mother's attorney his $15,000.00 fee. We affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees to Mother's attorney as well as its refusal to reduce Father's child support obligation due to his allegedly decreased income. However, we remand to the trial court for consideration of whether Father's child support obligation should be reduced due to increased parenting time, and for entry of the parties' Agreed Parenting Plan Order. We decline to award Mother her attorney fees incurred on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cedric Antonio Conner
The appellant, Cedric Antonio Conner, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and received a six-year sentence. On appeal, he challenges the trial court's refusal to grant him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Barnett
A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Lee Barnett, of attempted aggravated cruelty to animals. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days, ordering him to serve seventy-five days in jail and the balance of his sentence on probation. The defendant appeals, contending the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court improperly sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Moncelle Voorhies v. State of Tennessee
On August 13, 2007, Petitioner, Moncelle Voorhies, pled guilty in Rutherford County to sale of cocaine under .5 grams. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on August 11, 2008, alleging that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily and that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner now brings this appeal from the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. After a review of the record and arguments on appeal, we conclude that Petitioner entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that he was afforded effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Two Rivers Baptist Church, et al. v. Jerry Sutton, et al.
Officers of a church appeal the trial court holding that under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 48-66-102 the members of the church have a statutory right to church records. We find that the members have a right to the records described in subsection (a) of the statute since such access is unconditional and since enforcing this right does not entangle the court in religious affairs in violation of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. However, the members failed to articulate a "proper purpose" as required in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 48-66-102(c) to gain access to those records described in subsection (b) of the statute. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part and reverse in part. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terance Rose
The defendant, Terance Rose, stands convicted of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to three years for reckless homicide and twenty years for especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the state to amend the indictment over the defendant’s objection, (2) the sheriff’s deputies violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches, and (3) the deputies took his third statement in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kimberly Byars v. Earl Young
This is an appeal from a juvenile court custody proceeding. The mother filed a petition for legitimation in the Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Court entered an order finding that the defendant father is the child’s natural father, designating the mother as the child’s primary residential parent and granting weekend parenting time to the father. After a protracted dispute over parenting time, the Juvenile Court entered an order designating the father to be the child’s primary residential parent, with no provision for parenting time for the mother. The mother then appealed to the Circuit Court. After several years of Circuit Court proceedings, the case was transferred to another Circuit Court judge who ultimately entered an order dismissing the appeal. The mother appealed the Circuit Court’s order. After remand, the Circuit Court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals. We affirm the designation of the father as the primary residential parent but find that the Juvenile Court erred in not providing for parenting time for the mother, and remand the case to the Juvenile |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Wlodarz v. State of Tennessee
After entering “best interest” guilty pleas in order to avoid a potential death penalty conviction, Petitioner, Stephen Wlodarz, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Hawkins County Criminal Court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in finding there was no newly discovered evidence and that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Discover Bank v. Joy A. Morgan
This lawsuit began as a collection claim filed by Discover Bank ("Discover") against Joy A. Morgan ("Morgan") for $16,341.52. Discover claimed Morgan owed this amount on a credit card originally issued to Morgan's husband, now deceased. Morgan filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting a claim for libel as well as claims pursuant to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. _ 1681, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 47-18-101, et seq. Morgan's attorney gave Discover's original attorney an extension of time in which to file an answer to the counterclaim. After this extension of time had run, Morgan's attorney warned Discover's attorney that a motion for default judgment would be filed if an answer was not filed within fourteen days. When Discover failed to file an answer within the fourteen days, Morgan filed a motion for default judgment. Discover's attorney failed to show up for the hearing and a default judgment was awarded to Morgan. Discover filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment "pursuant to Rule 60.02. . . ." This motion was denied. Following a later hearing on damages, Morgan was awarded compensatory damages totaling $125,200, which the trial court then trebled under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After obtaining new counsel, Discover filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. Discover now appeals. We affirm the trial court's Order denying Discover's motion to alter or amend the judgment and set aside the default judgment. We, however, vacate the award of damages and remand for a new hearing on the amount of damages and also to determine reasonable attorney fees incurred by Morgan on appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Franke Elliott, et al. v. Icon in the Gulch, LLC
Purchasers of pre-construction condominium units sued the developer seeking rescission of their contracts to purchase the units. The developer filed a motion to compel mediation and/or arbitration pursuant to the contract. The trial court denied the motion and the developer appeals. Finding error, we reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. Schiefelbein v. State of Tennessee
A Williamson County jury convicted the petitioner, Mark A. Shiefelbein, of seven counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced him to ninety-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions but modified his sentence to thirty-two years. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial. Specifically, the petitioner contends that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he (1) did not object when the trial court ordered the spectators to move so they could not see the presentation of video evidence; (2) did not object when the trial court ordered that part of the defendant’s testimony be stricken from the record; (3) did not obtain a copy of the audio-taped conversation between the petitioner and the victim, object to the recording’s admission as evidence, or properly prepare the petitioner for cross-examination about the recording; (4) did not properly object or move for a mistrial during the state’s cross-examination of the petitioner; (5) did not lay a proper foundation for the admission of expert testimony; (6) did not object to the trial court’s questioning of state witnesses; (7) did not seek an extraordinary appeal when the trial court refused to compel the state to provide copies of videotape evidence; and (8) did not object to the state’s use of the term “vaginal shots.” Additionally, the petitioner avers that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficient performance post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Pierre Jackson
The defendant, Pierre Jackson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, two counts of leaving the scene of an accident, and one count of driving on a revoked license, third offense, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of fifty-two years, five months, and twenty-nine days. State v. Pierre Jackson, No. W2006-02127-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2053652, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2008), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008). In the first direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions and the trial court's order of consecutive sentencing, but remanded for resentencing of the aggravated vehicular homicide convictions because the trial court erroneously applied an enhancement factor that was not found by the jury. Id. Upon resentencing, the trial court imposed the same sentence. The defendant now appeals, arguing that his sentence is "neither fair nor consistent" with those received by other defendants with similar records and equal moral culpability whose drunk driving by chance does not result in anyone's death. Following our review, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Charles Howse
Following a bench trial, Defendant, William C. Howse, was convicted of violating the Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004 (the "2004 Act"), a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to one year to be served as ninety days in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in finding that he knowingly violated the provisions of the 2004 Act, and (2) the 2004 Act violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lisa Wiggins
The defendant, Lisa Wiggins, pled guilty to facilitation of burglary, a Class E felony, and facilitation of theft, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of one year of probation and ordered her to pay $4,874 in restitution. On appeal, the defendant argues that the state presented insufficient proof at the restitution hearing of the amount of restitution, and the trial court did not consider the defendant's financial resources and ability to pay. Following our review, we reverse the trial court's order and remand the matter for consideration of the amount of restitution, the defendant's financial resources, and her ability to pay. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry B. Brinton, Jr. v. Lisa A. Brinton
Father and Mother divorced in 1989 with the marital dissolution agreement obligating Father to pay all expenses for four years of college and graduate school for both son and daughter. Father refused to pay the entire cost of college for both but did pay $20,000 a year for each, deeming that reasonable. Mother sued. The trial court found that the children's choices of college were reasonable and that Father could afford the college costs. The trial court awarded Mother the costs she incurred in sending the children to college, interest and attorney's fees. Father appealed. We affirm and, based on the attorney fee provision of the MDA, remand for a determination of attorney's fees for Mother on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Earnest Banks v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Earnest Banks, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to burglarizing a motor vehicle and was sentenced, as a Range II offender, to a term of three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel placed him in “an untenable position of mounting no defense . . . or waiving his privilege against self-incrimination,” based upon trial counsel’s refusal to cross-examine witnesses regarding an unidentified third party. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Paul Clayton v. Andrea Dawn Clayton
Husband appeals the trial court's award of transitional alimony, alimony in futuro, and alimony in solido to Wife. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals |