Omawali Ashanti Shabazz, a/k/a Fred Dean vs. Donal Campbell, et al
M2000-01780-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
Appellant, a prison inmate, filed suit under the Tennessee Public Records Act against the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and others seeking disclosure to him of various records alleged to be public records, together with injunctive relief. The Chancellor dismissed the complaint with prejudice and we affirm the Chancellor.

State Dept. of Children's Services vs. T.M.L.
M2000-01785-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Betty Adams Green
The juvenile court granted a petition to terminate parental rights to three of the children of a Nashville woman. On appeal, the mother challenges the termination in regard to her oldest child only, on the ground that it is not in the child's best interest to be permanently separated from her. We affirm the trial court.

Lon Walker v. William Cameron
M2000-01903-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: John J. Maddux
This is a legal malpractice action which was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. Fourteen months before suit was filed the plaintiff sent a holographic letter to the Disciplinary Counsel complaining, in considerable detail, of the defendant's purported shortcomings. The trial judge held that the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Judgment affirmed.

Madge Fell,e t al vs. Gloria Rambo, et al
M2000-02100-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Lee Russell
This case is before the Court on appeal from the action of the trial judge in overruling a Rule 60.02 Motion for Relief From a Final Judgment. Non-jury trial on the merits of the case resulted in a judgment of the trial court finding no lack of capacity of Nannie Bell Crockett and no undue influence exerted upon her. That same final judgment held that Plaintiffs, as remaindermen, under the will of John E. Crockett, received at the death of Nannie Bell Crockett, the remaining proceeds from the sale of a farm during her lifetime, which farm had been willed to her for life by her husband, John E. Crockett, with unlimited power of disposition. On appeal, this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that the pre-1981 version of Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-1-106 (1993) applied to the case, and that the sale of the farm by the life tenant with unlimited power of disposition, terminated the interest of the remaindermen, and that the remaindermen were not entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the farm still remaining in the possession of Nannie Bell Crockett at the time of her death. This judgment is now final and is reported in Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). On remand, the trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion in issue on this appeal and we affirm the trial court.

Beatrice Scott Nall v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours and
M1999-00375-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace, Judge
This workers' compensation case has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee or claimant, Beatrice Nall, was 59 years old at the time of the trial, which began on October 9, 1998 and ended on October 12, 1998. She has a high school education, some business college and experience as a factory worker, waitress and secretary, as well as 16 years with DuPont, where she worked as a utility worker from 1977 until 1981, when she was promoted to a wet treatment operator. She suffered a previous injury in 1983, from which she received an award based on eighteen percent to the body as a whole. The claimant's duties as a wet treatment operator required her to unload railroad tank cars, which she had done for 12 to 15 years before suffering the present injury in 1993. Because some of the tank cars contained hazardous material, DuPont had established specific standard job procedures (SJP'S) for the unloading of railcars on the plant site. The claimant was intimately familiar with the SJP for unloading sulfuric acid cars. As the SJP'S were updated and changed, the claimant would review them again and initial them to document her review and understanding of the procedure. She last reviewed the SJP for unloading sulfuric acid from railcars on February 11, 1993, two months before her second acid related accident. All safety procedures were strictly enforced by the company. None of the several DuPont employees who testified was aware of anyone unloading acid cars without having on an acid suit. The applicable SJP required that the operator wear safety equipment and specifically required the wearing of an acid suit while unloading a railcar containing acid. On the day of her injury, the claimant attempted to inspect such a railcar, before commencing the unloading procedures, without donning the required safety equipment, particularly the acid suit. As she was doing so, she was sprayed with sulfuric acid and severely burned. The claimant initiated this action to recover medical and disability benefits as provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11 et seq. By its answer, the employer, DuPont, denied that the injury was compensable and affirmatively asserted, in general terms, that the injury was barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11. After a trial on the merits, the trial judge found that the injury was one arising out of and in the course of employment, that the employer had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant willfully violated a safety rule or refused to wear a safety device and that the claimant is permanently and totally disabled as a result of her injuries. The award was correctly apportioned between the employer and the second injury fund. The employer has appealed, contending (1) the trial judge erred in finding that the claim is not barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11(a) and (2) the trial judge erred in entering an order finding that the plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled. Our review of the trial court's findings is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The reviewing court is not bound by a trial court's factual findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

Shirley Loope v. Institutional Jobbers Co., Inc.
E1999-02503-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Daryl L. Fansler, Judge
The trial court found a work-related injury and awarded a ten percent whole body impairment. The defendant argues the evidence preponderates against the finding of compensability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. James M. Williams
W1999-01458-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

This appeal arises from the sentence that the Shelby County Criminal Court imposed upon James M. Williams, after a previous appeal to this court resulted in a modification of his original two-year incarcerative sentence to a sentence ordered to be served on probation. The defendant contests the trial court's authority to resentence him to serve 60 days in a correctional facility, with the balance of his two-year sentence to be served on probation. The defendant also challenges his new sentence as the product of judicial vindictiveness, and he claims that he is entitled to full probation based on the facts of the case. After a review of the record, we reverse the split-confinement sentence, order that the defendant serve his sentence on full probation with conditions, and remand for defendant to begin immediate service of his sentence.

Kathy Kay Scott v. Cantech Industries,
E2000-00728-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jean A. Stanley, Circuit Court Judge
The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered carpel tunnel syndrome as a result of her work with Contech Industries, Incorporated, that the disability should be converted to an injury to the body as a whole, and that the plaintiff had sustained a forty-two percent vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The trial judge found that Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company was the workers' compensation carrier at the time the plaintiff became unable to continue to work, and therefore, was the carrier responsible for the coverage. Wausau raises the issue of whether the trial judge properly found it, rather than Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, liable for the award to the plaintiff. Wausau and Contech Industries Incorporated further argue the trial court erred in finding the plaintiff gave sufficient or timely notice of the carpel tunnel syndrome injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Earl Wagner v. The Tennessee Coal Company
E2000-01013-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: John Mcafee, Judge
The trial court found the plaintiff sustained a ten percent permanent partial medical impairment as a result of a compensable injury and awarded him forty percent whole body vocational disability. The defendant says the evidence does not support the finding that the plaintiff suffered any permanent impairment and further says if he did, the award should have been restricted to two and one-half percent times the medical impairment because the plaintiff had a meaningful return to work. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Donald Picklesimer v. Mckee Foods Corporation
E2000-02694-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer , Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown III, Chancellor
The trial court awarded the employee 72 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employee appealed insisting his disability was 1 percent. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Aaron Bernard Gray
W2000-00645-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe C. Morris

The Defendant, Aaron Bernard Gray, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he asserts that he should have been granted post-conviction relief because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, because the trial court abused its discretion by finding the victim competent to testify, and because the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial. We hold that the Defendant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his other two issues are either waived or previously determined. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Fred Birdsall, et al., v. Floyd Birdsall
E2000-01544-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Conrad E. Troutman, Jr.

Plaintiffs/Appellants sought the return of several items, including a shotgun, tiller and lawn mower, as well as $1,500 in damages to a 1980 Ford pick-up truck, from Defendant/Appellee. The Trial Court found the matter too speculative and dismissed the case. We have no transcript and no Statement of the Evidence. Accordingly, we must assume that the record, had it been preserved, would have contained sufficient evidence to support the Trial Court's factual findings. Judgment of the Trial Court affirmed.

Melissa Suzanne Dew v. ProTemp, et al.
E2000-01750-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William E. Lantrip

This appeal arises from a grant of summary judgment to Pro-Temp ("Defendant"), a temporary employment agency. Melissa Suzanne Dew ("Plaintiff") brought suit against her employer, Defendant, and Eagle Bend Manufacturing, Inc. ("Eagle Bend"). Defendant assigned Plaintiff to work in a temporary position at Eagle Bend where Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury. A few months later, Plaintiff received a reprimand from her Eagle Bend supervisor related to Plaintiff's work performance. Thereafter, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's assignment at Eagle Bend. Plaintiff claims Defendant terminated her employment in retaliation for exercising her worker's compensation rights. Plaintiff argues there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the granting of summary judgment to Defendant. We affirm.

Unifirst Corporation, v. Harry Lane, et al.
M2000-00357-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

This is an appeal from an award of damages by the Chancery Court of Davidson County for a breach of a contract. The defendants assert that the individual executing the contract did not have the authority to bind the corporation and that the contract ended when the corporation sold its assets. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael H. Sneed v. Board of Professional Responsibility
M1999-01588-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor by Interchange Tom E. Gray

This cause is before the Court on the petition for rehearing filed by the respondent, Michael
H. Sneed. The crux of the petition is Sneed’s request for a period of thirty days within which to
“wind down [his] practice and to prepare for the transition of any remaining cases to substitute
counsel.”

River City Resort, Inc. v. Norfolk Southern Ry Co., Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific R. Y. Co. & Jit Terminal, Inc.
E1999-02567-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III

This is a dispute over the validity of an easement between River City Resort, Inc. (“River City”), and Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Railroad”) which is across a certain property owned by River City. River City brought this declaratory judgment against the Railroad and JIT Terminal, Inc. (“JIT”), an adjoining landowner who derives benefit from the easement.

Regina L. Cable v. Charles E. Clemmons, Jr.
E1998-00526-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bill Swann

We granted this appeal to determine the following two issues: 1) whether double jeopardy bars multiple convictions for criminal contempt based on violations of an order of protection and 2) whether domestic violence counseling may be imposed as part of the sentence for criminal contempt. After finding the defendant guilty of six counts of criminal contempt, the trial court's sentence consisted of 1) ten days in jail for each act of contempt to be served consecutively and 2) forty-five weeks of domestic violence counseling. A new order of protection was issued. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported only one conviction for criminal contempt and that the trial court lacked the authority to impose counseling as part of a sentence for criminal contempt. After reviewing the record and authority, we hold that double jeopardy does not bar multiple convictions for criminal contempt and that the evidence supports three convictions in this case. We further hold that although the legislature has not specifically authorized domestic violence counseling as a sentence for criminal contempt, the trial court properly imposed the requirement as part of a new order of protection.

Hoskin (Brewerv. Seaman Corporation
E2000-00842-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III, Judge
The plaintiff was laid off 66 months after returning to work following settlement of her claim for workers' compensation benefits. After the lay-off she filed this action to recover additional benefits.

Karen Henson v. Finelli, Hauge, Sanders and Ragland, M.C.,
E2000-01193-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell, Chancellor
This is a Rule 6 case. The plaintiff alleges that after her claim for workers' compensation benefits for a cervical spine and shoulder injury was settled and judicially approved she continued to suffer pain and discomfort owing to a torn rotator cuff and nerve impingement which was not discovered by her treating physician, thus implicating Rule 6.2.

Terri L. Carter v. Cmh Manufacturing, Inc.,
E2000-00654-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle, Circuit Judge
This action seeking benefits for total and permanent disability attributable to a disputed diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome superimposed upon pre-existing injuries was dismissed. The plaintiff appeals and presents for review the issues of whether the plaintiff proved that she suffered a job-related injury, or that she suffered a vocational disability. We affirm the judgment.

Wayford Demonbreun, Jr. vs. Dennis J. Hughes, et al
M2000-01116-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
Plaintiff, inmate acting pro se, sued two former attorneys alleging that after the first attorney was removed from his criminal case and ordered to refund part of the retainer fee paid, the second attorney was appointed to represent plaintiff. Subsequently, the second attorney, without authorization, compromised and settled plaintiff's claim against the first attorney and converted the proceeds of the settlement to his own use. The first attorney was never served with process, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the second attorney. Plaintiff has appealed.

Maria Nelson vs. Dept. of Safety
M2000-01147-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal arises from entry of a default judgment by the Appellee against the Appellant following the Appellant's failure to appear at a scheduled hearing. The Appellant filed a petition for judicial review with the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The trial court affirmed. The Appellant appeals from the Chancery Court of Davidson County's decision affirming the default judgment entered against the Appellant. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court's decision.

Gabriel Alwin vs. Percy Pitzer
W1999-00537-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
An inmate filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the sentencing court in Wisconsin was without authority to convict on one of the three counts under which he was convicted and that his sentence had expired. The trial court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.

Jaleesa Davis
W1999-01662-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: A. V. Mcdowell
The Shelby County Juvenile Court terminated parental rights of the natural mother and father of minor child. Parents have appealed. We affirm.

James Garrett vs. Isiah Roswer
W1999-02369-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This is a dispute among the members and officials of a church and the church pastor. The plaintiff church members and officials filed for injunctive relief against the defendant pastor of the church, seeking to remove him as pastor and prevent him from disposing of or eroding church assets. The trial court enjoined the pastor defendant from disposing of, eroding or concealing church assets, and also ordered an election. Under the court-ordered church election, the defendant was removed as pastor of the church. Subsequently, the defendant pastor executed a trust deed encumbering certain church properties. After the trust deed was foreclosed and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale, the defendant pastor filed a counter-complaint in the pending suit, alleging that he was the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale and that title of the church property should be transferred to him. In payment of his bid, the defendant pastor tendered bonds issued by the church. The trial court referred to a special master eight issues relating to the ownership and value of the bonds. The special master and trial court found that the defendant pastor had not established that he paid for the bonds. The defendant pastor appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its finding on the bonds and that it failed to address or take evidence on additional issues raised in his counter-complaint. We affirm the decision of the trial court on the bonds, but remand the cause for proof on the remaining issues.