State of Tennessee v. Dennis Burnett - Concurring
I concur in the result reached by the majority; however, I depart slightly from the majority’s chosen pathway to those results. Specifically, I would hold that the issues raised on appeal were precluded by the absence of a timely motion for new trial rather than by their absence from such a motion. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bernard Hughes vs. Demar Hudgins - Dissenting
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Bernard Hughes vs. Demar Hudgins
The plaintiff claimed that he suffered neck and back injuries after the automobile in which he was riding was rear-ended by the defendant’s automobile. The defendant admitted breach of the standard of care, but the jury found that the plaintiff had suffered no damages as the result of the accident, and he was not awarded any recovery. The trial court awarded the defendant $645.95 in discretionary costs to cover the court reporter fees he incurred for depositions. The plaintiff argues on appeal that there was no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict. For his part, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in declining to award him all of the discretionary costs he requested. We affirm the jury verdict, but we remand the issue of the award of discretionary costs. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Curtis Whitworth v. Patricia Gayle Whitworth
In this divorce action, the defendant, following the entry of the Divorce Decree, filed a Motion to Set Aside the Marital Property Settlement on the grounds that she did not agree to the same, and further was denied due process because she had no notice of a hearing resulting in the Divorce Decree. On appeal, we vacate and remand. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Dodson
The defendant, Frank Dodson, entered a guilty plea in the Franklin County Circuit Court to possession of cocaine, a Class C felony. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a Range I sentence of four years to be served on probation following the service of one hundred eighty days in the Franklin County Jail. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him full probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald Edward Walker v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Ronald Edward Walker, sought habeas corpus relief for his convictions for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and robbery. Petitioner argued that his sentences were illegal because the trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently despite the fact that Petitioner was on bail for a burglary charge at the time he committed the offenses. While the petition for habeas corpus relief was pending, this Court issued an opinion in another one Petitioner’s cases. See Ronald E. Walker v. Ricky Bell, Warden, No. W2006-00644-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 121730 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 18, 2007) (“Walker I”). This Court that Petitioner’s sentences for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and robbery were illegal but determined that the error was “clerical” and did “not merit habeas relief.” Id. at *4. The matter was remanded to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. Id. The habeas corpus court in the case herein denied the petition for habeas corpus relief but granted Petitioner forty-five days to supplement the record with further documentation. Petitioner supplemented the record with additional documentation relating to his convictions. The habeas corpus court entered a “Supplemental Memorandum Opinion,” in which it determined that Petitioner was not entitled to relief because of this Court’s decision in Walker I. Petitioner now seeks an appeal of that decision. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the habeas corpus court improperly dismissed his petition and asks this Court to vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for resentencing. After a review of the record, we determine that this Court has previously ruled on Petitioner’s argument and that he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Knight
Appellant, Donald Knight, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for felony murder and aggravated child abuse after the death of five-month-old T.J.1 Appellant was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to five years at 30% for the voluntary manslaughter conviction. Appellant received a sentence of twenty years for the aggravated child abuse conviction, to be served at 100% in incarceration. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Appellant filed a motion for new trial that was denied by the trial court. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly denied a continuance and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. We determine that Appellant failed to show actual prejudice resulting from the denial of the continuance and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Neil Laurent v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Paul Neil Laurent, was convicted by a judge of aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated sexual battery, aggravated sexual battery, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, and one count of attempted child neglect for which he received an effective sentence of seventeen years. State v. Paul Neil Laurent, No. M2005-00289-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 468700 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 27, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2006). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Tate
The Defendant-Appellant, John Tate (“Tate”), pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a Schedule III controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class D felony, with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The Madison County Circuit Court sentenced Tate as a Range I, standard offender; imposed two four-year sentences for each conviction to be served concurrently, which were suspended; and ordered him to serve six months in the Department of Correction before serving the remainder of his sentence on supervised probation. In his appeal, Tate argues the trial court erred by (1) denying judicial diversion, (2) sentencing him to the maximum in the range, and (3) denying full probation. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing and remand the case for a resentencing hearing on all issues regarding the length and manner of sentence. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey D. Allen - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the majority that upholds the determination of the trial court that the defendant’s May 11, 2005, statement was admissible. While I recognize the difficulty of securing an attorney qualified to represent the defendant in this first degree felony murder case, I believe that the nearly two-month gap between his arrest and his confession to the offenses compels our concluding that the confession was inadmissible. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey D. Allen
The defendant, Jeffrey D. Allen, was convicted by a Crockett County jury of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, facilitation of attempted first degree murder, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, he argues that the sequestered jury was improperly separated and that the trial court erred by not suppressing his statement to police, ruling a witness unavailable, admitting prior bad act evidence, and allowing improper opinion evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment form to reflect that the defendant received a life sentence for his first degree murder conviction. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: J.G.H.,Jr., dob 11/04/05, A Child Under 18 Years of Age James And Teri Wolfe v. Jennifer Lynn Duckhorn - Dissenting
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: J.G.H.,Jr., dob 11/04/05, A Child Under 18 Years of Age James And Teri Wolfe v. Jennifer Lynn Duckhorn
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her son based on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit. Mother appeals, claiming that the trial court should have dismissed the termination petition because the petitioners lacked standing, or alternatively, because the petition failed to contain a notice provision required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 9A. Mother also claims that the trial court looked to the wrong four-month period when determining whether she failed to visit and erred in finding that her failure to visit was willful. She also claims that termination was not in her son’s best interest. Finally, Mother claims that her due process rights were violated in various ways. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Oliver J. Higgins v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Oliver J. Higgins, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition for post-conviction relief fails as it is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Halbert B. Dodd, II
The defendant, Halbert B. Dodd, II, was indicted on two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion and the prosecutor denied the defendant’s application. The trial court granted the defendant’s writ of certiorari and determined that the prosecutor had not abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. The defendant’s motion for an interlocutory appeal was granted. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor had not abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion and that the prosecutor’s abuse of discretion was evidenced by his: (1) characterization of the defendant’s past behavior as a “history of criminal behavior”; (2) failure to consider evidence which tended to show that the defendant was amenable to correction; (3) reliance on the defendant’s failure to admit guilt; and (4) failure to consider all factors favorable to diversion. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Margaret Gail Moore v. Mountain Empire Oil Company
In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Margaret Gail Moore, while working as a fuel clerk at a truck stop, was attacked and beaten during a robbery, suffering multiple injuries. Ms. Moore sought permanent disability benefits for physical and mental injuries. She presented testimony of two evaluating physicians, who estimated her total anatomical impairment at 62% to 82% to the body as a whole. The employer, Mountain Empire Oil Company, presented testimony of two evaluating physicians who estimated her impairment to be 14.5%. The trial court awarded 93% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by basing its award on the testimony of the evaluating physicians presented by the employee.1 We affirm the judgment. |
Hawkins | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Burnett
A Monroe County jury convicted the defendant, Dennis Burnett, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to grant a continuance based upon the defendant’s medical issues; (2) refusing to grant a mistrial after a State’s witness testified regarding information that had not been contained in his pretrial statements; (3) improperly informing the jury that a certain witness would testify when the trial court was aware that the witness was unavailable; and (4) refusing to grant a mistrial or call rebuttal witnesses after a perjured testimony. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wendi Nicole Garrison
The defendant, Wendi Nicole Garrison, was found guilty as charged of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to sixteen years as a violent offender. On appeal, she argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; the trial court erred in failing to charge the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter; and the trial court erred in denying a new trial based on the composition of the jury. After careful review, we find that plain error exists in the omission of jury instruction for the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. We are, therefore, compelled to remand for a new trial. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Scott Winfrey
Appellant, David Scott Winfrey, pled guilty in Sumner County to twenty-nine Class A misdemeanors consisting of one count of aggravated criminal trespass, one count of stalking, thirteen counts of harassment, and fourteen counts of violation of an order of protection. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. In addition, the trial court ordered Appellant to serve ten of his violation of an order of protection sentences consecutively to each other, with the remaining sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court based the imposition of the consecutive sentences on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-113(g). On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days, in ordering incarceration above time already served, and in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error with the length of the sentences imposed. However, we have determined that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-113(g) authorizes sentences for violation of an order of protection to run consecutively to other convictions stemming from the same underlying facts, as opposed to authorizing sentences for violation of an order of protection to run consecutively to each other. Therefore, we vacate the sentences imposed by the trial court and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Troy Tackett v. State of Tennessee
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Troy Tackett, pled guilty to one count of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court ordered him to serve twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. J. C. Fair And Krederick Fair
Following a jury trial, Defendants, J. C. Fair and Krederick Fair, were convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. Each Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to eighteen years. On appeal, both Defendants argue (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support their conviction of aggravated robbery; (2) that the trial court erred in denying Defendants’ motions for a mistrial; and (3) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury. Defendant J. C. Fair also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment against him on the basis of prosecutorial vindictiveness and that the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donna Faye Shipley, et al. v. Robin Williams, M.D.
In reliance on plaintiff’s experts, the trial court granted defendant doctor’s motion for partial summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim pertaining to defendant’s failure to admit plaintiff into the hospital. The trial court later granted the defendant doctor summary judgment on the remaining malpractice claims finding that the plaintiff’s medical expert proof previously relied upon by defendant failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. We reverse the grant of partial summary judgment on the failure to admit claim since the defendant doctor relied solely on plaintiff’s experts, whose testimony was later found inadmissable. We also reverse the summary judgment of the remaining malpractice claims since the defendant doctor never presented proof to negate an element of those claims. Consequently, the plaintiff had no duty to create issues of fact at the summary judgment phase. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Candice Parrish
The defendant, Candice Parrish, pled guilty to theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. Following her guilty plea, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of four years but granted her request for judicial diversion. Shortly thereafter, the defendant was found to be in violation of her diverted probationary sentence, and, following a sentencing hearing, the trial court removed the defendant from judicial diversion and sentenced her to four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court erred in ordering a sentence of total confinement. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Entertainer 118 and Meroney Entertainment, Inc. dba Ken's Gold Club v. Metropolitan Sexually Oriented Business Licensing Board
An inspector cited an entertainer and the sexually oriented business in which she worked for violating an ordinance governing certain requirements for entertainers and businesses engaging in sexually oriented entertainment. The Metropolitan Sexually Oriented Business Licensing Board upheld the citations and fined the entertainer and the business $500 each. They appealed and the chancery court affirmed. They now appeal to the Court of Appeals. We find that the board did not have authority to assess the fine. We affirm the board and the chancery court’s finding that the ordinance was violated, and since the board has authority to impose other sanctions, we remand the matter to the chancery court with instructions to return the matter to the board. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Lebron Anderson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Lebron Anderson, was convicted of burglary of a building other than a habitation and was sentenced to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals |