Julia Fisher, et al. v. Ashley Revell, et al.
This is a summary judgment case, arising from an automobile accident. Plaintiffs/Appellants, the two injured parties, filed suit and served a copy of the summons on their insurance provider, the Appellee herein. In interpreting the policy, the trial court concluded that the policy limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence limited Plaintiffs/Appellants’ coverage to $200,000 (or $100,000 per person). Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal, asserting that they are entitled to recover the policy limit of $300,000 per occurrence. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Collins v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company Consolidated, et al.
Employee alleged that he sustained a gradual injury to his lower back as a result of his work as a route salesman for a soft drink company. He was treated by several doctors, to whom he gave differing histories concerning how his injury occurred. The trial court found that he had sustained a compensable injury and awarded 70% permanent partial disability apportioned between Employer and the Second Injury Fund. Employer appeals, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.1 |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Larry Eugene Douglas v. Dura-Craft Millwork, Inc., et al.
Employee injured his neck in the course of his employment. While he was receiving treatment for that injury, his doctors discovered that he had a serious spinal condition. The treating doctors testified that this condition was unrelated to his work injury. After receiving treatment, Employee returned to work at his previous job. Several months later, his position was eliminated. He declined an offer of alternate employment. The trial court found that he did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded 65% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by adopting the impairment rating of an evaluating physician and by finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We agree and modify the judgment accordingly.1 |
Benton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. William Glenn Wiley - Concurring
I agree with the majority that, in spite of numerous misdeeds committed by the State, the defendant is not entitled to relief. However, rules of discovery and rules of disclosure of exculpatory evidence exist for a reason. They are a necessary part of our notion of due process and ensure the accused an opportunity to adequately prepare for trial. If the State violates the rules, whether intentionally or negligently, the result, even if correct, is tarnished. As Justice Douglas aptly pointed out over forty years ago, “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Such is the case herein. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Glenn Wiley
At the conclusion of his second trial, Defendant-Appellant, William Glenn Wiley (hereinafter “Wiley”) was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The jury sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a concurrent twenty-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, Wiley argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal when the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery; (2) he should be granted a new trial because of several violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); (3) he should be granted a new trial because of several Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 violations; (4) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his Knights Inn employment application and Arrowhead Motel receipt; (5) the trial court erred in admitting prior bad act evidence in the form of Michelle Scheffel’s testimony and rebuttal evidence of a prior assault;(6) his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is excessive; and (7) the trial court erred in denying his request for co-counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sean Brett Browder
Appellant, Sean Brett Browder, was indicted for one count of theft over $10,000 and one count of theft over $500 by the Montgomery County Grand Jury. Appellant entered an open guilty plea to one count of theft of property over $1,000 and one count of theft of property over $500. At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five years for the first count and three years for the second count to be served concurrently to each other in the Department of Correction. Appellant now argues on appeal that the trial court erred in imposing the length of sentence and in not ordering alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is no basis for reversal of the length of his sentence and there was adequate support for the denial of alternative sentencing. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Joe Headley
Appellant, Ricky Joe Headley, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury in October of 2007 for four counts of official misconduct in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-402, as a result of actions taken while serving as the Sheriff of Williamson County. Appellant was also indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in October of 2007 in a multi-count indictment for thirty-three drug related charges that arose out of his unlawful acquisition of prescription medication from a pharmacy in Davidson County while he was wearing his Williamson County uniform and driving a Williamson County law enforcement vehicle. The cases were consolidated, and Appellant eventually pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit official misconduct and four counts of simple possession, all Class A misdemeanors, in exchange for an effective sentence of four years, eleven months, and twenty-five days. Appellant was ordered to serve the sentence on probation,three years of which was to be supervised. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion. Appellant appeals this denial. We determine that the trial court considered the factors required for the grant or denial of judicial diversion and did not abuse its discretion in denying judicial diversion to Appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shairiq Seabrooks
The defendant, Shairiq Seabrooks, was indicted on charges of first degree felony murder and first degree murder. After a jury trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the felony murder charge and the charge of first degree murder remained. The jury convicted the defendant of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and the defendant was sentenced as a standard Range I offender to serve twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant has appealed, raising the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding the victim’s prior arrest for the unlawful possession of a weapon; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony as inadmissible hearsay; (4) whether the jury charge concerning reasonable doubt was unconstitutional; and (5) whether the court erred in charging the jury on second degree murder. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Monique Y. Croom v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Monique Y. Croom, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that she received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: (1) maintain proper records, (2) adequately investigate her case and interview certain witnesses, (3) expedite her mental health evaluation, and (4) explain the types of homicide and the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Anthony Cline
The Defendant-Appellant, John Anthony Cline, was convicted by a Henry County Circuit Court jury of theft of property worth $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. The State filed a notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment based on several prior convictions. The trial court sentenced Cline as a Range II, multiple offender and imposed an eight-year sentence at thirty-five percent. In this appeal, Cline challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence and (2) the sufficiency of the State’s notice to seek enhanced punishment. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lisa Bass Collins v. Stephen Butler Collins
This case involves a divorce ending a one year marriage. Husband appeals the trial court’s valuation of marital property, its decision not to include the increase in wife’s separate property in the distribution of marital property and the award of temporary support to the wife during the pendency of the divorce. Because the trial court failed to properly determine the marital value on some items of property we reverse the trial court’s decision as to those items and remand for further consideration. We affirm the trial court’s decision as to the value of the remaining items of property and its award of temporary support. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Curtis S. Person v. The Board of Commissioners of Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.
In 1967, the General Assembly passed a Private act consolidating the juvenile courts of Memphis and Shelby County by establishing a new court. The Act also provided for a second division, with the judgeship of that division to remain vacant until the County Commission determined the need for it. Almost forty years later, the Commission adopted a resolution approving the appointment of a judge to the second division of the court. The current judge of the Juvenile Court of Shelby County challenged the attempted creation of a second judgeship, arguing that the relevant portion of the Private Act constituted an unconstitutional delegation of the authority to ordain and establish courts, which power is reserved to the General Assembly by the Tennessee Constitution. Because a judge is a necessary component of a court, in order to “ordain and establish” a court under Art. VI, § 1, the legislation creating or establishing the court must make provision for a judge. The legislature cannot establish a court without also establishing a judgeship. Since Section 20 of the Private Act does not create or establish a judgeship for division 2, it did not effectively create or establish that division or court. Additionally, because in Section 20 of the Private Act the legislature delegated to the Commission the power to decide whether a judge for division 2 was needed, which is the equivalent of delegating to the Commission the authority to establish or create division 2 of the juvenile court, we conclude that Section 20 is an unconstitutional delegation of power reserved to the General Assembly by Art. VI, § 1 of the Tennessee Constitution and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s holding on that issue. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on Open Meeting Act claims based on a prior resolution that was promptly rescinded by the Commission. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Thomas Stagner v. State of Tennessee
On November 3, 2006, the petitioner, Donald Thomas Stagner, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and theft over $500 and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years and one and onehalf years, respectively. The court ordered that the sentences would be served concurrently and suspended after ninety days. On October 18, 2007, the petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that his pleas of guilty were unknowing and that trial counsel was ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief by order entered on February 4, 2008. The defendant filed his notice of appeal on March 13, 2008, and the State argues that the notice of appeal was untimely and, thus, this appeal should be dismissed. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Don Wayne Williams
The defendant, Don Wayne Williams, was convicted by a Madison County jury of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, and felony failure to appear, a Class E felony. He was later sentenced by the trial court to six months for the resisting arrest conviction and as a career offender to six years for the failure to appear conviction. His sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for failure to appear. Based on our review, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Henry
The defendant, Ronnie Henry, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and four counts of robbery, a Class C felony. The counts involving the same victims were merged, resulting in two convictions for aggravated robbery and two convictions for robbery, and the defendant was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of seventy years in the Department of Correction. In his original direct appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and alleged that the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of a witness and in its sentencing determinations. See State v. Ronnie Henry, No. W2006-00344-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 450459 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 2008), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2008). We affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing “in compliance with Gomez II [State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007)] and our standard principles of sentencing.” Id. at *5. On remand, the trial court again sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of seventy years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the pro se defendant raises issues relating to the State’s alleged untimely filing of its notice of enhanced punishment; the trial court’s ruling on the State’s motion in limine with respect to the testimony of a defense witness; and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. The State responds by arguing that the first two issues are waived and that the record supports the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. We agree with the State and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Jackson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wireless Properties, LLC vs. The Board of Appeals for the City of Chattanooga, et al
The plaintiff filed a petition challenging the grant of a building permit to Verizon Wireless. The decision of the City was affirmed by the Board. After the trial court conducted a hearing, it affirmed and dismissed the petition. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas David Williams v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Thomas David Williams, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to provide him with discovery until after the guilty plea was entered. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carol J. Cataldo v. Larry B. Stanley, Sr., Executor of The Estate of James Alton Julian, Deceased
This case arises from the denial of Appellant’s claim against the Appellee Estate of James Alton Julian. Because Appellant held and exercised a power-of-attorney, a confidential relationship existed. The trial court determined that Appellant failed to overcome the presumption of undue influence, that the claim was satisfied by a specific bequest in the decedent’s will, and denied Appellant’s alternate theory of quantum meruit. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Macon v. Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board and Shelby County Sheriff's Department
This is an appeal from an administrative hearing on a termination. The plaintiff was a deputy jailer with the sheriff’s department. He was arrested and charged with, inter alia, driving under the influence. The subsequent internal investigation by the sheriff’s department revealed that, prior to his hire, the deputy jailer had pled guilty to a felony drug charge. The conviction was expunged. On the plaintiff’s later application for employment with the sheriff’s department and on the background check form, the plaintiff was asked whether he had had any arrests or convictions, including any that had been expunged. The plaintiff answered that he had none. After the internal investigation, the deputy jailer was terminated for violating sheriff’s department regulations governing personal conduct, adherence to law, and truthfulness. The deputy jailer appealed his termination to the civil service merit review board which upheld the termination based on violation of the truthfulness regulation. This was appealed to the trial court, which ultimately upheld the termination as well. From this order, the deputy jailer now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence before the board and arguing that the board’s failure to include conclusions of law precludes adequate judicial review. We affirm, finding that the evidence is substantial and material; that the sheriff’s department and the civil service board properly considered the expunged conviction; and that the board’s failure to include conclusions of law in its decision does not preclude adequate judicial review in this case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Madden Phillips Construction, Inc. v. GGAT Development Corporation
This appeal arises out of a dispute between a contractor and landowner over the parties’ duties under a construction contract. Plaintiff/Appellee Madden Phillips Construction, Inc. (“Madden Phillips”) filed suit to enforce a mechanics’ and materialmen’s lien and to recover damages in breach of contract against Defendant/Appellant GGAT Development Corporation (“GGAT”).1 Madden Phillips’ complaint included a claim for damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 66-34-101 to -703, also known as the Prompt Pay Act of 1991 (“Prompt Pay Act”). GGAT counterclaimed and asserted, inter alia, that Madden Phillips failed to perform its contractual obligations in a “workmanlike and expeditious fashion to coincide with the completion schedule of [GGAT].” |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Clarence E. Johnson v. Tanner-Peck, LLC,
This is a summary judgment case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee against his former employer, the Appellant herein. Finding that the Appellee presented sufficient proof to shift the burden of production to the Appellant pursuant to Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), and that the Appellant failed to satisfy this burden, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. Because the trial court’s order denying the Appellants’ motion to revise the grant of partial summary judgment does not include the trial court’s reasons, we cannot determine whether analysis under Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2000) was necessary, or whether the trial court otherwise abused its discretion. Consequently, we vacate the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to revise the grant of partial summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kim Geselbracht
On January 22, 2009, the Rhea County Criminal Court dismissed two counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”) against the defendant, Kim Geselbracht. The trial court determined that a law enforcement officer’s ignoring the defendant’s repeated requests for an independent blood test for blood alcohol content (“BAC”) denied the defendant his constitutional and statutory rights. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by dismissing the charges. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Keith Paulson, alias
The defendant, William Keith Paulson, was convicted by a Knox County jury of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony; two counts of felony evading arrest, Class D felonies; evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor; driving without a license, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the state registration law, a Class C misdemeanor. Subsequently, he was sentenced to an effective eighteen-year sentence, as a career offender, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises the single issue of whether double jeopardy principles require the merger of his convictions for reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest, and evading arrest into a single conviction for felony evading arrest. Following review of the record, we conclude that the two counts for felony evading arrest should have been merged into a single count as they were simply alternative charges for the same conduct. Further, we determine that the misdemeanor evading arrest should have also been merged with the felony evading arrest as it represented a single course of conduct. However, merger of the single remaining felony evading arrest and the reckless endangerment convictions is not required. As such, the case is remanded for entry of corrected judgments of conviction in accordance with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville v. James E. Brown, et al.
The matters at issue arise from the demolition of a dilapidated residential structure by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. Following the demolition of the property, the Metropolitan Government filed this action to recover the cost of demolition. The homeowners, who purchased the property at a delinquent property tax sale after the Metropolitan Government had filed Notice of Violation with the Register of Deeds Office, but prior to the structure’s demolition, responded by filing a counter-claim for inverse condemnation. The homeowners contended that the Metropolitan Government had no right to demolish their property and was not entitled to recover its costs for demolition, due to the intervening delinquent property tax sale. They also asserted in the counterclaim that the Metropolitan Government intentionally destroyed their property without the right to do so and, as a consequence, they are entitled to recover the value of the structure demolished. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the homeowners on both motions by summarily dismissing the Metropolitan Government’s claim for reimbursement and granting summary judgment to the homeowners on their inverse condemnation claim. The trial court then awarded the homeowners damages for the value of the structure and attorney’s fees; however, the court denied their request for prejudgment interest. Both parties appeal. We affirm the summary dismissal of the Metropolitan Government’s claim and the grant of summary judgment to the homeowners on their inverse condemnation claim. We also affirm the award of damages for the value of the structure and the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the homeowners. We reverse on the issue of prejudgment interest, finding that the award of prejudgment interest in inverse condemnation cases is mandatory under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-17-813(a). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger Glenn Dile
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Roger Glenn Dile, of rape of a child, a Class A felony; attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony; and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-two years to be served at 100% as a child rapist. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) the evidence, as a matter of law, was insufficient to support his convictions because the proof at trial fatally varied from his indictments; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to merge one of his aggravated sexual battery convictions into his rape of a child conviction; and (3) the trial court erred when it set the length and alignment of his sentences. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |