Booker T. Holloway and wife, Brenda Holloway v. James C. Purdy and Chris Purdy
This appeal involves the Tennessee Uninsured Motorist Act. The plaintiffs owned a body shop that was insured under a garage owner’s policy. The policy limited its uninsured motorist coverage to vehicles that were owned by the plaintiffs and listed on the policy. While driving to an auto parts store in a customer’s car, one of the plaintiffs was hit by an uninsured motorist and sustained physical injuries. The plaintiffs then submitted claims to the insurance company that issued the garage owner’s policy, and also to his customer’s insurance company, seeking recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of both policies. After the claims were denied, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the uninsured motorist. The insurance company that issued the plaintiffs the garage owner’s policy filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no coverage because the policy did not cover the plaintiffs while operating a non-owned vehicle. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. As a permissive operator, the injured plaintiff was covered under his customer’s uninsured motorist policy. The customer’s insurance company settled with the plaintiffs, obtained an assignment of their rights against the insurance company that issued them the garage owner’s policy, and then intervened as a third party plaintiff. The intervening plaintiff now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurer under the garage owner’s policy, arguing that the Uninsured Motorist Act prohibits such a limitation. We affirm, finding that the statute does not prohibit the limitation. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Lynn Autry, et al. vs. Phil Hooker, et al.
This appeal involves a sexual harassment claim by a student against a school district. The plaintiff was a student at a high school located in the defendant school district. In her senior year, the plaintiff enrolled in a class taught by the defendant teacher. Several times during class, the teacher made inappropriate comments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff reported the teacher’s behavior, an investigation was conducted, and ultimately the teacher received a letter of reprimand. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against the teacher, the school district, and other school district employees in their official capacities. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district and its employees, and it denied summary judgment to the teacher. The plaintiff student now appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district and its employees. We affirm, concluding that the student’s claims essentially alleged civil rights violations and, therefore, these defendants are immune from suit under the GTLA. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: K.H., S.F., A.F., & W.F.,Tarra Howell and Dennis Lee Moody v. Tanya Dee Ballard and Johnny Freeman
This case involves the termination of parental rights. The mother has a history of criminal activity and past incarcerations, including one for facilitation of murder, and is currently incarcerated. Between incarcerations, the mother lived with her boyfriend, the father of the two youngest of the mother’s five children. The mother’s boyfriend is incarcerated for raping and sexually abusing the mother’s two oldest daughters. With both the mother and her boyfriend incarcerated, the mother’s sister obtained custody of the children and filed this petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights, finding several grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals, arguing that the termination order did not satisfy the statutory requirements, that the trial court erred in finding that grounds for termination exist, and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the children. We find that the trial court’s order, while less than optimal, satisfies the requirements of the statute as to one ground for termination. As to that ground, clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding, as well as the finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Q.D.B, A.R.P., A.T.P. and A.A.W.
Mother appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights based on persistence of conditions. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David Arnold Ferrell v. Fletcher Long
The plaintiff, who paid for legal representation for his brother, sued the attorney for breach of contract, fraud, theft by deception and conversion. The trial court found that the suit had been commenced after the statute of limitations had run. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that his motion for default judgment should have been granted, the statute of limitations had not run, and the judge should have recused himself. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Rose Johnsey, Widow of Frederick Johnsey v. Northbrooke Manor, Inc., et al.
The plaintiff filed suit against a nursing home after her husband allegedly suffered a broken hip while he was a resident there. The nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff could not prove the elements of her claim. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were for medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence, but the court found that under either theory summary judgment was appropriate. We agree with the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s claims sound in medical malpractice, but we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Howard Johnson, Inc. v. Mabra Holyfield, et al.
This appeal arises out of the enrollment of a foreign judgment issued by the New Jersey District Court against defendants residing in Tennessee. Appellants contend that the New Jersey District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that the trial court, therefore, erred by enrolling the judgment against them. Finding that Appellants consented to jurisdiction in the New Jersey District Court, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
City of Knoxville vs. Joshua David Kimsey
Defendant has appealed from a traffic court violation conviction based on documentary evidence created by a camera at a street intersection. The Trial Court affirmed the City Court conviction and defendant has appealed to this Court raising several issues. Upon review of the record and consideration of the evidence, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Eugene Rickman v. Tracy Anna Rickman
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that the phrase “taking up residence,” as used in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, equated to cohabitation, and in finding that Wife did not cohabitate with an unrelated male in violation of such agreement. We are also asked to determine whether the trial court erred in finding no material change of circumstances warranting a modification of Husband’s alimony obligation, and in denying Husband’s motions to re-open and supplement proof and for a new trial, based on newly-discovered evidence. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Arckaiser Watkins, by and through her Guadian Ad Litem, Joe Duncan v. Methodist Healthcare System a/k/a Methodist Germantown, et al.
Plaintiff’s attorney appeals the trial court’s order summarily finding him in direct contempt of court. We vacate the trial court’s order, remand, and order the matter transferred to another judge for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Michael Kelly v. Stacey Lynn Kelly
The trial court denied a motion to terminate alimony based upon a finding that the award was for alimony in solido. Because the marital dissolution agreement provided that the award was subject to review, we find the award to be for alimony in futuro and therefore subject to termination upon the remarriage of the wife. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
City of Oak Ridge v. Diana Ruth Brown
The defendant was stopped by a City of Oak Ridge police officer and cited for speeding. Following an adverse decision in municipal court, the defendant appealed to the trial court. The defendant attempted to raise the defense that the posted speed limit of 45 mph was not legally established, but the trial court would not allow the argument. Subsequently, the trial court found the defendant guilty of speeding and imposed its judgment. On the initial appeal to this court, we vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the matter to allow the defendant the opportunity to present the defense. At the second trial, the defendant failed to put on proof that the posted speed limit was invalid. Once again, the trial court found her guilty of speeding. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Franklin, Tennessee v. Peggy Hunter, et al
Property owners appeal an order authorizing the City of Franklin to demolish a house on their property. Because we have determined that the procedure used by the city did not comply with due process, we reverse. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Gary L. Watts and Janet Watts, Parents And Next Friends of Clinton D. Watts, Deceased v. Earnestine J. Morris, et al. - Concurring
|
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gary L. Watts and Janet Watts, Parents And Next Friends of Clinton D. Watts, Deceased v. Earnestine J. Morris, et al.
This case arises from the death of a graduate student near the University of Memphis. While crossing the street, decedent was struck by a vehicle. Decedent’s parents, on his behalf, have sued the City of Memphis, pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging that the City negligently maintained the defective, unsafe, or dangerous street that decedent was crossing. The trial court held that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the Governmental Tort Liability Act waived the City of Memphis’ immunity from suit or that the City of Memphis was negligent. In addition, the court found that both decedent and the driver of the automobile that struck decedent were negligent and were each 50% at fault of the accident. We affirm on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the street was a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition for which the City’s immunity was waived. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tommy McDaniel, et al. v. Amal Rustom, M.D., et al.
The plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice against emergency room physicians who treated their daughter. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs’ only expert was not qualified to testify as to the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the defendants’ profession and specialty in their community or in a similar community. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs’ expert did not meet the qualifications of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, et al. v. Deliquent Taxpayers, as shown on the 2003 real property Deliquent tax records for Shelby County Trustee, et al. Home Funds Direct, A California Corporation/Delinquent Taxpayers v. William Garrett
This case involves the right to redeem property purchased at a tax sale. The trial court confirmed the petitioner’s right to redeem the property, divested title from the purchaser, and vested title in the original owners. The purchaser appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Holt v. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services
Plaintiff mother who had formally surrendered parental rights to her five children on March 21, |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Audrey Pryor v. Rivergate Meadows Apartment Associates Limited Partnership
When Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint and discovery requests, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the issue of Defendant’s liability. The trial court set a hearing to determine Plaintiff’s damages, and both Plaintiff and Defendant litigated the issue. After the trial court determined the amount of damages, Defendant asked, for the third time, the trial court to set aside the default judgment and schedule a trial on the merits. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, and Defendant appeals. Because Defendant failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense in its motion to set aside the default judgment, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Wayne Buckner, et al.
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“the insurance company”) brought an action for declaratory judgment against Wayne Buckner (“the policyholder”) and others1 seeking a determination regarding its liability and duty to defend under a homeowners’ insurance policy (“the policy”) issued to the policyholder. The insurance company’s action was prompted by lawsuits filed following an incident in which the policyholder’s two teenage sons, William Russell Buckner and Joshua Thomas Buckner (who will be collectively referred to as “Will and Josh”2), fired rifles at tractor-trailers on an interstate highway, resulting in the death of Aaron E. Hamel, the driver of a car, and severe injuries to Kimberly Bede, a passenger in another car. The lawsuits included a personal injury suit by Ms. Bede and David Hickman,3 a personal injury suit by Denise Deneau,4 and a wrongful death action by John Hamel and his wife, Rosemary Hamel.5 The plaintiffs and defendants in the underlying lawsuits will be referred to collectively as “Defendants,” their posture in this declaratory judgment action. Defendants filed counterclaims for declaratory judgment, seeking a determination that the policy provides coverage to the defendants in the underlying actions and that each of the shootings was a separate, covered occurrence. The trial court, in dismissing the insurance company’s complaint and granting judgment on the counterclaims, held, among other things, that an exclusion in the policy against injuries “reasonably expected or intended” by the insured is not implicated by the facts of the underlying suits.6 We hold that the exclusionary provision applies to bar coverage for the suits against Will Buckner and Josh Buckner. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment in favor of the insurance company as to the suits against Will Buckner and Josh Buckner. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Henry Frazier, et al. v. Rickey Helton, et al.
Buyers of a corporation filed suit against sellers for breach of contract. Buyers filed a motion for default judgment for failure to answer written discovery requests, which the trial court granted. Following a hearing on damages, the court entered a final judgment. Two of the sellers filed a motion, seeking to alter or amend the judgment, a new trial or for relief from the judgment, which the trial court denied. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Richard L. Hubbell v. Sumner Anesthesia Associates, Inc., et al - Dissenting
|
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Richard L. Hubbell v. Sumner Anesthesia Associates, Inc., et al
Shareholder and employee of a professional corporation filed suit demanding payment of the fair value of his shares in the corporation following termination of his employment. The corporation subsequently tendered $760.48 to the Sumner County Clerk and Master, the amount it believed represented the fair value of the shareholder’s shares as of the date of his termination of employment with the corporation. The trial court granted summary judgment for the corporation finding the shareholder failed to contradict the corporation’s proposed fair value. Finding error, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Tom R. Smith v. Thomas Harding Potter
Appellant and Appellee are both licensed attorneys practicing in the State of Tennessee. This appeal arises from Appellant's efforts to recover money owed by Appellee on two promissory notes. The trial court found that the promissory notes were executed in recognition of Appellee's debt under two lease agreements. The court concluded that the lease agreements called for fee-splitting between attorneys in violation of Rule 1.5(e) of the Rules of Professional Responsibility. We do not address the merits of the trial court's conclusion on this question. Instead, we find that no final judgment exists in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Antwone J. Terry v. Tennessee Department Of Correction, et al.
The appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court, seeking review of prison disciplinary proceedings. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not notarized or otherwise sworn, as required by statute. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals |
