State vs. Frederick Sledge
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs. Frederick Sledge
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Traci Sorrells vs. Donald Lee Sorrells
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Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Lee Smartt
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Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
01A01-9510-CV-00454
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tamco Supply, et al vs. Tom Pollard, et al
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Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Kline vs. Kline
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Court of Appeals | ||
02A01-9411-CV-00265
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Diana Morris v. State
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Court of Appeals | ||
Cecil Ayers vs. Minda Ayers
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Blan D v. State of Tennessee
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony Bland v. State of Tennessee
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lorri Bailey (Capps) vs. David Capps
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Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Arthur Ray Lepley
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Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joe Utley vs. State of Tennessee
The appellant, Joe L. Utley, appeals as of right from a judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner alleges that trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in several areas. After a through review of the record, we REMAND to the trial court with instructions to enter a findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Warren Glenn Brown, Candice Mathis, v. Joe Brown
In this case, the decedent’s grand niece, Candice Mathis, the petitioner, appeals the trial court’s finding that she failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence the lost or destroyed will of her grand uncle, Warren Brown. The trial court ordered that the administration of the estate proceed as an intestate estate. For the following reasons, we reverse. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Mina Woods and Robert Woods v. World Truck Transfer, Inc. and Edward J. Seigham
This appeal involves a personal injury action that was dismissed because the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Davidson County refused to accept and file a summons that had not been prepared on an original form provided by the clerk. By the time the plaintiff provided another summons acceptable to the clerk, the time for filing the complaint and the summons had elapsed. Accordingly, on motion of one of the defendants, the Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed the personal injury claim because it was time-barred. We have determined that the clerk’s office exceeded its authority when it declined to accept and file the summons and, therefore, that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, we vacate the order dismissing the personal injury claims and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel B. Taylor v. Donal Campbell, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction regarding the prisoner's request for access to the Department's rules governing prisoner sentence credits. The Department responded by informing the prisoner that its policies governing prisoner sentence reduction credits could be found in the prison law library. Thereafter, the prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County complaining that he had been wrongfully denied access to public records. The Commissioner of Correction moved to dismiss the complaint. Alternatively, the Commissioner sought a summary judgment and supported his motion with affidavits asserting that the prisoner had already received all the information he sought. Based on these affidavits, the trial court granted the Commissioner's summary judgment motion and dismissed the prisoner's complaint. We have determined that the Commissioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, reverse the summary dismissal of the prisoner's complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Doe v. Jane Doe
The petitioner, an attorney identified as John Doe, filed a petition for contempt alleging violations by the respondent, an attorney identified as Jane Doe, of the confidentiality requirement of Rule 9, section 25 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Court directed the parties to address as a threshold matter the constitutionality of Rule 9, section 25. After considering the arguments of the parties, the Attorney General and amicus curiae, and analyzing the applicable law, we hold that section 25 of Rule 9 violates free speech protections of Article I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. We further conclude that sanctions for criminal contempt are not appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the petition for contempt is denied. |
Jackson | Supreme Court | |
Cybill Shepherd v. Weather Shield Manufacturing, Inc.
The plaintiff brought suit against a manufacturer of windows and doors for allegedly supplying defective products which allowed substantial leaks into her dwelling and caused rotting because of excessive moisture. Following a nonjury trial, the trial court denied the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act but awarded judgment to the plaintiff on her claim that the defendant supplied defective doors and windows. Based upon our review, we affirm the trial court's denial of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim. Finding that the plaintiff did not provide notice to the defendant of its allegedly defective product within the applicable statute of limitations, we reverse the award of damages to the plaintiff and dismiss her complaint. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Owens, as Conservator of Mary Francis King, et al. v. National Health Corporation, et al.
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Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
James Gant v. Kenneth Broadway, County Executive and Chmn of the Decatur County Commission, et al.
Petitioner, James Edward Gant, appeals the judgment of the chancery court denying his application for a beer permit. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Alton F. Dixon v. Nike, Inc.
Plaintiff, Alton F. Dixon, appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendant, Nike, Inc. Nike is a manufacturer of sporting goods, footwear, and apparel, and Dixon was an at-will employee of Nike. Nike encourages its employees to actively participate in improving their work environment and in implementing ideas for new products on the market 2 through a program called “I Got It.” The program invites Nike’s employees to submit ideas that “eliminate waste, improve the way we work, increase productivity, prevent accidents, save time, money, or energy.” Employees can also submit ideas for new products or inventions. In a weekly bulletin for employees, Nike stated, “If what you are suggesting is an idea for a new product or invention, to protect you and NIKE, a letter of understanding will be sent for your signature stating, in essence, that NIKE will not use your product idea until a written contract is negotiated and signed.” |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John R. Farner, Jr.
The State of Tennessee has filed a petition to rehear asking this Court to reconsider certain |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
M2001-01866-CCA-R3-DD
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Supreme Court |