State of Tennessee v. William J. Wilson - Concurring
I join in the results reached by the majority insofar as we do not have an adequate record in which to review the particulars of the Defendant’s case. I write separately to express my concern that the probation rule in question, if applied to all probationers, offends due process. The rule prohibits contact or association with any adults who have minor children. The breadth of such a prohibition is problematic and the relationship of the prohibition to the goals of probation is questionable. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William J. Wilson
The Defendant, William J. Wilson, pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him to two consecutive sentences of six years, one year to be served in prison and the remainder to be served on probation. After a warrant was filed, the trial court found that the Defendant had violated his probation by dating, befriending, residing or uniting with someone who had children under the age of eighteen, because the Defendant has filed for a marriage license with a woman who had “several” children under the age of eighteen. The trial court ordered the Defendant returned to probation for ten years and required that he not have any contact with his fiancé, including telephone contact. The Defendant appealed, contending: (1) that the condition of probation requiring he not date or befriend a person with minor children had not been articulated to him by the trial court, as required by statute, and, further, is unconstitutional; and (2) that the condition that he refrain from telephone contact with his fiancé is unconstitutional. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael J. Calderone v. Glenn Chrisman, Chief of Police, et al.
This appeal involves § 1983 claims against a county and its sheriff on the basis of injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff while in the custody of the sheriff’s department. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying the sheriff’s motion for summary judgment in his individual capacity because the plaintiff did not produce any evidence to rebut the sheriff’s testimony that he had no involvement in or knowledge of the events in question. We further conclude that the trial court erred in denying the county’s motion for summary judgment because there was no evidence of any causal connection between a county policy or custom and the plaintiff’s alleged injuries. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: A.W.H. and N.N.H.
This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. After State authorities received a report that |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Thomas v. State of Tennessee
Appellant, an inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a claim in the Claims Commission, alleging that the Department of Correction had failed to apply 831 days of pretrial jail credit to his criminal sentences. Appellee State of Tennessee filed a motion to dismiss. The Claims Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Appellant had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and denied Appellant’s motion for new trial or amendment of judgment. Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Harriman, Tennessee v. Roane County Election Commission, et al.
This is a contest between two neighboring towns in Roane County over common territory that both have purported to annex. The defendant, Kingston, sought to add the territory through a successful referendum election conducted on February 5, 2008. The plaintiff, Harriman, sought to add the territory through its annexation ordinance No. 200801-1 adopted on first reading January 28, 2008. The disputed territory is outside the “[u]rban growth boundary” of both municipalities; it is within the “[r]ural area” of Roane County as those terms are respectively defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 6- 58-101 (7) and (6) (2005). Harriman’s complaint to void the Kingston referendum asserts that Harriman’s ordinance takes priority because Harriman, as a larger municipality, is granted statutory priority. Kingston argues that the Harriman ordinance was of no effect because Harriman did not first secure an amendment to its urban growth boundary before passing the ordinance. Harriman responded that it did in fact “propose” an amendment and that a proposal was all that was required under Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-58-111(d)(1) (Supp. 2009). The parties tried the case on stipulated facts. The trial court agreed with Kingston and dismissed Harriman’s complaint without reaching the issue of priority. Harriman appeals, asking us to reverse and remand for a determination of the pretermitted issues. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Xavier Tyrone Nolan
The Defendant, Xavier Tyrone Nolan, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced the Defendant to a Range I sentence of five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
H.P. Large, and Terrance R. Craig, d/b/a Greenfield Land and Cattle Company, v. Greene County, Tennessee
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant had constructed a bridge over Lick Creek which was adjacent to their property, and the bridge had caused their property to repeatedly flood. They further alleged that they were entitled to recover damages under the theory that the County maintained a temporary nuisance which damaged their property. Defendant filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings which characterized plaintiffs’ cause of action as an inverse condemnation action. Affidavits and other documents were filed in the record and the Trial Court agreed with the defendant that plaintiffs’ action was based on inverse condemnation and the statute had run on that action. The Trial Judge also ruled that the statute had run on the nuisance claim. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Judge’s holding that plaintiffs’ action was a nuisance type taking and was governed by the inverse condemnation statute, and we agree that the record demonstrates that the statute of limitations had run on plaintiffs’ claims. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
HP Large, et al. v Greene County, Tennessee - Dissenting
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Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Young v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Tony Young, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. He was originally convicted by a jury of aggravated rape, aggravated sexual battery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and four counts of aggravated assault. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-five years for the aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, concurrent six year terms for each of the four aggravated assault convictions, and twelve years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction. These several sentences were to be served consecutively to each other for an effective sentence of forty-three years. The petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Upon review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aaron Benjamin Rutherford v. Southern College of Optometry
The plaintiff/appellant voluntarily withdrew from graduate school when it became certain he would not successfully remediate a previously failed course. The school permitted the student to re-enroll the following academic quarter subject to several specific conditions of readmission. The school eventually dismissed the student after it determined that he had failed to earn a “C” or better in two audited courses, which it considered a violation of the student’s readmission conditions. The student filed suit following his dismissal, but not until after he entered into an agreement resolving the underlying dispute. The school counterclaimed for breach of contract, damages, and enforcement of the parties’ agreement. The jury determined that (1) the school violated its policies and procedures when it dismissed the student, (2) the parties agreed to settle any differences that they may have had as set forth in the proof, and (3) neither party violated the agreement. The trial court accordingly entered judgment in favor of the school. Finding material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carlos Cooper v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Carlos Cooper, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He originally pled guilty to attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud and two counts of possession of cocaine, a Schedule II narcotic, with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or greater. He received a four-year sentence for the attempt offense and eight-year sentences for his convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, all to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of eight years. The petitioner was originally ordered to serve the eight year sentence on Community Corrections. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
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Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Arnold Lynn Bomar v. Hart & Cooley Flex Division, et al.
Employee received an award of workers’ compensation benefits for a 1994 injury that |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lee Stewart
The Defendant, Ronald Lee Stewart, appeals as of right from his convictions in the Marshall County Circuit Court for one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, one count of theft of property valued at less than five hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor, and one count of theft of property valued between one thousand and ten thousand dollars, a Class D felony. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twelve years to be served in incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant claims that his convictions are constitutionally infirm due to juror fatigue and that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a persistent offender. Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant failed to prepare an accurate record of the subject of this appeal and his issues are waived. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Nelson
The defendant, James Nelson, was convicted of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, as a lesser included offense of the indicted offense of aggravated assault. He was sentenced, as a Range III, persistent offender, to six years in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that he was sentenced improperly. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Linn Cook v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Linn Cook, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that he was improperly sentenced in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). After careful review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Augustine J. Leon v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Augustine J. Leon, pled guilty to evading arrest and reckless endangerment, both Class E felonies, and eleven other misdemeanor traffic offenses. The Petitioner received an effective sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender, to be served in the Department of Correction consecutively to a previously imposed sentence of three years, for a total effective sentence of five years. The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition attacking his convictions and sentence based upon his alleged mental incompetence at the time of the guilty plea, failure of the State and the trial court to disclose his mental illness, and the failure of trial counsel to seek a mental evaluation prior to the entry of his guilty pleas. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner argues that due process concerns necessitated tolling the statute of limitations for filing his petition, and therefore the post-conviction court improperly dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Judson Eremity v. George Little and the Tennessee Department of Correction
Certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks review of disciplinary board proceeding finding him guilty of assault on another inmate and revoking his sentence reduction credits. Petitioner asserts that disciplinary board acted arbitrarily and illegally in its utilization and application of Tennessee Department of Correction policies and, further, that the disciplinary board’s handling of the hearing violated his rights to due process of law. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Olin Morris, Successor Trustee of The U.A.B. Holding Trust v. Martin A. Grusin, Former Trustee of U.A.B. Holding Trust, et al.
A Trust was created in 1985. In both 1997 and 1999, the grantor consented to the use of the Trust’s stocks for the benefit of a separate entity, of which the Trust owned a one-half interest. In 2001, an agreement was entered whereby the Trust’s stocks were pledged to a bank in return for a loan to the Trust. The Trust then transferred the loan monies to the separate entity to pay off the separate entity’s indebtedness. After the Trustee’s resignation, the successor Trustee brought suit, alleging breach of fiduciary duties, civil conspiracy, and misappropriation and conversion. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that they had not engaged in unlawful conduct. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nakomis Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Nakomis Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Drayton D. Berkley v. Household Financial Center and Beneficial Tennessee, Inc.
This appeal concerns an attempt to obtain the discharge of a debt. The plaintiff attorney executed two promissory notes in favor of the defendants financial institutions. The notes called for monthly payments. Just over a year later, the plaintiff mailed correspondence and a check to the institution’s payment processing center. The correspondence offered an amount in excess of the monthly payment in exchange for extinguishing each debt. At the payment center, the envelopes were opened by machine and the correspondence was separated from the checks. The checks were posted to the plaintiff’s account. The correspondence was forwarded to another department. The plaintiff made no more payments on the notes, and then filed a complaint for declaratory relief. The defendants answered and counterclaimed for the amount owed under the note. After conducting a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint, granted a judgment on the counterclaim to the defendants, and awarded attorney’s fees. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Sowell v. Estate of James W. Davis
This appeal involves Tennessee’s savings statute. The plaintiff filed a tort lawsuit against the defendant. During the pendency of the action, the defendant died. The plaintiff did not file a motion to substitute the proper party for the deceased defendant, as required under T.R.C.P. 25.01. The lawsuit was not dismissed on that basis. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit. The plaintiff re-filed the instant lawsuit within one year, making the same allegations as in the original action but naming the estate of the decedent as the defendant. The estate filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the savings statute was inapplicable because the original lawsuit should have been dismissed pursuant to T.R.C.P. 5.01 for failure to substitute the proper party, and because the defendants in the original lawsuit and the re-filed lawsuit were not identical. The trial court granted the estate’s motion to dismiss on both grounds. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse, finding that the estate’s argument that it is not an entity capable of being sued has been waived, and concluding that the trial court erred in determining that the savings statute was inapplicable. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michelle Bishop
The defendant, Michelle Bishop, pleaded guilty in the Sullivan County Circuit Court to three counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, two counts of identity theft, two counts of forgery, and one count of failure to appear in exchange for an effective sentence of five years with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The trial court ordered a fully incarcerative sentence, and the defendant now appeals, claiming she should have been granted probation or other alternative sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dorothy King, R.N. and Patricia Battle, R.N., et al. v. Virginia Betts,, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, in her Individual Capacity, et al
This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on alleged etaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Appellant claims that Appellees retaliated against her in her employment for speaking out against a hospital policy. Appellees assert the defense of qualified immunity. Appellant appeals from the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings to the Appellees. Finding that there are material issues of fact in dispute, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Further, we find that Appellant has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s decision to grant Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
T.O.T.S. v. Whirlpool Corporation
This appeal involves a complaint for breach of contract filed by a corporation that had been administratively dissolved prior to the date of the contract. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiff-corporation lacked capacity and/or standing to bring the suit. The plaintiff then filed a motion to amend, seeking to have the corporation’s founder substituted as the party plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion to amend and dismissed the complaint. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |