John Biaselli v. State of Tennessee
M2008-02335-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Crigler

The petitioner, John Biaselli, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance for resale and one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance for delivery, both Class B felonies. The trial court merged the two counts and sentenced the petitioner to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction at thirty percent. The petitioner appealed his sentence to this court, which affirmed the trial court. The petitioner now appeals the judgment of the Bedford County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. The petitioner asserts that he

Mario Pisani v. State of Tennessee
M2008-02206-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

A jury convicted the petitioner, Mario Pisani, of seven counts of rape of a child, seven counts of rape, eight counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, seven counts of aggravated sexual battery, and seven counts of incest. The trial court sentenced him to forty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court upheld the convictions. The petitioner now appeals the judgment of the Rutherford County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief and asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach the victim with a prior inconsistent statement. After review, we affirm the judgment denying post-conviction relief.

State of Tennessee v. James Ray Boles
W2008-02659-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The appellant entered pleas of nolo contendere to two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, and he pled guilty to one count of statutory rape by an authority figure. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years for each conviction and ordered that two of the sentences be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of six years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Joe Henry Moore v. State of Tennessee
W2008-02699-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer

This case arises out of a prisoner’s claims for medical malpractice, negligence, and violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions. The claims commission, in two separate orders, wholly resolved the prisoner’s claims in favor of the State of Tennessee. Because the prisoner has not argued or otherwise provided any basis for this Court to determine the alleged errors in the judgment of the claims commission, we affirm.

Stephen George Beem v. Joan Nan Gallina Beem
W2009-00800-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

This appeal involves a motion to set aside a marital dissolution agreement. After a long marriage, the parties filed cross-petitions for divorce. After mediation, they entered into a marital dissolution agreement settling division of the considerable martial estate. The parties presented the MDA to the trial court, and it was approved and incorporated into the final decree of divorce. Several weeks later, the husband filed this pro se petition to have the MDA set aside, claiming that, at the time it was signed, he was not mentally competent to enter in to such an agreement. The husband’s motion was denied, and the wife was awarded attorney fees pursuant to the terms of the MDA. The husband now appeals. We affirm. We hold that the evidence supports the factual finding below that the husband was mentally capable of understanding the consequences of the MDA, and we find no abuse of its discretion in the trial court’s denial of the husband’s motion to set it aside. We also affirm the award of attorney fees to the wife, and award attorney fees for this appeal.

Laranda Conner v. Robert King, II
W2009-00511-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Christy R. Little

The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in changing the minor child’s surname. Finding no error, we affirm.

Jonathan Parker v. Henderson County, Tennessee, et al.
W2009-00975-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

The plaintiff/appellee, Jonathan Parker (“Mr. Parker”), was shot once in the right shoulder by Officer David Stanhope (“Ofc. Stanhope”) of the Lexington Police Department during the execution of a search warrant at Mr. Parker’s residence. The trial court held the City of Lexington (“the City”) liable for the injury that Mr. Parker suffered. The court determined that Sergeant Jeff Middleton (“Sgt. Middleton”) was negligent in failing to properly supervise Ofc. Stanhope during the operation and that Ofc. Stanhope negligently created the dangerous situation leading to the use of deadly force. The court awarded $40,000 in damages to Mr. Parker, which accounted for his fault in failing to immediately respond to police commands. We affirm.

Donny Ray Thompson v. City of Lawrenceburg, et al.
M2008-02662-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Allen W. Wallace
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim. T. Hamilton

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found Employee to be permanently and totally disabled as a result of a compensable injury. It apportioned benefits 70% to Employer and 30% to the Second Injury Fund. Employer appealed. Employer and Employee then reached an agreement to compromise Employer’s portion of the claim for a lump sum payment. The appeal was voluntarily dismissed. Employee thereafter filed a motion requesting that the Fund  immediately commence paying its share of the judgment. The trial court granted that
motion. The Fund has appealed, contending that the order violates several provisions of the workers’ compensation law. We agree, reverse the order at issue, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Nathan E. Steppach, Jr. v. William H. Thomas, Jr., City of Memphis, et al.
W2008-02549-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kenny W. Armstrong

This case arises from the grant of a writ of certiorari by the Shelby County Chancery Court. Upon review of the Memphis City Council’s record, the court affirmed the Council’s action in approving a planned development and companion street closure. We conclude that the order appealed lacks finality due to the failure to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Tammy Teal Bennett v. David Ross Bennett
M2009-00147-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins

Wife appeals claiming trial court erred in finding her agreement to a Marital Dissolution Agreement and Parenting Plan was valid and not obtained under duress. Finding that wife later adopted the disputed Marital Dissolution Agreement and Parenting Plan with advice of counsel and without any allegation of duress, we find that wife waived her objection and, alternatively, that any dispute as to the validity of her agreement had been rendered moot by her later adoption of it.

Tony Samuel v. State of Tennessee
W2008-02346-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

A Lauderdale County jury found the petitioner guilty of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to an effective thirty-five year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, which affirmed the convictions and sentence. The petitioner then sought post-conviction relief on the theory that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial, inter alia. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition. The petitioner now appeals. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. V.L.S.C. and M.M.S.
M2009-00890-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donna Scott Davenport

Father challenges the trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failing to visit and by engaging in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. Finding that the trial court’s decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence, the judgment terminating Father’s parental rights is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. David Wayne Gray
M2008-02843-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the petition was time barred and that no due process consideration existed to toll the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition as time barred.

Keith Collins v. State of Tennessee
W2008-02235-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge John T. Fowlkes, Jr.

The petitioner, Keith Collins, pled guilty to possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class C felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of three years on probation as a Range I, standard offender. His probation was later revoked, and a petition for post-conviction relief followed. On appeal, he argues  counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

Judy Minutella v. Ford Motor Credit Company
M2008-01920-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: E. Riley Anderson, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5- 6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sought post-judgment medical care for a knee injury after the trial court approved a settlement agreement wherein Employer agreed that it would be responsible for medical expenses related to the injury. Employer declined to authorize the original treating physician to provide additional care and instead offered Employee a choice from a panel of three physicians. The first physician Employee chose declined her as a patient. The second physician she chose opined that her need for treatment was unrelated to her work injury and did not treat her. Employee then sought and received further treatment from her original treating physician. At the same time, Employee petitioned the trial court for an order authorizing Employee's original physician to act as her treating physician, requesting that Employer be held in contempt for failing to comply with the order of settlement, and requiring that Employer pay for all of Employee's past and future medical treatment for her injury, along with all attorney fees and costs. The trial court ordered that Employer pay only a portion of Employee's attorney fees, denied Employee's request that Employer be held in contempt, and otherwise granted Employee's petition in full. We reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the award of attorney fees and remand for further proceedings in that regard but otherwise affirm the judgment in full. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (28) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Remanded E. RILEY ANDERSON, SP. J., in which SHARON G. LEE, J., and ALLEN W. WALLACE, SR. J., joined. Colin M. McCaffrey, Nashville, Tennessee for the appellant, Ford Motor Credit Company. Robert P. Gritton, Murfreesboro, Tennessee for the appellee, Judy Minutella. MEMORANDUM OPINION FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY On September 19, 25, Judy Minutella ("Employee") fell in the parking lot of her employer Ford Motor Credit ("Employer") and injured her right knee. Employer offered her a panel of three physicians for treatment, but she declined medical treatment at that time and, therefore, did not select a physician from the panel. However, the injury apparently worsened, and Employee sought medical treatment from Dr. Roderick Vaughan, who was not on the Employer's panel. On February 23, 26, Dr. Vaughan, an orthopedic surgeon, performed anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction, partial medial and lateral meniscectomies and a chondroplasty on Employee's right knee. Dr. Vaughan's medical records indicate that he administered a steroid injection to Employee's right knee on June 19, 26, and Visco supplement injections on July 24, 26; July 31, 26; and August 11, 26. He informed Employee that this injection series could be repeated at six month intervals, and additional surgery was discussed as a "last resort." In November of 26, while under the care of Dr. Vaughan, Employee pursued a workers' compensation claim with respect to her fall and resulting injuries. The parties eventually settled this claim, as approved by order entered August 2, 27, the pertinent language of which provides as follows: The Defendant employer and the Defendant insurer have agreed to pay any authorized, reasonable and necessary future medical expenses incurred by the employee caused by this injury in accord with the Workers' Compensation Law of the State of Tennessee for a period of life, pursuant to statute, from the date of this settlement, provided that the employer and/or insurer has granted permission for future medical treatment prior to said treatment being rendered, but they will not be liable for any unauthorized, unreasonable or unnecessary past, present, or future medical expenses caused by this injury. The settlement agreement does not specify an authorized treating physician. After the settlement was approved, Employee began experiencing additional problems with her right knee. On September 4, 27, Employee wrote Employer a letter advising that Dr. Vaughan had been administering injections to her right knee "to postpone inevitable knee replacement surgery" and requesting that Employer approve Employee's return to Dr. Vaughan for "another round of injections." Employer refused to authorize Dr. Vaughan as Employee's treating physician and instead, presented Employee with the option of selecting her treating physician from a panel of physicians, consisting of Dr. James Renfro, Dr. Michael LaDouceur, and Drs. David Moore and Burton Elrod, who practice medicine in the same office. When Employee selected Drs. Moore and Elrod, Dr. Elrod declined to accept her as a patient and Employer instructed Employee to select one of the two remaining physicians on the panel. On November 28, 27, Employee selected Dr. James Renfro from the proffered list, and 2 ****** Document Outline ****** * Page_1 * Page_2 * Page_3 * Page_4 * Page_5 * Page_6 * Page_7 * Page_8 * Page_9

Delorris Bates v. Tullahoma City Schools
M2008-02192-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Special Judge E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee, who was over sixty years of age at the time of her permanent injury, was not subject to the cap set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A), which limits disability benefits to one and one-half times the medical impairment rating and that she had proved three of the four elements in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242 and could therefore exceed the six-fold medical impairment cap set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(b). The court further found that the employee was not totally and permanently disabled and awarded ninety-eight percent permanent partial disability to both arms, a scheduled injury under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(A)(ii)(w). The trial court also ordered that the entire award of benefits in the amount of $108,587.92 be paid as
a lump sum. The employer contends the trial court erred when it failed to find that the  employee was permanently and totally disabled and when it awarded the benefits to be paid as a lump sum. We affirm the trial court judgement.

Theresa Hayes v. The City of Lexington, Tennessee
W2008-02431-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Butler

The defendant-city required applicants for its vacant firefighter position to complete a physical agility exam as part of its hiring process. The plaintiff, a female, applied for the position but was eliminated from consideration based upon her performance on the physical agility exam. She sued the city under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, claiming that the physical agility exam had a disparate impact on females. Following a one-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the city and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Richard Ellis Stapleton
E2008-01776-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

The Defendant, Richard Ellis Stapleton, was convicted on his guilty pleas of attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; and two counts of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed concurrent, Range I, twelve-year sentences to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of the sentences. We modify the sentences for attempted especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated burglary to eleven years each and modify the sentences for facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping to nine years each.

Raymond Bailey v. State of Tennessee
W2008-01657-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Mark Ward

The Petitioner, Raymond Bailey, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and carjacking, a Class B felony. For the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, he received a sentence of twenty-eight years at one hundred percent. For the carjacking conviction, he received a sentence of twelve years at thirty-five percent. These two sentences were to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of forty years in confinement. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) trial counsel failed to challenge his dual convictions as violating due process under State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991) and State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997); and (2) trial counsel failed to investigate and call William Isom to testify at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tarik Robertson
W2008-01592-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge James M. Lammey, Jr.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tarik Robertson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of observation without consent, a Class A misdemeanor. He received the maximum sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with four months to be served in a county workhouse. On appeal, he claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court did not properly exercise its role as the thirteenth juror; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing both the length and manner of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Delawrence Williams
W2009-00748-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

The defendant, Delawrence Williams, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver or sell, a Class B felony, and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court to fourteen years for the drug possession offense and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the assault offense, with the sentences to be served concurrently to each other and concurrently to his sentence in a federal case but consecutively to his sentence in another Dyer County case. The sole issue the defendant raises in this appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Lionel E. Sherron
W2008-02666-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

A jury convicted the defendant, Lionel E. Sherron, of attempted voluntary manslaughter,  reckless aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment by use of a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective nine-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find him guilty. After review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. G. Mike Holden
W2009-00456-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

The defendant, G. Mike Holden, was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of sale of beer to a minor, a Class A misdemeanor. He was subsequently sentenced to a term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be suspended following service of one hundred twenty days in the county jail. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. However, the defendant has failed to include in the appellate record a transcript of the evidence from his trial. The defendant has submitted a statement of the evidence, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c)-(d). However, it was not timely filed pursuant to the rules. Because the issue submitted is not meritorious as a matter of law, we conclude that it is not in the interest of justice to waive the timeliness requirement. As such, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Loroy Salter
W2009-00981-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell Lee Moore, Jr.

The defendant, Loroy Salter, was found to be in violation of his probationary sentence in the Dyersburg City Court and was sentenced to twenty days in jail and ninety days of community service. The defendant subsequently appealed the decision to the Dyer County Circuit Court, which affirmed the violation and the resulting sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering revocation, based upon the defendant’s failure to pay costs and fines, without conducting a hearing on his ability to pay. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Joey Conner v. Carmen Conner
W2008-02254-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge George R. Ellis

After Mother and Father divorced, a parenting plan was entered designating Father as the primary custodian of the parties’ minor child. Mother filed a petition to modify, alleging several grounds, including excessive corporal punishment. The trial court initially found no material change in circumstances, but named Mother primary custodian, based on the minor child’s preference. Father appealed, and this Court remanded, finding that the court’s ruling was premature. On remand, the trial court, again, awarded custody to Mother, finding the following material changes in circumstance: 1) Mother’s remarriage and having had two other children; 2) Mother’s completion of her undergraduate degree, her work towards a Master’s degree, and having a stable job; 3) Mother’s having left the national guard; and 4) the minor child’s preference to live with Mother. We affirm the trial court’s modification of custody.