State of Tennessee v. Enrique Alejandro Perez
The Defendant, Enrique Alejandro Perez, appeals as of right from his jury conviction in the Hamblen County Criminal Court for aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, for which he received a sentence of ten years as a violent offender. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the jury panel based upon his allegation of an under-representation of Latino persons, (3) the aggravated kidnapping statute, as applied in this case, is unconstitutional because he was not separately indicted for the underlying offense of rape, (4) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping, and (5) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph Barna v. Preston Law Group, P.C., et al - Concurring
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Barna v. Preston Law Group, P.C., et al
The plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his legal malpractice action against his former attorney. In the Complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants, the attorney and his law firm, represented themselves to be “competent in securities law related matters,” and that the defendants breached their duty by failing to utilize the requisite skill and competency while representing him in a claim against a brokerage firm in arbitration before a panel of the National Association of Securities Dealers. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which was supported by the affidavit of the attorney who represented the plaintiff in arbitration. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding damages and causation. We have determined that the defendants’ motion and supporting affidavit failed to either affirmatively negate an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim or establish that the plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of his claim at trial. Having failed to shift the burden of production to the plaintiff, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment should have been denied without consideration of the sufficiency of the affidavits of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Harold Oliver McGee v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief. The Appellant filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vintage Health Resources, Inc. v. James Jose R. Guiangan
This appeal involves a breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff company recruits health care workers from the Philippines to come to the United States to work for its clients. The company recruited the defendant nurse by using written recruitment materials. The nurse signed an employment agreement that differed from the recruitment materials in that one of the benefits listed as “free” in the recruitment materials was not free. Approximately one year into the nurse’s threeyear term of employment, the nurse resigned. When notified of the nurse’s intent to resign, the company’s management threatened to report the nurse to immigration officials. Despite the threats, the nurse left the employ of the company. The company then filed the instant lawsuit against the nurse, asserting breach of contract. In his answer, the nurse asserted, inter alia, that the employment agreement violated public policy and was unenforceable because the company’s threats constituted involuntary servitude. Although unconscionability was not pled, the nurse was permitted to assert the defense at trial. The trial was bifurcated, with the issue of damages reserved. After the trial, the trial court held that the company’s threats constituted involuntary servitude, and that the employment agreement was unenforceable because it was unconscionable and contrary to public policy. The trial court also, sua sponte, enjoined the company in the future from using recruitment materials that differed from the employment agreements and from threatening to report employees to immigration officials. The company appeals. We reverse the holding that the employment agreement is unenforceable because unconscionability was never pled, the employment agreement is not unconscionable, and the agreement is not contrary to public policy. We vacate the injunctive relief as to the recruitment materials and affirm as to the remaining injunctive relief. The cause is remanded for consideration of the plaintiff company’s damage claim and the defendant nurse’s counterclaims. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Featherfoot Point Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Jim Zweig
This appeal arises from Appellant’s action to enforce a restrictive covenant in a residential subdivision. The matter was heard by the trial court in a non-jury trial on August 12, 2008. Before Appellant completed its presentation of evidence, the trial court sua sponte ended the proceeding and entered an order of involuntary dismissal. Finding that the trial court erred in dismissing the case before Appellant completed its presentation of evidence, we reverse. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Deborrah Brownlee v. Gastrointestinal Specialist, P.C.
Plaintiff filed this action against defendant after she slipped and fell in defendant’s bathroom. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that plaintiff could not establish the elements of her claim. The trial court found that plaintiff could not establish the elements of a premises liability claim and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. Finding that defendant did not meet its burden at the summary judgment stage, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
The City of Jackson, Tennessee v. David Hersh and PSET, L.P.
This appeal addresses whether a judgment is final and appealable. The plaintiff municipality sued the defendant owner of the city’s minor league baseball team for breach of contract. The city also sought prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees. A consent order was entered allowing the defendants to complete a planned sale of the team to a third party; the third party was to forward the sales proceeds to the court clerk to be held in escrow. The defendants then filed a counterclaim against the city, sounding in both contract and tort, as well as third-party claims against the mayor and a city employee. The contract issues were tried, and the trial court held that the city was entitled to damages and dismissed the defendants’ contract counterclaim against the city. The trial court did not address the city’s request for prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees. The defendants nonsuited their remaining claims and an order was entered dismissing the claims on June 11, 2007. The city filed a motion to assess attorney’s fees and prejudgement interest, and the defendants filed a motion to release the funds held in escrow. On September 15, 2008, the trial court denied the city’s motion for prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees, finding that the June 11, 2007 order was a final judgment because the request for prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees was not a claim but was instead an amount of the city’s recovery of damages. The trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the city’s request for prejudgment interest or attorney’s fees because the city failed to file a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment. The issue of the funds held in escrow was not addressed by the trial court. The city now appeals the September 15, 2008 order, arguing that the June 11, 2007 order was not final. We find that the trial court erred in holding that the June 11, 2007 order was a final judgment, and conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Remote Woodyards, LLC. v. The Estate of Romie Neisler, et al.
This case arises from a dispute over a timber contract. Appellees, through their attorney-in-fact, executed a timber deed in favor of John Jones, which deed was recorded. Mr. Jones then assigned the deed to the Appellant herein, and this assignment was not recorded. When the Appellees discovered that Mr. Jones’ checks were insufficient, they re-sold the timber to the third-party defendant. 1 The third party paid value for the timber, and proceeded to cut and remove it. Appellant then filed suit against the Appellees and the third party defendant. The trial court found that Appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value, but declined to award double or treble damages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-28-312. The trial court also relieved the Appellees’ attorney-infact from liability, and determined that the third party defendant was also a bona fide purchaser and, therefore, not liable. Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
James M. Jacks v. East Tennessee Mechanical Contractors, Inc.
The employee filed a workers' compensation complaint against his employer for hearing loss and tinnitus, injuries which he claimed had occurred gradually over his nearly four years of working as a truck driver. Shortly before trial, the employee voluntarily dismissed his tinnitus claim but proceeded with his hearing loss claim. The trial court awarded the employee compensation for permanent partial hearing loss and the Employer appealed. Upon referral, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, sitting in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), affirms. |
Anderson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Neddie Mack Lawson
The defendant was originally indicted for driving under the influence, second offense. More than one year after the arrest, the grand jury returned a second indictment, charging the defendant with driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony. The State filed a nolle prosequi as to the first indictment and, upon motion by the defendant, the trial court granted an order to expunge these records. At trial, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense, a misdemeanor. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted review in order to determine whether the one-year statute of limitations applicable to misdemeanors barred the prosecution. Because the trial court properly took judicial notice of the pendency of the first indictment at the time of the second, the statute of limitations, regardless of the efficacy of the order of expunction, was tolled and the prosecution was timely. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed. |
Claiborne | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Edward Lynch
A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Donald Edward Lynch, of two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and six counts of rape of a child. He challenges his convictions, arguing that the video recording used in his conviction was discovered through an illegal search and seizure. He also challenges the legal sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We discern error in the judgments for Counts eight through 10 of rape of a child and remand for correction of clerical error. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deonte McBee
The Defendant, Deonte McBee, appeals from his convictions of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of robbery; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to life for the murder conviction, to twenty-five years as a violent offender for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, and to twelve years as a Range I offender for each of the aggravated robbery convictions. The aggravated robbery convictions were imposed consecutively to each other and to the murder conviction, and the effective sentence is life plus forty-eight years. In this appeal, the Defendant claims (1) that there was insufficient proof to support the felony murder conviction, (2) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to consider the murder offense and its lesser included offenses in sequential order, and (3) that the trial court erred in giving a criminal responsibility instruction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elishea D. Fisher v. Christina M. Johnson
This is a personal injury suit arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her punitive damages claim, as well as its exclusion of evidence regarding Defendant’s underage consumption of alcohol prior to the accident and leaving the scene of the accident. Because Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Defendant’s intoxication, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim. Because liability has been stipulated in this matter, and the punitive damages claim properly dismissed, we find Defendant’s underage consumption of alcohol and leaving the scene of the accident irrelevant. Thus, we affirm the exclusion of such evidence. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Earl McGriggs
The defendant, James Earl McGriggs, was convicted of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery and was sentenced, respectively, to twenty-five years, ten years, three years, and eight years. The trial court ordered that the aggravated rape sentence be served consecutively to the aggravated kidnapping sentence, with all other to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fred Eugene Brooks, Sr. v. Mary Elizabeth Haimes Brooks
This case involves issues arising out of the parties’ divorce. Prior to the parties’ marriage, both Husband and Wife owned separate residences. In its property division, the trial court found that during the parties’ marriage, Husband’s home increased in value by $61,700.00, and the court awarded each party one-half of the appreciation, or $30,850.00. The trial court found Wife’s home to be her sole and separate property, as the value of her home decreased during the marriage. Finally, the trial court awarded Wife $3,000.00 in attorney fees to be paid by Husband. On appeal, Husband contends that Wife was entitled only to $9,000.00 of the increased value of Husband’s home–onehalf of the value of an addition made to the home during the marriage. Husband further claims that the trial court erred in failing to offset Wife’s award for debts paid on her home during the marriage, and in its award of attorney fees. We reverse the trial court’s award to Wife, and we affirm both the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Wife, and its finding that Wife’s home did not increase in value during the parties’ marriage such that Husband could recover a share of such increase. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Lincoln General Insurance Company v. Detroit Diesel Corporation, et al.
We accepted the following question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee: Does Tennessee law recognize an exception to the economic loss doctrine under which recovery in tort is possible for damage to the defective product itself when the defect renders the product unreasonably dangerous and causes the damage by means of a sudden, calamitous event? We answer this question in the negative. |
Supreme Court | ||
Edna N. Zulueta v. Winifred Lassiter, M.D., of The Lassiter Clinic, et al.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant physician in this medical malpractice action. We dismiss the appeal for failure to appeal a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Emily Christine Wimley v. Emily Annette Wimley and Jerry Lee Wilmley and The First National Bank of Manchester Tennessee
This case involves the validity of transfers of property and money from a mother to her daughter and son-in-law. The trial court determined that there was a confidential relationship between the mother and her daughter and that the defendants failed to overcome the presumption of undue influence. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Tyree v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Joe Tyree, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner submitted a guilty plea to one count of violation of the sex offender registry. On appeal, he contends that: defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel; his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; and the post-conviction court failed to comply with the statute that requires the court to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to each issue. After careful review, we conclude no reversible error exists and affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerome Williams v. George Little, et al.
Petitioner sought to withdraw a waiver he had signed as a prisoner. On a summary judgment motion by defendants, the Trial Court held that if the waiver was withdrawn, petitioner would serve more time and granted the motion. On appeal, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie McAfee v. Ruby Lambert, et al.
Defendant landowners appeal the trial court’s judgment finding that they had dedicated a roadway to public use by implication, and ordering the parties to widen the roadway and move utility lines. We dismiss for lack of a final judgment. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
George Hampton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, George Hampton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate and prepare the case for trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marktrail Lee
The defendant, Marktrail Lee, was convicted of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse by neglect. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-three years at 100 percent. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wadie Michael Holifield v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Wadie Holifield, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Tipton County Circuit Court. The petitioner was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises the single issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to: 1) investigate his mental health and his claim of impotence as possible defenses; 2) ensure an untainted jury by requesting “the Rule” prior to voir dire; 3) effectively preclude introduction or properly cross-examine a witness following testimony about the petitioner’s prior drug habit; and 4) effectively advise the petitioner. As an initial argument, the State contends that the petitioner has waived review based upon an untimely notice of appeal. We agree that the notice was not timely filed, but, in the interest of justice, we elect to review the petitioner’s issue. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of relief. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals |