In the matter of: Amber M. S. and Stefanie L. S.
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Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Shemain Sherille Riley, et al. v. Edith Swift
The General Sessions Court awarded the plaintiffs an $8,500 judgment for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The pro se defendant attempted to appeal the judgment to the Circuit Court, but failed to have the case docketed within 45 days after filing the notice of appeal, as is required by Davidson County Local Rule 20(b). The plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of untimeliness and to enforce the order of the General Sessions Court. The defendant did not respond to the motion, nor did she appear for the motion hearing. The Circuit Court granted the plaintiffs' motion and made the judgment of the General Sessions Court the judgment of the Circuit Court. The defendant then retained counsel, who filed a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment eight months after it was rendered. The Circuit Court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Fieldstone Farms Homeowners Association, et al. v. Cavender Enterprises, LLC
The trial court found that a parcel designated as a recreational facility in a planned unit development was a "lot" under the terms of the governing declarations such that it could not be subdivided or subjected to a revised use. Under the original declaration, the recreational parcel was expressly excluded within the definition of lot but the later supplemented declaration omits the exclusion. Finding that according to its terms the Supplementary Declaration could not conflict with the original declaration, we find the parcel was not included within the definition of lot. Consequently, it is not subject to the restrictions placed on lots. As there is no prohibition to subdivision or conversion to residential use in the documents governing the parcel, then the parcel may be subdivided and converted to residential use. Accordingly, the trial court is reversed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Chris Lawrence vs. Leigh Ann Lawrence
Leigh Ann Lawrence ("Mother") secretly tape recorded her 2 1/2-year-old daughter's telephone conversation with the child's father, Chris Lawrence ("Father"), during the course of a divorce and custody dispute. After the divorce was concluded, Father filed a complaint against Mother seeking damages for, among other things, wiretapping in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _39-13-601 (2006). Father filed a motion for partial summary judgment which the trial court denied upon finding that "[n]o set of facts would create liability under _39-13-601 et seq. for [Mother's] interception of [Father's] communication with his daughter." The court then entered partial summary judgment in favor of Mother and certified the judgment as final. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
New South Federal Savings Bank vs. Brenda Pugh
This is an appeal of two unlawful detainer actions consolidated below. New South Federal Savings Bank ("New South") filed separate detainer warrants against Brenda Pugh seeking possession of two non-adjacent properties conveyed to New South at a foreclosure sale instituted after Pugh defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust on the 1 properties. The general sessions court dismissed the actions. On appeal, the trial court rejected Pugh's challenge to the foreclosure. The court held in favor of New South and ordered that it be restored to possession of the properties. Pugh appeals. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Monya Jill Rayanne Roberts vs. James Kevin Roberts
On appeal, James Kevin Roberts ("Husband") challenges the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance to allow his fifth attorney time to prepare for trial, the trial court's refusal to exclude an expert witness called by Monya Jill Rayanne Roberts ("Wife"), the division of the marital estate, the amount of child support and the award of discretionary costs to Wife. Wife challenges the trial court's denial of her request for "supplemental" attorney's fees. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Tom Agnew vs. Meritan, et al
In this matter, the plaintiff appeals the decision of the Board of Review of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development that he is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-7-301, as a result of his failure to establish that he had covered wages not provided by an unemployment workrelief program financed by a federal agency under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-7-207(c)(5)(G). The trial court upheld the decision of the Board of Review. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Richard L. Holllow, Trustee, et al vs. Michael L. Ingram, et al
The parties, owners of a tract of land, ultimately agreed to the sale of the property by a Special Master appointed by the Court. The sale was held and the Master ultimately reported the purchase and asked that the sale be confirmed. Before the Court acted on the Master's Report, the plaintiff moved for a dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 41, which the Trial Court granted and dismissed the case. On appeal, we hold that the Trial Court was required to act on the Master's Report before entertaining any motion to dismiss the case, and reinstate the action and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Billy Joe Walls
This appeal arises out of a challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Upon the death of the testator, Billy Joe Walls, wills executed by him were submitted for probate in different states. Patricia Pemberton was appointed personal representative under a 2009 will admitted to probate in the trial court. Barbara Brown is the appointed personal representative under a 2007 will admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Alabama. Brown initiated these proceedings by filing a complaint in the trial court 1 to contest the will submitted by Pemberton. Subsequently, Brown sought summary judgment, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, Brown moved to transfer the case to Alabama under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The trial court dismissed Pemberton's petition on both grounds. She appeals. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jane Doe and John Doe v. Walgreens Company, et al.
This is an appeal from the grant of Appellees/Defendants' Tenn. R Civ. P 12.02 motion to dismiss. Appellant Jane Doe, who is HIV positive, was employed by Appellee Walgreens. In an effort to keep her medical condition private, Ms. Doe had her prescriptions filled at a Walgreens location other than the one at which she worked; therefore, Ms. Doe was also a customer of Walgreens. A co-worker of Ms. Doe's accessed Ms. Doe's prescription history in the Walgreens' database, and then disseminated her medical information to other coworkers and to Ms. Doe's fianc_. Ms. Doe and her fianc_ filed suit. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the Does' exclusive remedy was under the workers' compensation act. Finding that the injuries sustained by Ms. Doe do not arise out of her employment with Walgreens, and that she has sufficiently pled causes of action outside workers' compensation law, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ray Bell Construction Co. vs. State of Tennessee, Department of Transportation - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission. I believe the Claims Commission erred in finding a latent ambiguity in the contract, and as this was the purported basis for the Claims Commission’s decision, I would reverse the decision of the Claims Commission and grant judgment to the Tennessee Department of Transportation. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ray Bell Construction Co. vs. State of Tennessee, Department of Transportation
Tennessee Claims Commission - This case concerns an alleged breach of contract involving the incentive clause of a Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT") road construction contract. Before the Claims Commission, TDOT argued that the contract language was clear in prohibiting an extension, alteration, or amendment of the incentive clause. The Claims Commission agreed with the position of Ray Bell Construction Company ("RBCC") that it was entitled to a modification of the incentive provision. To so find, the Commission held that "a definite latent ambiguity exists for which parol evidence not only is admissible, but frankly, absolutely necessary in both understanding and deciding the issues in this case." TDOT has appealed. We affirm the decision of the Claims Commission. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Cardwell vs. Donald Christopher Hutchinson
Amy E. Cardwell ("Petitioner") was sexually abused by Donald Christopher Hutchinson ("Respondent"), who was the Youth Leader at petitioner's church. Petitioner, who is mentally disabled, filed for and obtained an order of protection prohibiting respondent from having any contact with petitioner. Respondent also was prohibited from attending the church where he abused petitioner so long as petitioner continued to attend that church. The order of protection expired in one year, at which time both petitioner and respondent agreed to extend it for another one year period. At the expiration of the second one year term, petitioner filed a motion seeking another one year extension. Respondent opposed the second extension. Following a hearing, the trial court extended the order of protection for another year. Respondent appeals, and we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Madison K. P.
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Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Rawdon, et al. v. Jimmie Lee Johnston, et al.
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Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Kline, et al. v. Club 616, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves a lawsuit filed against a nightclub and several individuals who, according to Plaintiffs, were owners of the nightclub at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit. The trial court granted summary judgment to two of those individuals, finding that they had produced "conclusive" evidence that they had no ownership interest in the club at the relevant time. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jelani Stinson v. Margaret Washington
This is a child custody dispute between a biological father and the children's maternal grandmother. The trial court awarded custody to the grandmother. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dillard Construction, Inc. vs. Haron Contracting Corp., et al.
The only parties left litigating in what started out as a complex construction dispute are, on one side, Dillard Construction, Inc , and, on the other, Dillard's demolition subcontractor, Havron Contracting Corp. After a bench trial and several post-trial motions, the court held that (1) Dillard, while not having a contract with Havron, was required by quantum meruit to pay Havron $91,100 for work performed by Havron's subcontractors; (2) Dillard was not entitled to an offset against that judgment for damage done to electrical equipment by Havron's subcontractor; (3) Havron was entitled to recover from Dillard, under a "passthrough" indemnity theory, the attorney's fees awarded against Havron and in favor of its subcontractor; and (4) Havron was not entitled to recover the attorney's fees that it, Havron, incurred in defending against the claims of its subcontractor. Dillard appeals challenging both the quantum meruit award and the denial of an offset. Havron challenges the trial court's denial of indemnification for attorney's fees Havron incurred in defending the claims of its subcontractor. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Limmie R. Walls v. Bobby G. Hopkins
This tort action arises out of a two-vehicle accident. Plaintiff sued defendant under a negligence theory and sought damages. After a jury trial, the jury equally allocated fault between plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, and the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the jury's verdict is not supported by material evidence and that the trial court erred in permitting testimony regarding plaintiff's intention to use a shortcut. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Katrina Martins, et al. v. Williamson Medical Center
Katrina B. Martins and her husband filed suit against Williamson Medical Center for injuries sustained when Ms. Martins fell in her hospital room. The trial court held that the complaint stated a claim based on medical malpractice and dismissed the lawsuit for failure to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting that the complaint sounded in common law negligence. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: April F. (d.o.b. 11/20/98), Dylan F. (d.o.b. 3/30/00), and Devin F. (d.o.b. 7/24/06 et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the father on the grounds of persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the terms of the permanency plans, and abandonment by willful failure to support. The father appeals, arguing that the Department of Children's Services did not clearly and convincingly show that it made reasonable efforts to help him address his addiction to methamphetamine, clearly and convincingly prove grounds for termination, or clearly and convincingly demonstrate that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Because DCS did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that it made reasonable efforts to reunite the father with his children, we reverse. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Carrol Bivens vs. Donald Eugene Bivens
Brenda Carrol Bivens ("Wife") filed this divorce action against Donald Eugene Bivens ("Husband") in the Hamilton County Circuit Court in the Eleventh Judicial District. At the time of the parties' separation, they lived in Grundy County in the Twelfth Judicial District. Husband has lived in Grundy County his entire adult life. Husband filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue which he claims was granted orally by the trial court. No order dismissing the case ever was entered. The trial court later entered a final decree and marital dissolution agreement submitted by Wife and signed by Husband. Husband filed a motion to set aside the final decree. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that Husband had waived any objection to venue and refused to set aside the final decree. Husband appeals. We conclude that Husband did not waive his objections to venue and that the proper venue in this case never has been Hamilton County. Accordingly, we vacate entry of the final decree and remand this case to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County with instructions to transfer this case to an appropriate court in Grundy County. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Keri C.
This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. The mother of the child tested positive for cocaine when the child was born, and DCS removed the child from the mother's custody and developed a safety plan for the mother. The child was eventually placed in the custody of the petitioners, who are the mother's cousin and her husband. During the time period at issue, the mother's visitation with the child consisted primarily of attending family gatherings and visiting with the child at these gatherings. She paid no child support. After the mother went to the petitioners' home to say that she intended to seek custody of the child, the petitioners filed this petition for termination of the mother's parental rights and for adoption of the child. After a trial, the trial court terminated the mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit. The mother now appeals. We affirm the trial court's finding of abandonment for failure to support and for willful failure to engage in more than token visitation with the child during the four-month time period preceding the filing of the termination petition, and affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Albert J. Hale vs. James Neeley, Commissioner, et al
Claimant, an employee of Wal-Mart, was charged with possession of cocaine and pled guilty to a misdemeanor possession, and was then discharged for violating company policy. Claimant was not at work nor on Wal-Mart's property when the offense occurred. The agency found that claimant was discharged under disqualifying conditions and denied unemployment benefits. Throughout the appeals process, denial of benefits was upheld. On appeal to this Court, we hold that claimant violated Wal-Mart's policies by failing to report his conviction under a criminal drug statute to his employer within three days as required under the employer's policy. We affirm the denial of unemployment benefits to claimant. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy Paul Hopkins vs. Bradley County, Tennessee, et al
Plaintiff was incarcerated in jail on an arrest warrant that authorized bail of $1,500.00, which defendants failed to honor until the elapse of a 12 hour period. The trial judge held the defendants violated the statute governing the arrest warrant, and that the violation amounted to a constitutional violation entitling the plaintiff to damages. We granted an interlocutory appeal on these two rulings by the trial judge. We uphold the trial judge's determination that the defendants violated the statute by holding plaintiff for 12 hours before allowing bond, but reverse the trial court's holding that plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated and remand the case to the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |
