State of Tennessee v. Gerald L. Powers
The Defendant, Gerald L. Powers, was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery and of aggravated robbery. The jury sentenced the Defendant to death for the murder on the basis of three aggravating circumstances: that the Defendant was previously convicted of one or more violent felonies; that the Defendant committed the murder to avoid his arrest and/or prosecution; and that the Defendant committed the murder while committing a kidnapping. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant as a Range III persistent offender to thirty years incarceration for the aggravated robbery, to be served consecutive to the death sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges his convictions, raising the following issues: (1) whether the evidence identifying him as the perpetrator is sufficient; (2) whether a variance between the indictment and the proof at trial is material and prejudicial; (3) whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the crimes; (4) whether the Defendant's wife's testimony should have been suppressed pursuant to the marital communications privilege; (5) whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence in support of a third-party defense; (6) whether the trial court erred in admitting a lay witness's testimony identifying photographs as being of the Defendant; and (7) whether the trial court erred in admitting a deposition taken in Mississippi by a Tennessee notary public. The Defendant challenges the imposition of the death sentence on the following grounds: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting the facts underlying the Defendant's prior felonies; (2) whether the Defendant's prior felonies were violent within the meaning of the statutory aggravating circumstance; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that the Defendant committed the murder to avoid his arrest and/or prosecution; (4) whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of the victim's bad character; and (5) whether Tennessee's death penalty scheme is constitutional. Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court should have sentenced him as a Range II offender for the aggravated robbery. Upon our review of the record and relevant legal authority, we find no reversible error in the Defendant's convictions or in the imposition of the death sentence. We reduce the Defendant's sentence for the aggravated robbery to twenty years. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony H. Dean
The defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and sentenced to forty years as a violent offender. He timely appealed, alleging, inter alia, that the trial court erred in not suppressing a confession obtained, following his warrantless arrest, after he had been jailed for five days without a determination of probable cause; in allowing DNA results into evidence; and in permitting a forensic nurse examiner to testify as a keeper of the sexual assault resource center records. Based upon our review, we conclude that testimony regarding the records of the Memphis Sexual Assault Resource Center was properly admitted as business records testimony and that the DNA evidence was properly admitted, as well. We conclude that the defendant's confinement violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that his confession should have been suppressed. However, this error was harmless in light of the other evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert L. Easterly
In this interlocutory appeal, Robert L. Easterly challenges the Knox County Criminal Court's order denying his motion to dismiss a presentment against him. Easterly claims that the state is barred from prosecuting him for the offense charged in the presentment because (1) the case was not joined with a prior prosecution of him in Sevier County, (2) the criminal conduct charged in the presentment is the same offense for double jeopardy purposes as the case in which he was convicted in Sevier County, and (3) the delay in commencement of the Knox County prosecution violates his speedy trial and due process rights. Because we agree with the defendant that both the mandatory joinder rule and double jeopardy principles bar dual prosecutions, we reverse the trial court's order and dismiss the presentment. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jody Sweat
The defendant, Jody Sweat, indicted for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault, was convicted of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 11 and four years, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for attempted second degree murder; argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on attempted second degree murder as a lesser included offense; contends that the state was guilty of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and submits that the jury was allowed to consider exhibits never offered into evidence. The judgments are affirmed. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Troy Wayne Davis
The defendant, Troy Wayne Davis, was convicted of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years, to be served consecutively to a robbery sentence for which the defendant was on probation at the time of the aggravated assault. The single issue presented for review is whether the evidence is sufficient. The judgment is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Grady Paul Gatlin - Concurring and Dissenting
I must respectfully depart from the lead opinion in this case. I cannot conclude that the misdemeanor offense of casually exchanging a controlled substance is a lesser-included offense of felony possession with the intent to sell or deliver. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4) (1997) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418(a) (1997). |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Grady Paul Gatlin
The Defendant, Grady Paul Gatlin, was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to sell a schedule IV controlled substance, possession with intent to sell a schedule II controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy to possess with intent to sell a schedule II |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Grady Paul Gatlin - Dissenting
I, like Judge Witt, respectfully disagree with Judge Welles’ conclusion that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to charge “casual exchange” as a lesser-included offense of possession with intent to sell. However, I also respectfully disagree with Judge Witt’s conclusion that the failure to give the casual exchange inference instruction was plain error. I would affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas L. Jones
The appellant was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder and was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-one years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant of second degree murder; and (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial because of improper jury instructions characterizing the appellant's statement as a confession. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas E. Cowan, Jr.
The defendant, Thomas E. Cowan, Jr., was found guilty of contempt. The trial court imposed a jail sentence of 10 days, six of which were suspended. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient; that the trial judge should not have acted as a witness; and that the sentence was excessive. Because the evidence was insufficient, the judgment is reversed and the cause dismissed. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Neil Friedman
The defendant, Neil Friedman, was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, six months of which was to be served in the county jail, for driving under the influence. A consecutive sentence of six months, 30 days of which was to be served, was imposed for driving on a revoked license. This court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. State v. Neil M. Friedman, No. 03C01-9704-CR-00140 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 14, 1998). The application for permission to appeal to the supreme court was denied December 21, 1998. In a hearing conducted on the following day, the trial court reduced the DUI sentence to 120 days, which the defendant has since served, followed by seven months and 29 days of probation. Over one year later, the trial court revoked the probation and ordered service of the remainder of the sentence. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court no longer had authority to revoke the probation. Because the sentence had been fully served and the probationary term had ended when the probation revocation warrant was issued, the judgment must be reversed and the cause dismissed. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew Patrick Frontera, a/k/a Matthew Anthony Frontera, a/k/a Patrick Matthew Foster, a/k/a Derrick Joshua Foster
The Defendant, Matthew Patrick Frontera, pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. As part of his plea agreement, the Defendant attempted to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law relating to the legality of his stop, detention and questioning by police officers. In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained against him due to an unlawful stop and detention. He also argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to serve six months in the county jail with release eligibility at seventy-five percent. Because the Defendant failed to properly reserve his issue concerning his stop and detention, we are unable to reach the merits of that issue. We affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marvin W. Hill, Jr.
In July 1999, the Defendant pled guilty to evading arrest and possession of marijuana, both Class A misdemeanors, and received concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days supervised probation. In December 1999, the Defendant was indicted for assault and aggravated criminal trespass, both of which are also Class A misdemeanors. In January 2000, a violation of probation warrant was issued against the Defendant, alleging that he had violated his probation in the first two cases. In March 2000, the Defendant pled guilty to the assault and aggravated criminal trespass charges, and a combined sentencing hearing and probation violation hearing was held by the trial court. The trial court revoked the Defendant's probation in the first two cases and imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration. The court also imposed sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the second two cases, to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentences imposed in the first two cases. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing sentences of incarceration in each case. Because our review of the record reveals that the sentences were proper, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
King David Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, King David Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sandra Brown
The defendant appeals the judgment of the trial court revoking her probation. She raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence supported the trial court's finding that she violated the terms of her probation by committing the offense of accessory after the fact; and (2) whether the trial court had the authority to order her to continue her supervised probation pending this appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we find both issues have merit; therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Morris Jason Pepper
The appellant, Morris Jason Pepper, was convicted by a jury in the Lincoln County Circuit Court of one count of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to grant the appellant's motion to suppress. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David D. Harris
The State appeals the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court suspending the appellee's sentences for aggravated robbery and granting the appellee probation for a term of twenty-four years. Following a review of the record and the State's brief, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry A. Rogier
The appellant, Terry A. Rogier, by means of an interlocutory appeal seeks review of the trial court's decision affirming the district attorney general's denial of pre-trial diversion. Rogier was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for the offenses of reckless endangerment, a class E felony, and reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor. After review, we find that the prosecutor failed to consider all the relevant factors in denying diversion. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's finding that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kelvin A. Taylor v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Kelvin A. Taylor, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Weakley County Circuit Court. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Taylor entered a "best interest" plea to class D felony child abuse, and was sentenced to six years in the Department of Correction as a range II offender. In this collateral attack of his conviction, Taylor presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the general sessions court's revocation of his bond without a hearing and the resulting confinement prior to indictment violated double jeopardy and due process rights; and (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Janet Lawson
The defendant pled guilty to one count of theft over $1,000.00 and the trial court sentenced her as a Range I standard offender to three years probation. The defendant appeals from the revocation of her probation, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. Because we conclude that the record supports that trial court's decision to revoke the defendant's probation, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles R. Francis
In an indictment returned by the Morgan County Grand Jury, defendant, Charles R. Francis, was charged with fourth offense DUI. Count 1 of the indictment alleged that the triggering offense of DUI occurred on December 10, 1998. Count 2 of the indictment alleged that he had previously been convicted of DUI on three separate occasions in Morgan County, Tennessee. The defendant entered a "blind plea" to DUI, fourth offense, and sentencing was submitted to the trial court for a later hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ruled that defendant was convicted of the Class E felony of DUI, fourth offense, ordered a sentence of two (2) years, with service by split confinement of 150 days in the county jail, and the balance of the sentence to be served in the Community Corrections program. Asserting that he should have been sentenced for commission of a Class A misdemeanor DUI, fourth offense, rather than a Class E felony, defendant has appealed. The original judgment entered by the trial court reflected conviction of a Class A misdemeanor, but the judgment was later amended to reflect conviction of a Class E felony, in accord with the trial court's ruling at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. We affirm the amended judgment of the trial court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott Ray Anderson
The defendant appeals the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Blount County revoking his community corrections sentence. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in the penitentiary. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William A. Tansil
The defendant, William A. Tansil, appeals from his conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense, for which he received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with all but one hundred fifty days being suspended. He contends that the trial court erred in finding him to be a third-time offender, arguing that the judgment for one of his prior convictions is void on its face. We affirm the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert G. Bean
The appellant, Robert G. Bean, challenges his conviction in the Williamson County Circuit Court of one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense. He presents the following issues for our determination: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's challenge for cause of prospective juror Thelma Woodard; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to suppress the State's use at trial of the videotape of the traffic stop of the appellant's vehicle; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on adult driving while impaired as a lesser-included offense of driving under the influence; and (4) whether the trial court erred in using the appellant's 1996 conviction of DUI to enhance the appellant's sentence. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie D. Denson
he defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault with an agreed four-year sentence, and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied the defendant any alternative sentence and ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals the trial court's judgment denying him an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals |
