Raymond Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Raymond Roger Jones, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court's dismissal of his pro se combined motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, petition for writ of error coram nobis, and petition for DNA analysis. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court of two counts of first degree murder. He received consecutive life sentences. This Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Jones, 735 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Washington County Criminal Court. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this Court affirmed. See Raymond Roger Jones v. State, No. 03C01-9102-CR-00068, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 26, 1991), perm. to app. denied (Tenn. 1992). On June 22, 2001, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, alleging that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), established a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application to his case. Petitioner subsequently filed a supplemental request for DNA analysis. The trial court dismissed the motion and denied Petitioner's request for DNA Analysis. Petitioner appeals. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frank W. Johnson v. Glen Turner, Warden
The petitioner, Frank W. Johnson, pled guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to thirteen and one-half years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he pled guilty to an illegal sentence. The trial court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Wayne McCormick
The defendant appeals from convictions of aggravated assault and evading arrest. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts, and that the sentence of eight years for aggravated assault was excessive. After careful consideration and a thorough review of the record, the convictions and the sentences are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Harrison
The Defendant, Ronald Harrison, was indicted for rape, and he pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of sexual battery. After holding a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, suspended sentence and probation, and sentenced the Defendant to two years in the county workhouse. The Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his application for judicial diversion; and (2) sentenced him to two years. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion. Further, we hold that the trial court improperly enhanced the Defendant’s sentences in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and we reduce the Defendant’s sentence in accordance with this opinion to the presumptive minimum of one year. We remand the case for the entry of appropriate judgments of conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles R. Turner
The Appellant, Charles R. Turner, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of two counts of identify theft and sentenced to concurrent sentences of three years, with service of one year in confinement. In addition, Turner was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, Turner raises four issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to suppress an in-court identification by a witness; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (3) whether the trial court imposed excessive sentences; and (4) whether the trial court erred in determining the amount of restitution. After review of the record, we conclude that the identification issue is without merit and the evidence is legally sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of conviction. However, after review, we conclude that the trial court failed to sentence the Appellant in accordance with the 1989 Sentencing Act and to properly determine the Appellant’s ability to pay the ordered restitution. Accordingly, we remand the case for a proper determination of these sentencing issues. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chance Coy Herron
The defendant appeals, on a certified question of law, the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence resulting from his warrantless arrest and search of his home. Because the defendant has failed to properly reserve a certified question of law for appeal, we dismiss. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Ray Dockery
The defendant, Jimmy Ray Dockery, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's decision to deny probation on his two-year sentence for attempt to fraudulently obtain a controlled substance. Based on our review of the record, we affirm the judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Merritt
The appellant, Mario Merritt, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of especially aggravated robbery. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant now brings this appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rosendo Reyna
The Appellant, Rosendo Reyna, appeals his convictions for multiple felony drug offenses by a Shelby County jury. On appeal, Reyna raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. After review, we find the evidence sufficient. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. However, because the record reflects that the offenses were not properly merged, we remand for merger and entry of corrected judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Kirkendall
The appellant, Christopher Kirkendall, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Kirkendall - Concurring
I agree that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that, under the terms of the 1989 Sentencing Act, the trial court erred by applying enhancement factors (10), (11), and (17). It is my view, however, that the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 2004), precludes the application of enhancement factor (21) in this case. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald W. Streck
The state appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's order granting Donald W. Streck's motion to receive jail credits toward his Tennessee sentence for time that he spent in federal custody serving federal sentences. Because the lower court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the motion, we reverse. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason D. Love
The defendant, Jason D. Love, appeals the trial court's denial of alternative sentences. The defendant pled guilty to three counts of delivery of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jody Lee Turner
Following his guilty plea to two counts of theft, the defendant, Jody Lee Turner, was sentenced in the Cumberland County Criminal Court to an effective four-year term to be served on probation, supervised by a community corrections program agency. A few weeks later, the court revoked the community placement and ordered the defendant to serve his four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. From that order, the defendant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgments below. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger Dale Cates
The defendant, Roger Dale Cates, was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with one hundred twenty days to be served in jail and the balance to be served on probation. The defendant's driver's license was revoked for a period of three years. Because the trial court properly instructed the jury as to whether the defendant was in control of the vehicle, the judgment is affirmed. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Monty Earl Picklesimer
The defendant, Monty Earl Pickelsimer, entered negotiated pleas of guilt to theft of property having a value of more than $10,000.00 or more but less than $60,000.00 and theft of property having a value of more than $1000.00 more but less than $10,000.00. The plea agreement included concurrent Range I sentences of three years on each offense and certified a question of law for appeal as to whether the defendant was denied a speedy trial under the state and federal constitutions. Because the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial, the judgment is reversed, the conviction is set aside, and the cause is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Godsby, Jr. v. Rickey Bell, and the State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he contends that: (1) the State cannot maintain convictions on both murder and robbery when the murder was committed in the act of robbery; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because he did not plead to the charge of attempted second degree murder; and (3) the court erred in dismissing his petition without first appointing him counsel. After careful review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Maria MacLin v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Maria Maclin, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and a ten thousand dollar fine was imposed. Following an unsuccessful appeal of her conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court’s denial of her petition. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Allen Ken Kinney, III
The defendant, Allen Ken Kinney, III, entered pleas of guilt to two counts of sale of a controlled substance, .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, a Schedule II drug. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(A)(3). The trial court imposed concurrent, Range I, eight-year sentences on each of the two Class B felonies, requiring twelve months in jail, less thirty-nine days of pretrial jail credit, with the balance to be served on probation.1 The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with a sentence imposed in Kentucky. In this appeal, the defendant complains that the term of incarceration was excessive. The judgments are affirmed. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Earice Roberts
The defendant, Earice Roberts, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of heroin with the intent to sell, a Class B felony; possession of heroin with the intent to deliver, a Class B felony; and two counts of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. After merging the possession of heroin with intent to sell conviction with the possession of heroin with the intent to deliver conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for possession of heroin with the intent to deliver; eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of marijuana; and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each assault. The trial court ordered that the marijuana sentence be served concurrently to the heroin sentence, but that the sentences for assault be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to the twelve-year sentence for possession of heroin, for a total effective sentence of thirteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raised on appeal was whether the trial court erred in admitting the heroin into evidence because of the State’s alleged failure to establish a proper chain of custody. However, while the case was still pending, the defendant filed a motion requesting that we consider an additional issue on appeal; namely, the impact of the United States Supreme Court’s recently released Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___,124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), opinion on the enhanced heroin sentence imposed as well as on the consecutive sentencing ordered in the case. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the heroin into evidence; that three of the four enhancement factors were inappropriately applied under Blakely, but that the remaining applicable enhancement factor, to which the trial court assigned heavy weight, justifies an enhanced sentence of ten years, six months; and that Blakely does not affect the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, we modify the defendant’s sentence for possession of heroin with the intent to deliver from twelve years to ten years, six months, but in all other respects affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arthur Southern
The Defendant, Arthur Southern, pled guilty to two counts of sale of a schedule II controlled substance. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years and three months on each count and ordered that the sentences run consecutively, for an effective sentence of eighty years and six months. The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. The Defendant then filed a motion for a new sentencing hearing or a sentence reduction, which the trial court denied. On appeal the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) ordered that his sentences run consecutively. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael K. Massengill
The defendant, Michael K. Massengill, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to place him back on intensive probation or in the community corrections program after he violated his probation. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James D.L. Perry v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The petitioner, James D. L. Perry, appeals pro se from the Johnson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The petitioner attacks his two convictions for possession with intent to sell one-half or more grams of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school for which he received concurrent twenty-year terms. He contends that the first cocaine conviction is void because he was entrapped, that the second cocaine conviction is void because he was convicted of a crime for which he was not indicted, and that both convictions are void because he was convicted under a statute which he claims was inapplicable. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamar Ross - Concurring and Dissenting
I write separately because, in my view, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), precludes the application of enhancement factor (5). While I agree with the majority that the jury's verdict in count two necessarily includes a finding that the victim is mentally defective, the verdict does not include a finding that the victim was particularly vulnerable because of his mental disability, which is required by the statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(5) (2003). Our supreme court has held that factor (5) may be used only "if the circumstances show that the victim, because of his age or physical ormental condition, was in fact 'particularly vulnerable,' i.e., incapable of resisting, summoning help, or testifying against the perpetrator." State v. Adams, 864 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Tenn. 1993). In my view, the verdict of the jury does not necessarily reflect that fact. In consequence, factor (5) would not be applicable under the rule established in Blakely. Because only one enhancement factor remains, I would have modified the sentence to twenty-one years, one year above the presumptive sentence. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamar Ross
The defendant, Lamar Ross, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury on two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, under alternate theories, for one offense. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of both counts, which were merged into a single judgment of conviction, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentencing imposed. Based on our review, we modify the conviction in Count 2 to rape, a Class B felony, in accordance with the offense with which the defendant was charged. Further, we conclude that two of the four enhancement factors are inapplicable, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Accordingly, we modify the aggravated rape conviction in Count 2 to rape, which merges into the conviction for aggravated rape in Count 1, and reduce the defendant’s sentence to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |
