Moore vs. Moore
M1999-02301-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.
In this divorce case, the husband argues that the trial court erred in the way it classified and distributed the parties' marital property. We agree that the trial court's implied classification of the parties' home on Pleasant Cove Road was erroneous as a matter of law, but we find that its disposition of the property was nonetheless within the court's authority and discretion. We accordingly modify the final decree to reflect our view of its correct classification, but otherwise affirm the trial court.

Owen vs. Martin
M1999-02305-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
The trial court found that a mother and her adult son had both breached an oral contract whereby the son agreed to pay off the mortgage on his mother's home and to permit her to remain there for the rest of her life, and the mother agreed to give the son her equity in the home upon her death, and to allow him to use a garage apartment in the home until that time. We reverse the trial court's finding that there was an enforceable contract between the parties, but we impress a resulting trust on the son's interest in the home, which inures to his mother's benefit.

State vs. David Mitchell
E1999-02761-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
The defendant, David Calvin Mitchell, appeals the manner of service of his sentence for second offense DUI. Notwithstanding Anderson County's lack of a work release program for jail inmates, he claims that he is statutorily and constitutionally entitled to work release during the mandatory, 45-day period of jail confinement for his crime. Because we hold that the defendant was not statutorily entitled to work release consideration and that there was no equal protection violation, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Kenneth England
E2000-00535-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: E. Shayne Sexton
The defendant appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence. Finding a lack of justiciable, substantial evidence to support the revocation, we reverse.

State vs. Danielle Walker
E2000-00578-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
The appellant, Danielle L. Walker, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to one count of theft of property over $1000, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a standard Range I offender to two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve twenty days of her sentence in periodic confinement and to serve the balance of her sentence on supervised probation. The trial court also ordered the appellant to make restitution to the victim in the amount of $2,928.56. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant the appellant judicial diversion; and (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant the appellant full probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Juliann Whitehead
E2000-00031-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
The appellant, Juliann Lynn Whitehead, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to one count of burglary, a class D felony, and one count of theft under $500, a class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the appellant to four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the burglary conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the Blount County Jail for the theft conviction. The trial court ordered that these sentences run concurrently, and allowed the appellant to serve her sentences on intensive probation. During a random drug screen conducted by the appellant's probation officer approximately three months after sentencing, the appellant tested positive for cocaine. Additionally, the appellant admitted to her probation officer that she had left the state without permission. Pursuant to a probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered her to serve the balance of her sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction and recommended that she be placed into a Special Needs Facility to assist with her substance abuse and mental health problems. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant to serve the balance of her sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction after revoking her probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Teresa R. Hodge
E2000-00040-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
The defendant appeals the Blount County Circuit Court's determination that her plea-bargained, eleven-month and 29-day effective sentence for theft and possession of cocaine shall be served in confinement, subject to 75 percent of service before the defendant is eligible for rehabilitative programs. The record supports the trial court's determination, and we affirm.

State vs. Gary Russell
E1999-01511-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
The appellant pled guilty in the Anderson County Criminal Court to three counts of selling over .5 grams of cocaine. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each conviction. The trial court denied the appellant any form of non-incarcerative alternative sentencing, including probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State vs. Martin Charles Jones
E1999-01296-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins
The Appellant, Martin Charles Jones, pled guilty to nine counts of criminal exposure to HIV, class C felonies, and to three counts of statutory rape, class E felonies. Following a sentencing hearing, the Knox County Criminal Court imposed an effective sentence of seventeen years incarceration. On appeal, the Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

State vs. Walter Jackson
E1999-02186-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Mary Beth Leibowitz
Walter Jackson appeals the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court revoking his placement in the community corrections program and reinstating his original eight-year Department of Correction sentence. Prior to his revocation, Jackson was serving an eight-year community corrections sentence resulting from his 1991 guilty pleas to two counts of sale of cocaine. Jackson challenges the revocation of his community corrections sentence and the redesignation of his confinement with the Department of Correction. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Oneal Sanford
E1999-02089-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Carroll L. Ross

Luther Brown, III vs. State
E1999-02290-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
The petitioner, Luther Robert Brown, III, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Brown seeks relief from a "parole hold" that Tennessee officials have caused to be placed upon him within the Virginia prison system. According to the allegations of his petition, the parole hold has resulted in the Virginia prison system denying him inmate privileges to which he would otherwise be entitled. Additionally, he complains that he has not been granted a Tennessee parole hearing even though he has served his Tennessee sentence past the release eligibility date. Because we agree with the lower court that these complaints are not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding, we affirm the lower court's dismissal of the petition.

State vs. Patty Pace Purkey
E2000-00308-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: O. Duane Slone
The appellant, Patty Pace Purkey, pled guilty in the Grainger County Criminal Court to one count of vehicular assault, a class D felony, one count of reckless endangerment, a class E felony, three counts of simple possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, and one count of driving on a revoked license, a class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the appellant to the following terms of incarceration: three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for vehicular assault; two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for reckless endangerment; eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail for each of the simple possession convictions; and six months in the county jail for driving on a revoked license. The trial court further ordered that all of the appellant's sentences be served concurrently and assessed a total of $750 in fines. The trial court denied the appellant any form of alternative sentencing. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in failing to order probation or another alternative sentence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State vs. Howard W. Weaver
E2000-00066-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: E. Eugene Eblen
The defendant appeals his convictions of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. He claims that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion to suppress his statement given to investigators from the Department of Children's Services and sheriff's department, and (2) in failing to require the state to elect the particular offenses upon which it sought convictions. He also claims that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we accept the state's concession of error in the failure to elect, but we are unpersuaded of merit in the defendant's suppression and sufficiency issues. We reverse the defendant's convictions and remand for a new trial.

State vs. Michael Colvin
E2000-00701-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Lynn W. Brown

State vs. Josh Moon
E2000-00690-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle
The defendant appeals from his Sevier County Circuit Court sentence for simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and 29 days, with six months of the sentence to be served incarcerated in jail and the balance on supervised probation. The trial court ordered restitution to the victim in the amount of $18,700 for medical expenses. In this direct appeal, the defendant complains that he should have received full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. William Washington a/k/a "Freddie"
E2000-00695-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Cupp
William Washington was found guilty by a Washington County jury of one count of possession of less than one-half gram of cocaine with intent to sell. Washington, a range III offender, was sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction. The following issues are presented on appeal: (1) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and (2) whether the trial court impermissibly limited the scope of his voir dire examination of prospective jurors with regard to racial bias. Finding no error, the judgment is affirmed.

State vs. Donald Lynn Miller
E1999-00148-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins
Donald Lynn Miller was convicted by a jury of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and received respective sentences of life imprisonment and twenty-three years. On appeal, Miller raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the victim's skull to be admitted into evidence; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting Miller's statement to police into evidence and (3) whether the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court.

George T. Potter v. Schlegel Finishing, Inc.,
E1999-01808-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of his case by way of summaryjudgment and also appeals from the order of the trial court awarding the defendant discretionary costs. The defendant raises as an issue the action of the trial court in considering the affidavit of the plaintiff in determining the summary judgment motion. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court for Blount County is Reversed and Remanded JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, C.J. and ROGER E. THAYER, SP. J., joined. Edward M. Graves, Jr, Carl Winkles, and Douglas C. Weinstein, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, George T. Potter. F. R. Evans, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellees BTR Sealing Systems N. America - Tennessee Operations f/k/a Schlegel Tennessee, Inc., and ACE USA (mis-styled "CIGNA" in the caption). OPINION Facts The plaintiff brought suit to recover for an injury to his back, which he alleges occurred on June 14, 1993. The protracted proceedings in this case resulted in the taking of the plaintiff's deposition, the interrogatories of the plaintiff, the affidavit of the plaintiff, a deposition of a representative of the defendant, the depositions of two doctors, and various other documents which were collected and filed in the record. In the course of taking the plaintiff's deposition and other discovery, it was discovered the plaintiff had suffered a previous back injury that ultimately required surgery; however, when the plaintiff filled out his application for employment with the defendant, he responded "no" to the questions concerning previous work injuries, workers' compensation claims and surgery. Further, he did not reveal the information to the preemployment physician who conducted a physical examination of him on behalf of the defendant. The defendant made a motion for summary judgment in the case. The trial judge granted the motion, ruling: Considering the entire record, the court is of the opinion and finds that the gross misrepresentations of the employee to the employer at the time of hire are unconscionable and that this is a proper case for summary judgment in that (1) the employee knowingly and wilfully made false representations of his physical condition, (2) the employer relied upon the false representations and such reliance was a substantial factor in the decision to hire, and (3) a causal connection exists between the false misrepresentations and the alleged injury suffered by the employee in this case. Discussion The standard of review of a summary judgment order in a worker's compensation case is not de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness, which is the standard generally applied to such cases in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e). Rather, it is governed by Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and the judgment of the trial court is not reviewed with a presumption of correctness. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the pleadings and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent of the motion. Wyatt v. Winnebago Indus. Inc., -2-

State vs. Michael Wayne Perry
M1999-01832-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond
The defendant, Michael Wayne Perry, was convicted by a Wilson County jury of second degree murder and first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of, or attempted perpetration of, rape. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life without parole for the first degree murder conviction, twenty years as a standard Range I offender for the second degree murder conviction, and then merged the two counts into a single conviction for first degree murder. Defendant appeals his convictions and presents the following issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in admitting Defendant's recorded confession; 2) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained from the vehicle that Defendant drove on the night of the murder; 3) whether the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victim's body; 4) whether the trial court's instructions to the jury were proper; 5) whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and 6) whether the conduct of law enforcement officials in the case "shocks the conscience." Based upon a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Lonnie Turner
M1999-01127-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: James K. Clayton, Jr.
The defendant appeals from his convictions for first degree felony murder and aggravated rape, for which he received consecutive sentences of life and twenty-two years, respectively. The defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence, whether certain statements which he made to investigators were taken in violation of his rights, the validity of the search warrant for samples of his hair and blood, certain evidentiary and procedural rulings of the trial court, the ordering of consecutive sentences, and the denial of his motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. We affirm the judgments of conviction.

State of Tennessee v. Clarence L. Currie
W1999-01813-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

A jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated assault for shooting a coworker with a handgun during an altercation at their workplace. The trial court sentenced him to five years in the county workhouse, denying his request for probation. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentencing, arguing that the jury's verdict was not supported by the evidence, and that the trial court erred in sentencing him to five years imprisonment. Based upon our review, we conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the conviction, and that the nature and circumstances of the defendant's offense justifies the sentence imposed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Bobby B. Barrett
W1999-02002-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

The defendant was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of rape of a child. In this appeal as of right, the defendant presents two issues, one with subparts: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting the following: (a) testimony of the sister of the victim concerning a prior bad act of the defendant; (b) testimony of the mother of the victim concerning statements made by the victim to her following the rape; and (c) testimony of the nurse practitioner concerning statements made to her by the victim and his mother; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the victim's sister concerning the defendant's sitting her on his lap and asking for a kiss. Nevertheless, we conclude that such error was harmless. The testimony of the mother of the victim was properly admitted pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The defendant's failure to timely object to the testimony of the nurse practitioner constitutes a waiver of that issue. We further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for child rape. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State vs. Carl Preston Durham
E1999-02640-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Stephen M. Bevil
The defendant, Carl Preston Durham, was indicted for two counts of first degree murder (premeditated and felony), aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery in connection with the murder of the victim, Rene Earl Cabirac, Sr. After a nine-day trial, verdicts of guilt were rendered on all four charges. At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the trial court merged the defendant's two first degree murder convictions and the jury sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court found the defendant to be a career offender and imposed a concurrent sentence of 30 years for the aggravated robbery and a consecutive sentence of 15 years for the conspiracy. The effective sentence is, therefore, life without the possibility of parole plus fifteen years. Because there was no prejudicial error, the convictions and sentences are affirmed; however, because the trial court failed to indicate on the judgment form a merger of the felony murder and the premeditated murder, the judgment is modified to reflect a single conviction for first degree murder.

Ross Gunter vs. State
E2000-00747-CCA-R3-CD
Trial Court Judge: Carroll L. Ross
The petitioner, Ross Gunter, pled guilty in the McMinn County Criminal Court to second degree murder and was ordered to serve one hundred percent (100%) of his fifteen year sentence in confinement. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging fault in the plea agreement, and the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the post-conviction court erred in not granting the petition for post-conviction relief based on the State's breach of the plea agreement, and (2) whether the post-conviction court erred in not granting the petition for post-conviction relief because the petitioner did not knowingly and voluntarily enter a guilty plea. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.