COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Mandi Gregory, et al. v. Peachtree Settlement a/k/a Settlement Funding, LLC, et al.
W2023-01131-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Brent Bradberry

In this conservatorship action, we address whether subject-matter jurisdiction over the ward’s assets remains with the court appointing the conservator. Here, the conservatorship was opened in Madison County. Appellee and the ward’s conservator agreed to transfer some of the ward’s rights to payments from a structured settlement, the ward’s sole asset, to Appellee. Appellee filed a petition for approval of the transfer in Anderson County, where none of the parties resided, and the Anderson County court approved the transfer. A second conservator was appointed for the limited purpose of challenging the Anderson County order, and the instant lawsuit was filed to set aside the Anderson County order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court initially held that Anderson County lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, but on Appellee’s motion to alter or amend, reversed itself. Appellant appeals. Because subject-matter jurisdiction over the ward and her property remained with the conservatorship court, Anderson County lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and its order allowing the transfer of the asset was void ab initio. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s orders finding otherwise and affirm and reinstate its initial order finding no subject-jurisdiction in Anderson County.

Diana Sofia Acevedo v. Daniel Jose Acevedo
W2025-00115-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Felicia Corbin Johnson

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because the order denying recusal conflicts with the trial court’s previously entered standing order of recusal regarding all cases involving Appellant’s attorney, we vacate the trial court’s order denying recusal and remand for resolution of the conflicting orders.

In Re Jacob J.
M2024-00184-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Louis W. Oliver

After this Court dismissed the appellant’s first appeal as untimely, he filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

In Re Raidyn C.
E2024-00286-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Marie Williams

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment for failure to provide support and (2) the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the termination decision.

John Byron Mejia v. Jenna Michelle Leone
M2024-00303-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Darrell Scarlett

This is an appeal from the trial court’s entry of a permanent parenting plan involving one minor child. The trial court named the father the primary residential parent, entered a parenting plan awarding the father the majority of parenting time during the school year, and gave the father authority over the child’s education. The mother appeals. We affirm.

Brandy Leigh Frame Taylor (now Tipper) v. Joseph Daniel Taylor
M2024-00045-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J.B. Cox

This post-divorce appeal arises from competing petitions to modify a parenting plan and a petition for criminal contempt. At the time of the divorce, Brandy Leigh Frame Taylor2 (“Mother”) and Joseph Daniel Taylor (“Father”) adopted a parenting plan naming Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarding Father visitation. The child was four years old at the time of the divorce. Five years later, the then nine-year-old child purportedly began refusing to visit Father. Thereafter, Mother petitioned the trial court to modify the parenting plan to, inter alia, stop all visitation with Father. Father filed a counter-petition to modify the parenting plan to, inter alia, name him the primary residential parent. Father also filed a contempt petition alleging, in relevant part, that Mother intentionally and repeatedly obstructed his visitation and coached the child to refuse to visit Father. After a two-day hearing in which the trial court found Father was a credible witness and Mother was not credible, the court determined that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to Mother’s severe alienation of the child from Father and that a drastic modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. The court’s modifications of the parenting plan included designating Father as the primary residential parent with sole decision-making authority, reducing Mother’s parenting time to what Father had been awarded in the previous order, and restricting Mother to supervised visitation pending a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 psychological evaluation. In a separate order, the court found Mother guilty of seventy-one counts of criminal contempt for willfully violating the parties’ visitation schedule and sentenced Mother to serve concurrent ten-day terms in jail for six of the seventy-one acts of contempt but suspended the sixty-day sentence except for the service of three weekends on the condition that Mother strictly adhere to the court’s orders going forward. Mother appeals the modification of the parenting plan and the trial court’s seventy-one criminal contempt findings. Both parties challenge the sentence imposed for Mother’s criminal contempt. We affirm. Father also requests his attorney’s fees on appeal. We find Father’s request to be well taken and remand for a determination of Father’s reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal.

First South Financial Credit Union v. Collierville 385 Motors, LLC
W2024-01084-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary L. Wagner

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Radonda Vaught v. Tennessee Board of Nursing
M2023-01816-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Patricia Head Moskal

This is an appeal arising from a decision by the Tennessee Board of Nursing (“the Board”)
to revoke a registered nurse’s license after she retrieved the wrong medication from an
automatic dispenser and administered it to a hospital patient, resulting in the patient’s
death. The Tennessee Department of Health (“the Department”) brought an initial
complaint against the nurse concerning the incident, which it first determined did not merit
further action but then later re-opened. Simultaneously, the nurse faced criminal
prosecution and was ultimately convicted of two criminal charges related to the incident.
Following a contested hearing in the administrative proceedings, the Board revoked the
nurse’s license. The nurse sought judicial review of this decision pursuant to Tennessee’s
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. During the judicial review proceeding, the nurse
raised, for the first time, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as affirmative
defenses to the Department’s complaint. In response, the Board argued that the nurse had
waived these affirmative defenses because she had failed to raise them during the
administrative proceedings. While the petition for judicial review remained pending, the
criminal case moved to the sentencing phase. A doctor, who had testified as an expert
witness in both the contested administrative proceeding and the criminal case, wrote a letter
of support for the nurse to the criminal court judge in preparation for her sentencing. When
the nurse learned of the doctor’s supportive letter, she moved the trial court to remand the
instant case to the Board so that the Board could consider the contents of the letter in its
decision. The trial court declined to remand the matter to the Board or to allow the nurse
to present the letter to the Board as additional evidence. The trial court subsequently
entered a final order, determining that the nurse had not waived the affirmative defenses of
res judicata or judicial estoppel but declining to reverse the Board’s decision on those
grounds. The trial court then affirmed the Board’s decision to revoke the nurse’s license.
The nurse has appealed. Upon review, we determine that the nurse waived the affirmative
defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel because she failed to present those doctrines
during the administrative proceedings  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
determination concerning waiver of those defenses. In all other respects, we affirm.

Joe H. Edwards v. Angela L. Underwood
E2023-00640-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri Bryant

Property owners retained a licensed engineer to develop subdivision lots. As partial compensation for his services, the engineer agreed to accept a 6% share of the gross proceeds when the lots were sold. The agreement was to be binding on the property owners’ heirs and assigns. After both owners died, ownership of the remaining unsold lots passed to a daughter through probate. She sold some of the lots without payment of the engineer’s 6% share. The engineer sued the daughter for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Among other things, the daughter argued that the engineer’s action was barred by the probate statutes. The trial court held that the engineer’s 6% share was secured by a statutory lien on the real property and its proceeds and that such lien was not subject to any affirmative defenses. After careful review, we reverse.

In Re Emmeline C.
M2024-00567-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stanley A. Kweller

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her daughter, the trial court found that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Betty Ann Wallace v. First Cash Inc.
E2024-01096-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mike Dumitru

The appellant filed a civil summons in the general sessions court, asserting that items she had pawned at one of the appellee’s locations were returned to her damaged. After the appellant failed to appear at the initial hearing, the matter was dismissed. The appellant appealed the dismissal to the circuit court, which found that the appeal was not timely filed and dismissed the appeal. On appeal in this Court, we have determined that the appellant’s brief is deficient under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and dismiss the appeal.

Wendy Rose, Et Al v. Lakeway Medical Property Partnership, Et Al
E2025-00335-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael S. Pemberton

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the petition, the appeal is hereby dismissed.

Roger Judd et al. v. Kaylee Powell et al.
M2024-00319-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven D. Qualls

This appeal arises out of a petition filed by Roger and Regina Judd (collectively, “Appellants”) seeking grandparent visitation with three minor children, Appellants’ grandchildren. Kaylee and Spencer Powell (collectively, “Appellees”) filed their answer to the petition, claiming that Appellants lacked standing to bring their request. The Putnam County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) dismissed Appellants’ petition for failure to state a claim based on lack of standing. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In Re: Kendin L.
E2024-00209-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Randy M. Kenndy

Rhonda L. (“Mother”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for the City of Bristol (“the Juvenile Court”) to modify a parenting plan granting Mark K. (“Father”) sole custody of Kendin L. (“the Child”) and Mother at least four days of parenting time each month.1 Father filed a motion for injunctive relief seeking the suspension of Mother’s parenting time based upon Mother’s persistent inappropriate behavior and psychological evaluation results. The Juvenile Court entered an ex parte order granting the motion for injunctive relief. After trial, the Juvenile Court dismissed Mother’s petition for her failure to prosecute and ordered that the suspension of Mother’s parenting time remain in full effect until Mother engaged in therapy and treatment for her personality disorder. Mother appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In Re Gabriel T.
M2024-00486-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Haylee Ann Bradley-Maples

This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Humphreys County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Tabitha P. (“Mother”) and Cody T. (“Father”) to their minor child Gabriel T. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on several grounds. Mother and Father appeal, arguing mainly that DCS failed to assist or communicate with them. The Juvenile Court determined that Mother and Father were not credible witnesses, a determination we leave undisturbed. We find that each ground for termination found by the Juvenile Court was proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm.

Deena Brell v. Deniece Thomas, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development et al.
M2024-00300-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bonita Jo Atwood

This is an appeal of a denial of unemployment benefits. The issue presented is whether, under Tennessee’s unemployment statutes, an employee who gives her employer notice of her resignation as of a certain date and is terminated by the employer prior to the effective resignation date is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits on the ground that the employee voluntarily quit. The trial court affirmed the agency’s decision denying benefits. Based upon the plain language of the relevant statutory provision, we conclude that the employee’s actions do not constitute a voluntary decision to quit. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision.

Mahdieh Shabanian v. Seyed Mohammad Hadi Hosseini
W2024-00886-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gina C. Higgins

We do not reach the substantive issues because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Vacated and remanded.

Jeremy Wayne Long v. Candice O'Brien Beasley et al.
M2024-00444-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge David D. Wolfe

This is a defamation action filed by a plaintiff police officer against two defendants concerning allegedly defamatory comments the defendants posted on Facebook about the officer. The defendants, citizens of Ashland City, where the plaintiff had served as a police officer for several years, filed a petition to dismiss the defamation action pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied the petition, determining that the officer had successfully established a prima facie case of defamation against each defendant and that the defendants had not met their burden to establish a valid defense. The defendants appealed the denial, arguing that the officer, a public official, had not met the heightened standard of proof necessary to establish that either of them had acted with actual malice when posting their comments to Facebook. During the pendency of this appeal, the officer attempted to nonsuit the underlying defamation lawsuit and moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. Upon review, we determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the officer’s voluntary nonsuit, and therefore we deny the motion to dismiss this appeal. We further determine, upon our de novo review of the record, that the trial court should have granted the defendants’ TPPA petition and dismissed the defamation lawsuit, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 17-20-105(b), because the officer failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that either defendant had acted with actual malice when posting the Facebook comments. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

Stevy Ellis, et al. v. Snookums Steakhouse, LLC, et al.
W2024-01165-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph T. Howell

The patron of a restaurant sued the business and its owner when she was injured attempting to sit on a bench outside the business. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the patron failed to demonstrate the existence of a dangerous or defective condition. We affirm.

Manoucheka Thermitus v. Schiller Jerome
W2024-01508-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins

Appellant, Schiller Jerome, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on September 3, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

Ronald Austin v. Angela Kay Plese
E2024-00586-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Deborah C. Stevens

This appeal arises from a lawsuit over defamation and false light invasion of privacy.
Ronald Austin and Linda Austin (“Mr.” and “Ms. Austin,” respectively) (“Plaintiffs,”
collectively) were neighbors of Angela Kay Plese (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs and Defendant
did not get along. At one point, Defendant posted certain statements on Facebook about
Ms. Austin, including that Ms. Austin had been convicted in Texas of deadly conduct with
a gun. While Ms. Austin had pled guilty many years earlier to a Texas statute called
“deadly conduct,” this was in the context of her reaching a better deal in a DUI case. Ms.
Austin’s matter did not involve a gun. Plaintiffs sued Defendant for defamation and false
light in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court
found in favor of Plaintiffs, awarding $95,100 in total damages for Ms. Austin’s medical
expenses, damage to reputation, emotional distress, punitive damages, as well as Mr.
Austin’s loss of consortium.1 Defendant appeals. We vacate that portion of the Trial
Court’s award concerning damage to Ms. Austin’s reputation since the record contains no
evidence of such damage. Therefore, we modify the judgment to $75,100. Otherwise, we
affirm.

Kenneth Merritt v. Home Town Disposal, LLC
W2024-01453-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary L. Wagner

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Barbara Ellen Lee v. Deanna Lynn Peavy
M2024-00890-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

After an unfavorable judgment in a detainer action for real property in general sessions court, the Plaintiff sought relief in Davidson County Circuit Court. Two and a half years later, after numerous resettings, the court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Dale Muhlenberg v. Neva Muhlenberg
M2025-00307-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: PER CURIAM
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Thompson

This is an appeal from an order entered on January 2, 2025. The appellant filed her notice of appeal on February 24, 2025, together with a motion requesting an extension of time within which to file the appeal. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the motion for extension and dismiss the appeal.  

Jolene Renee Scholl v. Michael Ray Scholl
M2025-00314-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: PER CURIAM
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ben Dean

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on December 10, 2024. The appellant filed his notice of appeal with the appellate court clerk on March 3, 2025, together with a Motion to Accept Late Filing. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal with the appellate court clerk is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the Motion to Accept Late Filing and dismiss the appeal.