State of Tennessee v. Johnny L. Burns
The Defendant, Johnny L. Burns, was originally tried and convicted of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class B felony. Due to an error in jury instructions, this Court reversed and remanded his case for a new trial. See State v. Johnny L. Burns, No. M2005-01945-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 595632, (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 26, 2007). The Defendant was retried and again convicted of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred because it: (1) denied his request for supplementary police reports that he claims contain exculpatory information; (2) refused to admit into evidence a photograph used by the defense in cross-examination; (3) denied his motion for a mistrial due to improper remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument; and (4) failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jesse Wade Glover
Defendant, Jesse Wade Glover, was indicted in count one for initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine by beginning the extraction of an immediate methamphetamine precursor from a chemical product, a Class B felony, in count two for promotion of methamphetamine manufacture by possessing more than 9 grams of an immediate methamphetamine precursor with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class D felony; in count three for promotion of methamphetamine manufacture by acquiring a chemical and an ingredient that could be used to produce methamphetamine knowing that it would be used to produce methamphetamine, a Class D felony; and in count four for possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant was tried jointly with co-defendant, Britt Alan Ferguson. Co-defendant Ferguson’s case is not part of this appeal. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found not guilty of the charges in counts one, two, and four, and guilty of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class E felony, in count three. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to four years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of facilitation of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Richards
The issue presented in this case is whether evidence seized from the Defendant’s person following a warrantless search should have been suppressed or, conversely, whether the search was justified as a search incident to lawful arrest. After receiving a tip from a citizen informant that three individuals were involved in drug activity around a picnic table in the back yard of a house, police officers were dispatched to the scene and found the three identified persons plus a fourth person – the Defendant – seated around the picnic table. As the officers approached, they observed one participant sweep the table with his arm and drop a corner baggie to the ground, and they subsequently discovered that this person held a rolled dollar bill containing a white powdery residue. The officers also saw a white powdery residue on the surface of the table that field-tested positive for cocaine. Although the Defendant was seated at the picnic table where the police officers observed evidence of cocaine use, they did not see the Defendant engaged in any illegal or suspicious activity. An initial “pat down” search of the Defendant revealed no drugs or weapons. After a consensual search of one of the participants at the table revealed white powder on the seat of his wheelchair, the officers searched the Defendant a second time and found a bag of marijuana and a bag of cocaine in his pocket. The Defendant was indicted for misdemeanor possession of marijuana and cocaine. The trial court found that the search was proper due to exigent circumstances supported by probable cause, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, finding that the circumstances did not support the existence of probable cause. After review, we conclude that the search of the Defendant cannot be justified as a search incident to an arrest because, at the time of the search, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the Defendant. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Richards - Dissenting
The pivotal question in this case is straightforward. Did the law enforcement officers who came upon Marcus Richards and his three associates sitting at a picnic table on which residue of powder cocaine was in plain view have probable cause to search Mr. Richards incident to arresting him for the simple possession of the cocaine on the table? The Court has concluded that they did not. I respectfully disagree. Based on the essentially undisputed facts, I would affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the warrantless search incident to Mr. Richards’s arrest was valid. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Emma Lou Hale vs. Gerald D. Hale and Bonnie F. Hale
Plaintiff sought a partition by sale of property she owned as a tenant in common. The defendants sought a partition in kind. The undisputed proof showed that the parcels were more valuable if sold together than if they were divided and sold separately. The trial court ordered the property sold. The defendants appealed. We affirm. |
Van Buren | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Craig Abston
Defendant, following a jury trial, was convicted of one count of second degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years for Count 1, second degree murder, twelve years for Count 2, attempted second degree murder, and eight years for Count 3, attempted second degree murder. Counts 1 and 2 were ordered to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to Count 3 for a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in its remarks to the jury venire; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Sergeant Berryman that Defendant had two gold teeth at the time he was interviewed; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the convictions. We reduce the sentence in Count 2 from twelve years to eight years. Further, we reverse the judgments only insofar as they order consecutive sentencing, and remand for a new sentencing hearing solely to determine whether consecutive sentencing should be imposed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marico Fowler
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Marico Fowler, was convicted of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, and vandalism, a Class A misdemeanor. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for vandalism, eleven months, twenty-nine days for reckless endangerment, three years for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and ten years for aggravated assault, for an effective sentence of ten years. The felony sentences are as a Range II multiple offender. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State Of Tennessee, Department Of Children's Services v. Ruth Sails, Sylvester Pollard, Kenny Jones, and Unknown Fathers
This is a termination of parental rights case. The appellant mother of four children has a history of mental illness and substance abuse. The children were taken into state custody based on the mother’s lack of safe and stable housing and her drug abuse. The children were then placed together in the home of their maternal grandmother and ultimately stayed in State custody for over eight years. For the first several years, the children’s permanency plans required the mother to obtain drug treatment, attend parenting classes, seek treatment for her mental health issues, and provide a stable home for the children. At various times, these goals were accomplished, but at other times they were not. In 2006, the state petitioned the trial court to permit the mother to regain custody of the children, indicating that the mother had fulfilled her responsibilities. Around the same time, however, the mother tested positive for illegal drugs. Soon thereafter, the state filed the instant petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights. After a trial, the trial court granted the petition for termination based on the ground of persistent conditions, finding that the State had made reasonable efforts to assist the mother and that the children’s best interest would be served by termination. The mother as well as the children’s guardian ad litem now appeal the termination. We reverse, finding that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to assist the mother, particularly with respect to her underlying mental illness, and dismiss the petition to terminate her parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State Of Tennessee, Department Of Children's Services v. Ruth Sails, et al. - Dissenting
|
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond Clay Murray, Jr. v. Jes Beard
This is the second appeal in a legal malpractice case filed by Raymond Clay Murray, Jr. (“the Client”) against Jes Beard (“the Attorney”). In the first appeal, we affirmed the Trial Court’s sanction against the Attorney for discovery abuse which prohibited the Attorney from introducing any expert testimony at trial. However, a majority of this Court reversed the Trial Court’s issuance of a default judgment as a further sanction against the Attorney. We also affirmed the Trial Court’s determination that the amount of the Client’s damages totaled $16,697.38. We remanded the case on the sole issue of liability. On remand, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted the Client’s motion for summary judgment and found the Attorney 100% at fault for the Client’s damages. The Trial Court then denied the Attorney’s motion for summary judgment, found that motion was filed in violation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11, and awarded an additional $1,374.94 in damages. The Attorney appeals raising several issues. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demetry Fitzgerald Conley - Dissenting
I respectfully depart from the majority’s determination that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(a)(3)’s mandate for release of a defendant operates upon the aggregate sentencing from two or more counties. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demetry Fitzgerald Conley
The defendant, Demetry Fitzgerald Conley, pled guilty in four separate cases to multiple counts of forgery and theft. In Lincoln County case number S0700004, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of forgery between $500 and $1000 (Class E felony). In Lincoln County case number S0700062, the defendant pled guilty to one count of forgery between $500 and $1000. For these three convictions, the defendant was sentenced to concurrent two-year sentences, with 365 days to serve in the county jail. In Marshall County case number 17437, the defendant pled guilty to thirty-two counts of forgery up to $1000 (Class E felony). In Marshall County case number 17438, the defendant pled guilty to thirty-four counts of forgery up to $1000 (Class E felony), fifteen counts of theft under $500 (Class A misdemeanor), and two counts of theft of property between $500 and $1000 (Class E felony). The court subsequently imposed a sentence of one-year and six-months for each forgery conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine-day sentences for each theft. Based upon the imposition of partial consecutive sentencing, the effective sentence in the two Marshall County cases was six years, with 365 days to serve. The court further ordered that the Marshall and Lincoln County cases be served consecutively to each other for a total effective sentence of eight years, with two terms of 365 days to be served in the local county jail. The balance of the sentence was to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the defendant raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of split confinement rather than a full community corrections sentence and whether the sentence of confinement, as imposed, violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(a)(3); and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentence within the range in the Lincoln County cases based upon the application of enhancement factors in violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Following review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court with the following exceptions: 1) remand for entry of corrected judgments as identified supra; and 2) remand for resentencing with regard to the two Class E felony thefts in Marshall County case number 17438 as discussed infra. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Herbert Jones v. Lemoyne-Owen College and Cheryl Golden
This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiff college professor was asked by his employer college to teach a summer class. The class was cancelled after the professor had taught only two class sessions. The college said that the class was cancelled due to low enrollment; this reason was disputed by the professor. The professor filed a lawsuit against the college for breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, breach of contract implied in law, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with contractual relations. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant college on all of the professor’s claims. The professor appeals, arguing that he was denied discovery and that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. We affirm the challenged discovery rulings and the grant of summary judgment as to the claims for breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional interference with contractual relations, and as to the claim for breach of contract implied in law with respect to the second class taught by the plaintiff. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the claim for breach of contract implied in law with respect to the first class taught by the plaintiff. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Steven LaRue vs. Laura Michelle LaRue - Concurring
|
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Steven LaRue vs. Laura Michelle LaRue
In this divorce action the Trial Court awarded primary custody of the children to the mother, refused to allow overnight visitation with the father until the children were one year old, and ordered standard visitation with the father. The father appealed, insisting that the Trial Court erred in applying the “tender years doctrine” and also erred in awarding standard visitation of the children. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derrann William Estill
A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Derrann William Estill, of aggravated kidnapping, and the appellant pled guilty to domestic assault. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of seventeen years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by failing to define “possession” adequately when the jury requested a definition during deliberations, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for aggravated kidnapping, and (3) his sentence for aggravated kidnapping is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jamie C. Runions v. Tennessee State University, et al
A woman enrolled in a nursing program at Tennessee State University received a grade of D in one of her courses and was dropped from the program. She appealed to the provost of the university, who led her to believe that she had been, or would be, reinstated. She learned that this was not so when she returned to class and the instructor physically escorted her from the classroom. She brought suit against the university and four of its employees, including the provost, asserting claims of battery, conspiracy to commit battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court dismissed her suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy Dale Taylor, Sr.
The defendant, Tommy Dale Taylor, Sr., was convicted by a Tipton County jury of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, for the rape of his granddaughter, who was seven years old when the abuse was discovered. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court to eighteen years for each count with the sentences to be served concurrently, for an effective eighteen-year sentence at 100 percent in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s alleged prior sexual abuse, admitting a photograph of the victim’s vaginal and anal areas, allowing the trial to continue too long in one day and the jury to deliberate into the late evening hours, and not properly instructing the jury on the election of offenses. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rebecca Cornelius v. State of Tennessee, Department Of Children's Services
This appeal arises from a dependency and neglect proceeding finding the minor child, B.C., dependent and neglected under Tennessee Code Annotated 37-1-102(b)(12), and specifically on the ground of severe child abuse on the part of the Appellant/Mother. The trial court sustained the petition to adjudicate dependency and neglect filed by the Appellee Department of Children's Services. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Lynn Miller v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Donald Lynn Miller, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Knox County from his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life and twenty-three years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding that he did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrin Bonner
The Defendant-Appellant, Darrin Bonner (“Bonner”), was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class D felony, and was later sentenced to six years in confinement. On appeal, Bonner argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony; and (3) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial deprived him of his federal and state constitutional rights. Following our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Milburn Hogue and Melanie Hogue
The certified question from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennesse |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Lee Hayes v. Gibson County, Tennessee
The issue presented in this declaratory judgment action brought by Lee Hayes, the Gibson County juvenile court clerk, is whether he should be compensated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-24-102, as amended in 2001, which sets the Gibson County juvenile court clerk’s salary at a minimum of $50,805 per year, or pursuant to a 2000 private act that sets the salary at $32,000 per year. Gibson County argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the private act of 2000 creating the office of Gibson County Juvenile Court Clerk and establishing his salary at $32,000 per year, controls. Mr. Hayes argues that the General Assembly’s 2001 amendment to TennesseeCode Annotated section 8-24-102, establishing statewide salaries for county officers, including juvenile court clerks, supersedes the 2000 private act and that his annual salary should be $50,805 in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-24-102, as amended. We hold that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the 2000 private act and the 2001 public act, and that the 2001 public act, a general statutory scheme of statewide application, supersedes and repeals by implication the earlier private act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
Millennium Taxi Service, L.L.C. v. Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport Authority
Millennium Taxi Service, L.L.C., filed suit against the Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport Authority (“CMAA”) seeking a declaration that CMAA regulations prohibiting unregistered taxicabs from picking up passengers curbside at the Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport were unconstitutional. Millennium further sought injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the challenged regulations. In its counterclaim, CMAA asserted that Millennium had repeatedly and flagrantly violated its regulations and requested that Millennium be permanently enjoined from engaging in any further violations. The court granted in part and denied in part summary judgment to CMAA upon finding that the challenged regulations had a rational basis and did not discriminate unreasonably against unregistered taxis. Millennium appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Kerney, et al vs. Gary Endres, et al
Eric Kerney and wife, Cassandra Kerney, brought this suit to enjoin the operation of a beauty salon by defendant Susan Endres in the home owned by her and her husband, Gary Endres. The Kerneys and the Endreses are adjoining homeowners in the Plantation Manor Subdivision in Kingsport. The properties are subject to a restrictive covenant limiting their use to residential and forbidding commercial use. Following a bench trial, the court found the salon was merely incidental to the residential use and, as a consequence, did not violate the restriction. The court did, however, enjoin any expansion of the business. Plaintiffs appeal. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals |