Robert Lee Adams, Jr. v. State of Tennesse
Petitioner, Robert Lee Adams, was convicted by a Tipton County Jury of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to deliver and simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance. As a result, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to a fourteen-year sentence. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Robert Lee Adams, Jr., No. W2007-00880-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2152497 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 22, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on various grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. We have reviewed the record and conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re IMP: a Child Under the Age of Eighteen Years, J.J.A., Petitioner/Appellant, v. M.P., et al.
Petitioner brought this action in Juvenile Court to establish paternity and set co-parenting time with the child. The mother answered and, as an affirmative defense, averred that the father had signed a waiver of his parental right and cited the statutes stating that a waiver of parental rights could not be revoked. The Trial Court appointed a guardian ad litem, and the sole issue tried by the Trial Court was whether the waiver should be voided on the grounds that the father had signed the waiver under duress and undue pressure. The Trial Judge found that the father failed to carry the burden of proof to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he signed the waiver of interest and notice due to fraud, duress or intentional misrepresentation. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Saundra J. Counce, RN, v. Asecension Health, et al.
The plaintiff, formerly an at-will employee of Baptist Hospital, filed this action asserting that she was wrongfully terminated from her employment. She asserted twelve claims, inter alia, retaliatory discharge, age and sex discrimination, sexual harassment, violation of wage and hour laws, and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The trial court summarily dismissed all of the claims. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. Markie Jade Laxton v. Samuel Byron Biggerstaff
This is an appeal by the father requesting modification of his child support obligation due to |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Lamar Tennessee, LLC, et al., v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals, et al.
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County adopted a redevelopment plan for an area of the city which included the site of a long-existing billboard. The Tennessee Department of Transportation subsequently ordered the removal of the billboard to accommodate a road-widening project. The sign’s owner filed an application for a permit to relocate the sign on another portion of its leasehold, but the city declined to approve the application because the redevelopment plan totally prohibits signs of that type. The sign company filed a petition for certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, asserting that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 of the zoning statutes gave it the right to replace the sign. The court agreed, and ordered the city to re-evaluate the permit application in accordance with the statutory provisions for a pre-existing non-conforming use after a change of zoning. We reverse, finding that the grandfather provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 have no applicability to the restrictions contained in redevelopment plans under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-20-201 et seq. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Darnell Pinex v. State of Tennessee
The defendant, Larry Darnell Pinex, appeals from his Davidson County Criminal Court convictions of assault, attempted vandalism, and attempted theft. He claims that the trial court erred in not requiring the State to elect an offense to serve as the basis for the assault charge, that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions of assault and attempted vandalism, and that the trial court erroneously sentenced him on all convictions. The attempted vandalism conviction must be reversed, and that charge must be dismissed because insufficient evidence underlies the conviction. The assault conviction is affirmed as are the sentences for assault and attempted theft. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shuttleworth, Williams, Harper, Waring and Derrick, PLLC, v. Gary K. Smith, Smith, Sabbatini, & McLeary, PLLC
This dispute is between an attorney and his former firm. All parties to this suit appeal the trial court’s interpretation of their operating agreement about how the fees and expenses generated by the withdrawing member’s cases should be apportioned among them. The operating agreement gave the firm discretion to value the services provided by its other members, but the trial court correctly determined that the firm’s claimed value was not reasonable. We reverse the trial court’s holding with regard to the withdrawing lawyer’s interest in a member’s share of the expenses he is obligated to pay the firm. The trial court is affirmed on the issue of sanctions and as to its refusal to make an award to nonparties. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles M. Myer, III, et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
Property owners sued, alleging that the Metropolitan Government was using or taking their property without their permission and without compensation. The Metropolitan Government took an easement over the property by eminent domain and the State built the Victory Memorial Bridge over part of it. The Metropolitan Government later transferred its interest in the property to the State. Much later, the Metropolitan Government built the Gay Street Connector over part of the easement and maintained exclusive control over the part of the easement not used for the bridge. The trial court found for the government. The property owners appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alice L. Warren v. David E. Warren
In a divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s division of the marital estate, its determination of her income for child support purposes, and its division of the parties’ income tax liabilities. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jane Field, et al., v. The Ladies Hermitage Association and State of Tennessee
The heirs of the woman who conveyed Tulip Grove to the Ladies’ Hermitage Association filed suit claiming, among other things, that due to the Association’s failure to pay the heirs as required in the deed of conveyance, the property reverted to the heirs. We affirm the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to the Association holding that the Association did not fail to comply with the obligations relevant to the reversion, so no reversion was triggered. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antionette Horton
The defendant, Antionette Horton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense or defense of others. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kathy Melissa Cantrell v. Nissan North America, Inc., et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been |
Warren | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Joe Turner v. Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC, et al.
Employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back. He alleged that he also sustained a mental injury as a result of chronic pain. His employer contended that the chronic pa in and any menta l conditions a rising f rom it we re the re sult of seve ra l previous injurie s and surge rie s. The tria l court awa rded bene fits for the menta l injury. The employe r contends tha t the trial court erred by doing so. We disagree and affirm the judgment. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Naomi Schutte, as Adminstrator of the Estate of William Anthony Lucy, deceased v. Cheyenne Johnson, Shelby County Assessor et al.
This appeal arises out of an action to refund tangible personal property taxes. The |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nigel Kavic Watkins
The Defendant, Nigel Kavic Watkins, was charged with one count of first degree felony murder and one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and one count of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-215(b), -15-402(b). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years for reckless homicide and, as a violent offender, to twenty-five years for aggravated child abuse. The trial court ordered him to serve these sentences consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-nine years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of certain autopsy photographs; (3) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of aggravated child abuse; and (4) the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentence and in ordering consecutive service. We notice as plain error that the Defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s double jeopardy clause were violated by his dual convictions. After our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated child abuse. We merge the Defendant’s reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated child abuse conviction and remand for resentencing. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Reid
The Defendant-Appellant, Kevin Reid, appeals the revocation of his intensive probation by the Circuit Court of Madison County, for which his original four-year term of probation was re-instated after the service of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail. Reid originally pled guilty to attempted aggravated assault, a Class D felony, possession of a |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Bernosa Young
The Defendant-Appellant, Johnny Bernosa Young, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued at $1000 or more, a Class D felony. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering Young to serve his felony sentences consecutively. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher M. Black
Defendant-Appellant, Christopher M. Black, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. For each aggravated rape conviction, Black received a twenty-year sentence to be served consecutively to one another. For each aggravated robbery conviction, Black received a ten-year sentence to be served concurrently with one another. The trial court ordered the aggravated rape sentences to be served consecutively to the aggravated robbery sentences, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, Black argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the prosecution failed to establish a legitimate chain of custody for the evidence swabs collected from the crime scene; (3) it was constitutionally improper to allow a witness, Dwight Brewer, to identify Black at trial; (4) it was improper to admit proof of the original “CODIS hit” without establishing a chain of custody; and (5) the imposition of consecutive sentencing was improper. We affirm Black’s convictions but remand for a resentencing hearing regarding Black’s sentencing status with respect the 2005 sentencing act and regarding the issue of consecutive sentencing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Landon McConaughy
The Defendant-Appellant, Landon McConaughy, was arrested 1 after a valid traffic stop, and various contraband was seized from his person and his vehicle. He filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop, which was denied by the Madison County Circuit Court. McConaughy subsequently pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a prohibited weapon, both Class A misdemeanors. He received an effective sentence of five years. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, McConaughy properly reserved three certified questions of law alleging violations of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution: (1) “whether the scope of his detention following the traffic stop was exceeded by [the arresting officer], without reasonable suspicion or probable cause;” (2) “whether [the arresting officer] had sufficient reasonable suspicion that McConaughy was armed in order to justify a Terry style pat-down;” and (3) “whether [the arresting officer] exceeded the scope of a Terry pat-down.” Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cedric Johnson
The Defendant-Appellant, Cedric Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days of confinement at the county workhouse, with six months of the sentence to be suspended. On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court erred in failing to set a minimum service percentage for his sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Stewart
The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Stewart, was convicted of destruction or interference with utility lines, a Class E felony, following a bench trial in the Criminal Court of Shelby County. He was sentenced as a multiple offender to three years and three months in the county workhouse. On appeal, Stewart claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not rebut his defenses of duress and necessity beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of: The Estate of Anna Sue Dunlap, Deceased, Richard Gossum, Administrator CTA
This dispute involves the administration of a decedent’s estate. The chancery court removed |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Lynn Morgan
The Defendant, Gary Lynn Morgan, pleaded guilty, just prior to trial and in front of the jury, to two counts of evading arrest, one a felony and the other a misdemeanor. He proceeded to trial on the remaining counts of the indictment, and the jury found the Defendant guilty. On appeal, the Defendant argues that, because the trial court failed to question him in accordance with constitutional and supervisory authority mandates, the trial court erred by denying his request to set aside his guilty pleas. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the Lincoln County Circuit Court. We remand solely for the purpose of entry of corrected judgments. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard E. Brown, Jr.
The Appellant, Richard E. Brown, Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence for driving under the influence, second offense. Because the Appellant failed to prepare an adequate record on appeal, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christina Altice v. NATS, Inc., et al
Judgment creditor sued defendants to collect a judgment against a defunct nonprofit corporation, claiming defendants were the alter egos of the defunct corporation. In a prior appeal, this court instructed the parties to focus on whether certain transactions were or were not loans. If they were loans, then the plaintiff could not prove her case to make the defendants responsible for the judgment against the defunct corporation. The trial court found that the transactions were loans. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |