Jerry Tigner, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jerry Dale Tigner, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we conclude that the petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating either that counsel was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies in representation prejudiced the outcome of his case. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rickie Reed v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Rickie Reed, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the dismissal of his motion, this court has no jurisdiction in the case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul L. McMillin vs. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant in 2005 and another action, similar in nature, against the same defendant in 2006. The actions were assigned to two separate Judges and the 2005 action was first dismissed by one Judge and subsequently the 2006 action was dismissed by the other Circuit Judge. The plaintiff has appealed the 2006 action. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David W. Frazier
Following a jury trial, the defendant, David W. Frazier, was convicted by a Weakley County jury of one count of driving under the influence, second offense, (“DUI 2nd”), a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to a term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, sixty days of which was to be served in the county jail. The defendant was initially indicted by a Weakley County jury for DUI 2nd and violation of the implied consent law. He subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, as the preliminary hearing tape was inaudible. The State agreed, and the court dismissed the indictment. Subsequently, a second preliminary hearing was held, and the defendant was reindicted by a grand jury. The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the second indictment upon grounds that he had previously been charged and indicted for the same offenses. The court denied the motion. On appeal, he raises the single issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the second indictment because the State failed to timely reindict the defendant and because the second indictment violates double jeopardy principles. After review of the record, we find no merit to the defendant’s contentions and affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edwin O. Martin, et al v. Carl Nash, et al
Members of family in whose name a cemetery was established brought suit against owners of property surrounding the cemetery seeking removal of a cloud upon their title to the cemetery, injunctive relief and damages. The trial court declared the boundaries of the original cemetery and limited those entitled to be buried therein to the family members; allowed that members of the general public were permitted to be buried in land added to the original cemetery tract; and appointed trustees to manage the cemetery as established under both conveyances. Family members appeal, contending that trial court erred in setting the cemetery boundary; in disregarding proof of cost of repairing fence which had been removed by one defendant; and in refusing to hear testimony as to the trust fund established for the maintenance of the cemetery. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Richard L. Williams v. Roland Colson, Warden, and State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Oliver J. Higgins, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Amodeo, D.C., et alL. v. Conservcare, LLC., et al.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees as to Appellants’ claims of civil conspiracy; violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104(b)(8), (27); violation of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1986, Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-32-229(a); and common law claims of outrageous conduct and tortious interference with another’s business. We are also asked to determine whether the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants’ Tennessee Trade Practices Act claims. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kristina Moore v. City of Manchester
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. While at work, Employee received a message that her sister had fallen and injured herself. She started to leave for the purpose of checking on her sister. Before she reached her car, she tripped and fell in a parking lot on Employer’s premises. She sustained a broken wrist. Employer denied her workers’ compensation claim, contending that she was on a personal errand. The trial court found the injury arose from and occurred in the course of the employment, and awarded workers’ compensation benefits. Employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding the injury to be compensable. We affirm the judgment, and find the appeal to be frivolous. |
Moore | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Civil Constructors, Inc., et al. v. George Haynes, III
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee was injured on the job, when the dump truck he was driving overturned. Employer denied liability, asserting that the injuries were the direct result of willful misconduct by Employee. The trial court found in favor of Employer on that issue, and denied benefits. Employee has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment. |
Williamson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Charles Arellano, a/k/a Chuck Arellano, a/k/a Dr. Chuck Arellano
The defendant, Dennis Charles Arellano, a/k/a Chuck Arellano, a/k/a Dr. Chuck Arellano, pled guilty to one count of TennCare fraud valued between $10,000 and $60,000, one count of impersonating a licensed professional, and one count of reckless endangerment. The defendant agreed to a total effective sentence of six years and restitution in the amount of $30,000, with the manner of service of the defendant’s sentence left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to nine months in the county jail and the balance of his sentence on probation. He was also ordered to perform 200 hours of public service work. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion or, in the alternative, a sentence of full probation. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Friendship Home Health Agency, LLC
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a continuance based on Appellee’s failure to provide certain documents until the day before trial and the absence of a witness for Appellant. We are also asked to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that no accord and satisfaction was made when Appellee cashed a check from Appellant for a lesser amount than was owed to Appellee for increased insurance premiums. Finally, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that the statute of frauds was not violated although no writing was made when Appellant’s insurance policy was re-instated. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a continuance, and affirm the trial court’s ruling that no accord and satisfaction was made. Because a statute of frauds defense was not properly raised in the trial court, we deem the issue waived. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zandy Orlando Nelson a/k/a Vandy A. Nelson
The defendant, Zandy Orlando Nelson a/k/a Vandy A. Nelson, appeals as of right his Davidson County Criminal Court conviction of aggravated assault for which he received a sentence of eleven years as a persistent offender, consecutive to a previously imposed sentence. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying a motion for continuance when the State filed a notice to seek enhanced punishment on the day of trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Artis Whitehead v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Artis Whitehead, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing as untimely his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court tolled the one-year limitations period for filing a post-conviction petition, and because his petition was filed within one year of the Supreme Court’s order denying certiorari, his post-conviction petition was timely. The petitioner also argues that because counsel incorrectly informed him that the deadline for filing his postconviction petition was one year after the Supreme Court denied certiorari, due process requires the tolling of the one-year limitations period. After reviewing the record, we conclude that while the petition was untimely, further development of the record is necessary to determine whether counsel’s advice regarding the limitations period constituted “misrepresentation, either attributable to deception or other misconduct,” see Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Tenn. 2001), that necessitated due process-based tolling of the limitations period. As such, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stanley Blue
The defendant, Stanley Blue, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of facilitation of premeditated first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed sentences of thirty-four years, fifteen years and six years, respectively; the trial court also ordered the thirty-four-year sentence to be served consecutively to the six-year sentence for a total effective sentence of forty years. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to define premeditated murder and felony murder during voir dire, (2) the trial court erred in denying an excusal for cause of a juror, (3) the trial court erred in its instructions regarding facilitation, (4) the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony, and (5) the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for attempted second degree murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Winston E. Wolfe, Trustee of the Winston E. Wolfe Revocable Living Trust Dated December 5, 1997 v. O. Michael Jaeger, et ux.
This appeal arises from a private condemnation action commenced by Plaintiff pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 54-14-101, et. seq. After the jury of view filed its report, but before the report was acted upon by the trial court, Plaintiff moved for a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. The trial court granted the nonsuit, and Defendants filed a Rule 60.02 motion for relief from the judgment granting the nonsuit. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Theresa S. Biancheri, Trustee of the Mercer Family Trust v. Charles M. Johnson, Jr., et al. AND Charles M. Johnson, Jr. v. Ida Louise Cromwell, et al.
The matters at issue arise from a contract for the sale of a residence and the buyers’ refusal to close on the purchase of the residence. The seller, the trustee of a family trust, and the buyers entered into a contract for sale of a residence. Prior to closing, the buyers discovered that elaborate audio-visual equipment, that was material to them, had been removed by the husband of the Trustee. The buyers considered this a material breach and refused to close; as a result, the seller filed suit against the buyers for breach of contract. The buyers counter-claimed alleging the seller breached the contract first and that the seller, through its real estate agent, had made fraudulent misrepresentations to induce the buyers to sign the contract, specifically that the audio-visual equipment was part of the sale and that the previous resident, who died inside the home after being shot by his wife in the bedroom closet, had not died in the home. The buyers also filed a separate action against the seller’s real estate agent alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud, promissory fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The buyers’ claims against the seller were summarily dismissed upon findings by the trial court that the contract was valid and that the buyers breached the contract by failing to close. The real estate agent was summarily dismissed upon a finding that the buyers could not establish actionable misrepresentations. The buyers then filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages for breach of contract, contending the contract afforded the seller the option of electing liquidated damages, in lieu of compensatory damages, in the amount of the earnest money and that the seller had made that election by retaining the earnest money. The trial court summarily ruled that the seller had elected to receive liquidated damages as its exclusive remedy. The buyers appeal the summary dismissal of their claims against the seller and the seller’s real estate agent. The seller appeals the summary ruling that it elected to recover liquidated damages in lieu of compensatory damages. We have determined the real estate agent was not entitled to summary judgment as material facts are in dispute concerning whether the agent made material misrepresentations to induce the buyers to enter into the contract. We have determined the seller was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability for the buyers’ alleged breach of the contract because material facts are in dispute concerning whether the buyers are entitled to rescission of the contract based on the agent’s alleged misrepresentations and whether the seller breached the contract prior to the buyers’ alleged breach by removing components from the integrated television system, which the buyers contend was a material part of the contract. Due to our ruling that the seller was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability, the seller is not entitled to damages for breach of contract, and it is premature to determine which party may be entitled to damages and in what amount. Accordingly, the award of liquidated damages in favor of the seller is reversed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jason Clark v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden and State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jason Clark, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner was indicted for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and he ultimately pleaded guilty as charged. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the indictment against him was fatally defective and, thus, deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and violated principles of due process. Specifically, he argues that the indictment did not state the charges against him; i.e., failed to include the words “especially aggravated robbery” and “first degree felony murder.” The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. We agree and affirm the order summarily dismissing the petition. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wayne B. Gillard v. James A. Taylor, et al.
Police officer who was injured while driving his patrol car brought this action against his automobile insurer to recover uninsured motorist benefits under his personal policy. The trial court denied insurers’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the regular use exception found in the policy was ambiguous. The insurance company appeals. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Melinda Reust Williams v. Eric Butze
This case began as a petition for dependency and neglect, which petition was dismissed by consent of the parties. The juvenile court then proceeded to determine custody pursuant to its authority granted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(f). When custody was placed with Father/Appellee, Mother/Appellant appealed to the Circuit Court of Shelby County. The Circuit Court determined that the Tennessee Court of Appeals was the proper appellate court and entered an order transferring the appeal to us. Mother appeals that transfer. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles A. Ruffner v. Union Carbide Corp.
Twenty-six years after his retirement, the employee sought workers' compensation benefits from his employer for hearing loss. The trial court denied the claim. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the holding of the trial court as to causation, the judgment is affirmed. |
Roane | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Bruce Warren Scarborough
The defendant, Bruce Warren Scarborough, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated rape, Class A felonies, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of sixty years as a career offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress the in-court and out-of-court identifications of him and his tattoos, (2) failing to grant a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, (3) classifying him as a career offender, and (4) ordering consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Beverly Waller v. Brenda Evans
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the decedent, Floyd Evans, Sr., possessed the requisite mental capacity to execute a power of attorney naming his brother as attorney-in-fact, which was subsequently used to change his life insurance and investment account beneficiary from his daughter to his wife. Additionally, we are asked to determine whether a confidential relationship existed between the decedent and his wife such that his wife exerted undue influence upon him in having his beneficiaries changed just prior to his death. We affirm the trial court, finding that the decedent possessed the requisite mental capacity and that the presumption of undue influence was rebutted through independent advice. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Renee Adams v. Jeffery Farrell Adams
This appeal involves a father’s petition to modify a parenting plan due to an alleged material change in circumstances. The trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred, and that it was in the children’s best interest for the father to be named primary residential parent. The trial court awarded the father his attorney’s fees. Mother appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
William L. Odom, Jr., et ux. v. Harold Oliver, et al.
Purchasers brought this action against sellers, realtor, and realty company of home that they purchased, alleging fraudulent concealment, and violation of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosures Act. We affirm summary judgment for realtor and realty company, but we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to sellers. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Joann Abshure, et al. v. Jeremiah Upshaw, M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice action filed against individual Defendants/Physicians and Defendant Hospital. Following Plaintiffs’ second Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01 voluntary dismissal of individual Defendants, Defendant Hospital moved for summary judgment. The trial court awarded Hospital summary judgment upon concluding that the evidence demonstrated negligence on part of one Defendant/Physician only, and Plaintiffs had failed to assert a claim of vicarious liability against Hospital for the alleged negligence of its agent, Defendant/Physician prior to twice dismissing Physician. The trial court determined Plaintiffs’ cause of action had been extinguished where the statute of repose applicable to claim against Physician had expired, and that Plaintiffs had conferred on Physician an affirmative right not to be sued again. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and affirm the award of summary judgment to Defendant Hospital. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |