Silvino Gonzales, Invidually and as Next Friend of Rubcel Gonzales, a Minor v. Judith Long
This appeal arises out of a minor automobile accident. The plaintiff filed suit individually and on behalf of his son, claiming that his son suffered whiplash in the accident. The defendant admitted fault for the accident but denied that she caused any damages to the plaintiff. The plaintiff presented testimony from a physician who opined that the son was injured in the car accident. Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lamar Advertising Company (formerly Outdoor Communications, Inc.) v. By-Pass Partners
This is a dispute over lease agreements. The plaintiff outdoor advertising company leased two parcels of property from the defendant real estate development company for the purpose of erecting billboard signs. The defendant then cancelled the leases. The defendant had contracted to sell the property to another outdoor advertising company, and cancelled the leases with the plaintiff in reliance on a lease provision allowing cancellation in the event that the plaintiff’s signs interfered with the defendant’s sale or development of the property. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant’s cancellation was ineffective because this was not the type of interference that was contemplated in the agreement. The defendant counterclaimed, seeking damages allegedly suffered as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to remove its billboards. Meanwhile, the third-party outdoor advertising company that was supposed to purchase the property filed a motion to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging that the plaintiff was interfering with its contractual relations with the defendant real estate development company. A trial was held, and no proof of damages was submitted. The defendant real estate development company and the third-party advertising company that sought to intervene asked for a hearing on damages in their post-trial brief. The trial court issued a letter ruling finding that the defendant’s termination of the leases was effective. Years later, an order was entered reiterating the finding that the defendant effectively terminated the leases; the order set the matter for a special hearing on damages owed to the defendant real estate development company and the third-party advertising company. The third-party’s motion to intervene was never explicitly granted. Shortly thereafter, the trial judge assigned to the case died. A substitute judge was assigned to hear the remainder of the case. In response to a series of motions, the trial court determined that the trial was properly bifurcated, that the third-party advertising company did not transfer its right to damages in a sale of its assets, and that its motion to intervene was never granted by the previous trial judge, and it therefore could not recover damages. The thirdparty advertising company now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s decision that the motion to intervene was never granted, finding that the motion to intervene was implicitly granted in the order following the trial. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the bifurcation was proper, that the defendant real estate development company effectively terminated the leases, and that the third-party advertising company that sought to purchase the property retained the right to damages after the sale of its assets. The case is remanded for a hearing on the damages owed to the third-party advertising company, if any. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cris R. Woods
The defendant, Cris R. Woods, appeals his conviction by a jury in the Criminal Court for Union County for reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict and that the trial court improperly denied his motion for acquittal. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court, and we vacate the conviction. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Knox County, Tennessee, on the relationship of Environmental Termite & Pest Control, Inc., qui tam
Plaintiff filed this action as a “qui tam claim” pursuant to the Tennessee False Claims Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-18-101 et seq. The Trial Court awarded plaintiff proceeds from the settlement under the Act and both parties have appealed. On appeal we hold that plaintiff did qualify under the statute as an original source, and the Trial Court had jurisdiction to award a recovery. However, we hold there is not sufficient evidence to affirm the award. We vacate the award and remand pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-3-128. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Eugene Armes
Defendant, Glenn Eugene Armes, presents for review a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Defendant entered a plea of guilty to arson and simple possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced defendant to nine years for arson and eleven months and twenty-nine days for simple possession to be served consecutively. As a condition of his guilty plea, defendant properly reserved a certified question of law as to whether he was subjected to an unconstitutional traffic stop. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Talmadge Wayne Bradley
Appellant, Talmadge Wayne Bradley, pled guilty in Lawrence County to one count of possession of a Schedule III substance with intent to sell. The trial court held a separate sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that enhancement factor (14), abuse of a position of public trust applied to appellant. Appellant was sentenced to four years, one year to be served in incarceration and the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant appeals arguing |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tom Spears and Dana Spears v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
Owners of an insured vehicle that was damaged by fire filed suit against their insurance company for breach of contract, failure to pay insurance claim in good faith, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Insurer filed a counter-complaint alleging that one of the insureds had no right of recovery under the policy because she had no insurable interest in the vehicle and that the other insured was barred from seeking recovery under the policy because the insured failed to answer questions under oath when asked by the insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Carlton
The defendant, Raymond Carlton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of felony murder, premeditated first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment plus twenty-two years. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing questions concerning his prior convictions and arrests, and he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bert Newby
The defendant, Bert Newby, was convicted of one count of first degree murder, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life for the first degree murder charge and three years for the aggravated assault. The defendant raises three issues for appeal: 1) whether the late-filed notice of appeal should be waived in the interest of justice and judicial economy; 2) whether the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments for trial; and 3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his murder conviction. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Johnson
The defendant, Brandon Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and second degree murder for shooting a man to death during an attempted robbery. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction, for which the defendant received a life sentence. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for a sequestered jury; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (4) whether the cumulative effect of the various alleged errors deprived him of his constitutional rights to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Mays v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Donald Mays, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner has previously been granted a remand to the post-conviction court for consideration of the issues that he now appeals: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to allege in his motion for new trial that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery; and (2) whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal that it was plain error for the trial court not to instruct on robbery as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Brunner
The defendant, John Brunner, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder and domestic assault. He was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to concurrent terms of twenty-three years, six months and eleven months, twenty-nine days. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s eviction letter to the defendant into evidence; (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; (4) the trial court erred by failing to merge the domestic assault conviction with the second degree murder conviction; and (5) cumulative error entitles him to relief. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: S.E.J. Donald Jordan v. Donald Roberson
This case involves competing adoption petitions filed by a child’s maternal and paternal grandparents after the child’s father was sentenced to death for killing the child’s mother. The trial court simply compared the relative fitness of the two sets of grandparents and granted the adoption petition of the paternal grandparents. We conclude that the trial court erred in giving equal weight to both petitions because the paternal grandparents did not meet the requirements set forth in Tennessee’s adoption statutes. We also conclude that the maternal grandparents were fit persons to have the care and custody of the child, that they are financially able to provide for the child, and that adoption is in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the chancery court and remand for entry of an order granting the adoption petition filed by the maternal grandparents. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Thuy-T-Lam d/b/a Nail Paradise v. Tuan Ngoc Buile a/k/a David Le
The appellant-defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his Motion for Summary Judgment and the modification and enforcement of his non-competition agreement with appellee-plaintiff. We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant-defendant’s motion for summary judgment; we affirm the trial court’s ruling modifying the territorial restrictions in the non-compete agreement; we further modify the terms of the non-competition agreement in order to be consistent with Tennessee’s public policy; and we reverse the trial court’s institution of a permanent injunction against the appellantdefendant. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Gray Stewart
The Defendant, Phillip Gray Stewart, was convicted in the Franklin County Circuit Court of driving under the influence, second offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with forty-five days to be served in the county jail. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marlos Shields
The defendant, Marlos Shields, was indicted on charges of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the charged offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of twelve years for the aggravated robbery conviction and six years for the aggravated burglary conviction and ordered the sentences to run consecutively for an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Cooper
The defendant, Carlos Cooper, appeals from the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court, revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence of eight years. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marvin Anthony Matthews v. Henry Steward, Warden
The petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Harold Jones, Alias
The Defendant, William Harold Jones, appeals the revocation of his enhanced probation sentences in the Criminal Court for Knox County. He pled guilty to two charges of theft, a Class D felony, for which he received two consecutive, suspended sentences of four years; theft, a Class E felony, for which he received a consecutive suspended sentence of three years; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, for which he received a suspended sentence of two years, with a total effective sentence of eleven years of enhanced probation as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. We affirm the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Georgia O'Keeffe Foundation (Museum) v. Fisk University
At issue in this appeal are the respective rights of three parties concerning charitable gifts of 101 pieces of art given, subject to conditions, to Fisk University in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The collection has an estimated present value in excess of $60 million. Four of the pieces, including the painting Radiator Building - Night, New York, were the property of Georgia O’Keeffe and given to the University by Ms. O’Keeffe. The other ninety-seven pieces were part of a much larger collection formerly owned by Alfred Stieglitz, Georgia O’Keeffe’s late husband. The ninety-seven pieces were gifted to the University by Ms. O’Keeffe as executrix of the estate and/or as the owner of a life estate in the ninety-seven pieces. All 101 pieces were charitable, conditional gifts that were subject to several restrictions, two of which are at issue here; the pieces could not be sold and the various pieces of art were to be displayed at Fisk University as one collection. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Georgia O'Keeffe Foundation (Museum) v. Fisk University - Concurring
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William M. Putnam v. Ricky Bell, Warden
The pro se petitioner, William M. Putman, challenges the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Taurus Merriweather
The Defendant-Appellant, Taurus Merriweather (“Merriweather”), was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder and was subsequently sentenced to twenty-five years in confinement. Merriweather’s sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as the shooter in this case. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Marvin L. Clark
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensatiom Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court ordered Employer to provide pain management treatment to Employee. Employer has appealed, contending that the proposed treatment was made necessary by a pre-existing condition, an independent intervening cause, or both, rather than Employee’s work injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
White | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Janie Vincent v. Calsonic Kansei North America, Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court held that Employee suffered a compensable injury to her left shoulder; that she did not make a meaningful return to work and the statutory cap therefore did not apply; and awarded her benefits based upon a vocational disability of 35% to the body as a whole. Employer and its insurance company appealed. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Workers Compensation Panel |