I concur with the Court’s decision on the ground that the summaries of Harold L. Jenkins’s financial records indicate a lack of trustworthiness because of their method of compilation and their incompleteness.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
Pamela K. Cole v. Baptist Hospital of Cocke County, Inc. 03S01-9701-CV-00015
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben W. Hooper, Ii,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. _________________________________ Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Special Judge CONCUR: ________________________________ John K. Byers, Senior Judge ________________________________ Adolpho A. Birch, Jr., Justice 2
This somewhat protracted litigation began in August 1993 when Brian Keith Feather (Husband) filed for divorce from Dolly deKrafft Feather (Wife). A divorce decree was entered by the chancery court in September 1994, which, inter alia, dissolved the fifteen year marriage of the parties and determined custody of their four minor children. Separate orders pertaining to the case were entered by the trial court in August and October, 1995, respectively. Both parties appealed therefrom, but this Court in April 1996, determined that the parties’ respective appeals were from a nonfinal judgment. Litigation thereafter continued due to the parties’ filings of various petitions for contempt, to rehear and to modify custody. After additional hearings, the trial court entered its final judgment in December 1996 from which both parties have appealed.1 The primary issues before us concern the trial court’s decisions regarding child custody and classification and division of the marital estate. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm as modified.
The defendants, Robert and Deborah Koch, have appealed from a non jury judgment that plaintiffs, Joseph and Gloria Gannon, have a private easement from their land across the land of defendants for access to the public way.
Plaintiff Patty M. Richards appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants/Appellees O’Connor Management, Inc., and Russ Hackett.In entering summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, the trial court dismissed Richards’ claims for outrageous conduct and false imprisonment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
In this divorce case, the defendant-counter claimant husband has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing the husband’s counterclaim; granting the wife a divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct, $750 per month alimony until her death or remarriage, and $10,000.00 attorneys fees; and dividing the marital estate.
Defendant Harriet C. Upton, now known as Harriet Cathey, appeals the trial court’s final judgment awarding Plaintiff/Appellee James B. Oliver the sum of $15,225.66, continuing in effect the lis pendens filed against the subject property pending Cathey’s satisfaction of the judgment, denying Cathey’s request for attorney’s fees, and assessing forty percent (40%) of the costs against Cathey. We affirm the judgment in part (with modifications), reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Fannie B. Carter v. National Health Care Center, et al. 01S01-9704-CH-00093
Authoring Judge: Hamilton
Trial Court Judge: Hon. F. Lee Russell
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of fact and conclusions of law. In this two-sided appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying the recovery of incurred medical expenses; the defendant contends the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff temporary total benefits and permanent partial disability benefits. The focus of this dispute is plaintiff's employment application wherein, the defendant contends it was not correctly filled out by the plaintiff, and was materially misleading, and therefore the plaintiff is estopped from claiming benefits. In accordance with T.C.A. _ 56-225(e), the standard of review in this case is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings. It is the plaintiff's burden to show by the preponderance of the evidence that the evidence is otherwise in relation to the trial court's denial of medical benefits; likewise, it is the burden of the defendant to show that the court erred in granting the Plaintiff both temporary total benefits and permanent partial benefits. The panel concludes that the trial court's judgment approving temporary total benefits and permanent partial benefits was correct and should be affirmed. The panel, however, reverses the trial court in the denial of the medical benefits of two of plaintiff's treating physicians. Plaintiff, age 62 at the time of the trial and a divorced mother of six children has an eighth grade education and vocational training as a nurse's aide. Her first employment was domestic work in the homes of the other people and later in commercial pressing. Subsequently, the plaintiff worked for Genesco where she built and inspected shoes. During her employment with Genesco, plaintiff injured her neck and left her employment there. As a result of this injury at Genesco, plaintiff underwent surgery by Dr. Arthur Cushman for a ruptured disc. At the trial plaintiff testified that Genesco had told her she did not qualify for workman's compensation benefits. Later, however, plaintiff acknowledged that she hired an attorney and brought suit against Genesco for workman's compensation benefits. She was successful in obtaining benefits. 2
Carter
Workers Compensation Panel
Deborah Ellis v. Nat'L. Union Ins. and Sue Ann Head 03S01-9705-CH-00051
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Earl H. Henley,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer's insurer and the Second Injury Fund contend the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's asthma is compensable; and the employer's insurer contends the condition is not permanent. As discussed below, the panel concludes the judgment should be affirmed. At the time of the trial, the employee or claimant, Debra Ellis, was 44 years old. She has a high school education and some office and computer training, but has never done office work. She began working for National Union's insured, F. L. Industries, in 1971. Before that, she had worked for short periods of time as a cashier in a grocery store, as a sewing machine operator and in a beauty shop. She has worked for the employer as a packer and loader of electrical connectors and outlets. She ran a machine called an autobagger in the employer's Focus department when she became disabled to work because of asthma. The claimant was in good health when she began working for the employer at the age of 19, except for some upper respiratory problems from allergies during the spring and fall of the year. Since then, she has had pneumonia three times and two back injuries. She has received prior workers' compensation awards totaling eighty-eight and one-half percent to the body as a whole, but had returned to work following those illnesses and injuries without any respiratory restrictions. On April 11, 199, the claimant developed facial redness and swelling at work. Her symptoms disappeared and she returned to work the next day, but her symptoms returned after she began working. When her symptoms worsened to the point where one of her eyes swelled nearly shut and she felt as if she were sunburned, she was referred by the company nurse to a doctor, who hospitalized her. 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Christopher v. Sockwell 02S01-9705-CV-00047
Authoring Judge: Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr., Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. D'Army Bailey
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Witco Chemical Company and Witco Corporation ("defendant"), self insured, contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of eighty percent (8%) vocational disability to plaintiff, Alfred Edwards, computed at two and a half times the anatomical impairment rating of plaintiff's physician of thirty-two percent (32%). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. Plaintiff, forty-nine years old at time of trial, had been an employee of defendant for 18 years. He had been performing the same job for defendant for almost 17 years. There is nothing in the record as to plaintiff's prior employment. Basically, plaintiff's job at defendant's plant entailed transferring hot oil from one processing vessel to another. As part of his normal routine, he was required to open and close several valves. Some valves operated by turning a round handle, others by pulling on sections of chain that would open and close a particular valve. In May, 1995, while in the process of transferring hot oil from one tank to another, hot oil bubbled up and splashed onto plaintiff's body. Plaintiff received severe burns on his arms, back, and abdomen, along with a small spot in front of his right ear. He required skin grafts to areas of his right arm and the right side of his stomach. The rest of his burns healed without requiring surgery. Plaintiff was treated by Dr. William Hickerson, a plastic surgeon, at the local burn center. Plaintiff was off work for approximately seven months. At the time of his deposition in November 1996, Dr. Hickerson testified that he was currently treating plaintiff for persistent healing problems and that in all likelihood plaintiff would need to undergo more
I agree with the majority’s analysis in this case. However, I concur separately to emphasize that our review, under either the common law writ of certiorari or the statutory writ, should be limited to hearing the petitioner’s claims regarding “the illegality of acts taken by the disciplinary board.” Williams v. Tennessee Dept. of Correction, No. 02A01-9503-CV-00046 1995 WL 575142 (Tenn. App. Oct. 2 1995). Even if the requirements of a statutory writ of certiorari are met, our review should not include the substance of the disciplinary proceeding, i.e. whether the petitioner actually committed the acts with which he was charged.
Lake
Court of Appeals
Hubert. Scott v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation 02S01-9709-CH-00077
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Floyd Peete, Jr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the trial court found that the plaintiff suffered an injury to his back during the course and scope of his employment with the defendant. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 25 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole for the injury to the lumbar spine. The trial court also determined that the plaintiff's claim for the alleged hernia injury was not compensable under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-212(a). The defendant appeals and says that the trial court erred in determining that the plaintiff sustained 25 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The plaintiff appeals and says that the trial court erred in determining that the hernia injury was not compensable. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Robert Jones v. Vick Idles E2001-02833-SC-S09-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: William E. Lantrip
We granted this appeal to determine whether the chancellor correctly granted a new trial after finding that the jury's allocation of ninety percent of the fault to the plaintiffs and ten percent of the fault to the defendant was against the weight of the evidence and that the evidence supported "a defense verdict for both sides." A majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that the chancellor correctly granted a new trial on both the plaintiffs' claim and the defendant's counterclaim and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we agree with the Court of Appeals and hold that the chancellor properly granted a new trial after finding that the jury's allocation of fault was against the weight of the evidence in his role as the thirteenth juror. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Anderson
Supreme Court
Walter Austein v. Riverwood Int. USA, Inc. 02S01-9704-CH-00037
Authoring Judge: Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. D. J. Alissandratos
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the special worker's compensation appeals panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The sole issue on appeal is whether the one-year statute of limitations under T.C.A. _50-6-203 ran prior to the filing of the lawsuit. This marks the second appearance of this case before this panel. In Austein v. Riverwood International USA, Inc., No. 02S01-9507-CH-00059 (Tenn. Work. Comp. App., February 23, 1996), this panel found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue because issues of material fact existed concerning both the date the statute of limitations began to run and the estoppel issue. The case was remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits. Plaintiff again appeals the trial court's finding that the statute of limitations ran before he filed this action.
Shelby
Workers Compensation Panel
George Randall Bailey v. U.S.F.&G. & Institutional Distributors 02S01-9704-CV-00025
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William B. Acree, Jr.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff to be 15 percent permanently partially disabled on account of "emotional or behavioral symptoms." The plaintiff appeals, insisting that the preponderance of the evidence requires a greater award. We disagree, and accordingly affirm the judgment. On March 4, 1996, the plaintiff was injured when struck on the head by falling cartons of pizza dough. A CAT scan revealed no cranial pathology, but owing to his continuing complaints, the plaintiff was extensively treated and examined by Dr. R. A. Tyrer, Dr. Robert Greene, Jr., and Dr. Glenn Barnett, II, neurosurgeons; Dr. Robert Pusakulich, a clinical psychologist; and other experts. The neurologists administered various tests, including an MRI of the brain, MRI of the lumbar spine, MRI of the cervical spine, and an MRI of the head. A host of x-rays, a bone scan and a spinal tap completed the diagnostic testing. These experts found no disability. Dr. Pusakulich believed that the plaintiff was suffering from a "great deal of financial overlay;" so did Dr. Barnett. Dr. Pusakulich also believed the plaintiff demonstrated a remarkable psychogenic overlay, as evidenced by his complaint of double vision that "he saw double with both eyes open and one eye closed," a neuroanatomical impossibility. The plaintiff was referred to Dr. Tewfik E. Rizk, of the St. Joseph Hospital Rehabilitation Center, by his attorney. On his initial examination, Dr. Rizk testified that the plaintiff had a slow, slurred speech, memory loss, and was limping on the left side. His diagnosis was post-traumatic closed-head injury syndrome with left-side hemiparesis. He disagreed with the conclusions 2
