Eddie Williams vs. Alton Hesson
W2000-02725-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
This appeal involves a claim of discrimination and denial of access to the courts by a maximum security inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. The court below granted summary judgment to the defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment.

Darlene Moore Collins v. Cmh Manufacturing, Inc. (Also
E1999-01225-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, III, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the plaintiff sixty-five percent impairment due to occupational asthma and awarded prejudgment interest to accrued benefits. The defendant argues the trial court's award was excessive because the plaintiff failed to adequately prove through medical testimony the causation and extent of her impairment. The defendant also appeals the amount of prejudgment interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the impairment award and remand for further findings of facts with regard to the prejudgment interest award.

State vs. Cornelius Michael Hyde
E2000-00042-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

Wade Nance v. State Industries, Inc., and Itt Hartford
M1999-02262-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Frank F. Drowota,III, J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Leonard W. Martin, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends that the trial court erred in finding that the employee's conduct amounted to a willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11(a). To clarify this area of workers' compensation law, the panel adopts a new standard which requires the employer to prove four elements in order to make out the affirmative defense of willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance. The Panel vacates the trial court's judgment and remands the case for a new trial in which the new standard will be applied.

State vs. Michael Knox
W2000-00362-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Mark Agee
The defendant pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to: eight years imprisonment; a $10,000 fine; and state probation, to be served upon his release from prison, with the condition that he perform five hundred hours of community service. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. After review, we conclude that the record supports the sentence of incarceration, but that the trial court erred in ordering that the defendant be placed on probation and required to perform community service upon the completion of his prison sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the judgment ordering an eight-year sentence of incarceration and a fine of $10,000, but reverse the portion ordering that the defendant be placed on probation following his release and that he perform community service. In addition, we order that the defendant be prohibited from operating a motor vehicle for a period of five years from the entry of an order prohibiting such.

State vs. Jimmy Harber Jr.
W2000-00462-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Mark Agee
While driving under the influence of alcohol, the defendant lost control of his pickup truck and crashed into a road embankment, causing the death of one of his five teenaged passengers. He pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication as to the passenger who died, and to reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon as to all other passengers, agreeing to allow the trial court to set his sentences. Applying enhancement factors (10) and (16), the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to ten years for the vehicular homicide conviction, and two years for the reckless endangerment conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant appeals the sentencing, arguing that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors, and that he should have been granted probation. Based upon our review of the record and of applicable law, we conclude that the enhanced sentences are supported by the record, and that the trial court, therefore, committed no error in its failure to grant probation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Bobby Haley
W2000-00860-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
The defendant pled guilty to delivery of less than one-half gram of a Schedule II, controlled substance, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

State vs. Demario Jackson
W2000-01421-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
The Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of rape of a child. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of fifteen years, to be served at one hundred percent. The Defendant complains in this post-conviction proceeding that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his plea, resulting in a plea that was not knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily entered. The trial court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State, Ex Rel., Tammy Davenport vs. Gerald Partridge
E1999-02779-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Suzanne Bailey
This appeal from the Hamilton County Juvenile Court concerns whether the Juvenile Court erred in determining the child support obligation of the Appellant, Gerald Lamont Partridge. We vacate the order of the Juvenile Court and remand for further findings of fact.

Robert Covert vs. Kimberloy Covert
E2000-00864-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: William R. Brewer

Robert Covert vs. Kimberloy Covert
E2000-00864-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Susano

Sharon Kelly vs. George Evans, III
E1999-00417-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Steven H. Jones
This is a suit initiated by Sharon S. Sarli (now Kelly) against George Leroy Evans, III, wherein she sought a determination that he was the father of her child. After Mr. Evans stipulated that he was indeed the father of the child, the Referee and the Juvenile Judge made various determinations relative to custody, child support and the like. Mrs. Kelly, being dissatisfied with a number of the determinations in the Referee's last order which on appeal was in the main affirmed by the Juvenile Judge, filed this appeal. We vacate the judgment of the Juvenile Court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Leslie vs. State
M1998-00585-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
We granted review in this post-conviction case to determine whether the trial court erred by allowing the appellant's appointed attorneys to withdraw and refusing to appoint new counsel. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court did not err either by allowing the appointed attorneys to withdraw or by refusing to appoint new counsel because the appellant had abused the post-conviction process. We conclude, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred by allowing counsel to withdraw without a hearing and failing to appoint new counsel. We therefore reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for the appointment of counsel and proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Seibers vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.
M1999-02559-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: J. Curtis Smith
This case involves a dispute between a lawyer and his former client over a fee in a personal injury case. The client discharged the lawyer before the case was concluded and agreed to give the lawyer a lien on the potential recovery for the work the lawyer had already performed. When the lawyer attempted to collect his fee after the case was settled by another lawyer, the former client asserted that the lawyer should forfeit his fee because he engaged in unethical conduct. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the lawyer had "technically" violated Tenn. S. Ct. R. 8, DR 5-105(A) but that the lawyer's conduct had not prejudiced the client and that the client had waived his conflict-of-interest claims. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the lawyer $69,525.83 in legal fees and expenses. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Castleman vs. Castleman
M2000-00270-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey S. Bivins
Mother appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to set aside a default judgment awarding divorce to Father, distributing marital property, and awarding custody of the minor child to Father. Because no evidence was heard regarding factors which must be considered by a court in making these determinations, we reverse the trial court's denial of her motion to set aside the default judgment and remand this matter for a trial on the merits.

Stewart vs. State
M1998-00304-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
In this case, we determine whether the Tennessee Claims Commission properly asserted jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) and -307(a)(1)(F) for the alleged negligence of a state highway patrol officer in failing to properly control county police authorities at an arrest scene. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction, and the State requested permission to appeal on the issue of whether the Claims Commission properly asserted jurisdiction and whether the plaintiff, who stepped into the road before being hit by the truck, was fifty percent (50%) or more at fault for his accident. We hold that the Claims Commission lacked jurisdiction in this case under either section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) or section 9-8-307(a)(1)(F), and because the Claims Commission possessed no jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims, we decline to reach the issue of whether the plaintiff was more than fifty percent (50%) at fault for his accident. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals finding proper jurisdiction is reversed, and the plaintiff's claim against the State is dismissed.

State vs. James Cole
W2000-00056-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Chris B. Craft
The Defendant, James L. Cole, appeals as of right from his first degree felony murder conviction. On appeal, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Clarence Braddock Jr.
W2000-00383-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
The Defendant, Clarence Braddock, Jr., entered a guilty plea to the offense of introduction of contraband into a penal institution, a Class C felony. After a sentencing hearing, he was denied alternative sentencing and was sentenced to three years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying him alternative sentencing. We hold that the Defendant was properly denied alternative sentencing; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Stan Wallace Mosley vs. Carrie Lynn Mosley
E2000-01445-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Jean A. Stanley
This appeal arises from a bifurcated trial in a divorce action. After hearing the parties' proof in the second phase regarding alimony, child support and division of property, the Trial Court entered a Judgment which the Trial Court designated as "final." The Judgment, however, does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The Trial Court did not decide the issue of whether excess retained earnings of Telescan, Inc., a company in which Stan Wallace Mosley ("Husband") is a 90% shareholder, should be imputed as income to Husband. The Judgment states that this issue will be considered by the Trial Court in the future. Husband appeals the Judgment but does not raise the issue of Telescan's excess retained earnings. Carrie Lynn Mosley ("Wife") contends that the Trial Court erred by failing to impute the excess retained earnings of Telescan to Husband's personal income for purposes of calculating his child support obligation. We dismiss this appeal because the Judgment is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies.

In Re: The Matter of John Adams, Deceased v. City of Lebanon v. The Tennessean
M2001-00662-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
This appeal challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue a protective order sealing a settlement agreement between the City of Lebanon, Tennessee, and a private citizen, Mrs. Lorrine Adams. The trial court issued the protective order in response to the City's motion, a motion which followed a request by The Tennessean, a daily newspaper, for information regarding the settlement. The protective order was issued ex parte, despite the fact that no action had been filed against the City by Mrs. Adams or by The Tennessean. We hold that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the protective order. The order is therefore void and vacated.

Mary Hall, et al vs. Mary Rose Pippin, et al
M2001-00387-COA-OT-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
This is an original contempt proceeding filed by the appellants against the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court for Putnam County in a now-concluded appeal. The appellants assert that the clerk and master knowingly and willfully violated our September 3, 1998 order directing her to file a supplemental record containing seven exhibits that had not been previously transmitted to this court. We have determined that we no longer have jurisdiction to consider the contempt motion because it was not filed until after our jurisdiction over the appeal had ended.

Jo Frances Luedtke v. Travelers Insurance Company
M1999-01717-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Drowota, J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ellen Lyle Hobbs, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) for hearing and reporting findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the plaintiff sued for benefits following the death of her husband, the employee. The employee died of a heart attack while at work. The trial court found that the employee was exerting himself, but that there wasno causal connection between the exertion and his death. This Panel has concluded that the trial judge was incorrect in finding that the exertion was not linked to the employee's death. We find that death or disability arises out of and in the course of employment when the exertion of the employee's work causes the heart attack, or aggravates a preexisting condition. It makes no difference that the employee suffered from a preexisting heart disease or that the attack resulted from ordinary exertion of the employee's work. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed Drowota, J., in which John A.Turnbull, Sp. J. and Frank G. Clement, Jr., Sp.J., joined. Joseph M. Dalton and Catherine S. Hughes, Nashville, TN, for the Applicant, Jo Frances Leudtke. Sean Antone Hunt, Spicer, Flynn, & Rudstrom, PLLC Nashville, TN, for the Respondent, Travelers Insurance Company. OPINION The deceased employee, Richard Luedtke, worked as a professional painter for Harold Moore and Sons Painting. Harold Moore and Sons worked as the painting subcontractor for renovations to the Massey Auditorium at Belmont University in Nashville. The project was to be completed by the latest on August 6, 1997, as that date was scheduled for an important campus event. Due to the 1 deadline, the job was stressful for everyone involved. Because the renovations were behind schedule, Luedtke worked overtime to complete the job on time. In fact, Luedtke had worked fifteen of the sixteen days prior to his death. On the morning of September 24, 1997, Luedtke was sanding the auditorium doors and had been doing so for about an hour and a half. A co-worker, Doug Russell, was working next to Luedtke at the time. Russell turned and noticed that Luedtke was "laying on the floor." Attempts to resuscitate Luedtke were unsuccessful. Luedtke was pronounced dead at Vanderbilt University Medical Center of a heart attack. Luedtke first became aware of possible heart problems when he was hospitalized for another ailment in May 1996. Throughout 1996, Luedtke's heart condition was asymptomatic. However, in the two months prior to his death, Luedtke began to show symptoms of possible heart failure. The symptoms included fainting twice, coughing up fluid, and fatigue. From the time he discovered heart problems until his death, Luedtke was reluctant to seek treatment. Two months had passed between the time that Luedtke's symptoms began to appear and the date of an appointment for treatment with Dr. John Ververis, September 24, 1997. Luedtke did not make this afternoon appointment, because he died that morning. Luedtke's wife, Jo Frances Luedtke (hereinafter "the plaintiff"), brought this suit for workers' compensation benefits. At trial, the parties introduced the depositions of three doctors into evidence. Two of the doctors, Robert B. Gaston, M.D. and John Ververis, M.D., were Luedtke's treating physicians. The other, Leon H. Ensalada, M.D., never examined Luedtke. Dr. Ensalada based his diagnosis on the medical records and on the transcript of Dr. Ververis's deposition. Dr. Gaston was Luedtke's primary care physician and first saw Luedtke in April 1996. Dr. Gaston reported that upon examination Luedtke's lungs and heart appeared normal and that Luedtke did not complain of any symptoms associated with heart problems. Dr. Gaston diagnosed a perirectal abscess and suggested surgery. Dr. Gaston sent Luedtke to a general surgeon, Dr. LeNeve, who detected Luedtke's irregular heartbeat. Dr. Gaston saw Luedtke again in June 1997. According to Dr. Gaston's records, nothing suggested that Luedtke suffered from any discomfort or symptoms indicative of heart problems. During preparation for the April 1996 surgery with Dr. LeNeve, tests revealed that Luedtke suffered premature ventricle contractions or an irregular heartbeat. Dr. Ververis, Luedtke's cardiologist, cleared Luedtke for surgery but scheduled an appointment to follow up treatment on May 8, 1996. At the examination, Dr. Ververis performed an arteriogram and diagnosed severe dilated cardiomyopathy or a weak heart. Luedtke received no other treatment for his heart and died on September 24, 1997. Testifying about Luedtke's condition at the time of his death, Dr. Ververis felt that Luedtke's condition was so severe that any activity, including walking or sleeping could have contributed to congestive heart 2

John Morgan, etc. vs. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc.
M2000-02382-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
The State Comptroller sued Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc. seeking access to Cherokee's records for an audit of the company's affairs. The Chancery Court of Davidson County held that the company's contract with the State, and Chapter 960 of the Public Acts of 2000, gave the State the right to conduct the audit. Based on our opinion in Memphis Publishing Company, et al. v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, et al., released simultaneously with this opinion, we hold that the company's contracts with the State do not make all their records public records. We also hold that to apply Chapter 960 retroactively would violate the constitutional prohibition against retrospective legislation. We therefore reverse the lower court's judgment.

Memphis Publishing Co., et al vs. Cherokee Children & Family Svcs, Inc., et al
M2000-01705-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The publisher and assistant managing editor of The Commercial Appeal, a Memphis newspaper, sued a non-profit corporation seeking access to the corporation's books and records under the Tennessee Public Records Act. The Circuit Court of Shelby County held that the corporation's contract with the State made virtually all of its records State property. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and reject the appellee's alternative argument that the corporation is a State agency. Therefore the appellee is not entitled to free access to the corporation's records.

Lindsey, Bradley & Maloy vs. Media Marketing Systems, Inc., et al
E2000-00678-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
This appeal involves a grant of summary judgment to Defendant Sam Cooper, the sole shareholder, president and CEO of his co-defendant, Media Marketing Systems, Inc. Lindsey, Bradley & Maloy ("Plaintiff") brought suit against Sam Cooper and Media Marketing for breach of contract stemming from an agreement between Plaintiff and Media Marketing. Plaintiff sought to pierce Media Marketing's corporate veil so as to render Defendant personally liable for the debt owed under the agreement. Plaintiff also made claims against Defendant for his alleged individual tortious conduct related to the agreement. Both Plaintiff and Defendant filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff's motion but granted Defendant's motion. Plaintiff appeals and argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether Media Marketing's corporate veil should be pierced due to Defendant's conduct. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant should not have been granted summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact. We reverse in part and affirm in part.