State of Tennessee v. Linda Anne Dunavant
The Defendant, Linda Anne Dunavant, was convicted of aggravated assault and filing a false police report and sentenced, respectively, to terms of three years and two years, to be served concurrently. On appeal, she argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault, and that the court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Luis G. Mendoza v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Luis G. Mendoza, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his motion for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the motion. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher C. Solomon
The Defendant, Christopher C. Solomon, entered an open guilty plea to aggravated vehicular homicide, aggravated vehicular assault, and leaving the scene of an accident. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-three years and imposed a restriction banning the Defendant from driving for life. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred in imposing a lifetime ban from driving. We conclude that the Defendant’s sentence is not excessive but that the trial court erred in imposing the lifetime driving ban. Accordingly, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment for the Defendant’s aggravated vehicular homicide conviction to reflect that the Defendant’s license is to be revoked in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-501(a)(1). We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nikia Bowens
A jury convicted Defendant, Nikia Bowens, of six counts of theft of property under the value of $500 and burglary in case number 105992, and of theft of property under the value of $500 and burglary in case number 106786. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve a total effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for his convictions in both cases. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the theft convictions, but asserts that his burglary convictions violate the principles of due process under the Tennessee and United States Constitutions because Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402(a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague and does not provide defendants fair warning that they can be prosecuted for burglary if they commit or attempt to commit a felony, theft or assault after entering a building open to the public knowing that the property owner has revoked its consent for them to enter. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we conclude that subsection 39-14- 402(a)(3) is not vague, that the word “building” in subsection -402(a)(3) is not ambiguous, and that Defendant’s due process rights were not violated by his burglary convictions. Thus, we affirm Defendant’s convictions, but remand for correction of judgments. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Kane Ivey
Jason Kane Ivey, Defendant, was convicted following a jury trial of two counts of misdemeanor theft based on alternative theories and one count of Class D felony burglary. The trial court merged the theft conviction in Count 3 into the theft conviction in Count 2 and then merged the theft conviction in Count 2 into the burglary conviction in Count 1 and sentenced Defendant to serve four years as a Range II multiple offender. Defendant claims that his burglary conviction “violated constitutional due process protections” because Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402 is unconstitutionally vague and subsection 39-14-402(a)(3) failed to give him fair warning that his conduct was forbidden by the burglary statute. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and applicable law, we hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402 is not unconstitutionally vague and that subsection 39-14-402(a)(3) provided fair warning to a person of common intelligence that a person could be convicted of burglary for committing theft after entering a building open to the public, knowing the owner had revoked its effective consent for the person to enter. We affirm the judgments of conviction. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John D. Henry
The Appellant, John D. Henry, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI) per se, fifth offense, and driving on a revoked license and received an effective two-year sentence to be served as 150 days in jail with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motions to suppress evidence because his warrantless stop did not fall under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and because he did not voluntarily consent to his warrantless blood draw. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
McArthur Bobo v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, McArthur Bobo, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was deprived of his right to a full and complete hearing on his motion for new trial because the trial court confused his case with another case, that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and that his due process rights were violated by the fact that he never received the statement of a key witness. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephano Lee Weilacker
Following a jury trial in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, Defendant, Stephano Lee Weilacker, was found guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery for his role in a criminal episode at the Triangle Kwick Stop (Triangle Market) in Montgomery County. He received an effective sentence of twenty years to be served consecutively to a sentence received for another aggravated robbery. This is the fourth time the direct appeal has been before this court. Per the order of the Tennessee Supreme Court granting Defendant’s Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 application, we address three issues in this opinion: (1) plenary review of Defendant’s assertion that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted by the trial court, (2) plenary review of Defendant’s issue that he is entitled to a new trial because of improper closing arguments by the prosecutor; and (3) plain error review of Defendant’s issue wherein he asserts that the trial court caused a reversible constructive amendment to the especially aggravated kidnapping count, and that there was a fatal variance between the proof and the allegations in the indictment. Following a thorough review, we reverse the judgments and remand for a new trial. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephano Lee Weilacker - concurring in part and dissenting in part
I agree with majority’s conclusion that after plenary review, Defendant is not entitled to relief on the suppression issues regarding his detention and arrest. I further agree with the majority’s conclusion that Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief on the indictment issue. However, I respectfully disagree that Defendant is entitled to a new trial for statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Rich v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Rich, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Felipe Gonzales
The Appellant, Felipe Gonzales, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received an effective fifty-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police, that the trial court erred by not allowing him to cross-examine witnesses about possible bias, that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on attempt as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child, that his convictions violate double jeopardy, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Godspower v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Charles Godspower, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that due process considerations should toll the running of the statute of limitations because he timely handed his petition to a prison guard during a period of “lockdown” in the prison. He further argues that his trial counsel were per se ineffective in his defense and that he should have been granted post-conviction funds for a mental evaluation. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as time-barred. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Areanna O. Lloyd
Defendant, Areanna O. Lloyd, entered guilty pleas to two counts of robbery in concert with two or more others in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-401 and 39-12-302, Class B felonies, and pursuant to the plea agreement was sentenced to concurrent terms of seven years, two months, and twelve days, in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) as a mitigated offender with release eligibility after service of twenty percent of the sentence. After Defendant was denied parole, she filed a “Petition for Suspended Sentence” (“the petition”). Following a hearing, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction over Defendant’s sentence and denied the petition. Defendant then filed a “Motion to Reconsider” (“the motion”), arguing that she had remained incarcerated in Rutherford County and was never transferred to the physical custody of TDOC, and therefore, the trial court retained “full jurisdiction over the manner of [D]efendant’s sentence service” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-212(c) and (d)(1). Following a second hearing, the trial court granted the petition and ordered Defendant to serve the balance of her sentence on supervised probation, and the State filed the instant appeal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by suspending the balance of the sentence service and placing her on probation. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Areanna O. Lloyd - dissenting in part
I agree with the majority’s well-reasoned conclusion that the trial court maintained jurisdiction over Defendant’s sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-212 to consider her petition for a suspended sentence. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court correctly modified the Defendant’s agreed upon sentence, which was the result of a fully negotiated plea agreement between Defendant and the State just mere months earlier. There is no evidence of post-sentencing information or developments that would warrant an alteration of the agreed upon manner of service of Defendant’s sentence. I respectfully dissent. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricky Harris v. State of Tennessee
In 1988, a Carter County jury convicted the Petitioner, Ricky Harris, of first degree murder. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. See State v. Ricky Jerome Harris, No. 85, 1990 WL 171507, at *25 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 8, 1990), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991). In 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The trial court held a hearing and denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to coram nobis relief based upon newly discovered evidence as well as evidence withheld by the prosecution. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Edward Clardy v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Thomas Edward Clardy, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and three counts of reckless endangerment. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance counsel, that he is actually innocent, and that the trial court erred by denying him the opportunity to make an offer of proof at the post-conviction hearing. After a thorough review, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and failed to prove that he is actually innocent. Though Petitioner should have been given the opportunity to make an offer of proof, we hold that this error by the post-conviction court was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Arnell Britton
The pro se Defendant, Tony Arnell Britton, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Caraway v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Terry Caraway, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and aggravated burglary. On December 15, 2004, Petitioner pleaded guilty to first degree premeditated murder, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment. On May 12, 2015, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to toll the post-conviction statute of limitations, claiming that he was mentally incompetent and that he was unable to understand the law and comply with the statute of limitations, and a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary. Petitioner was appointed counsel, and counsel filed an amended motion to toll the statute of limitations. An evidentiary hearing on the motion to toll the statute of limitations was held on February 25, 2016, and taken under advisement. An order was entered on December 25, 2016, granting Petitioner the services of an expert “to the extent allowed by law” to determine whether Petitioner suffered from mental illness at the time of the offenses. On August 3, 2017, the postconviction court entered an order denying Petitioner’s motion, in which the court concluded that Petitioner had been unable to present sufficient evidence to prove he suffered from mental illness during the applicable time period. The order effectively dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief, which was filed several years after the statute of limitations had expired. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Devon Brown v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Devon Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2012 convictions of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clark Beauregard Waterford III v. State of Tennessee
A jury convicted the Petitioner, Clark Beauregard Waterford III, of second degree murder for the stabbing of Ms. Faye Burns, and the Petitioner was sentenced to serve forty years in prison. After the Petitioner’s conviction and sentencing, DNA evidence favorable to the Petitioner came to light, and the Petitioner sought post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court determined that the Petitioner had not received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, that the Petitioner had not established entitlement to relief based on the State’s failure to provide exculpatory evidence, and that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief, and we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Arthur Lee Jamison, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
A jury convicted the Petitioner, Arthur Lee Jamison, Jr., of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of a substance containing cocaine within a drug-free school zone. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel when trial counsel failed to communicate with him, failed to file pretrial motions, including a notice of his intent to use the entrapment defense, failed to investigate and summon witnesses, and gave deficient advice regarding testifying at trial. Because the Petitioner has failed to establish either deficiency or prejudice for each claim, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcus Dwayne Townsend v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition related to his guilty plea convictions of two counts of rape of a child, for which he is serving concurrent twenty-five-year sentences as a violent child rapist with 100% service. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition and argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Berline Orrick
This interlocutory appeal concerns the Warren County Circuit Court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to disqualify the Office of the District Attorney General for the Thirty-First Judicial District based upon an imputed conflict of interests of an assistant district attorney general. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tywan Montrease Sykes
Defendant, Tywan Montrease Sykes, was convicted by a Blount County jury of a violation of the sex offender registry, for which he received a sentence of two years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he established a secondary residence under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-208. Defendant further contends that there was insufficient evidence to corroborate his statements to investigators and establish the “body of the crime,” or corpus delicti. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Casey Colbert
The Defendant-Appellant, Casey Colbert, entered guilty pleas to two counts of bribery of a witness and two counts of coercion of a witness, see T.C.A. §39-16-107(a)(1) and §39-16-507 (2010). After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two convictions for bribery and the two convictions for coercion into single convictions of bribery and coercion. The trial court then imposed a six-year sentence for bribery and a four-year sentence for coercion, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. Upon our review, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |
